لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/١٠/١٠ بواسطة مصادر
من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشيف الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية.
يحتوي السجلّ على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة
للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:
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المرجع	IOR/L/PS/10/50
العنوان	ملف ١٨٥٥\١٩٠٤، الأجزاء ٦-٨ "الكويت"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	١٩٠٤-١٩٠٨ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية , الفرنسية و العربية في اللاتينية بالأحرف والعربية
الحجم والشكل	مجلدٌ واحد (٣٢٤ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	غير معروف

حول هذا السجلّ

يحتوي المُجلّد على الأجزاء ٦ و٧ و٨، وهي معنية بموضوع "الكويت":

- الجزء ٦ (IOR/L/PS/10/50/1) يتعلق بوضع المواطنين الكويتيين في بلاد فارس.


- الجزء ٧ (IOR/L/PS/10/50/2) يتعلق باقتراح بأن ترفع سفن الكويت علمًا مميزًا، وبرد الفعل المحتمل نتيجة لذلك من جانب حكومة تركيا [الدولة العثمانية].

- الجزء ٨ (IOR/L/PS/10/50/3) يتعلق بمواقف حكام الكويت والدول الأخرى على ساحل الخليج العربي تجاه الأنشطة السياسية لابن سعود [عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود].

يشتمل كل جزء على فاصل يوضّح الموضوع وأرقام الأجزاء، والسنة التي فُتح فيها الملف المعني، وعنوان الموضوع، وقائمة مراجع المراسلات الواردة في ذلك الجزء مُرتّبة حسب السنة. ويوجد هذا

الفاصل في نهاية المراسلات.

يشمل نطاق التاريخ جميع تواريخ الوثائق الموجودة في المجلد؛ أوراق محاضر الإدارة السرية المرفقة بتلك الوثائق، مؤرخة في ١٩٠٤-١٩٠٧.



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



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










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Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
1855
1904.

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Subject:

Koweit :- Arabia
Chiefs attitude towards tribes of
the interior (Najd &c.)


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
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1907.	P.	189 2564-5 326 477 2938 2820 692 3039 3092 1054 3286
19 .	P.	
19 .	P.	

Memoranda.

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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Minute Paper.

Register No. 3286

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O. Dated Rec. 11 July 1907.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	12/7	WL
Secretary of State	12	af
Committee		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Koweit.

F.O. concur in the view that it is inadvisable to issue further warnings to the Sheikh not to mix himself up with the tribes of the interior.

Copy to India 16 Aug '07 Secy. 33

Dft: telegram to Viceroy (Oates Jan 08)

(A printed memo on British relations with the Wahabis is attached 30/1/08).

Sent 15/7/07.


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
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3286/07

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. January 1908.

CONFIDENTIAL. (6 copies, one of which were returned to F.O.)

RECEIVED IN 20 JAN 1908 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

(e.) *British Relations with the Wahabees.*

[Communicated by the India Office.]

Aitchison, vol. x, p. 116.

IN April 1866 the then Wahabee Amir, Imam Abdullah-bin-Fysul, entered into a voluntary engagement with the British Government (in the form of a declaration, which was not signed on our side), by which he bound himself—

1. Not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in territories under his authority.

2. Not to "injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government, specially on the Kingdom of Muscat, further than in receiving the *zukat* that has been customary of old."

With the decline of the Wahabee power and the withdrawal of their influence from politics on the coast, the above engagement ceased to be of practical value, and all relations between the Wahabees and ourselves came to an end. It

Lord Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor, October 1, 1901.

is worth recording that in October 1901, at a time of serious intertribal disturbances in the interior of Arabia, we came to an understanding with the Turkish Government that we would do what we could to discourage the Sheikh of Koweit from aggressive action, on the understanding that the Turks would endeavour to restrain the Amir of Nejd.

The successes of the present Wahabee Amir, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud, over his rival the Amir of Nejd (Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid) again brought the Wahabee question to the front. In February

Mr. Brodrick's telegram of February 8, 1904.


1904, when the Government of India were considering a proposal to send an Agent to Riadh, the Wahabee capital, for the purpose of collecting information on Central Arabian affairs, Mr. Brodrick telegraphed to the Viceroy as follows:—

2248/04

"No steps should be taken to enter into closer relations with Nejd, or send Agents there,

1098 (2) B

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without previous sanction of His Majesty's Government."

Sir N. O'Conor to Lord Lansdowne, February 26, 1904.

Sir N. O'Conor, who was consulted, while recognizing the advantages of obtaining fuller information as to affairs in the interior of Arabia, held that the moment was not opportune for the action suggested; and to this opinion the Government of India, after receiving the views of Colonel Kemball, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, subscribed in a despatch dated the 24th March, 1904. They considered, however, that, in view of recent developments of the situation, there was reason to think that "it may shortly be incumbent on us to take a more lively interest in the affairs of Central Arabia," and they added that: "later, ... when the political situation in Nejd has developed, and above all if the present representative of the Wahabee family . . . . succeeds in establishing and extending his ascendancy, which from the latest accounts received seems to be not improbable, we think that it may be desirable again to enter into relations with our old ally."

2453/04

Government of India's letter, March 24, 1904.

701/04

Sir N. O'Conor to Foreign Office, April 26, and May 4, 1904.


Viceroy's telegram. May 20, 1904.

The successes of Bin Saoud in April 1904 led the Turkish Government to send troops and guns to the assistance of Bin Rashid. Bin Saoud thereupon wrote to the Resident in the Persian Gulf on the 2nd May, 1904, protesting against the Turkish invasion and soliciting the protection of Great Britain for himself and his country. At the same time the Resident received from Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit a letter addressed to the latter by Bin Saoud, in which he hinted that, if he failed to obtain British protection, he might have to fall back on the Russian offer of assistance made to him in 1903. The Government of India, in reporting this on the 20th May, suggested that it might become necessary to revive the proposal to post a British Resident at Koweit, in order to watch events, should the Turks persist in armed intervention.

Lord Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor, May 10, 1904.

Sir N. O'Conor had already been instructed, on the 10th May, 1904, to point out to the Porte that His Majesty's Government, in the hope of assisting to preserve the peace, had "employed special efforts to dissuade the Sheikh of Koweit from taking part, even indirectly, in the hostilities that have broken out," and to protest against any action being taken by the Turkish Government "which might add still further to the

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disturbed condition of this part of Arabia." On receipt of the Viceroy's telegram of the 20th May, 1904, Sir N. O'Conor was further instructed by telegraph to communicate at once with the Porte, and to repeat in urgent terms the representations he had already been instructed to make.

Lord Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor, May 21, 1904.

Sir N. O'Conor replied on the 23rd May that it was difficult to see on what grounds the Porte could be pressed to refrain from assisting the Amir of Nejd, who was the party attacked. He considered that we should confine ourselves for the present to maintaining intact the territory of Koweit and awaiting developments, but that, if the Turks persisted in rendering assistance to Bin Rashid, it might be expedient to reconsider the question of appointing a British Resident at Koweit.

Sir N. O'Conor to Foreign Office, May 23, 1904.

The substance of Sir N. O'Conor's views was telegraphed to India on the 24th May. In reply the Government of India, in a telegram dated the 29th May, suggested that Sir N. O'Conor should be instructed to inform the Porte that we had no desire to assist Bin Saoud directly or indirectly, but that if, as a result of Turkish support, Bin Rashid became unduly powerful, our interests in Eastern Arabia might be injuriously affected. They held that British prestige at Koweit would be impaired if, by preventing Mubarak from assisting his friend and ally Bin Saoud, and by stopping the importation of arms, we allowed Turkish influence to determine the supremacy of the Turkish nominee in Central Arabia. Their conclusions were that an Agent should be sent to Koweit, and that the arms trade there should not be interfered with.


Viceroy's telegram, May 29, 1904.

The proposal to send an officer as Political Agent to Koweit was approved by His Majesty's Government, and the Government of India were informed accordingly on the 24th June, 1904. It was decided at the same time to defer for the present any fresh measures for the prevention of the importation of arms at Koweit. Captain Knox, the officer appointed, proceeded to Koweit in August 1904.

Mr. Brodrick's telegram, June 24, 1904.

Towards the end of August 1904 the Turks, who had hitherto supported Bin Rashid, made overtures to Bin Saoud, and the latter applied to Sheikh Mubarak for advice as to how the Turkish advances should be met. Mubarak approached

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the Political Agent at Koweit on the subject in October 1904, but Captain Knox informed him that he had no instructions to give advice, and that Bin Saoud should consult his own interests in the matter. On the 30th December, 1904, Mr. Brodrick telegraphed to the Government of India that "His Majesty's Government desire that it should be clearly understood that their interest and influence are to be confined strictly to coast-line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing should be said or done to connect them even indirectly with warfare now in progress in interior. They agree that Knox should give no opinion on advice to be given by Mubarak to Bin Saoud, but should repeat to former warnings already given against entanglements in interior." It may be added that in February 1905 a meeting took place at Koweit between Sheikh Mubarak, the Turkish Vali of Bussorah, and Bin Saoud's father, and Bin Saoud seems subsequently to have come to terms, for the time being, with the Turkish Government.

Captain Knox to Captain Trevor, October 17, 1904.

2188 A/04

Mr. Brodrick's telegram, December 30, 1904.

3499/04

Mr. Townley to Foreign Office, February 12 and 17, 1905.

Towards the end of 1905 Bin Saoud, whose successes in Nejd had continued unabated, paid a visit to El Katr and addressed letters to the Sheikhs of the Pirate Coast, announcing his intention of visiting their territories in the following spring. The most important of the Trucial Chiefs, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, conferred personally with the Sultan of Muscat on the situation, both rulers regarding the prospect of Bin Saoud's visit with considerable apprehension.


Captain Trevor to Government of India, October 29, 1905.

285/06

The Government of India addressed the Secretary of State on the subject in a despatch dated the 11th January, 1906, in which they pointed out "how very serious to our prestige and influence the consequences might be if Bin Saoud should attack the Pirate Coast Chiefs or the Sultan of Muscat, or succeed in extending his influence over them, and how important it is that we should prevent, as far as lies in our power, such a contingency, especially now that the Wahabee Amir has recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan." They accordingly proposed that inquiry should be made, either through Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit or through the Sultan of Muscat, as to Bin Saoud's intentions, with a view to ascertaining "whether he is prepared to stand by the engagement of his predecessors not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in his

Government of India's letter January 11, 1906.

285/06



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territories, and not to interfere with the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government"; and that, failing a satisfactory assurance on his part, he should be warned that interference in those localities would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and that "suitable measures would be taken to frustrate it." "These measures," the despatch concluded, "might amount, in our opinion, to a more stringent embargo on the import of arms at Koweit and elsewhere on the Arabian coast of the Gulf, or even, in the case of an attack being imminent, to actual armed assistance from British ships to the Sheikhs threatened, as might be necessary."

India Office to Foreign Office, February 22, 1906.

285/06

In communicating this despatch to the Foreign Office, some doubt was expressed as to the practicability of the Government of India's suggestions, and it was suggested that no steps should be taken, "in the absence of any urgent necessity caused by Wahabee action," until Sir N. O'Conor had been consulted on the proposal to approach Bin Saoud otherwise than through the medium of the Turks.

Major Cox to Government of India, February 4, 1906.

535/06

Meanwhile, on the 19th January, 1906, Captain Knox, the Political Agent at Koweit, had talked the matter over informally with Mubarak, and after inquiring as to the truth of the reports regarding Bin Saoud's intentions, gave the Sheikh a hint that any interference by the Wahabee Amir in the affairs of States in Treaty relation with us would not be likely to find favour with the British Government. Mubarak replied that he regarded Bin Saoud's plans as designed merely to extort money from the Sheikhs on the coast, and that he had himself written to Bin Saoud strongly advising him against persisting in any such attempt. Major Cox, in reporting this conversation to the Government of India, suggested that he should be authorized to inform all the Trucial Chiefs that the Government of India "would not regard with complacency the intrigues of any of them with Bin Saoud."

552/06

The Government of India telegraphed on the 15th March, 1906, supporting Major Cox's suggestion, which was approved, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, by Mr. Morley's telegram dated the 9th April.


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Sir N. O'Conor, March 20, 1906.

As regards the warning to Bin Saoud contemplated by the Government of India, the Foreign Office adopted the views of Sir N.

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O'Conor, who had been consulted and had recommended in a despatch dated the 20th March, 1906, that any such warning should be conveyed direct to Bin Saoud, and not through the agency of the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat. Sir N. O'Conor further suggested that Bin Saoud, in the event of his visiting the coast, should be met by a British vessel of war at one of the places which he proposed to visit, and told that no tampering with the engagements and Conventions of the Trucial Chiefs would be permitted.

2834/06

In conveying the decision of His Majesty's Government to the Government of India, the Secretary of State wrote as follows in a despatch dated the 13th April, 1906 :—

Mr. Morley's despatch, April 13, 1906.

"His Majesty's Government accept the view that a warning to the Amir would be necessary if he were to carry out his reported intention. They consider, however, that it would be better that such warning should be conveyed to him only in the event of his appearing upon the coast, and that it should then be conveyed to him directly as proposed by Sir N. O'Conor."

Bin Saoud's reply to Mubarak's letter of advice was communicated to the Political Agent, Koweit, on the 25th February, 1906. Major Cox described it as a "very courteous response." The terms of Bin Saoud's letter, as translated from the vernacular, are obscure, but his apparent object was to disclaim any intention of objectionable action. As a matter of fact, Bin Saoud did not ~~yet~~ visit the Pirate Coast.

Major Cox to Government of India, April 5, 1906.

874/06


In April 1906 news was received of the defeat and death of Bin Rashid at the hands of his rival, Bin Saoud.

On the 16th September, 1906, Major Cox again raised the question of entering into closer relations with the interior of Arabia. He drew attention to ~~the~~ overtures that had been made by and on behalf of Bin Saoud with a view to the establishment of a closer connection between himself and the British Government, and recommended that the opportunity should be taken to come to terms with the Wahabee Chief on the following grounds :—

Major Cox to Government of India, September 16, 1906.

1817/06

1. That overtures had been made at various imes by Bin Saoud himself, and by Sheikh



7

Jasim-bin-Thani of Katr and Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit on Bin Saoud's behalf, with a view to securing for the latter some measure of British protection, and that if we neglected these overtures Bin Saoud and his following might regard us with hostility.

2. That if a friendly understanding were to exist between the British Government and Bin Saoud, both the Sultan of Muscat and the Trucial Chiefs would be fortified by the knowledge that any attempt on the part of the Wahabee to make a descent upon Oman would involve a preliminary rupture between him and the British Government.

3. That if Bin Saoud were our friend he would be able to assist us in suppressing piracies in the northern part of the Gulf.

4. That such a friendly understanding would facilitate Major Cox's dealings with the Trucial Chiefs and would render it possible for our officers to make occasional tours in the Nejd country.

5. That the Arabs of Central Arabia, apparently driven to desperation by Turkish interference, seemed disposed to make common cause to throw off the yoke, and were apparently trying to secure the support of the Sheikh of Koweit and even of the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Realizing, however, that they were not strong enough to stand alone, they saw the necessity of enlisting the support of a Christian Power, and if we did not respond they might approach some other Power.


It may be explained that, in addition to the overtures of Sheikh Mubarak and Sheikh Jasim the subject had also been broached by an emissary of Bin Saoud himself, one Musaad-bin-Suweilim, who arrived at Bahrein in January 1906 and informed the British Agent there that Bin Saoud now felt himself strong enough to turn the Turks out of Hassa and Katif, and then wished to enter into Treaty relations with the British Government, allowing us, if we desired, to keep a Political Officer in Hassa or Katif in return for our protecting him from a sea attack by the Turks.

Major Cox's letter of the 16th September, 1906, was sent home for information in the ordinary course, without comment, in October 1906. On the 9th November Mr. Morley informed the Government of India by telegram that "His Majesty's Government maintain view

1817/06

Mr. Morley's telegram, November 9, 1906.

1098 (2) D




8

that their interest and influence should be confined to coast." "No steps," the telegram added, "should be taken to enter into relations with Nejd or to send Agents into interior without my previous sanction."

Bin Saoud lost little time in renewing his application. In October 1906 he sent a further message through Sheikh Jasim, in which his proposals were set forth in greater detail. This message, which was delivered by Sheikh Jasim to the interpreter of the British Political Agent, Bahrein, was thus reported by Captain Prideaux on the 17th November, 1906:—


Captain Prideaux to Major Cox, November 17, 1906.

"The resources of Nejd are stated to have been strained to the utmost by the recent internecine wars, and Bin Saoud considers that the oases of Hassa and Katif were always the most profitable possessions of his Wahabee ancestors. He is anxious, therefore, to recover the two districts, and he proposes that a secret understanding should be arranged between the British Government and himself, under which he should be granted British protection from Turkish assaults at sea, in the event of his ever succeeding in driving the Turks, unaided, out of his ancestral dominions. In return for this protection the Amir is willing to bind himself to certain agreements (probably similar to those of the Trucial Chiefs), and to accept a Political Officer to reside at his Court. The details of this secret Treaty he wishes to be settled or discussed at an interview which he is ready to give me, either in person or with his brother representing him, at some convenient rendezvous in the desert. Bin Saoud is determined to make an effort to obtain possession of Hassa and Katif, for without the additional revenue which he can derive from these tracts he admits that he is unable to control the tribes who menace the highways of commerce and pilgrimage. He proposes, therefore, in the first place, to apply to the Sultan for the *Mutasarrif-lik* (Governorship) of the districts, and to throw off the Turkish yoke as soon as he considers the moment favourable after establishing himself. If his application is refused, he will invade the districts as soon as he is ready, and, having captured them, he will appeal openly to the British Government for protection. If he fails, he will never betray the secret understanding between himself and the


8. Earch. xvi.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel.
With Mr. Ivor Nicholson's
Compliments
Delhi 5th March.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x000018



9

Government. Possibly he will not make his attempt even for four or five years more."

Major Cox to Government of India, November 24, 1906.

In forwarding Captain Prideaux's Report to the Government of India, Major Cox, in a letter dated the 24th November, 1906, urged the necessity of an "authoritative" reply being returned to the "references made through the local officers by Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit and Sheikh Jasim of Katr on behalf of Bin Saoud—references which have in no way been courted, but which I cannot leave unanswered without incurring among the Chiefs concerned a reputation for personal negligence or discourtesy, which would be prejudicial to my work in other ways."

18/07

These papers were sent home for information in the ordinary course by the Government of India without comment in January 1907. In a telegram dated the 9th February, 1907, the Government of India were asked for an expression of their views as to the answer to be returned to Sheikh Jasim. They replied as follows on the 15th February :—

Viceroy's telegram, February 15, 1907.


"We are sending despatch reviewing situation in Eastern Arabia, and suggesting that answer be conveyed to Bin Saoud to the effect that British Government, while anxious to maintain friendly relations with him so long as he comports himself in a manner consonant with British interests and our engagements with Arab Sheikhs on coast, see no necessity at present for making him any formal promises of the protection which might even have effect of stimulating Turkish opposition to consolidation of his authority. Answer might be conveyed orally through Sheikh Jasim or such other agency as our Resident in the Persian Gulf may recommend."

326/07

Government of India, February 24, 1907.

The promised despatch was sent on the ~~24th~~ 25th February, 1907. In it the Government of India reviewed the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to Nejd affairs since 1904. They expressed the view that matters were rapidly approaching a crisis, which would compel us to make up our minds as to our policy towards Central Arabia. They considered the prospects of Turkey re-establishing her authority in Eastern Arabia remote, and even contemplated the prospect of the Turks disappearing altogether from the whole of Arabia south of Zobehr. At the same time they held

477/07



10

that the establishment of the Wahabee power would be a menace to our position at Koweit as well as on the Pirate Coast. In regard to the question immediately at issue, they recommended that a reply should be returned to Bin Saoud's overtures in the terms set forth in their telegram of the 15th February.

Sir N. O'Conor, who was consulted, took the view that it would be most unwise for His Majesty's Government to entangle themselves with Bin Saoud or in any other way to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia. Sir N. O'Conor, April 1, 1907.

2938/07

The reply of His Majesty's Government to the Government of India's representations was conveyed in Mr. Morley's despatch of the 3rd May, 1907, in the following terms:— Mr. Morley to Government of India, May 3, 1907.

2938/07

"After carefully considering, in consultation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the views expressed by your Excellency's Government as to the general situation in Central Arabia, His Majesty's Government see no reason to modify the policy laid down in my predecessor's telegram of the 30th December, 1904, and repeated in my telegram of the 9th November, 1906, that British interests and influence in those regions should be strictly confined to the coast; and they agree with Sir N. O'Conor that it would be most unwise for them to entangle themselves with the Wahabee Amir or in any other way to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.


"The terms of the reply, which in paragraph 11 of your letter you propose to return to Bin Saoud, appear to His Majesty's Government to be open to objection, as implying an approval of the consolidation of the Wahabee power, and consequently a certain interference in Arabian affairs. No such communication should therefore be made. But if Major Cox finds it impossible to avoid giving some answer to those who have approached him on the Wahabee Amir's behalf, he should inform them, as Bin Saoud's proposals involve considerations which it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to maintain, that no reply is to be expected."

So far as is known, Bin Saoud's advances were not renewed during the year 1907.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x00001a


(10)

INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

Mr. Sanett,


4 copies herewith of this memo.


I have put one copy of with Pol. 3286/07 (file herewith).

The 6th copy sent from F.O.

I have returned to Parker with a few small corrections.

JIS 30/1/08





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched 16th July 1907.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrorum)


Your Foreign Secret telegram of 21st June. Kuwait. We fully accept your view that in existing circumstances it would be inadvisable to issue further warnings to Sheikh as to his attitude towards Turks.

Copy to India. (+) 26 July.


F.O. (+) 20 July. (D) 29 July.

18010. L 1841. 1000.—10/1906.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x00001d



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x00001e



3286

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 22135.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED 11 JUL 1907 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN OFFICE
July 11, 1907.

mediate.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant transmitting telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India relating to the Sheikh of Koweit.

I am to state in reply that Sir E.Grey concurs in Mr. Secretary Morley's proposal to inform the Government of India that His Majesty's Government accept their view that in existing circumstances it is inadvisable to issue further warnings to the Sheikh against mixing himself up with the tribes of the interior.

I am,


Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

Louis Mallet.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.





Minute Paper.

Register No. 1054

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Telegram ~~Letter~~ from Viceroy

Dated 21 } June 1907
Rec. 22 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	22 Jun	
Secretary of State	24	
Committee	25.	
Under Secretary.....	2 July	
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Koweit.


Undesirability of a further injunction to Mubarak not to involve himself in Nejd disturbances.


Copy to F.O. (see within)
India Secret No. 27 dfs 5 July/07.

Dft. to F.O.

Previous Papers:— 3042

Y 12508. 1000.—4/1907. I. 575.





14th July 1907.

Pol. to F.O.

Sir,

I am dir. by Mr. Sec. Morley to ask the rec. of yr. Le., No. 16,416 dated the 27th May last, which enclosed a dispatch from H.M.'s Ambassador at Constan. - tinople containing a suggestion that the influence of H.M.'s Govt. should be exercised on Shiekh Mubarak to prevent his undertaking military operations against the Ajman tribe, save in self-defence.


In reply I am to forward a copy of telegraphic correspondence between the Govt. of India and (the Govt. of India) from which it will be seen that they would prefer in existing

Approved Pol. Com'ee., 2 JUL. 1907

Boyle 2/10

Kitchener 4 June '07. 21 "


(+) Sent 10 Aug.


circumstances not to
issue further warnings
to the Sheikh against
mixing himself up
with the tribes of
the interior.

Subject to the
concurrence of Sec. Sir
E. Grey, Mr. Morley
proposes to inform
the Govt. of India
by telegram that
H.M.'s Govt. accept
their view.

(Sd) A. Godley.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x000024




1054


From Viceroy, 21*st June* 1907. (309 21/07)

Foreign Secret. Koweit. Your telegram of 4th instant. Consul Crowe's report dated 17th April just received. It deals with early history of case only. Our information, as reported under Koweit in diaries of Persian Gulf Political Residency for weeks ending 24th March and 31st March, 7th April, and 5th May (*vide* enclosures in Foreign Secretary's letters Nos. 16, 17, and 21 M., dated 18th April and 25th April, and 23rd May respectively), is that Sheikh Mubarak only arranged to make reprisals on Ajman, near Koweit, for thefts of Koweit cattle (20 herds), and that his threat has been sufficient to induce tribe to come to terms. Matter has been carefully watched by our officers in the Gulf, who have not reported that there is any danger of widespread disturbances or that any further warning to the Sheikh was necessary. In the circumstances, unless His Majesty's Government have information to a different effect, we would prefer not to issue further warnings to the Sheikh against mixing himself up with the tribes of the interior, as this might tend to weaken our influence over him.

840/07
852/07
1007/07

Copy to India
(P.) 12/7/07





Minute Paper.

Register No. 3092

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated 27 May 1907.
Rec. 28

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	29 May	
Secretary of State	30	
Committee	31.	
Under Secretary.....	4 June	
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Arabia.

Split between the Sheikh of the Shi'a tribe and Ibn Saud: the former took refuge with the Sheikh of Koweit. Mubarak is preparing to raid the Ajman tribe of Bedouins. Asks to exercise influence of H.M.'s Govt. on Mubarak to prevent his undertaking military operations except in self-defence.

Copy to

COPY TO INDIA
31 May 1907
SECRETARY'S No. 22

Send
Cf
12 June 07


Sent to India 6:07

Draft: telegram to India.


Previous Papers:—

3039
2938
4777/9.

Y 12508. 1000.—4/1907. I. 575.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x000028



DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched 4th June 1907.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrorum)

Foreign, secret. Koweit.


H.M.'s Ambassador at Constantinople suggests, in view of report from Consul at Basra dated 17th April as to action contemplated by Mubarak against Ajman tribe that influence should be exercised to prevent his undertaking military operations save in self-defence.


Approved Pol. Com'ee., 4 JUN. 1907

Copy to India. (+ & P) 14 June.

Copy to FO. (+) 6 June. (P) 13 -

18019. I. 1841. 1000.—10/1906.





3092

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 16416
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN
28 MAY 1907
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India

— *and, by direction of the Secretary of State,*

transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper, calling special attention to paragraph 3.

Foreign Office,

May 27, 1907.

Reference to previous letter:


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir W. Lorimer No 289 May 15/07	Events in Central Arabia


RECEIVED
10 a.m.
28 MAY 1907
INDIA OFFICE.

[12]

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x00002b



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x00002c



Copy.

No.289. CONSTANTINOPLE,
(16416). May 15th 1907.


Sir:-


I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Basra, respecting events in Central Arabia. The news of Bin Saood's defeat, if true, is important, especially if it is the issue of fighting on a large scale, such as was anticipated in the second of the reports from Mr. Consul Devey, inclosed in my despatch No. 257 of April 30th.

It seems to me to show the impolicy of intervention on the part of His Majesty's Government in the entanglements of internal conflicts between the Arab tribes, and to confirm the view as to the prudence of abstention, which I expressed in my despatch No.198 Confidential of April 1st.

The influence of His Majesty's Government should however, I think, be exercised on Sheikh Mubarak to prevent

Sir E. Grey, Bart.,
&c., &c., &c.





prevent his undertaking military operations, save in self-defence.


If we do not show our displeasure at aggressive action on his part, he may presume on our support and I venture again to repeat that I am by no means sure that if Pertev Pasha, the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army Corps, who has now been ordered to Basra to restore order there, were to organize a punitive expedition against Mubarek, he would not be successful.


The result would produce a very complicated situation in which we might be called upon to intervene.

I never felt assured that any overtures made to Bin Saood, whether through Mubarek or otherwise, would not be revealed to the Turkish Government and the fact that he is now sending a messenger to Constantinople makes me think that His Majesty's Government were well advised in discountenancing any project of that kind.

I have &c.,

(Signed) N.R.O'Conor.





No.31.

B A S R A,
April 17th 1907.

Sir:-


I have received the following information from the Political Agent at Koweit regarding events in Central Arabia.


Mohamed Bin Ithnain, Sheikh of the Sbi'a tribe broke off his alliance with Bin Saud, because the latter had killed two of his followers for intriguing, and sought refuge with Sheikh Mubarek of Koweit on March 6th last. He was kindly received but advised to return to his own country. Bin Saud is said to have tried to raid the Shammars, but the latter collected in force and Bin Saud retreated to Boreyda.

By order of the Sheikh of Koweit, heavy dues are levied on the Haj caravan from Koweit to Mecca £T5 on each woman's litter and £T1 on each camel rider. Rs.16 per head were levied on 114 slaves brought from Mecca to Koweit by the Haj caravan.

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir N. R. O'Conor, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
&c., &c., &c.

Customs






Customs duties are being raised all round.


The Sheikh of Koweit is preparing to raid the Ajman tribe of Bedouins for stealing 20 herds from Koweit Bedouins in February last. About 2,000 townsmen, exclusive of Bedouins, have been enlisted and all the Haj camels and their furniture, as well as a cargo of arms which lately arrived, have been commandeered by the Sheikh of Koweit for the foray. The Umtair and Thaffer Bedouins are assisting Sheikh Mubarek in the business, and the latter is forming his camp at Sirra.

The news received at Basra regarding Nejd events is meagre. Izzet Pasha, late Commandant at Basra, received permission to proceed to Constantinople with two followers of Bin Saud named Salih Ul Addil, former Sheikh of Rass, who was a partisan of Bin Reshid and came over to Bin Saud's side after the former's death, and Ibrahim el Damer. These two gentlemen, who proceed to Constantinople to do homage to the Sultan on behalf of Bin Saud, left by the Burhanieh for Bagdad on April 10th. They received from the Turkish Government £T450 for journey

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


journey expenses and an oufit allowance of £T5 and are each accompanied by a scribe and a servant.


On April 13th a letter reached the Vilayet of Basra to the effect that Sultan el Hamud had fought with the Arabs of Bin Saud near Kasim and killed many of them. It is said that Bin Saud alone escaped. I am not yet in possession of details of the engagement.

I have &c.,

(Signed) F.E. Crow.



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Minute Paper.

Register No. 3039

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated / Rec. 14 May 1907

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	15 May	
Secretary of State	16	
Committee		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Arabia.

Detailed account furnished by H.M.'s Consul at Damascus of the murder by his cousin (? uncle) of the Amir of Nejd and his brothers and cousin. Overtures of the new Amir to Ibn Saoud: "intolerable list of conditions" imposed by the latter. Possibility of fighting.

Copy to

COPY TO INDIA
31 May 1907
SECRETARY'S No. 22

For information.


Seen Pol. Com'ee.
23 MAY. 1907

Previous Papers:—


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Y 12368. 1000.—4/1907. I. 575.

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3039

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 14630
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED
14 MAY 1907
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
" *and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*


Foreign Office,
May 14 . 1907.

Reference to previous letter:
Y.O. of March 21 (2870/07)


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir N. O'Conor No 257 April 30	Affairs in the Nejd

[12]



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opy.

CONSTANTINOPLE.

April 30th, 1907.

.257.

(14630)

Sir:-

(29355/07)

With reference to my despatch No.198 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus respecting affairs in the Nejd.

In the first of these despatches Mr. Devey gives a new version of the circumstances in which Mut'ib er Rashid was murdered, and relates a ghastly tale of treachery.


In the second despatch he gives an account of the relations between Ibn Saoud and the new Emir of Hail. It appears that Ibn Saoud replied to Sultan-ibn-Rashid's offer of friendship by an intolerable list of conditions, and that as a result Sultan-ibn-Rashid has raised a very considerable force with which to attack Ibn Saoud. No fighting has yet taken place but Mr. Devey anticipates that it will end in favour of Ibn Saoud.


I have &c.,

(Signed) N. R. O'Conor.

e Right Honourable
Sir E. Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.,

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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DAMASCUS.

April 8th, 1907.

.16.

Sir:-


With reference to my despatch No.9, of the 22nd February last respecting the murder of Mut'ib er-Rashid and the succession of his cousin Sultan ibn Hamoud er-Rashid I have the honour to report to Your Excellency that the version given there as to the murder of Mut'ib by Telal er-Rashid, having Sultan as its author, appears now, in the face of a new report that reached me on a very good authority, to be erroneous and a falsehood created by the actual murderer.


The plot against the life of Mut'ib and his brothers was organized by Sultan in the following way:

First of all Sultan persuaded Mut'ib to send his mother (sister of Sultan) to Mecca for the Haj and to escort her with a large number of his most faithful servants and attendants including Ikab, the bravest and most daring of the bodyguards of Mut'ib, and Abdur-Rahman, the wisest and most devoted of his advisers.

Securing

s Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir N. R. O'Conor, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
&c., &c., &c.,







Securing the success of this first step by which Mut'ib was deprived of his best men, Sultan proposed to him an ibex shooting party far away from Hail to which proposition Mut'ib innocently agreed. The members of the party were Mut'ib, his two brothers Mashaal and Mohammed and his cousin Telal on one side, and Sultan, his two brothers Sooud and Feissal, and his cousin Dhari on the other, with a big number of servants and attendants. After they lunched at a certain fountain in the open country Sultan suggested that the eight of them would go ahead and leave their followers at lunch. Mut'ib accepted the suggestion and the above mentioned eight chiefs rode together side by side. When they were at a distance far enough from the camp, Sultan and his brothers and cousin, in execution of their plot, rode alongside of the others and at a signal from Sultan shot them dead. Sultan killed Mut'ib, Sooud killed Mashaal, Feissal killed Mohammed and Dhari killed Telal. They rode back to the camp and told that Telal killed Mut'ib and his brothers and that they, the murderers, avenged for their death and killed Telal. Consequently Sultan was proclaimed Emir of Shammer at

the

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


the camp and marched back to Hail triumphantly. He broke the news to the whole tribe and to the neighbouring chiefs and finally to the Turkish authorities at Medina, Damascus and Constantinople in the same form as stated in the despatch under reference.


Hamoud er-Rashid, the father of Sultan, was greatly displeased by the cruelty of his son towards his grandsons and in mark of his disapproval of those atrocities he left Hail and started to Medina where he arrived yesterday to spend the remaining days of his life there. He telegraphed his arrival at Medina to one of his friends here.

I have &c.,

(Signed) G. P. Devey.



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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x000042



DAMASCUS.

o.18. April 15th, 1907.

Sir:-


With reference to my despatch No.16 of the 8th instant I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency the following report on the actual relations between Sultan ibn-Rashid and Abdul-Aziz ibn-Sooud of the Nejd with the events that took place since the succession of the former to the Principality of Jebel Shammer at Hail.


When Sultan became the master of Hail he wrote to Ibn Sooud who was then at Bureiden of Kassim telling him of the events which led to his succession and asking him to recognize that change, proposing at the same time friendly relations between Hail and Riadh. Ibn Sooud replied that he would be glad to maintain the good relations and accept the friendliness offered on the following conditions:

1. The members of Abul-Kheil family of Bureideh, rival of Ibn Sooud, now refugees at Hail, should be expelled from that town.

2.

s Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir N. O'Conor, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
&c., &c., &c.,





2. The 30 swords and 300 Martini rilfes taken from Ibn Sooud's men by Mohammed ibn Rashid 20 years ago should be returned.

3. The two cannon at Hail given by the Turkish Government must be handed over to Ibn Sooud.

4. The Muteir Tribe which frequently annoys Ibn Sooud by its raids against his partisans should be fought by Ibn Rashid.


5. Ibn Rashid should not communicate or conclude treaties with any people beyond Jebel Shammer except through Ibn Sooud.


6. Ibn Rashid would not be allowed to march with a standard of his own unless authorized by Ibn Sooud to do so.

7. The expenses of the recent mobilizations at Kassim amounting to £T.5,000 incurred by Ibn Sooud for an expedition against Mutib, the late Prince, should be paid by Ibn Rashid.

Certainly Ibn Rashid refused to agree to these hard terms and marched out from Hail with 4,000 cavalry and about 15,000 camel riders to meet Ibn Sooud who was at the head of a considerable force coming from

Kassim







Kassim to Hail in support of his demands. Seeing that his forces were inferior to those of his rival, Ibn Sooud, who never anticipated that Sultan ibn Rashid the murderer of his cousins, the usurper of their posts and the newly proclained prince, would be able to have such a large force under him, at once retired and re-crossed the path back to Kassim, where he is now calling his various allies for his help.

Sultan ibn Rashid is at the present moment camping at a place called Kehefa one day journey from the frontier of Kassim, and as soon as the mobilizations of Ibn Sooud are complete probably an action will take place between the two rival princes, the issue of which will be, with probability, in favour of the latter.

I have &c.,

(Signed) G. P. Devey.





Minute Paper.

Register No. 692

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 73 M., Dated 28 March 1907. Rec. 13 April

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	17 Apr	MU	Arabia.
Secretary of State	18	ag	
Committee	19.	JM.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Details furnished by Major Knox of the murder at Hail of Metaab ibn Rashid and his brothers and of all that has occurred recently at Hail. Genealogical tree of the Ibn Rashid Family of Jebel Shammar.

Copy to IO 6 May 07.


For information

Seen Pol. Com'ee., 23 APR. 1907


Previous Papers:—

TH 2820

Y 11891. 2000.—4/1906. L. 652.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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692

(*Confidential.*)

No. 322, dated Bushire, the 10th (received 19th) February 1907.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the entry in Bushire Diary of 1907, No. 215, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letter marginally noted received from the Political Agent, Koweit, giving further details of the murder of Metaab "Bin Rashid" and his brothers.

No. 38, dated 21st January 1907.

2. A genealogical tree of the Ibn Rashid Amirs of Jebel Shammar is at the same time attached to facilitate identification of the individuals mentioned.

3. Consul Crow writing on January 26th informed me that according to his information, Sultan-el-Hamood had sent a telegram a week before through Basrah informing the Sultan's Secretary that Metaab had been murdered and that he, Sultan, had taken his place as Amir. No reply had been received to this telegram when Mr. Crow wrote.

No. 38, dated the 21st January 1907.

From—Major S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to inform you that one Nasir, a relation of the Amir of Hail, has arrived at Koweit and that Sheikh Mubarak informs me that he has been sent by Bin Rashid in order to inform the Sheikh of Koweit of all that has occurred recently at Hail and notably of the murder of Metaab Bin Abdul Azaz Bin Rashid, the late Amir of Hail, and his two brothers.


2. According to Sheikh Mubarak, Nasir has brought letters in which Sultan practically puts himself at Sheikh Mubarak's disposal, is ready to listen to all his advice, and hopes for his friendship and protection. The letters may not be all that Sheikh Mubarek describes them to be and, even if they are, are probably only half sincere, but the fact that Sultan has, at once, sent a near relative to inform the Sheikh is of significance, as showing how far Mubarak's influence extends.

3. The Sheikh states that there is no lineal descendant left of Abdullah Bin Rashid, and that, of the sons of Hamood Bin Obeid, only three are left, as all the others were gradually killed off during the recent troubles and fighting between Bin Rashid and Bin Saood.

4. The three sons referred to are Sultan, who has now assumed the title of Amir, and Saood and Faisul. Apparently it was Sultan who is responsible for the murder of the young sons of the Amir Abdul Aziz. The story, as received in Koweit, goes that the young boys were out hawking and Sultan came out and joined them. He had consulted his father, Hamood, who endeavoured in vain to dissuade him from his design. He left a slave with the two younger boys with instructions to kill them, as soon as he heard a shot fired. He himself rode out with Metaab who had no suspicion of the crime intended and was easily shot by the traitor from behind. The two little boys were then murdered by the slave. It is surmised in Koweit that Sultan had some previous understanding with Bin Saood.

5. The Sheikh is of the opinion that all this tends to strengthen Bin Saood's position and he says that the latter will probably now take Hail. He has told me that he recently met the Wali of Basrah who was very much afraid that Bin Saood would go over to the English. Mubarak says that he reassured him and told him that the English do not want Nejd. The Sheikh says too that it is interesting to see the change of tone in the correspondence

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
2

of the Turkish authorities with Bin Saood. At first, they hardly replied to his letters and now they are excessively civil to him and exhort him incessantly "to keep foreigners at a distant." It is impossible to put on paper the gusto with which the Sheikh repeated this phrase to me, but, with the mischievous Arab nature, he seemed thoroughly to enjoy the spectacle of his lordsand masters, the Ottoman authorities imploring their turbulent vassal to keep "those devils out."

BIN RASHID AMIRS OF JEBEL SHAMMAR.

G. I. C. P. O. No. 4450 F. D.—20-2-1907—60—L. G. C.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Minute Paper.

Register No. 2820

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated / Rec. } 21st March 1907.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	22 March	
Secretary of State	22	
Committee		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Arabia.

Affairs of Nejd. Assassination of Mutaib the young Amir, by his Uncle who has assumed the title of Amir of Nejd. Report that an Englishman is at present in Kassim.

Copy to

COPY TO INDIA
April 5 1907
SECRETARY'S No. 14


Mutaib was the son of the late Amir Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid, who was killed by the Wahabi Amir, Abdul Aziz bin Saud.


Seen Pol. Corresp.
20 MAR. 1907

Previous Papers:—

TH 3778/06

Y 11891. 2000.—1/1906. L 652.





2820

3778/06

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 8803.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 21 MAR 1907

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.


Foreign Office,
March 21, 1907.

Reference to previous letter:


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. O'Conor No. 162 March 13.	Affairs of Nejd.

[12]



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Copy.

CONSTANTINOPLE,
13th March 1907.

No.162.
(8803).


Sir:-

With reference to Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 733 of October 30th last I have the honour to forward herewith a Despatch as marked in the margin, from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jeddah on the subject of the affairs of Nejd.


I have &c.,

(Signed) N.R.O'Conor.

His Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.



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No.4.

JEDDAH,
February 17th 1907.


Sir:-

I have the honour to report that in the first week of January last, Sultan maternal uncle of Mut-ab the Amir of Nejd, assassinated the Amir Mut-ab, his younger brother Mash-al, and their cousin Talal-en-naif and assumed the title of Amir of Nejd. When this happened in Nejd, Mut-ab's mother was on her way to Medina for pilgrimage, with Talal's uncle Abdulla Obeid. She does not intend to return to Nejd, and desires to reside at Medina. She is also taking steps to bring to Medina her youngest son, who is a youth of 10 years age and who has miraculously escaped murder at the hands of Sultan, though was three times fired upon.


It is said here that Sultan the murderer of Mut-ab is on very friendly relations with Bin Saood and all that he has done, has been done with a previous understanding between the two.

Rumours

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir N.R.O'Conor, G.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.



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
Rumours have, recently, been circulated here that Sultan has also been killed by the old Khaznadar of Abdul-Aziz bin Rashid, but the news does not appear reliable.

I have also been informed on good authority that an Englishman, who had accompanied the Koweith Haj Caravan is at present in Kassim. There are no Turkish troops now in Kassim or Nejd.


I have &c.,

(Signed) Mohammad Hussain.
Acting Consul.

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2660

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ASIATIC TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 28.]

SECTION 1.

[3038]

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January 28.*)

(No. 55.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 23, 1907.


WITH reference to Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 3 of the 4th instant and previous correspondence on the subject of affairs in Central Arabia, I have the honour to report that Mr. Lamb has been informed by the Grand Vizier that news has been received of the murder of Mita'ad ibn Rashid, the young Emir of Hail, who succeeded his father in the spring of last year. The murder was committed by a cousin of the Emir named Tillal, and another cousin named Hamoud has now become Emir.

Mita'ad ibn Rashid was an active and promising Ruler, who appeared to be making himself very popular with his tribesmen, and he had sided strongly with the Turkish authorities against Ibn Saood.


I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[2315 *ee*—1]



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Minute Paper.

Register No. 2938

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from FO.,

Dated 16 April 1907.
Rec. 18

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	20 April	ME
Secretary of State	22	AG
Committee	24	JM.
Under Secretary.....	30	ME
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Arabia.

Bin Saood's overtures: objections to proposed message to Bin Saood, even as modified by I.O. letter of 27th March.
Passage of Turkish troops through Koweit.
Undesirable to make representations to the Porte at this distance of time.
(Views of Sir Elgey and Sir NO'Conor.)

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
Off to Mora.

It seems desirable to instruct the Govt of Mora as to the reply to be given by Major Cox, if he is forced to make one.


Previous Papers:—

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Y 11891. 2000.—4/1906. I. 632.



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India Office, London,
3rd May 1907.

Secret,
No. 17.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

With reference to your Secret letter No. 28, dated the 21st February 1907, regarding affairs in Nejd, I forward herewith, for the information of Your Excellency in Council, copy of correspondence* with the Foreign Office on the subject.

Nejd Affairs. Bin Saood's overtures to Great Britain and the passage of Turkish troops through Koweit.


* To Foreign Office, dated 27th March 1907.
From ditto, dated 16th April 1907, with enclosure.

2. After carefully considering, in consultation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the views expressed by Your Excellency's Government as to the general situation in Central Arabia, His Majesty's Government see no reason to modify the policy laid down in my predecessor's telegram of the 30th December 1904, and repeated in my telegram of the 9th November 1906, that British interests and influence in those regions should be strictly confined to the coast; and they agree with Sir N. O'Conor that it would be most unwise for them to entangle themselves with the Wahabi Amir, or in any other way to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.

3. The terms of the reply which, in paragraph 11 of your letter, you propose to return to Bin Saood, appear to His Majesty's Government to be open to objection as implying an approval of the consolidation of the Wahabi power, and consequently a certain interference in Arabian affairs. No such communication should therefore be made. But if Major Cox finds it impossible to avoid giving some answer to those who have approached him on the Wahabi Amir's behalf, he should inform them, as Bin Saood's proposals involve considerations which it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to entertain, that no reply is to be expected.

4. With regard to your further proposal that representations should be made to the Porte regarding the passage through Koweit of Turkish troops on their way back from the interior, Sir N. O'Conor is of opinion


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that a protest made so long after the event would only provoke ill-feeling, without any corresponding advantages. In this view His Majesty's Government concur.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

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ENCLOSURE.

Enclosure No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.

India Office,
27th March 1907.

Sir,

In continuation of previous correspondence relative to affairs in Nejd, ending with the telegram from the Viceroy of the 15th February last, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to forward, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from the Government of India, No. 28 (Secret), of 21st February, and enclosures, reviewing the situation and making certain proposals.

The first of these proposals is to send a message to Sheikh Jasim, for repetition to the Wahabi Emir, to the effect stated in the 11th paragraph of the enclosed letter. To this Mr. Morley sees no objection, with the omission of the words "under present circumstances," and "formal," provided that the message is conveyed in writing so as to avoid the danger of misrepresentation. But he would be glad to be favoured with Sir E Grey's views upon the subject.

The second proposal is that, in view of the recent passage of considerable bodies of Turkish troops through Koweit, a warning should be addressed to the Sublime Porte in the sense of Lord Lansdowne's Despatch to Sir N. O'Conor, No. 177, of the 10th May 1904, together with an intimation that, if troops are again moved through Koweit territory on their passage to or from Nejd, His Majesty's Government will be forced to consider what action should be taken to protect their own interests.

In view of the fact, stated by the Government of India, that the passage of the troops in question is merely the withdrawal of beaten troops from the interior, it does not appear to Mr. Morley that there are the same grounds for a representation to the Porte which existed when Lord Lansdowne's Despatch above quoted was written; and he is not prepared to support this proposal.

With regard to the general question of policy discussed in the earlier paragraphs of this letter Mr. Morley sees no reason at present to alter the policy stated in paragraph 6, viz., that of strictly confining our interests and influence to the coast line of Eastern Arabia.

I have, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

Enclosure No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.

No. 11,067.


Foreign Office,
16th April 1907.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, relative to the affairs of Nejd, and containing copy of a letter from the Government of India, reviewing the situation and making certain proposals.

In reply, I am to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Morley, copy of a Despatch which has since been received from His

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Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, commenting on the same letter, which was simultaneously forwarded to His Excellency.

Sir N. O'Conor, in discussing the situation and outlook, strongly urges that it would be most unwise for His Majesty's Government to entangle themselves with Ibn Saood or in any other way interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.

Sir E. Grey is disposed to concur in this view, and he considers that it would be therefore inadvisable to carry out the proposal of the Government of India contained in paragraph 11 of their Despatch, even as amended in accordance with Mr. Morley's suggestions, as this would imply an approval of the consolidation of Ibn Saood's authority, and consequently a certain interference in Arabian affairs.

Sir E. Grey equally concurs in Sir N. O'Conor's suggestion that representations to the Porte with reference to the passage of some Turkish troops through Koweit territory would be undesirable at this distance of time from the actual event.

I am, &c.,
F. A. CAMPBELL.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Annex.

Sir N. O'Conor to Foreign Office.

No. 198. (Confidential.) Constantinople,
Sir, 1st April 1907.

I have the honour to inform you that I have received from the Government of India a copy of their Despatch to Mr. Morley, No. 28 (Secret), of 1907, and I venture to offer the following remarks on its contents.

It is difficult to forecast events in Turkey and particularly so in Arabia, where the Ottoman Government have so often re-established authority which seemed to have passed from their grasp.

But it looks just now as if Ibn Saood might possibly consolidate a Wahabee dynasty by the absorption of Nejd, the practical expulsion of the Turks from Kassim and Boreyda, and by establishing friendly relations with Sheikh Jasim of Katr and the Hassa regions.


At the same time it would be unwise to conclude that the Turkish Government cannot recover their ground, or that Ibn Saood will be able to amalgamate tribal interests in such a manner as to resist the forces of the Suzerain Power and continue his victorious course.

It may be that all that is national, in feeling and aspiration, may group itself around Ibn Saood, but all the elements of a firm and stable régime are well nigh wanting so far, and I should be slow to assume that we are on the eve of important changes in those parts.

Moreover, Ibn Saood has not yet had to deal with a large Turkish military force, partly owing to tribal disturbances, and partly to his double-faced policy towards the Sultan. It is by no means certain, however, that if he openly declares his hostility to the Caliph, the energetic commandant of the Sixth Army Corps, Pertev Pasha, who is now reorganizing this corps at Bagdad, will not crush him before he has time or means for resistance.

I confess I see nothing to be gained by entangling ourselves with him under present circumstances, and I do not see how we can, with political honesty, assist his insurrectionary movement against, for instance, El Hassa, which we recognise as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. We can hardly approach the Porte with a declaration, disguised how it may be diplomatically, that we shall protect a rebel who is in arms for the disintegration of the Empire. Even were we to do so, I should have no faith in the phenomenon of political gratitude from an Arab race.

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Apart from this, I am not at all sure how far the establishment of a strong and fanatical Wahabee dynasty in those parts would serve our interests; on the contrary, I am of opinion that our right policy is to interfere as little as possible with the internal affairs of these tribes, and let them work out their own destiny as best they can.

If, in the course of time, Ibn Saood, or another, should succeed in establishing their rule and authority under some more or less stable order of Government, it might be necessary to consider whether we should recognise them as representative of the will of the people, and even, perhaps, to consider how far it would be desirable to protect their coasts from predatory or other attacks.

But this is some way off, and before a confederacy of the Arab states of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Nejd is in existence, the chances are that the present Ottoman régime will have come to an end and be succeeded by a nationalist and popular Government, or that the disintegration of the component parts of the Empire will have begun.

In the latter case we cannot escape our responsibilities, but I should be sorry to see England enter into relations with a new Turkish régime, having previously agreed to a secret arrangement with Ibn Saood for the disruption of the Empire.

The Moslems of this country would never forgive nor forget such a policy.

As regards the idea that I should be instructed to make representations to the Porte with reference to the passage of some Turkish troops through Koweit territory, I venture to submit that if these expostulations had been made within even a few months of the circumstance complained of, it might have been in place, but if we raised such a question after a lapse of eight months, it would provoke much ill-feeling without, so far as I can see, any corresponding advantages.

If we want to assert our predominance in Koweit, I would on the whole prefer to insist upon the evacuation of Bubian Island should Ottoman gendarmes still be there.

But this I do not advocate at present, although at some future time we may have to remind the Porte of the subject.


I quite understand the unpleasant position in which Major Cox is placed by not being able to reply satisfactorily to the overtures of Ibn Saood or Sheikh Jasim, but I do not see how this can be avoided, and after all it is better than pledging ourselves to unknown risks and responsibilities.

As regards a descent of Ibn Saood on the Oman coast and his assistance in repressing piracy and his influence with the Trucial Chiefs, I venture to think that there is as little chance of his being able to be really useful to us as there is of his daring to attack the maritime Chiefs who are under our protection.


It would be well, however, carefully to watch the proceedings and policy of this somewhat active Sheikh while strictly maintaining with the Sheikh of Koweit the engagements which we have undertaken.

I have, &c.,
N. O'Conor.

The Right Hon. Sir E. Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.



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3 May 1907

Secret.

No. 17


Copy to F.O.
6 May 1907.

Approved Pol. Com'tee.,
30 April 1907
(as altered)

My Lord,


With reference to your Secret letter no. 28 of the 21 February 1907, regarding affairs in Nejd, I forward herewith for the information of Y. E. in C. copy of correspondence with the F.O. on the subject.

After carefully considering, in consultation with His Ambassador, Sir N. O'Conor, the views expressed by Y. E. in Sat. as to the general situation in Central Arabia, H.M. Govt. see no reason to modify the policy laid down in my predecessor's telegram of the 30th Dec. 1904 & repeated in my telegram of the 9th Nov. 1906, that British interests & influence in those regions should be strictly confined to the Coast; and they agree with Sir N. O'Conor that it would be most unwise for



them to entangle themselves
with the Wahabi Amir or in
any other way to interfere
in the internal affairs of
Arabia.

The terms of the reply,
which, in para. 11 of your
letter, you propose to return
to Bin Saood, appear to HMG at
to be open to objection as
implying an approval of the
consolidation of the Wahabi
power & consequently a certain
interference in Arabian
affairs. No such communication
should therefore be made.
But if Major Cox finds
it impossible to avoid
giving some answer to those
who have approached him
on the Wahabi Amir's behalf,
he should inform them
that, as Bin Saood's proposals




involve considerations
~~are of a nature~~ which it is
impossible for H. M. Govt. to
entertain, ~~that~~ that no reply
is to be expected [~~by him~~].


The P.R. Comm would
write the words in
brackets
W. Lew

With regard to your further
proposal that representations
should be made to the Porte
regarding the passage through
Koweit of Turkish troops
on their way back from the
interior, Sir N. O'Conor is
of opinion that a protest made
so long after the event would
only provoke ill-feeling without
any corresponding advantage.
In this view H. M. Govt. con-
cur. ~~To which, having regard~~
~~to the exceptional nature~~
~~of the circumstances in which~~
~~the defeated troops met with~~
~~their loss from the scene of~~
~~action through Sheikh Mubarak's~~
~~territory~~, H. M. Govt. consider
that the incident was not,
in any case, of a nature

to Lew
H.
DD
HMS.
By John Morley.



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In any farther communication on this subject, please quote
No. 11067.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

FOREIGN OFFICE
April 16th. 1907.

Sir:-


I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th. ultimo, relative to the affairs of Nejd, and containing copy of a letter from the Government of India, reviewing the situation and making certain proposals.


In reply I am to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Morley, copy of a despatch which has since been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, commenting on the same letter which was simultaneously forwarded to His Excellency.

Sir N. O'Conor, in discussing the situation and outlook, strongly urges that it would be most unwise for His Majesty's Government to entangle themselves with Ibn Saood or in any other way interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.

Sir E. Grey is disposed to concur in this view, and

ıe Under Secretary of State,
India Office.





and he considers that it would be therefore inadvisable to carry out the proposal of the Government of India contained in paragraph 11 of their despatch, even as amended in accordance with Mr. Morley's suggestions, as this would imply an approval of the consolidation of Ibn Saood's authority, and consequently a certain interference in Arabian affairs.


Sir E. Grey equally concurs in Sir N. O'Conor's suggestion that representations to the Porte with reference to the passage of some Turkish troops through Koweit territory would be undesirable at this distance of time from the actual event.

I am,


Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,



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Constantinople,

April 1st. 1907.

. 198 Confidential.

11067
APR 8 1907

Sir,


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
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At the same time it would be unwise to conclude that the Turkish Government cannot recover their ground or that Ibn Saood will be able to amalgamate tribal interests in

Right Hon:
Sir E. Grey Bart. M.P.
&c. &c. &c.






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
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Moreover, Ibn Saood has not yet had to deal with a large Turkish military force, partly owing to tribal disturbances and partly to his double-faced policy towards the Sultan. It is by no means certain , however, that if he openly declares his hostility to the Caliph, the energetic commandant of the sixth Army Corps, Pertev Pasha, who is now reorganizing this Corps at Bagdad, will not crush him before he has time or means for resistance.

I confess I see nothing to be gained by entangling ourselves with him under present circumstances and I do not see how we can with political honesty assist his insurrectionary movement against, for instance, El Hassa, which we recognize as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. We

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
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Apart from this, I am not at all sure how far the establishment of a strong and fanatical Wahabee dynasty in those parts would serve our interests; on the contrary I am of opinion that our right policy is to interfere as little as possible with the internal affairs of these tribes and let them work out their own destiny as best they can.


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But this is some way off and before a confederacy

of



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
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
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If

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If we want to assert our predominance in Koweit, I would on the whole prefer to insist upon the evacuation of Bubian Island should Ottoman gendarmes still be there.

But this I do not advocate et present, although at some future time we may have to remind the Porte of the subject.


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
It would be well, however, carefully to watch the proceedings and policy of this somewhat active Sheikh,

while

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


while strictly maintaining with the Sheikh of Koweit the
engagements which we have under taken.


I have the honour to be, with the highest respect

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Minute Paper. Register No. 477 SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 28, Dated 21 Feb/07 Rec. 9 March/07. 190 .

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15 March		Arabia.
Secretary of State	15		Bin Saood's overtures to Gt. Britain. Major Cox's proposals. Suggested warning to Turkish Govt. regarding action on their part likely to add still further to the disturbed condition of this part of Arabia: passage of Turkish troops thro' Koweit. Proposed answer to Bin Saood.
Committee	20		
Under Secretary.....	26		
Secretary of State			

Copy to India (see minute)

In his letter of the 5th inst. of India of the 24th November last Major Cox stated his opinion that some authoritative reply should be made "to the references made through the local officers by Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit and Sheikh Jasim of Katar on behalf of Bin Saood."

The Secretary of State telegraphed (14th) that, if so, he would like to see the terms of the proposed answer; and to know whether it would be given by letter or orally.

The present letter from the Govt.


Answered 3 May 1907 No 17. Secret. (2938).

(189/07)

Previous Papers:—

326/07 (187/06 P.)

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


of India gives (para. 11) the terms of the proposed
reply, but does not indicate whether it should be
given orally or in writing. In their* telegram of the
15th February, however, they suggest that it should
be conveyed orally, either through Sheikh Jasim or
some other approved channel.

The Govt. of India review the position of H.M. Govt.
towards affairs in Nejd since 1904. They consider
that affairs are rapidly approaching a crisis, which
will compel H.M.G. to make up their minds as to their
policy in regard to the affairs of Nejd. For the moment
they advise an answer to Abdul Aziz Bin Saood's overtures
"to the effect that the British Govt., while anxious to maintain
"friendly relations with him so long as he comports himself
"in a manner consonant with British interests and our
"engagement with Arab Sheikhs on the coast, see no
"necessity under present conditions for making him any
"formal promises of protection, which might even have the
"effect of stimulating Turkish opposition to the consolidation
"of his authority".

They regard the chances of the Turkish Govt. re-establishing
its authority in Central Arabia - or at least in the Eastern portion
of it - as remote, even with the assistance of the Hedjaz Railway,
and they consider that the establishment of the Wahabi power with its
a menace to our position not only on the Pirate Coast, but in
Koweit. They do not, however, attach great importance to this,
as they contemplate the possibility of H.M. Govt. restraining the Turks
from

(326/07)




from ousting Abdul Aziz Ibn Saood from his positions on the coast - and they seem to look forward with some satisfaction to the prospect of the Turkish authority disappearing altogether from the whole of Arabia south of Zobeir, which is a point considerably to the North of Koweit.

In this connection, they draw attention to the passage of Turkish troops through Koweit, which they think, may occasion an awkward situation, necessitating British intervention for the maintenance of the status quo of 1901. and, to avoid this, they propose a representation to the Porte in the terms of Lord Lansdowne's despatch to Sir N. O'Conor of the 10th May 1904, when the Turkish Govt. were taking steps to assist Ibn Rashid against Ibn Saood, and there was a probability that the Sheikh of Koweit would be drawn into the quarrel on Ibn Saood's side.


Dft. to F.O.

P.S. Departmental memoranda are annexed, which show that the policy of H.M. Govt. has hitherto been to abstain from intervention, except on the coast of the Persian Gulf.

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India Office.
Whitehall. S.W.

To Viceroy

Your Foreign Secret Despatch 21st Feb affairs in Nejd paragraph 13 I am aware that there are precedents for the course which you have taken in sending copy of your despatch to Constantinople Embassy, but such communications are unusual and in my opinion should be avoided if possible. I therefore take this opportunity of requesting you not to communicate direct with H.M. Embassies either at Constantinople or Peking. You will I am sure understand that I regard this as a matter of official convenience. It appears to me that all communications or suggestions from H.E.'s Government should be imparted

Copy to F.O. (H) 28.3.07. (P) 2.4.07


India (Tel) 29 March


and I fully recognize nature of your motives


Seen Pol. Com'tee. 26 MAR. 1907

Sent to Mr. 16/3/07.

Sent to Egypt 19.3.07 as a general principle


through me
in this country
not only to the Foreign Office but also
to all their subordinates abroad unless in
cases where you have obtained my
previous approval -


Enclo.!
F.O.
27 March 1907.
Sir.
In continuation of previous
Correspondence relating to affairs
in Kejd ending with the telegram
from the Viceroy of the 15th February
last, I am directed by Secretary
Morley to forward
for the consideration of the Secy. of
State for F. a. a copy of a letter
from the Govt. of India, reviewing
the situation and making
certain proposals.
The first of these proposals
is that a message
for repetition to the Wahabi Emir
to Sheikh Jasim to the effect
Noted
Approved Pol. Com'ee.,
26 MAR. 1907
(as altered)
Govt of India
29 March 1907
Secy 13.



stated in the 11th paragraph of the Enclosed Letter. In this Mr. Morley sees no objection, but it is a subject for consideration whether the message should be oral or in writing; and Mr. Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views upon the subject.


The second proposal is that, in view of the recent passage of considerable bodies of Turkish troops through Koweit, a warning should be addressed to the Sublime Porte in the sense of Lord Lansdowne's

The P.R. C— would substitute for the part in brackets -


with the omission of the words "under present circumstances" and "formal"; provided that the message is conveyed in writing so as to avoid the danger of misrepresentation. But he

H. Ch

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
Lansdowne's Despatch to Sir
R. O'Conor No. 177 of the 10th
May 1904, together with an
intimation that, if troops are
again moved through Koweit
territory on their passage to
or from Nejd, H.M.G. will
be forced to consider what
action should be taken to
protect their own interests
stated to
In view of the facts, ~~that~~
the Govt. of India, that the passage
of the troops in question is merely
the withdrawal of beaten troops
from the interior, it does not
appear to Mr. Morley that there
are the same grounds for a
Representation



representation of the Porte, which
existed when Lord Lansdowne's
despatch above quoted was
written; and he is not prepared
to support this proposal.

With regard to the general
question of policy discussed
in the earlier paragraphs of
this Letter Mr. Morley sees no
reason at present to alter the policy stated
in paragraph 6 of Lansdowne's
despatch, viz. that of strictly con-
-fining our interests and influence
to the Coast line of Eastern Arabia.

(Sd) Algodday
W. Lee



477

1907.

RECEIVED IN 16 MAR 1907 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.


No. 28, DATED THE 21ST FEBRUARY 1907.


Letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Nejd affairs.

Foreign Office Press—No. 141—19-2-07—14.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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No. 28 of 1907.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 16 MAR 1907

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE JOHN MORLEY, O.M.,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 21st February 1907.*

SIR,

In continuation of the correspondence ending with your telegram, dated the 9th November 1906, regarding affairs in Nejd, we have the honour to forward, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers cited in the enclosed list.

2. The correspondence relates to the overtures made by and on behalf of Abdul Aziz Bin Saood, the Wahabi Chief, with a view to the establishment of a closer connection between himself and the British Government. Major Cox, our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, desires to be in a position to give a definite answer to these overtures, and has recommended in his letter No. 2181, dated the 16th September 1906, that we should take the present opportunity to come to terms with the Wahabi Chief, on the following grounds :—

(1) that overtures have been made at various times by Bin Saood himself, and by Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani and Sheikh Mubarak on Bin Saood's behalf, with a view to securing for the latter some measure of British protection, and that if we neglect these overtures, Bin Saood and his following may regard us with hostility ;


(2) that if a friendly understanding were to exist between the British Government and Bin Saood, both the Sultan of Maskat and the Trucial Chiefs would be fortified by the knowledge that any attempt on the part of the Wahabi to make a descent upon Oman would involve a preliminary rupture between him and the British Government ;

(3) that if Bin Saood were our friend he would be able to assist us in suppressing piracies in the northern part of the Gulf ;

(4) that such a friendly understanding would facilitate Major Cox's dealings with the Trucial Chiefs and would render it possible for our officers to make occasional tours in the Nejd country ;

(5) that the Arabs of Central Arabia, apparently driven to desperation by Turkish interference, seem disposed to make common cause to throw off the yoke and are apparently trying to secure the support of the Sheikh of Koweit and even of the Sheikh of Muhammerah.* Realising, however, that they are not strong enough to stand alone, they see the necessity of enlisting the support of a Christian Power, and if we do not respond, they may approach some other Power.

* *Vide* enclosures Nos. 4 and 5 and Mr. Consul McDouall's letters, dated 13th and 17th October 1906 (annexures to enclosure No. 9).



2

3. Proposals have been made on previous occasions for British intervention in the affairs of Nejd, but it has been decided on each occasion that it would be inexpedient to incur the difficulties and embarrassments involved. When in March 1904, proposals were made* for adopting a course which might lead to closer relations with the Saood family, your predecessor decided† that it was inadvisable that His Majesty's Government should be committed to any course of action which would appear to encourage that family or which could be represented by the Turkish Government as a breach of the understanding between the two Governments for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Nejd. On the other hand, it was recognised‡ as very important that the British Government should be in a position to decide as to the policy to be followed in case of a serious revolutionary outbreak in Nejd and the cessation of Ottoman rule in El Hasa. Your predecessor therefore hinted that, in the event of an alteration of conditions in Nejd in the above-mentioned direction, he might be prepared to consider further a proposal for sending a British officer to Riadh on a mission of enquiry.

* Government of India despatch No. 69 (Secret), dated the 24th March 1904.

† Mr. Brodrick's despatch No. 24 (Secret), dated the 29th April 1904.

‡ *Vide* letter from Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 129, dated the 26th February 1904.

4. In May 1904, on hearing that the Turks were collecting troops to assist Bin Rashid, the Government of India suggested§ to His Majesty's Government that representations might be made by Sir N. O'Conor to the Porte in order to prevent this. It was urged that our interests in Eastern and Southern Arabia were such that we could not view with indifference intervention on behalf of one of the parties contending for power in Nejd, and that our prestige at Koweit must suffer materially if we permitted Turkish influence to determine the supremacy of the Turkish nominee against Bin Saood, Mubarak's friend. It was further pointed out that Turkish supremacy in Nejd might involve the destruction of Mubarak's influence and a possible attack on Koweit territory.

§ Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th May 1904.


5. This view was not altogether accepted by His Majesty's Government, but on 15th May, Sir N. O'Conor drew‖ the attention of the Porte to the understanding arrived at between the Porte and the British Government with regard to Koweit. He said that, as His Majesty's Government had on several occasions cautioned the Sheikh of Koweit to refrain from interfering in neighbouring disturbances, they had a right to expect that the Ottoman Government would do what it could to restrain the Amir of Nejd and refrain from any action which might endanger peace in those regions, whose tranquillity was a matter of interest to His Majesty's Government as well as to that of the Sultan. Sir N. O'Conor gave it as his opinion that he could not press the Turks to desist from sending assistance to Bin Rashid without appearing to be a partisan of Bin Saood. His idea was that we should confine ourselves, at all events for the present, to maintaining intact the territory of Koweit and to watching developments.

‖ *Vide* letter from Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 373, dated the 16th May 1904.

6. This policy appears to have been adopted by His Majesty's Government as, in a telegram, dated 30th December 1904, your predecessor said that His Majesty's Government desired that it should be clearly understood that their interest and influence were to be confined strictly to the coast line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing should be said or done to connect them even indirectly with warfare in progress in the interior. We recently received similar instructions from you in your telegram, dated 9th November 1906, which disposed of the suggestion made by Major Cox.

7. We have already issued the necessary orders to Major Cox to ensure strict adherence to the line of policy which has been laid down, but in the meanwhile we think it our duty to point out that there are indications in the papers received since Major Cox's letter of 16th September 1906 was written, that the position of the Turks in Nejd is becoming increasingly difficult, and that they have been unable to do more than maintain a mere semblance of power

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3

in Hassa where they have recently sustained a somewhat serious reverse at the hands of the local Arabs. They are now trying to re-establish their position there by the despatch of troops, and it was rumoured that they intended to use Bahrein as an intermediate base though this intention was not carried out and the troops were sent direct to Katif. On the other hand, the greater part if not the whole of the Turkish garrisons are stated to have been withdrawn from Nejd and Kasim in a pitiable condition and the plans of the Wahabi Chief for dislodging the Turks from Nejd and the Arab littoral seem now to be more within the bounds of possibility. Although it is possible that, as anticipated in Mr. Lloyd's Memorandum* respecting German influence on the Hedjaz Railway, the completion of the line to Medain-Saleh will affect the balance of power in western Nejd in favour of the Turks, yet it will be a long time before the posts which have been abandoned can be re-occupied by reinforcements from the railway.

* *Vide* despatch from Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey, No. 507, dated the 24th July 1906.

8. On the whole it seems to us that the situation is developing towards the point at which Sir N. O'Conor in 1904 anticipated that it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to make up their minds as to the policy to be followed in regard to Nejd. The question is one primarily for decision by His Majesty's Government, and we hesitate to offer our advice in a matter in which India is only interested in a secondary degree† and merely because a disturbance of the position on the Arabian coast might adversely affect Indian trade and our political arrangements in the Gulf. In view however of the rapid aggrandisement of Bin Saood as indicated by the recent reports, we venture to call attention to the opinion expressed by Sir N. O'Conor in his letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 373, dated 16th May 1904, that if Bin Saood succeeds in re-establishing a Wahabi dynasty throughout the centre of Arabia, the result might render our influence and authority at Koweit precarious. We would also invite a perusal of our Secret despatch No. 7 (External), dated the 11th January 1906, in which we showed that the growing importance of this Chief, if he is hostile to our interests, is a danger to our relations with the Trucial Chiefs. If the Turks are really likely to disappear from the stage, and if Bin Saood is to be a power in the land, it seems to us desirable that this Chief should, when a suitable moment arrives, be led to come to a friendly understanding with us.

See letter No. 129 (Confidential), dated the 26th February 1904, to the Marquess of Lansdowne.


† *Vide* your despatch No. 35 (Secret), dated the 5th October 1906.

9. Bin Saood has made a definite request,‡ through Sheikh Jasim, that a secret understanding may be arranged between the British Government and himself under which he may be granted British protection from Turkish assaults at sea in the event of his ever succeeding in driving the Turks unaided out of his ancestral dominions. Having regard to our relations with the Turks, it would of course be impossible that even a secret undertaking to this effect should be given to the Wahabi Chief at present. The difficulty is, however, that, if we hold back too long, we risk the possibility that Bin Saood may succeed in obtaining control over Hassa and Katif without any reference to us, either by arrangement with the Turks, as their representative, or by his own unaided efforts. Either of these alternatives might be disadvantageous to us. We do not want Turkish power consolidated in Nejd, as our influence over Koweit and the Trucial Chiefs might be weakened; similarly, if Bin Saood obtained unquestioned authority in Nejd and Hassa and Katif, he would be a disturbing influence in coast politics if he were not attached to us in some way.

‡ Enclosure No. 11.

10. But, on the other hand, it is unlikely that the Turks would formally hand over full authority in Nejd, Hassa, and Katif to Bin Saood in response to the application which he proposes to make to the Sultan for the Governorship of these districts. Even if they did so, Bin Saood, by his own admission,§ would not long rest content with this, but would seize the first opportunity of throwing off the Turkish yoke. Whether he ousted the Turks from Hassa

§ See Captain Fridesux's letter No. 500, dated the 17th November 1906 (annexure to enclosure No. 11).




and Katif by guile, or by force, according to his alternative proposal, he would never be able to consolidate his position there so long as the Turks were able to attack him from the sea. On the whole, therefore, it does not appear that we should run any serious risk of alienating Bin Saood by failing to respond immediately and directly to his advances. When, if ever, he successfully vindicates his authority, he will still be compelled to turn to the British Government for protection against attacks by sea, and His Majesty's Government will be in a position, if they consider it to be to their advantage and in consonance with their obligations towards the Porte, to stretch out a hand which Bin Saood will be compelled, in his own interest, to take. Possibly, if the Turks were ousted from Hassa and Katif, His Majesty's Government might think it advisable to restrain them from attacking Bin Saood's position on the coast, on the ground that we are responsible for the maritime peace of the Gulf, and that we cannot permit coastal warfare to be pursued to the prejudice of that peace. On this point of general policy we can only say that from an Indian point of view it would be distinctly desirable that the Turks should not possess a semblance of authority on the Eastern Arabian coast south of Zobehr, as their position at Katif and Ojair may easily be embarrassing and encourages the claims to sovereignty over Koweit and even Bahrein which are still put forward. The risk of the lease of harbours to other maritime powers in the gulf would also be greatly decreased.

11. In the meanwhile, as some reply seems to be necessary to the reiterated enquiries which have been made by, or on behalf of, Bin Saood, we propose, subject to your approval, to convey an answer to him to the effect that the British Government, while anxious to maintain friendly relations with him, so long as he comports himself in a manner consonant with British interests and our engagements with Arab Sheikhs on the coast, see no necessity, under present conditions, for making him any formal promises of protection which might even have the effect of stimulating Turkish opposition to the consolidation of his authority.

12. Our anxiety as to the possible effect of the recent changes in Nejd has been heightened by the recent passage of considerable bodies of Turkish troops through Koweit, a proceeding which is in contravention of the terms of the *status quo* Agreement of 1901 by which the Turks undertook not to send troops to Koweit. It is true that the undertaking which the Porte gave related primarily to the offensive movement of troops by sea to Koweit and did not contemplate such a situation as the present in which the Turks have withdrawn beaten troops by land through Koweit. Still, in our opinion, if the occurrence is allowed to pass unnoticed it will form an inconvenient precedent as tending to bring the Sheikh more directly under Turkish authority or even to facilitate a *coup de main* on Koweit. If it is repeated and the Sheikh resents it, there is some danger that he may take direct measures to stop the passage of military parties through his territories, and this might at any moment lead to a disagreeable incident necessitating action on our part which it is desirable, if possible, to avoid. According to a report* from Major Knox the Sheikh has already, on one occasion, felt himself able to refuse to permit some Turkish refugees to enter Koweit and he might now welcome some support on this point from us. This would have the incidental advantage of strengthening our influence at this important point, which is desirable in view of the uncertainty which Sheikh Mubarak apparently feels as to the present policy of the British Government, which has led him to demur to introducing the new Koweit flag and to coquet more openly with the Turkish authorities at Basrah. We therefore invite His Majesty's Government to consider whether the opportunity might not suitably be taken to warn the Turkish Government once more against taking action likely to "add still further to the disturbed condition of this part of Arabia" (see Lord Lansdowne's despatch to Sir N. O'Conor, No. 177, dated the 10th May 1904), and to intimate to them that, if troops are again moved through Koweit territory on their passage to or from Nejd, His Majesty's Government will be forced to consider what action should be taken to protect their own interests.


* Enclosure No. 15.




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13. As His Majesty's Government will no doubt desire to obtain the advice of Sir N. O'Conor on the question discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of this despatch to Constantinople.

We have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your most obedient, humble servants,



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
List of Enclosures in Secret despatch No. 28 (External), dated the 21st February 1907, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.
1	No. 2138, dated the 15th September 1906, with enclosure.	From the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
2	No. 2181, dated the 16th September 1906, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
3	Telegram No. 378, dated the 2nd October 1906.	From ditto ditto.
4	Telegram No. S.-100, dated the 8th October 1906.	To ditto ditto.
5	Telegram No. 396, dated the 9th October 1906.	From ditto ditto.
6	No. 804, dated the 29th September 1906, with enclosures.	From the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.
7	No. 2344, dated the 6th October 1906, with enclosures.	From the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
8	No. 2438, dated the 14th October 1906, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
9	No. 2477, dated the 21st October 1906, with enclosures.	From ditto ditto.
10	No. 2480, dated the 21st October 1906, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
11	No. 2719, dated the 24th November 1906, with enclosures.	From ditto ditto.
12	No. 2738, dated the 24th November 1906, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
13	No. 2799, dated the 2nd December 1906, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
14	No. 3051, dated the 16th December 1906, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
15	No. 29, dated the 4th January 1907, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto.
16	No. 157, dated the 20th January 1907, with enclosures.	From ditto ditto.
17	Extract from the diary of ending the 6th January	the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week 1907.


H. Wood

Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

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
FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


SECRET.

External.

Enclosures of a letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 28, dated the 21st February 1907.



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Enclo. No. 1.

(Confidential)

No. 2138, dated Bushire, the 15th (received 24th) September 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a despatch* addressed by His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

* No. 62, dated 31st August 1906.

With reference to Mr. Crow's statement as to the channels through which Ibn Saood and Meta'ab bin Rashid respectively receive their allowances, I am addressing the Political Resident at Baghdad and the Political Agent at Koweit on the subject and will forward in due course any further information I may receive from them.

No. 62, dated the 31st August 1906.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah,

To—His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

With reference to my despatch No. 59 of August 25th, I have the honour to report that I called on Lieutenant-General Sudqi Pasha last Wednesday. He had been ordered to Baghdad and left the same evening. It is uncertain whether he will return to take up his appointment as Commandant at Basrah. Sudqi Pasha stated that he had handed over the Command in El Kasim to Sami Pasha, Acting Mutessarif and Commandant and stayed ten days with him after his arrival. Sami Pasha brought 500 soldiers and one gun with him from Medina. The troops arrived in excellent condition.


According to Sudqi Pasha's account there are 2,500 troops in Nejd and El Kasim. The lines of communications are open and caravans arrive freely and, though supplies are not easily obtainable locally, all necessaries were forwarded to them by caravans.

Information from other sources does not confirm this favourable account. The tale told by the numerous deserters who have from time to time found their way to Koweit and thence the Basrah during Sudqi Pasha's command in Kasim is a very different one. They describe the state of the troops there as pitiable in the extreme and state that provisions are scarce and they are without pay. Sudqi Pasha himself is said to be owed 2,000 Turkish £ for his services.

Sudqi Pasha said that Ibn Saood was jealous of Saleh bin Mohanna's intercourse with the Turkish Officers and that he got the people of Boreyda to sign a *masbata* complaining of his oppression and then removed him to Riadh. He attributes his removal to personal animosity. Though Mohanna was appointed Kaimakam of Boreyda by the Mushir, the appointment had not been confirmed by Constantinople.

Sudqi Pasha marched from Boreyda to Zilfi and thence travelled by way of Es Safa and Subakeya to Koweit, crossing the northern end of the Dahna between Koweit and Kasim. From Zilfi onwards he found water once every four days. The journey was performed on camels. He brought 142 men with him and had no casualties. He seems to have travelled very quickly. He told me that peace had been established between Ibn Saood and Ibn Rashid but did not think it would last very long. He described Ibn Saood as a desert diplomatist and the late Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid as a desert warrior and said the former displayed considerable ability and adroitness in his dealings while the latter was a fighting man pure and simple. Meta'ab his son is only 21 and Sudqi Pasha thinks his youth will prevent him from taking any active line for the present, but his ambition to make a name for himself and follow in his father's footsteps may lead to a recurrence of hostilities between the rival factions at no distant date. He stated the Arabs had now all retired to their homes and their pastures.

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The murder of Abdul Aziz bin Jilwa, while on his way to Koweit with letters from Ibn Saood, was, I am informed, perpetrated by a raiding party of Shamar Arabs who had not heard the news of peace being proclaimed.

I learn that the allowance granted by the Turkish Government to Ibn Saood is by recent arrangement paid through the Sheikh of Koweit, who deducts it from the land tax due to the Government on his Fao property. Meta'ab's allowance is supposed to be paid through Baghdad, but I have not heard of his receiving anything as yet.

I can obtain no confirmation of the report from Jeddah, mentioned in Your Excellency's despatch of 7th July, that Ibn Saood had ordered the Arab Sheikhs and tribes in Nejd to abstain from communication with Turkish officers and troops and to stop carrying their mails and supplies. Sudqi Pasha seems to have been on very friendly terms with Ibn Saood who visited him several times during his recent visit to Boreyda and brought his retainers and many Arab Sheikhs with him. The troops have no doubt suffered from want of money and though there was little or no fighting they must necessarily have endured great hardships.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW.

No. 12.


Copy forwarded to His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General, with the compliments of the undersigned.

BASRA ;
6th September 1906.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.

G. C Press, Simla.—No. C-294 F. D.—10-10-06.—67—BBC.

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Enclo. No. 2.

No. 2181, dated Bushire, the 16th (received 24th) September 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Government, a copy of the communication marginally quoted which I have received from the Political Agent at Koweit, on the subject of the aspirations of Bin Saood to enter into closer relations with the British Government.

Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, No. 313, dated the 28th August 1906.

2. In the same connection, I have the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of my letter No. 64 of 23rd February last to your address.

Subsequently when touring on the Arab Coast in May last I had an opportunity of meeting Sheikh Jasim bin Thani at his summer quarters at Lusail, and on that occasion he expressed himself to much the same effect on behalf of Bin Saood, saying that the latter was now strong enough to drive the Turks out of Nejd and Al-Hassa and asking whether in the event of his coming down to the coast, the British Government could not see their way to give him the same measure of protection by sea as they gave to Sheikh Mubarak and other Arab Chiefs on the Coast, in pursuance of their traditional policy of preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf. He added that it would be a simple matter for Bin Saood to meet a British officer at the coast, if that course were considered desirable.

In reply, I told Sheikh Jasim that this was a question to which I could not give him any definite answer offhand and without instructions from the Government of India.

Just at that time the news of the death of Bin Rashid at the hands of his rival reached the coast and the situation seemed so kaleidoscopic that I delayed making any report to Government until matters had crystallised somewhat.


I have now received from Captain Knox a communication from Sheikh Mubarak to much the same effect as the foregoing. We have thus been approached from three directions and I think there can be no doubt that these representations may be held to have been inspired by Bin Saood personally.

3. Bin Rashid's death at the hands of his rival had an important influence on the situation, and as the Government of India have been informed, the three cornered peace of which the possibility was indicated in paragraph 2 of my letter No. 620 of 18th March has lately taken shape.

Whether it will endure on its own merits or whether the Turks will at once set themselves to undo it, it is impossible to prophesy, but seeing that the present Bin Rashid is a mere youth of 18, it is hardly likely that he will be able to make any serious stand against Bin Saood for some time to come. The juncture is consequently a convenient one for an examination and review of the political situation in Central Arabia and of our attitude towards Bin Saood and I venture to hope that Government will take advantage of it for that purpose.

4. While I believe I am right in thinking that His Majesty's Government regard with no favour the idea of the Turks establishing themselves in Nejd,* I am at the same time aware that it has been a recognised principle of their policy not to allow themselves to become involved in the tempestuous politics of Central Arabia. Nevertheless it must be conceded that we have principles and interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative doctrine of aloofness above mentioned, and I cannot see that these are in any way served by our carrying that doctrine to an extreme point and by our treating the predominant Arab element in Nejd with an active neglect which not only places us in an

* (1) Foreign Department telegram No. 1748-E. A., dated 19th May 1904.
(2) Foreign Department letter No. 3397-E.B., dated 8th October 1904.



unnecessarily unfavourable position for safeguarding the other interests referred to but which, persevered in, may be mistaken for hostility on our part and may engender a reciprocation of that sentiment on the part of the Wahabi Chief.

5. Thus it will be remembered that Bin Saood formally appealed to us for protection in a letter to me, dated 2nd May 1904, but no reply on behalf of Government to that communication was ever authorised, and at the present time no practical *modus vivendi* between the Arab and ourselves can be said to exist.

Vide telegram Resident to Foreign Department, dated 16th May 1904.

The inconvenience of this became apparent in connection with the intention attributed to Bin Saood of visiting Oman, which has created so much apprehension in the minds of the Pirate Coast Chiefs during the past year. Had they known that any sort of friendly understanding existed between the Residency or Government and Bin Saood, both the Sultan of Muscat and the Trucial Chiefs would have been fortified with the consequent knowledge that any attempt on the part of the Wahabi to make a descent upon Oman would involve a preliminary rupture with us. In the absence of any such entente all we could do was to get Sheikh Mubarak to give him a hint that any such action on his part would be regarded with disfavour by us. It is true that it appeared afterwards that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had expressed the opinion that we should deal with Bin Saood direct, but meanwhile it had become necessary to take action locally in the most expeditious way open to us. As a matter of fact this course met with a very courteous response from Bin Saood as reported to Government at the time.

Vide correspondence received with Foreign Department endorsement No. 2020-E.B., dated 17th May 1906.

Resident to Foreign Department No. 773, dated 5th April 1906.

6. Another matter in regard to which we lose by not being on any sort of terms with the Wahabi is the question of piracy in the northern part of the Gulf. There is good reason to suppose that, had we friendly relations with him, Bin Saood would be able to give us considerable assistance in running down notorieties like the outlaw Ahmed bin Salman, who yearly commits more or less serious depredations during the pearling season.

7. At the present epoch, as before mentioned, peace reigns in the land, and if we have any intention of establishing some measure of friendly intercourse with the Ruler of Nejd, the present seems to be the time for us to do so. If on the other hand we persevere in our policy of ignoring him altogether and leaving his appeals unanswered and if we allow the Turks to revive the strife in Central Arabia, which theoretically they have now no excuse for doing, it will be small matter for wonder if we make him our bitter enemy for the future.


I hesitate to make premature suggestions as to the terms which might figure in any agreement made, as I am aware that the problem is a delicate one and requires examination by a lens of longer focus than I can command, but I think I may say without temerity that I should welcome any degree of friendly understanding which would facilitate my dealings with the Trucial Chiefs and which would render it possible and unobjectionable for our officers to make occasional tours in the country and thereby to acquire accurate information regarding the topography, tribes, and tribal politics of the interior, in respect of which our present store of knowledge is very meagre.

In these latter connections, I solicit reference to the following items of previous correspondence:—

(i) The latter part of letter No. 69, dated 26th March 1904, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State.

(ii) Despatch from Sir Nicolas O'Conor to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 189, dated 20th March 1906, in which His Excellency advocated the arrangement of a meeting between Bin Saood and a British representative on one of our Government ships at some convenient point on the Coast. If this could

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take place, we should at all events know first hand what were the Arab's ambitions and what undertakings he was prepared to give in regard to matters which concerned us.

In any case, I trust that I may be placed in a position to give an authoritative reply to the enquiries of Sheikh Jasim and Sheikh Mubarak, for the information of their ally.

No. 313, dated Koweit, the 28th August 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to inform you that, at an interview that I had to-day with Sheikh Mubarak, he referred to the letters that Abdur Rahman bin Feysul bin Saood wrote in the year before last to your address and to the letter that reached me shortly after my arrival at Koweit, and seemed anxious again to persuade me that it would be to the advantage of the English to take Bin Saood under protection.


2. One of the arguments he used was that, with Nejd in security and Bin Saood under British protection, a caravan would start daily from Koweit for the interior and all its loads would be of Indian merchandise. He also said that Nejd contained with the tribes upward of three millions of men.

3. It is clear that Bin Saood and probably Mubarak himself are uneasy about the late activity of the Turks in El Kasim. Sheikh Mubarak declares now that the Turkish soldiers in Nejd are still 3,000 men.


4. In reply, I said to Sheikh Mubarak that he might rest assured that I would report this conversation to you.

G. C. Press, Simla.—C294 F. D.—9-10-06—30.—R. S. W.

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Enclo. No. 3.

Telegram No. 378, dated the 2nd (received 3rd) October 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Please see paragraph 7 of my letter No. 2181, dated the 16th September. An apparently well-founded report has since been communicated by Knox to the effect that the Turkish authorities have written to Bin Rashid asking why he made peace with Bin Saood and stating that his action in doing this was unauthorised.

Enclo. No. 4.

Telegram No. S.-100, dated the 8th October 1906.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Please see your telegram dated 2nd October regarding Nejd affairs. The report of frequent visits of Sheikh Mubarak to Sheikh Khazal and of the reconciliation between Bin Rashid and Bin Saood point to the possibility of these Chiefs being actuated by desire to form compact to secure their independence of Turkish or other Foreign domination. Please telegraph if you have any reason to suppose that they contemplate anything of the kind.

Enclo. No. 5.

Telegram No. 396, dated Bushire, the 9th (received 10th) October 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Please see your telegram No. S.-100 of 8th October. No special light is thrown, on the contingency suggested, by recent reports from Koweit and Mohammerah. On the other hand recent developments in Nejd situation already reported, afford good reason for the supposition that the Arabs of Central Arabia, driven to desperation by persistent Turkish interference, are disposed to make common cause to throw off the yoke, and Sheikh Khazal may come in as adviser and friend (of) Mubarak, but I think that they all see the necessity of enlisting the protective support of a Christian Power preferably ourselves if we will give it effectively, and in time, and that they realise their inability to stand alone for long even as an Arab confederacy.

Repeated to Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Enclo. No. 6.

No. 804, dated Baghdad, the 29th September 1906.

From—Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad,

To—Sir Louis W. Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of Consul Basrah's despatch No. 62, dated the 31st August 1906, which he address to the British Ambassador at Constantinaple. Also of a note dated the 24th September 1906, by Mr. Gaskin with remarks by myself.

Copy of a Secret and Confidential Despatch No. 62, dated 31st August 1906, from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Busreh, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople. (Not reprinted as copy separately received, see Enclo. to Pro. No.).

No. 12.


Copy forwarded to His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General with the compliments of the undersigned.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW,

His Majesty's Consul.

Basra;

6th September 1906.



2

Memorandum of information obtained by Mr. Gaskin.

With reference to the Turkish occupation, * he informed me that there were only about 50 Turkish soldiers under a Kulaghasy at Boreida and a similar detachment at Aneza, and the main body, consisting of over a thousand Infantry, a few Cavalry with 4 heavy field guns and 5 or 6 lighter pieces stationed at Sheihiya, a village about 5 or 6 hours ride West-North-West of Boreida, under the command of Sami Pasha.

* See my note at end.

The Turks are there on sufferance, and do not interfere in any way with the local affairs, and confine themselves to their quarters, only leaving them when going to purchase food or going to the Mosque for prayers.

The troops are rationed by their own Government. The Amir does not provide them with anything. They are wretchedly off. Many of the officers and men are continually deserting. If no fresh troops are sent to relieve the present garrison before long no soldiers will be left in Kassim through the wastage by disease and desertions.

As regards the young Amir, he stated that the people of Jabal Shammar are very hopeful of him, and he has gained their affection through his straightforwardness, generosity, and the habit of carrying out no undertaking without consulting all the elders of the Al-Rashid clan and listening to the best advice. He has remitted the tribal taxes for the current year, and re-instituted the payment, of annual allowances to the various tribal chiefs, retainers, and charities on the same scale as that paid by his grandfather. These allowances had been reduced by his father.


After reducing to obedience the Hoteim and Shararat tribes occupying the tract of country lying between Teima and Jowf, the Amir on about the last week of August 1906 attacked the Mateir Arabs, adherents of Bin Sa'ud, in Kassim and carried away much plunder in the shape of camels, horses, cattle and sheep.

Regarding the general feeling of the Arabs towards the Turks, my informant declared that there is a growing discontent and dislike towards them because of their unjust demands and harsh treatment, the life of the Arabs is becoming harder every year, and poverty is overshadowing them. Many of the Arab Chiefs whose incomes amount to 400 or 500 Liras, which would be sufficient under ordinary conditions for their needs, are reduced to beggary on account of the exactions of the Turkish officials. The Arabs are longing to throw off the Turks and become independent or to come under the protection of the Great Powers as in the case of Bulgaria and Roumelia. With this view recently a Hithim Chief whose brother is imprisoned by the Turks and not yet released, though the amount of bribes demanded by the officials have been paid, has proposed to the Sheikh of the Muntafik Arabs the formation of a strong confederacy of all the tribes for the purpose of turning the Turks out of Arabia and applying subsequently to the Great Powers for protection. The Muntafik Sheikh did not fall in with the views of the Hiteim Sheikh as the Arabs consider the Hiteim are of inferior blood and a proposal coming from such a source would not be taken up by other Arabs.

NOTE.—This has not been paraphrased, but is what the Arab said.

My informant also informed me that cereals were very expensive in Jabal Shammar and Kassim, and prices ranged five or six times as high as those on the Euphrates owing to the limited produce available in the regions mentioned. He explained that the fields are irrigated by water drawn from wells by camels, and these animals cannot stand the work, and in two months they become useless and are sold for a fifth of their original price and though there is plenty of water and arable land, for this reason they find it just as cheap to import their grain from the districts on the Euphrates. He has heard of the recent importations of pumps into Baghdad for purposes of irrigation and he is very much interested in the matter as he thinks that these appliances would meet with much favour in the regions indicated as the whole of the cultivable land may be brought under cultivation by their employment. He understands

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that the price of Russian kerosine oil necessary for working the oil-engine which drives the pump is about 20 per cent dearer in Jabal Shammar than at Koweit from where it will have to be procured, and that proper mechanics will have to be engaged to work the engines, &c., from Baghdad at a higher rate of pay than they receive locally. He wishes to procure definite information as regards a pumping plant capable of raising a similar quantity of water as 10 or 11 Bakras* from a depth of 8 to 9 metres. When the details are forthcoming he proposes to transmit them to the Amir of Jabal Shammar and suggest to him the purchase of such a pumping plant for erection at Havil as a trial. If the venture meets with success he declares that over 200 plants will be required in the localities mentioned alone. He asked me whether I would assist him in obtaining the details of a suitable plant—a plant that can be carried in pieces weighing from 2 to 2½ cwts. each for transport by camel.

* Water bags drawn by bullocks, known in India as "charas."

In respect of the appearance of several sections of the Aneza tribe of Arabs on the Euphrates between Musayib and Nedjef he stated that it was nothing unusual. He explained that it was customary for these Arabs to camp in that neighbourhood during this season of the year so long as the grazing round-about supported their camels, cattle and flocks. About 15 years ago the Aneza fell out with the Amir of Jabal Shammar and to avoid being raided by the Amir they kept aloof from the lower reaches of the Euphrates, but now that they have come to an understanding with the Amir they need no longer take that precaution. There are several thousands of tents scattered in groups of 200 to 500 throughout the region mentioned.

J. C. GASKIN.

24th September 1906.

Note by Major Ramsay.

Mr. Gaskin's informant is in a position to have the latest and most accurate information of what is going on in the Ibn Rashid camp and counsels. The interview took place in the house of an Indian Resident of Baghdad. I did not take part in it as my movements are carefully watched.


Mut'ib Ibn Rashid is said to have received an order on the Karbala District for £ T. 250 a month. This is not regularly paid and the local officials are trying to get a bribe to induce them to pay: this Mut'ib has refused to pay. From another source I hear that the Sultan's Aide-de-Camp, who went to take a decoration to Mut'ib, had got as far as Havil.

J. BAMSAY, *Major.*


29th September 1906.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 0335 F. D.—24-10-06.—20—B.B.C.

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Encl. No. 7.
Confidential.

No. 2344, dated Bushire, the 6th (received 15th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of the communications marginally noted, I have the honour to forward, for the information of Government of India, extracts from news-letters* since received from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, regarding the outlook in Nejd.

Letter No. 2181, dated 16th September 1906, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.
Telegram No. 378, dated 2nd October 1906, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

* Dated 18th and 26th September 1906.

Extract from a news letter, dated 18th September 1906, from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I write to let you know that Mubarak was again talking about Nejd and repeating how anxious Bin Saood was for protection.

He assured me that, whether helped by us or not, Bin Saood would certainly fight before submitting to the Turkish demands and that the people of Nejd would fight too. This is probably true as long as their side is winning but Abdul Aziz bin Saood has many enemies who would of course turn against him without hesitation at the first reverse.

* * * * * * * *

Extract from a news-letter, dated 26th September 1906, from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

The following news has reached me with reference to the situation in Nejd and seems to me to have its own significance.


The Turkish authorities are said to have addressed a letter to Meta'ab bin Rashid enquiring why he made peace with Abdul Aziz bin Saood and informing him that he had no authority to do so.

The Fariq, who passed through Koweit the other day, is said to have addressed the people of El Kassim in the following terms :—


"I do not wish to offer you advice and I admit that the soldiers we have here are not sufficient to take El Kassim and that you are more numerous and as well armed as we are. But, if 500 of us are killed and we kill 200 of you, we can replace our 500, but whence will you replace your 200? Nejd is a bit of string whereas the Turkish Government is like a bit of elastic *and the Turkish Government must have El Kassim.* Would it not be as well for you to put up with the light burden it is now sought to impose on you, rather than go through the process I have described?"

From the way this story was told and came into the conversation, I do not think that it was made up for my benefit.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C-348 F. D.—24-10-06—57.—R. S. W.



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Encl. No. 8.

[Confidential.]

No. 2438, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 24th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter marginally noted, giving cover to a copy of Mr. Crow's despatch No. 62 of 31st August 1906 to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on the subject of his interview with Sudgi Pasha, and referring also to the allowances paid by the Porte to the rivals in Nejd, I have the honour to forward, a copy of a report which I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, in reply to an enquiry on the latter subject, for the information of the Government of India. A copy is also being forwarded to His Majesty's Consul, Basrah.

Resident to Foreign, No. 2139, dated the 15th September 1906.

Koweit, No. 379, dated the 30th September 1906.

2. I take the opportunity to mention at the same time that I have since had an opportunity of discussing with Major Knox the subject of Sudgi Pasha's return from Nejd with 300 men *viâ Koweit*, which was reported in article 1039 of this Office Diary for the week ending 2nd September; and have the honour to invite consideration to an aspect of the incident which inevitably suggests itself.

It will doubtless have been noticed that the Turkish Officer and his men were got out of the place by Sheikh Mubarak with all possible despatch and although Sheikh Mubarak and his subjects would probably be too proud to admit that their presence in Koweit caused any actual trepidation, it can hardly be doubted that the pulses of both one and the other were considerably quickened by the unwelcome visitation.

On this occasion their arrival was fortuitous and their intentions were doubtless innocuous, but as a precedent the incident is a somewhat inconvenient one, for it is possible to conceive that the experiment might be repeated with a larger force from Nejd or Baghdad, and that having arrived by this means a Turkish force might for the time being easily possess themselves of the town and of Sheikh Mubarak by a *coup de main* similar to that which the Bedouins effected in Maskat in 1895.

3. I venture to draw attention to the possibility, in case it might be considered desirable for us to give Sheikh Mubarak any advice on the subject for future guidance, or to suggest to the Porte that the course taken in this case seems to us open to objection and calculated to disturb unnecessarily the minds of the Koweit public, including British subjects.

If the Porte wants to put troops into Nejd, or get them out of Nejd, it is reasonable to argue that they should use Ojair for the purpose and not the territory of a neutral Chief.

No. 379, dated the 30th September 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 2140, dated 15th September 1906, on the subject of the allowances paid to Bin Saood and Bin Rashid by the Turkish Government.

2. In reply, I have the honour to inform you that Sheikh Mubarak informs me that the allowances are fixed as follows :—

For Abdur Rahman bin Feysul bin Saood, Turkish £ 90 per mensem.

For Meta'ab bin Rashid, 200 tigars rice per annum and Turkish £200 per mensem.

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In addition to the above, Meta'ab's predecessors used to receive presents of arms and ammunition.


3. Sheikh Mubarak says that the allowances to Bin Rashid are paid through the Baghdad authorities, and that Yusuf Pasha bin Mandil, a Basrah merchant, draws the Saood allowances from the Basrah authorities and remits them by cheque to Abdulla Nafisi, a Koweit shopkeeper, who hands the money to Bin Saood's emissaries.

4. At the same time, enquiries I have made in another direction confirm His Britannic Majesty's Consul's statement that the allowances are paid through Sheikh Mubarak in the way indicated but, at the same time, my informant said that there was no regular channel and that the payments were made in whatever manner was most convenient.

5. While I was discussing this matter with Sheikh Mubarak, he suddenly turned to me and said "You have been asking me about Bin Rashid's and Bin Saood's pay, but you don't ask me any question about my pay?" I said "Surely, you don't draw any pay?". He replied "No, I do not, but the Turkish authorities at Basrah are for ever pressing me to accept it. Instead of that, I pay them and when they ask me for Turkish £200, I send them T. £600. I told them in reply to their insistence that the receipt of pay from the Turkish Government had ceased to be a source of honour and had, therefore, no longer any attractions for me and that, thanks be to God! I had plenty of money".

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C365 F. D.—6-11-06.—57—H.A.W.

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Enclo. No. 2.

[Confidential].

No. 2477, dated Bushire, the 21st (received 29th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of my telegram No. 396, dated 10th October 1906, I have the honour to forward copies of communications received from the Political Agent at Koweit, and His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, on the subject of a possible Arab Confederacy.

Koweit No. 1-C., dated 13th October 1906.
Mohammerah No. 52, dated 13th October 1906.
Mohammerah No. 54, dated 17th October 1906.

No. 1-C., dated Camp, the 13th October 1906.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement No. 2379, dated 10th October 1906, in which I am honoured by the request for an expression of my views as to the possible combination between the four Chiefs of Mohammerah, Koweit, Riadh and Hail with the view of forming an Arab Confederacy independent of any Foreign Power and especially of the Porte.

2. In reply, I have the honour to state that I think such a contingency extremely unlikely, and I am also of the opinion that neither Sheikh Mubarak nor Sheikh Khazal can possibly entertain any illusions as to the durability of such a confederacy.

3. First and foremost, the peace patched up between Abdul Aziz bin Saood and Meta'ab bin Rashid seems to be a hollow truce which will be broken on the first opportunity, *i.e.*, as soon as ever one of the conflicting parties sees his way to deal a telling blow at the strength and prestige of the other. It is true that Bin Saood would probably make considerable concessions to keep the Turk out of Nejd and El Kassim, but he can have no confidence in either the ability or willingness of Meta'ab bin Rashid to assist him in such an undertaking.


The Bin Rashid family, on the other hand, are in such low water just now that they would probably welcome Turkish interference and willingly accept a subordinate position under the Turkish authorities, provided the Bin Saood dynasty was destroyed.

Thus the two factions, apart from the jealousy which has now become a second nature to them and the long blood feud account still unsettled, are hopelessly divided on what may be called their foreign policy.

4. Indications have not been wanting to show that the bond that unites the families of As-Saood and As-Subah is a loose one and the Bedouins who live by plunder and lightly transfer their allegiance from one party to the other, as suits their own convenience, will almost certainly cause trouble between the two Chiefs, unless they both show a restraint and moderation utterly foreign to Arab nature. It is, I venture to think, only Bin Saood's dread of Turkish encroachment and dominion that has so far kept him wary of offending Sheikh Mubarak.

5. Nothing serves to unite the interests of As-Subah and Bin Rashid except a regard for the blessings of commerce and the maintenance of order. These considerations are not likely to weigh heavily with either side and least of all with Bin Rashid.

6. On the other hand, it would seem that Sheikhs Khazal and Mubarak have nothing whatever to quarrel about, while they are both large owners of date gardens, both draw a large income from the smuggling of arms and ammunition, both dislike the interference of the Belgian Customs, and both are anxious to maintain their independence, the one of Persian, and the other of Turkish,



dominion. Each can help the other in these questions by advice, information, mutual loans, combinations to raise the price of dates or rifles, etc. These matters alone would be quite sufficient to account for frequent conferences, and I think there is no reason to attribute to them the more far-reaching designs sketched out in the Government of India telegram, the impracticability of which the two Chiefs would be the first to realise.

No. 52, dated the 13th October 1906.

From—W. McDOUALL, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to your endorsement No. 2380 of October 10th to copies of telegrams concerning the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit and Central Arabia, that my views on the subject are practically those expressed in your telegram.

I have no information as to the objects of Sheikh Mubarak's visits except that he appears to be trying to effect a reconciliation with all his old enemies, and he can from the Sardar Arfa's Palace communicate with people at Basrah and elsewhere without attracting attention. Many of the influential Sheikhs such as Bin Rashid, Ghazban of the Beni Lam and others occasionally communicate with the Sardar Arfa.

As to the Sardar Arfa, from conversations with him, especially when Colonel Meade was here about seven years ago, I am certain that he is fully convinced that he cannot stand alone and, being a Shiah, prefers Persian, if it can last, to Turkish suzerainty. His fear has always been that Persia will break up and then he must find protection against Turkey. He considered the interests of the whole country in the vicinity of the Shatt-el-Arab identical and British negociations with Mubarak raised hopes that protection given to Koweit to the south of the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab would in time lead to protection being given to the north thereof, inhabited by his Arabs.

No. 54, dated the 17th October 1906.

From—W. McDOUALL, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah,


To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of my No. 52 of 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have made enquiries as to communication here between Sheikh Mubarak and Central Arabian Chiefs and am told that when he was here a month ago, a representative of Bin Rashid met him on board the "Iran" and Sheikh Khazal was heard to say "if you three are one I will support you" or words to that effect. On an Arab of Basrah, Ibn Mendil, coming alongside, Sheikh Khazal signed to Bin Rashid's man to withdraw. Nothing as to the subject discussed is known.

Whatever the subject may have been, I see no reason to alter my opinion as expressed in my letter under reference. Sheikh Khazal, even by those not friendly to him, is acknowledged to be the cleverest Sheikh who has ruled in these parts, and though he cultivates friendly relations with other powerful Sheikhs whenever possible, would not do anything to put himself in a false position with either the Persian or Turkish Government.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C. 378 F. D.—7-1 1-06.—57—B.S.S.

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Encl. No. 10.

No. 2480, dated Bushire, the 21st October 1906 (Confidential).

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 2438, dated 14th October 1906, I have the honour to forward a copy of a communication received from the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, on the subject of the *bin Saood* and *bin Rashid* representatives.

Baghdad No. 829, dated 8th October 1906.

No. 829, dated the 8th October 1906.

From—Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Acting British Consul-General, Baghdad,


To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter No. 2139, dated the 15th September 1906.


2. With my letter No. 803, dated the 29th September 1906, I sent to you a memorandum of information about Mut'ib ibn Rashid. I regret to say that I can get no reliable information about payments made by the Turkish authorities to Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud. I hear however from a pro-Rashid source that Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud used to get £ T. 30 a month from the Basrah Vilayet, and that he used also to receive annually 100 suits of clothes and some grain. My informant says that these allowances have now been stopped.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3759 F. D.—23-10-07—14—L. G. G.

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Encl. No. 11.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 2719, dated Bushire, the 24th November (received 4th December) 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Department telegram No. S.—148, dated 13th November 1906, repeating to me the terms of the reply cabled by His Majesty's Secretary of State to the Government of India's reference in connection with my letter No. 2181, dated 16th September 1906.

2. I note that His Majesty's Government adhere to their previous view that our interest must be confined to the coast; and it goes without saying that no steps will be taken without previous sanction to enter into relations with Nejd or to send agents to the interior; but my immediate difficulty is to find a suitable reply to the references made through the local officers by Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit and Sheikh Jasim of Katar on behalf of Bin Saood; references which have in no way been courted but which I cannot leave unanswered without incurring among the Chiefs concerned a reputation for personal negligence or discourtesy, which would be prejudicial to my work in other ways.

As it is obviously advisable that the replies vouchsafed to the references previously reported, as well as to the further one just received from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, which I now enclose, should be authoritative and in terms which would be considered suitable by His Majesty's Government, I shall be grateful for the advice of the Government of India as to the precise language which should be used.

Bahrein, No. 500, dated 17th November 1906, and enclosure.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 500, dated Bahrein, the 17th November 1906.

From—Captain F. B. Prideaux, Political Agent, Bahrein,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to report that on the 10th October 1906 I received a brief note, translation attached, from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, written with his own hand, requesting me to visit him for a few minutes' conversation.


2. It was inconvenient for me to go to Lusail within a reasonable time after the receipt of this note; I therefore deputed my Interpreter, Mr. Inamul Hak, to visit Sheikh Jasim, instructing him only to receive the old Chief's message, and not to give any reply in my name. Mr. Inamul Hak reached Lusail on the 23rd October 1906, and left the following day for Doha in the boat by which he had travelled from Bahrein, as he would otherwise have been detained at Lusail for an indefinite time waiting for a means of return.

3. Shaikh Jasim's message transpired to be connected with the affairs of Abdul Aziz bin Saood. The latter had requested his friend to communicate with me, because he suspected that the Chief of Koweit had been representing his cause to the Government of India in lukewarm manner and it seemed possible that Sheikh Mubarak was afraid of his own importance being overshadowed if Abdul Aziz succeeded in achieving his ends.

4. The resources of Nejd are stated to have been strained to the utmost by the recent internecine wars, and Bin Saood considers that the oases of Hasa and Katif were always the most profitable possessions of his Wahhabi ancestors. He is anxious, therefore, to recover the two districts and he proposes that a secret understanding should be arranged between the British Government and himself, under which he should be granted British protection from Turkish assaults at sea, in the event of his ever succeeding in driving the Turks, unaided, out of his ancestral dominions. In return for this protection the Amir is willing to bind himself to certain agreements (probably similar to

2919 F D

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those of the Trucial Chiefs) and to accept a Political Officer to reside at his Court. The details of this secret treaty he wishes to be settled or discussed at an interview which he is ready to give me either in person, or with his brother representing him, at some convenient rendezvous in the desert. Bin Saood is determined to make an effort to obtain possession of Hasa and Katif, for without the additional revenue which he can derive from these tracts, he admits that he is unable to control the tribes who menace the highways of commerce and pilgrimage. He proposes, therefore, in the first place, to apply to the Sultan for the Mutasarrif-lik (Governorship) of the districts, and to throw off the Turkish yoke as soon as he considers the moment favourable, after establishing himself. If his application is refused, he will invade the districts as soon as he is ready, and having captured them, he will appeal openly to the British Government for protection. If he fails, he will never betray the secret understanding between himself and the Government! Possibly he will not make his attempt, even, for four or five years more.

5. Such is the message, and Sheikh Jasim requests that the reply may be given to him only by word of mouth, when he will arrange to forward it on by trusted messenger.

6. I presume that the only answer possible is that while the British and Turkish Governments entertain friendly relations towards each other, it is impossible for the Government of India to enter into any such agreement as the Amir desires. I would like, however, to be permitted to add a warning to the Amir, that if he has never yet involved himself in any direct admission of subordination to the Sultan, as I understand he claims not to have done, he should be careful not to commit himself now unless he decides to abide by the consequences. It is generally believed by the Arabs in Bahrein, that the Turkish Government, finding that they are unable to collect revenue in the two districts and that the people are favourable towards Bin Saood, are themselves contemplating an invitation to the latter to assume the Government in the Sultan's name.

7. With regard to Sheikh Jasim's own health, my Interpreter reports that he appeared considerably stronger than last spring, and that his eyes are so much improved that he is able to attend to all his correspondence himself.

He seemed, however, to be downcast in mind, which Mr. Inamul Hak subsequently learnt was due to the fact that he had invested 80 lakhs of rupees in pearls this season at very high rates, and that he had found recently that he was likely to lose heavily in consequence of the subsequent fall in prices.


Translation of a letter from Sheikh JASIM BIN THANI, to Captain F. B. PRIDEAUX, Political Agent, Bahrein, dated the 19th of Sha'ban 1324 / 5th of October 1906.

After Compliments,—I beg to say that I have need of meeting you at Lusail, even if it be just for a quarter of an hour. I have just two words to say to you personally.

Seal.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2919 F. D—10-12-06.—41—N. N. R.

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Encl. No. 12.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 2738, dated Bushire, the 24th November (received 4th December) 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted communication which I have received from His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, regarding Nejd affairs.

No. 15, dated 10th November 1906.

Extract from His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople, No. 80, dated the 10th November 1906.

* * * * from information received at Basrah, I learn that the people of Kasim asked Sami Pasha to keep one battalion only and send the rest away. Sami Pasha is reported to have said that he must have four, whereupon the matter was referred by both sides to Constantinople. The Sultan instructed the Commander of the VI Army Corps at Baghdad to withdraw all troops from Kasim, except two battalions, and in a year's time to reduce the force to one battalion. Orders were sent about a month ago to Sami Pasha to this effect. It is said that there are nine battalions belonging to the VI Army Corps in Kasim but none are up to full strength. The effective of each battalion is reckoned at about 200 men. It is said that the troops are preparing to evacuate Kasim and that the troops sent from Medina will also be withdrawn.

I am also informed that Izzet Pasha received a letter from Sheikh Mubarak a few days ago forwarding £T.200, as the Sheikh had heard the barracks at Basrah were still unfinished. The letter was couched in obsequious terms, and Izzet Pasha was requested to inform the higher authorities of the Sheikh's further donation.

I have, etc.,

F. E. CROW.

No. 15.


Forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Resident at Bushire with the compliments of the undersigned.

F. E. CROW,
His Majesty's Consul.


Basrah;
The November 10th, 1906.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2923 F. D.—10-12-1906.—W. G. B.

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Enclo. No. 13.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 2799, dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 12th) December 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my two letters marginally noted by last mail, in connection with Nejd affairs, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a further communication which I have since received from the Political Agent, Koweit, reporting the details of a conversation which he has had with Sheikh Mubarak.

Nos. 2719 and 2738, dated 24th November 1906.

Koweit, No. 451, dated 20th November 1906.

The latter's remarks in behalf of Bin Saood's cause, as reported in paragraph 5 of Captain Knox's letter, are a repetition of his former representations, but his subsequent observations regarding the Baghdad Railway question, are of much interest as evidence of the astute concern which he takes in the political situation, and, at the same time, seem to me to bear out the view which I have all along maintained that, in spite of the coquetry with the Turks in which the force of circumstance obliges him periodically to indulge, Sheikh Mubarak has at bottom a genuine conviction that his salvation lies in close adherence to the Christian Power, at present Great Britain, which occupies a predominant position in the northern portion of the Gulf.

No. 451, dated the 20th November 1906.

From—Major S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to inform you that I have just returned this morning from a visit to Sheikh Mobarak at which he gave me the following news from Nejd.

2. He said that he had received letters from Bin Saood and from Bin Rashid, and that the former had told him that the Mutessarif with 1,200 men (Syrian troops) and 12 guns had left for Medina on the 15th Ramzan=3rd instant, and that on the first day of Shawal=19th instant, the Amir-ul-Alai (Commandant) with 1,100 Iraq men and 3 guns would return to Iraq.


3. Bin Saood also said that the Turkish authorities were very anxious to leave 200 men in El Kasim, of whom 100 men should remain in Boraida and 100 in Anaiza. To this, however, he and the headmen of El Kasim refused to consent, and eventually it was agreed that small detachments only should remain, *viz.*, 25 men in Boraida and 15 in Anaiza.

4. Bin Saood also said that he holds a paper signed by 80 Turkish Officers to say that they have found Bin Saood a loyal servant of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who has helped them to all they needed as far as possible; that Nejd is a poor country with an abominable climate, bad water and no supplies which can support Turkish troops.

5. Sheikh Mubarak ended this lengthy recital with comments on the affairs of Al Hassa which he said were in a very bad way, and he suggested that it would be an excellent thing if Bin Saood were to take Al Hassa and Katif, his ancestral property, and that he would then apply for the official protection of His Majesty's Government.

6. To this, I replied that I could make on this proposal no comment whatever, but that, as the Sheikh probably was perfectly well aware, all communications that he made to me were promptly passed on to you for transmission to higher authority who would send such instructions as they thought fit and that it was idle for me to speculate as to what views such authority would take.

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7. The Sheikh then mentioned that a large number of people at Kerbala had applied to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad for protection, and that the Muntafik country round Amara between the two Vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah was full of revolt, and that the railway would never reach the sea nor be prosperous unless it was in British control from Baghdad to the sea, and that the Sultan could draw the profit of it. He said that the Germans had been playing with the Porte, and remarked that it was England and her warships that had saved Constantinople at the close of the last Russo-Turkish War.

8. The Sheikh told me that he had no exact information as to the Turkish casualties, in Al Hassa, but that the Ajman declared that they had destroyed two troops (طابورين) and taken away their arms, and that more than half the Al Hassa garrison had been killed. He said that undoubtedly Fahad bin Hithlain, the Ajman Chief, now in Koweit, had captured a gun and had brought in two mules and many donkeys for sale in Koweit and would send in more.


9. Fahad bin Hithlain came to see me on the 19th instant, and with him an old and influential Sheikh of the Ajman, named Salim bin Muhammad of the Al Hadi Section. The Chief is a fine handsome young man of about 30 years of age. He looked lazy and goodnatured and talked but little, but he gave one the impression that he would be a leader of men, fierce and vindictive, if he were roused to action.

10. These two both exaggerated Sheikh Mubarak's account of their victory and said that the El Hassa townsmen with the soldiers had now tasted their vengeance and were ready to agree to any terms. They had offered to write off all claims for blood-shed and to pay up all arrears of allowances due to the Ajman Sheikhs, and especially sued that they might redeem the gun (offering for it T.£2,000) and to pay double prices for all arms and mules. Fahad refused to sell the gun, saying that he would send it either to Mubarak or to Bin Saood. The two Chiefs offered me a warm welcome if I came into their country, which begins about three days south of Koweit.

11. The Turkish withdrawal from Nejd, coupled with the news from Al Hassa, appears to have had an effect, very unfortunate for them, on public opinion in these parts and one might hazard the assertion that Sheikh Mubarak knows more than he told me about possible complications in Al Hassa and the Muntafik country.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3103 F. D.—15-12-1906.—57.—J. N. S.

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ENCLOSURE No. 14.

No. 3051, dated Bushire, the 16th December 1906 (Confidential).

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to paragraph 8 of Political Agent, Koweit's letter No. 451, dated 20th November 1906, which formed an enclosure to this office letter No. 2799, dated 2nd December 1906, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of the marginally noted communication which I have received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah, regarding disturbances in Hassa.

Paraphrase of a telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople, No. 84, dated 7th December 1906.

Telegram No. 84, dated the 7th December 1906.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah,


To—His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

A letter dated 12th November has been received from Hassa. According to the accounts given it appears that Arab tribes attacked the town on 22nd October and engaged the Turkish troops. The Turkish loss was considerable in men, mules and rifles, and Arabs captured a cannon. A village called Shiqeg, which belongs to the Seniye Department, was plundered and burnt. Money was paid to the tribes to retire, the captured cannon returned, and peace restored.


No. 16, dated Basrah, the 7th December 1906.

Forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Resident, Bushire, with the compliments of the undersigned.

F. E. CROW,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.



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Enclo. No. 15.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 29, dated Bushire, the 4th (received 15th) January 1907.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 2799, dated 2nd December 1906, I have the honour to forward copies of the communications marginally noted regarding the exodus of Turkish troops from Kasim.

News-letter from Political Agent, Koweit, date 25th December 1906.
Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah, dated 31st December 1906.

2. The Government of India have already learnt from the enclosures to my letter No. 3051, dated 16th December 1906, and the previous report alluded to therein, of the difficulties in which the Turkish garrison of Al Hassa recently found themselves; and the incidence of these simultaneous set-backs, added to the prevalent knowlege of their want of success in Yemen cannot fail both greatly to depreciate the prestige of the Porte in Central Arabia and to strengthen the confidence of Bin Saood, of which mention has frequently been made of late, in his ability to make a clean sweep of Turkish troops from his particular sphere.

Dated Camp Wara, the 25th December 1906.

From—Major S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


Some interesting news reached me yesterday by a lucky chance. I think I have already told you of one Turkish soldier who came into my camp. Yesterday we got another who still wears a few rags of uniform but had no rifle nor ammunition. This is his account of his adventures. He reached Safa wells with the other soldiers but a few hours out he fell ill, buried his rifle and lay down by it. He was picked up with his rifle by some townsmen who brought him along on their camels as far as Gara, the plateau on the far side of the Shaq about opposite Subaihiya. There they took his rifle, bound him and left him to die. A passing Bedouin unbound him, gave him food and drink and set him on his way again. He was eventually found by Jafir, one of my sowars and brought in. He is a native of Moosul and is accompanying my Camp into Koweit.

About tea time in came Misfir, an Ajman Bedouin, whom I enlisted as sowar when I formed my camel escort and never saw again. He got leave to hunt for his Thalool and wandered up to Nejd where Bin Saood chose the old gentleman, a well known guide, to act as rafiq to the Turkish soldiers and sent him down to Koweit paying him reals thirty-five for his services. He was 25 days on the road and started with them from Boraida. He reckons the number of Turkish soldiers who came at from 7—800. They had six guns with them, two large and four small. Their transport was about 2,000 camels. They got 700 camels from Anaiza and about 800 from Boraida and about 700 from Zilfi. They were all the property of townsmen and were commandeered by Bin Saood's orders, but hire was paid in advance. Twelve reals per camel was paid for the journey which was cheap enough. I suppose it was all they could screw out of the Turks and the people were only too glad to see El Kasim quit of them. Misfir knows that only 8 soldiers were left in Anaiza and he thinks the same quantity in Boraida.

Sheikh Mubarak turned the soldiers off to their left and would not permit them to enter Koweit nor even Jahra but sent Abdul Aziz bin Salim bin Badar with provisions out for them.

Misfir gave me also the following details about Nejd affairs. The Amir of Boraida is Khalid bin Abdulla Abul Khail, who is a cousin of Salehul Mohanna, the ex-Amir who, Misfir assures me, is not dead but still in prison under Bin Saood's orders. Misfir tells me that he has spoken with the man who supplies him with food and drink. Saleh's death was reported by me

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some time ago. The term Abul Khail appears to be an alternative for Al Mohanna. I have never heard it before. The Amir of Anaiza is Abdul Aziz us Salaim. He was appointed by the townsmen of Anaiza while Khalid bin Abdulla of Boraida is a nominee of Bin Saood. It appears, according to Misfir, that no Turkish representative of standing has been left in either of the towns and that the soldiers are under the orders of the two Amirs.

Telegram, dated the 31st December 1906.


From—F. E. Crow, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Please refer to my telegram No. 79. On December the 28th 900 more men arrived from Kassim, thus making out of the seven battalions a total of 1,050. They are in a miserable condition. Sami Pasha, I am informed, left for Medina and there remain in Kassim only 26 soldiers.

Addressed Constantinople. Repeated Bushire.

G. I., C. P. O.—No. 3745 F. D.—22-1-1907—57—S. B.

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Encl. No. 16.

(*Confidential.*)

No. 157, dated Bushire, the 20th (received 29th) January 1907.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to refer to my letter No. 2438, dated 14th October 1906, in which I ventured to suggest certain inconvenient aspects of the inclination evinced by the Turks to make use of Koweit, without reference to Sheikh Mubarak, as a base or channel for the ingress and egress of their troops to and from Nejd.

2. In the same connection, I beg to attach extracts from recent newsletters from the Political Agents at Koweit and Bahrein, for the information of the Government of India.

Political Agent, Bahrein, to Resident, No. 545, dated 16th December 1906.
Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, dated 23rd December 1906.

In the particular case mentioned by Captain Prideaux, on receiving his letter I took steps forthwith to find out from Basrah what foundation there was for the report current at Bahrein and to ascertain the probable movements of the S.S. *John Scott* which had been chartered to convey the troops; and as she ended in proceeding direct to Katif, it was not necessary to trouble Government with a reference; but in regard to the general question involved, I share Captain Prideaux's opinion, and in view of the fact recently reported, that the Porte has issued instructions to the local officials at Basrah to treat Koweit and Bahrein as integral portions of the Ottoman Empire, I shall be glad to be favoured with the views of Government on the subject.

No. 545, dated the 16th December 1906.

From—Captain F. B. Prideaux, I.A., Political Agent, Bahrein,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have just heard that a Turkish transport is expected here in two or three days' time, and that it is proposed to land the troops here for conveyance in sailing boats to their destinations—Katif, Ojair and Doha, or perhaps only one or two of these places. In any case, it is believed that the steamer will not go to any of the mainland ports herself. I hear also that she will fire two guns on her arrival here, whether as a salute to the Sheikh or to let Katif know of her arrival, I cannot say.


This procedure (landing the troops) it seems to me is only justifiable when the port is a component part of the Turkish Empire, and would not be tolerated in any other circumstances except after special diplomatic correspondence and the obtaining of the Ruler's permission.

It is not likely that the Turks will formally apply to Sheikh Esa for sanction, nor will it be regular for him to accord it direct. It seems to me that the landing of a considerable body from a troopship is very different to booking small parties by the ordinary mail-steamer and allowing them to tranship here.

Dated the 23rd December 1906.

From—Major S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


A Turkish soldier or hanger on turned up yesterday at my camp. He is one of a large body that passed not very far from us and we have seen other stragglers. It appears that a body of about 1,000 is moving down from Nejd, and I hear that Sheikh Mubarak, who is in camp at Jehra, has sent men out to divert them in his direction *and not to allow them to enter the town.* My friend, who has come to my camp, tells me that the larger party of troops were



2

those who returned to Medina and that it is the smaller division who are returning to Baghdad. He says that the Baghdad force was originally much the larger, but that, while only 100 men were actually killed in battle, 2,000 died of disease and starvation. He himself, though he looks healthy and well fed, was in a pretty deplorable state of destitution. He has no boots or shoes and only one garment—a coarse brown overcoat very tattered. One leg was badly swollen and the other foot had double blisters. I operated and dressed his blisters and am giving him food and lodging until we leave, but two days' rest will probably set him up and fit him to get to Koweit.

G. I. C., P. O.—No. 3068 F. D.—1-2-1907—57—G. R.



ENCLOSURE No. 17.

Extract from the diary of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week ending 6th January 1907. Received 15th January 1907.


* * * * *

BAHREIN.


14. *22nd to 28th December.*—It has been reported from Katif that a chartered steamer of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company arrived at Katif (Ras Tanura anchorage) from Basrah on the 27th December. She brought two Taburs (battalions) of Turkish soldiers, and a quantity of rice for Haji Mansur Pasha.

* * * * *

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000a9



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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000aa



1907.

FORT WILLIAM.


FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.


External.

No. 28, DATED THE 21ST FEBRUARY 1907.

List of Enclosures.



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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000ac



India Office, London,
29th April 1904.

Secret,
No. 24.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

I have considered the letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 69 (Foreign Secret), of the 24th March last, on the subject of the measures to be taken to obtain more reliable knowledge of the progress of events in Nejd.

Question of deputing a British Officer to visit the interior of Arabia.


2. I forward, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence* with the Foreign Office on the subject, and would invite your Excellency's attention to Lord Lansdowne's Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 15th February 1904, No. 50, and His Excellency's reply, dated the 26th February 1904, No. 129.

* To Foreign Office, dated 4th February 1904.
From ditto, dated 6th February 1904.
Telegram to Viceroy, dated 8th February 1904.
From Foreign Office, dated 18th March 1904, and enclosures.
To ditto, dated 29th April 1904.


3. His Majesty's Government agree in the opinion at which you have arrived, that it would not be expedient at present to send an officer to Riadh on a mission of enquiry. Should the circumstances hereafter induce your Government to revive the proposal for my further consideration, I shall desire to be informed as to the methods by which it is proposed to conduct the investigation.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) St. John Brodrick.

S. 21. A



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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000ae



ENCLOSURES.

Enclosure No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.

India Office,
4th February 1904.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will draw the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the enclosed copy of correspondence between the Government of India and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in which a proposal is made to depute a European officer to visit Riadh.

I am to say that Mr. Brodrick feels considerable doubt as to the expediency of the suggested step, and I am to enclose the draft* of a telegram which he proposes, with Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, to address to the Viceroy.

* *See* Enclosure No. 3.

I am, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

Enclosure No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office,
6th February 1904.

Sir,

I have laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of 4th February, forwarding correspondence between the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Government of India, on the subject of a visit of Sheikh Abdul Rahman-bin-Salman to the Assistant Political Agent at Bahrein, with the object of entering into closer relations with His Majesty's Government.

Lord Lansdowne concurs in the telegram which Mr. Brodrick proposes to address to the Government of India to the effect that no steps are to be taken for sending agents to Nejd, or for entering into closer relations with the tribes, without the sanction of His Majesty's Government.

His Lordship, as at present advised, doubts the wisdom of entering upon a negotiation with the tribes in question, but, before replying upon the subject, he desires to consult His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I am, &c.,
T. H. SANDERSON.


The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Enclosure No. 3.

Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
8th February 1904.

P.—Please refer to the letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Resident in the Persian Gulf,

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No. 36, dated the 6th January last. The previous sanction of His Majesty's Government must be obtained before any steps are taken with a view to entering into closer relations with Nejd or to sending agents there.

Enclosure No. 4.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office,
18th March 1904.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 4th ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of correspondence with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the proposal of the Government of India to send a Political Agent to enquire into the condition of Nejd.

It will be observed that Sir N. O'Conor does not consider that this step would be advisable at the present moment, though he is of opinion that the proposal should be borne in mind.

I am accordingly to suggest that the Government of India should be informed that His Majesty's Government would prefer that no such action should be taken for the present.

The question might be made the subject of further consideration when more detailed information is received as to the methods by which it is proposed that the investigation should be conducted.

I am, &c.,
T. H. SANDERSON.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Annex 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor.

No. 50. (Confidential.)

Foreign Office,
15th February 1904.

Sir,


I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the India Office, forwarding correspondence relative to the condition of affairs in the interior of Turkish Arabia, in which a proposal is made by the Government of India that a European officer should visit Riadh in order to report on the state of the tribes.

I also enclose a copy of the reply which I have caused to be returned.

Your Excellency will observe that the Government of India have been informed that no steps are to be taken to enter into closer relations with Nejd, or to send agents there, without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government.

It will be within your Excellency's recollection that, since the date of the Koweit Agreement, proposals have successively been made for the extension of British protection to the territories of the Sheikhs of Koweit and El Katr and of the Amir of Nejd, and that on each occasion His Majesty's Government have, after full consideration of the circumstances, decided that it would be inexpedient to incur the difficulties and embarrassments involved. In the present instance, though it is no doubt desirable that His Majesty's Government should be in possession of fuller information with regard to the interior of Arabia, the proposed course of deputing a European officer would, in all probability, lead to further proposals for establishing closer relations with the Saud family, to which there would be objections at least as

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great as in the case of the overtures made on behalf of the Chiefs of Nejd and El Katr.

In particular, the advice repeatedly given to Sheikh Mubarek of Koweit to abstain from all participation in the insurrectionary movement against the Amir of Nejd, of which the Saud family are the prime movers, renders it inadvisable that His Majesty's Government should be committed to any course of action which would appear to give encouragement to the latter, or which could be represented by the Turkish Government as a breach of the understanding between the two Governments for the maintenance of the *status quo* in those regions.

Before, however, replying finally to the India Office, I should be glad to be furnished with your Excellency's observations upon the subject.

I am, &c.,
LANSDOWNE.

The Right Hon. Sir N. R. O'Conor, G.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

Annex 2.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

No. 129. (Confidential.) Constantinople.
My Lord, 26th February 1904.

In your Despatch, No. 50 (Confidential), of the 15th instant, your Lordship is good enough to ask my opinion regarding a proposal to send a political agent into the interior of Arabia to report on the condition of the tribes, more especially with regard to the situation of affairs at Riadh and Nejd.

I venture to express my concurrence in the objections stated in your Lordship's above-mentioned Despatch to sending a special emissary to either place, at all events just at a moment when the susceptibilities of the Turkish Government have been excited by the visit of the Viceroy of India to the Arabian Coast, and the hopes of the Arabs, who are well disposed towards His Majesty's Government, have been raised to a point which may indirectly encourage them to engage in a movement against the Ottoman rule and authority.

At the same time, I feel that it would be no doubt useful to have fuller information than we possess in regard to the position of affairs in the interior, and while thinking the present moment unfavourable, I consider it most important not to lose sight of the proposal. The troubled condition of affairs and the internecine feuds, which threaten at any moment to assume formidable proportions, make it very important that we should understand the exact condition of affairs, and be in a position to make up our minds as to the policy to be followed in case of a serious revolutionary outbreak and the cessation of Ottoman rule in El Hasa.

I have, &c.,
N. R. O'CONOR.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
&c., &c., &c.

Enclosure No. 5.

India Office to Foreign Office.

India Office,
Sir, 29th April 1904.

With reference to your letter of the 18th March last on the question of the proposal of the Government of India to send a Political officer to inquire into the condition of affairs in Nejd, I am

directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to forward, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, a copy of a Despatch* which has been received from the Government of India on the subject, and of Mr. Brodrick's reply.†

It will be seen that the Government of India, having regard to the views expressed in the letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, of the 5th February 1904, do not consider it expedient to take any steps in the matter at present. They state, however, that, should the development of the political situation in Nejd appear to them to render it desirable, they will again address His Majesty's Government on the subject of the policy to be pursued.


Mr. Brodrick, it will be observed, has informed the Government of India that His Majesty's Government agree in the view that no action in the matter should be taken for the present.

I have, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

* No. 69, Secret, dated 24th March 1904, and enclosures.

† No. 24, Secret, dated 29th April 1904, and enclosures.



Register No. 326

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Telegram / Letter from Viceroy, Dated 15 / Rec. 16 Feb. 1907

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	17 Feb	WW	Arabia.
Secretary of State	18	AG	Bin Saood's overtures to Gt. Britain.
Committee	19.	JM.	Govt. of India are sending a despatch reviewing the situation in E. Arabia: the answer which they suggest should be sent to Bin Saood - orally through Sheikh Jasim or such other agency as Pol. Resident may recommend
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to

70 (+) 21.2.07. (P) 23.2.07

India (P) 8 March

most dangerous in a case of this sort DM

For information.

Presumably we should await the promised despatch


Seen Pol Com'ee., 28 FEB. 1907

Previous Papers:—


189

Y 11801. 2000.—4'1906. I. 632.

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326 pp. 189

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.


COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM + Viceroy


DATED Calcutta 15 Feb. 1907

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 10.8 p.m.

Foreign Secret. Your telegram of Feb. 14th. We are sending Despatch covering situation in Eastern Arabia and suggesting that answer be conveyed to Bin Saood to the effect that British Government while anxious to maintain friendly relations with him so long as he comports himself in a manner consonant with British interests and our engagements with Arab Sheikhs on coast see no necessity at present for making him any formal promises of the protection which might even have effect of stimulating Turkish opposition to consolidation of his authority. Answer might be conveyed orally through Sheikh Jasim or such other agency as our Resident in the Persian Gulf may recommend.



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Minute Paper.

Register No. [2564-5] 189

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from 70. Dated 4, 19, 19, 3 } Jany. 1907.
Sep. Letter from India, No. 1 M., Rec. 4, 21, 21, 19 }
Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	22 Dec	RK	Arabia.
Secretary of State	23	ag	Nejd affairs. Accounts of fighting.
Committee	23.	[illegible]	troubles in El Hassa.
Under Secretary.....	31	RR	Ibn Saood's desire for a treaty with Gt. Britain.
Secretary of State	1	ag	his wish to turn the Turks out of Hasa and Katif and to hold them with the help of Great Britain.

Copy to 70. 16/2/07 [189]

COPY TO INDIA (2564-5) 15 February 1907 SECRETARY'S No. 7

If the forces are to be "authorised": I do! Like to see them before they go to Mr. Cox.

For information


See especially Major Cox's letter of 24 Nov as to messages received from Ibn Saood, which he thinks will have to be answered "authorised"

See telegram to Viceroy 17th instant


Secn Pol Com'ee., 29 JAN 1907


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
Y 11891. 2000.—4/1906. L. 652.




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





189
Draft telegram
Viceroy
[via Bushire]
Foreign Secret. Wejo. Cox's
letter 24: Nov: No: 2719. Do
you consider reply to Sheikh
Jasim's message necessary.
If so I should like to see
terms you propose would
reply be by letter or one
message
Seen Pol Corresp
9 FEB 1907
Copy to I.O. (P) 16.2.07.
" " India (+TP) 22.2.07.
Send
Mr.
1/2/07.
+Sent 1/2/07



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189.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 2719, dated Bushire, the 24th November (received 4th December) 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Department telegram No. S.—148, dated 13th November 1906, repeating to me the terms of the reply cabled by His Majesty's Secretary of State to the Government of India's reference in connection with my letter No. 2181, dated 16th September 1906.

2. I note that His Majesty's Government adhere to their previous view that our interest must be confined to the coast; and it goes without saying that no steps will be taken without previous sanction to enter into relations with Nejd or to send agents to the interior; but my immediate difficulty is to find a suitable reply to the references made through the local officers by Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit and Sheikh Jasim of Katar on behalf of Bin Saood; references which have in no way been courted but which I cannot leave unanswered without incurring among the Chiefs concerned a reputation for personal negligence or discourtesy, which would be prejudicial to my work in other ways.

As it is obviously advisable that the replies vouchsafed to the references previously reported, as well as to the further one just received from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, which I now enclose, should be authoritative and in terms which would be considered suitable by His Majesty's Government, I shall be grateful for the advice of the Government of India as to the precise language which should be used.

Bahrein, No. 500, dated 17th November 1906, and enclosure.

[*Confidential.*]

No. 500, dated Bahrein, the 17th November 1906.

From—Captain F. B. Prideaux, Political Agent, Bahrein,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to report that on the 10th October 1906 I received a brief note, translation attached, from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, written with his own hand, requesting me to visit him for a few minutes' conversation.


2. It was inconvenient for me to go to Lusail within a reasonable time after the receipt of this note; I therefore deputed my Interpreter, Mr. Inamul Hak, to visit Sheikh Jasim, instructing him only to receive the old Chief's message, and not to give any reply in my name. Mr. Inamul Hak reached Lusail on the 23rd October 1906, and left the following day for Doha in the boat by which he had travelled from Bahrein, as he would otherwise have been detained at Lusail for an indefinite time waiting for a means of return.

3. Shaikh Jasim's message transpired to be connected with the affairs of Abdul Aziz bin Saood. The latter had requested his friend to communicate with me, because he suspected that the Chief of Koweit had been representing his cause to the Government of India in lukewarm manner and it seemed possible that Sheikh Mubarak was afraid of his own importance being overshadowed if Abdul Aziz succeeded in achieving his ends.

4. The resources of Nejd are stated to have been strained to the utmost by the recent internecine wars, and Bin Saood considers that the oases of Hasa and Katif were always the most profitable possessions of his Wahhabi ancestors. He is anxious, therefore, to recover the two districts and he proposes that a secret understanding should be arranged between the British Government and himself, under which he should be granted British protection from Turkish assaults at sea, in the event of his ever succeeding in driving the Turks, unaided, out of his ancestral dominions. In return for this protection the Amir is willing to bind himself to certain agreements (probably similar to

2919 F D

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000bd



2

those of the Trucial Chiefs) and to accept a Political Officer to reside at his Court. The details of this secret treaty he wishes to be settled or discussed at an interview which he is ready to give me either in person, or with his brother representing him, at some convenient rendezvous in the desert. Bin Saood is determined to make an effort to obtain possession of Hasa and Katif, for without the additional revenue which he can derive from these tracts, he admits that he is unable to control the tribes who menace the highways of commerce and pilgrimage. He proposes, therefore, in the first place, to apply to the Sultan for the Mutasarrif-lik (Governorship) of the districts, and to throw off the Turkish yoke as soon as he considers the moment favourable, after establishing himself. If his application is refused, he will invade the districts as soon as he is ready, and having captured them, he will appeal openly to the British Government for protection. If he fails, he will never betray the secret understanding between himself and the Government! Possibly he will not make his attempt, even, for four or five years more.

5. Such is the message, and Sheikh Jasim requests that the reply may be given to him only by word of mouth, when he will arrange to forward it on by trusted messenger.

6. I presume that the only answer possible is that while the British and Turkish Governments entertain friendly relations towards each other, it is impossible for the Government of India to enter into any such agreement as the Amir desires. I would like, however, to be permitted to add a warning to the Amir, that if he has never yet involved himself in any direct admission of subordination to the Sultan, as I understand he claims not to have done, he should be careful not to commit himself now unless he decides to abide by the consequences. It is generally believed by the Arabs in Bahrein, that the Turkish Government, finding that they are unable to collect revenue in the two districts and that the people are favourable towards Bin Saood, are themselves contemplating an invitation to the latter to assume the Government in the Sultan's name.

7. With regard to Sheikh Jasim's own health, my Interpreter reports that he appeared considerably stronger than last spring, and that his eyes are so much improved that he is able to attend to all his correspondence himself.

He seemed, however, to be downcast in mind, which Mr. Inamul Hak subsequently learnt was due to the fact that he had invested 80 lakhs of rupees in pearls this season at very high rates, and that he had found recently that he was likely to lose heavily in consequence of the subsequent fall in prices.


Translation of a letter from Sheikh JASIM BIN THANI, to Captain F. B. PRIDEAUX, Political Agent, Bahrein, dated the $\frac{10\text{th of Sha'ban } 1324}{5\text{th of October } 1906}$.

After Compliments,—I beg to say that I have need of meeting you at Lusail, even if it be just for a quarter of an hour. I have just two words to say to you personally.

Seal.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2919 F. D—10-12-06.—41—N. N. B.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000be



[*Confidential.*]

No. 2738, dated Bushire, the 24th November (received 4th December) 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted communication which I have received from His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, regarding Nejd affairs.

No. 15, dated 10th November 1906.

Extract from His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople, No. 80, dated the 10th November 1906.

* * * * from information received at Basrah, I learn that the people of Kasim asked Sami Pasha to keep one battalion only and send the rest away. Sami Pasha is reported to have said that he must have four, whereupon the matter was referred by both sides to Constantinople. The Sultan instructed the Commander of the VI Army Corps at Baghdad to withdraw all troops from Kasim, except two battalions, and in a year's time to reduce the force to one battalion. Orders were sent about a month ago to Sami Pasha to this effect. It is said that there are nine battalions belonging to the VI Army Corps in Kasim but none are up to full strength. The effective of each battalion is reckoned at about 200 men. It is said that the troops are preparing to evacuate Kasim and that the troops sent from Medina will also be withdrawn.

I am also informed that Izzet Pasha received a letter from Sheikh Mubarak a few days ago forwarding £T.200, as the Sheikh had heard the barracks at Basrah were still unfinished. The letter was couched in obsequious terms, and Izzet Pasha was requested to inform the higher authorities of the Sheikh's further donation.

I have, etc.,

F. E. CROW.


No. 15.

Forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Resident at Bushire with the compliments of the undersigned.


F. E. CROW,
His Majesty's Consul.

Basrah;
The November 10th, 1906.

G. I. C. P, O.—No. 2023 F, D.—10-12-1906.—W. G. B.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000c0



[*Confidential.*]

No. 2799, dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 12th) December 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my two letters marginally noted by last mail, in connection with Nejd affairs, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a further communication which I have since received from the Political Agent, Koweit, reporting the details of a conversation which he has had with Sheikh Mubarak.

Nos. 2719 and 2738, dated 24th November 1906.

Koweit, No. 451, dated 20th November 1906.

The latter's remarks in behalf of Bin Saood's cause, as reported in paragraph 5 of Captain Knox's letter, are a repetition of his former representations, but his subsequent observations regarding the Baghdad Railway question, are of much interest as evidence of the astute concern which he takes in the political situation, and, at the same time, seem to me to bear out the view which I have all along maintained that, in spite of the coquetry with the Turks in which the force of circumstance obliges him periodically to indulge, Sheikh Mubarak has at bottom a genuine conviction that his salvation lies in close adherence to the Christian Power, at present Great Britain, which occupies a predominant position in the northern portion of the Gulf.

No. 451, dated the 20th November 1906.

From—Major S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to inform you that I have just returned this morning from a visit to Sheikh Mobarak at which he gave me the following news from Nejd.

2. He said that he had received letters from Bin Saood and from Bin Rashid, and that the former had told him that the Mutessarif with 1,200 men (Syrian troops) and 12 guns had left for Medina on the 15th Ramzan=3rd instant, and that on the first day of Shawal=19th instant, the Amir-ul-Alai (Commandant) with 1,100 Iraq men and 3 guns would return to Iraq.


3. Bin Saood also said that the Turkish authorities were very anxious to leave 200 men in El Kasim, of whom 100 men should remain in Boraida and 100 in Anaiza. To this, however, he and the headmen of El Kasim refused to consent, and eventually it was agreed that small detachments only should remain, *viz.*, 25 men in Boraida and 15 in Anaiza.

4. Bin Saood also said that he holds a paper signed by 80 Turkish Officers to say that they have found Bin Saood a loyal servant of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who has helped them to all they needed as far as possible; that Nejd is a poor country with an abominable climate, bad water and no supplies which can support Turkish troops.

5. Sheikh Mubarak ended this lengthy recital with comments on the affairs of Al Hassa which he said were in a very bad way, and he suggested that it would be an excellent thing if Bin Saood were to take Al Hassa and Katif, his ancestral property, and that he would then apply for the official protection of His Majesty's Government.

6. To this, I replied that I could make on this proposal no comment whatever, but that, as the Sheikh probably was perfectly well aware, all communications that he made to me were promptly passed on to you for transmission to higher authority who would send such instructions as they thought fit and that it was idle for me to speculate as to what views such authority would take.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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7. The Sheikh then mentioned that a large number of people at Kerbala had applied to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad for protection, and that the Muntafik country round Amara between the two Vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah was full of revolt, and that the railway would never reach the sea nor be prosperous unless it was in British control from Baghdad to the sea, and that the Sultan could draw the profit of it. He said that the Germans had been playing with the Porte, and remarked that it was England and her warships that had saved Constantinople at the close of the last Russo-Turkish War.

8. The Sheikh told me that he had no exact information as to the Turkish casualties, in Al Hassa, but that the Ajman declared that they had destroyed two troops (طابورين) and taken away their arms, and that more than half the Al Hassa garrison had been killed. He said that undoubtedly Fahad bin Hithlain, the Ajman Chief, now in Koweit, had captured a gun and had brought in two mules and many donkeys for sale in Koweit and would send in more.


9. Fahad bin Hithlain came to see me on the 19th instant, and with him an old and influential Sheikh of the Ajman, named Salim bin Muhammad of the Al Hadi Section. The Chief is a fine handsome young man of about 30 years of age. He looked lazy and goodnatured and talked but little, but he gave one the impression that he would be a leader of men, fierce and vindictive, if he were roused to action.

10. These two both exaggerated Sheikh Mubarak's account of their victory and said that the El Hassa townsmen with the soldiers had now tasted their vengeance and were ready to agree to any terms. They had offered to write off all claims for blood-shed and to pay up all arrears of allowances due to the Ajman Sheikhs, and especially sued that they might redeem the gun (offering for it T.£2,000) and to pay double prices for all arms and mules. Fahad refused to sell the gun, saying that he would send it either to Mubarak or to Bin Saood. The two Chiefs offered me a warm welcome if I came into their country, which begins about three days south of Koweit.

11. The Turkish withdrawal from Nejd, coupled with the news from Al Hassa, appears to have had an effect, very unfortunate for them, on public opinion in these parts and one might hazard the assertion that Sheikh Mubarak knows more than he told me about possible complications in Al Hassa and the Muntafik country.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3103 F. D.—15-12-1906.—67.—J. N. S.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Confidential.

No. 3051 of 1906.

British Residency and Consulate General,
Bushire, 16th. December 1906.

From

Major P. Z. Cox, C. I. E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 19 JAN 1907

To

Sir Louis Dane, K. C. I. E., C. S. I.,
Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, CALCUTTA.

Sir,


With reference to paragraph 8 of Political Agent, Koweit's letter No. 451, dated 20th November 1906 which formed an enclosure to this office letter No.2799 dated 2nd December 1906, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India,

Paraphrase of a telegram No.84 dated 7th December 1906, from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, to His Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople.	copy of the marginally noted communication which I have


received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, regarding disturbances in Hassa.

I have, etc.,

Sd/- P. Z. Cox,
Major,
Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754160.0x0000c4



Paraphrase of telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, to His Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople.

No. 84, dated 7th December 1906.

A letter dated November 12th. has been received from Hassa. According to the accounts given it appears that Arab tribes attacked the town on October 22nd. and engaged the Turkish troops. The Turkish loss was considerable in men, mules and rifles, and Arabs captured a cannon. A village walled Shiqeg, which belongs to the Seniye Department was plundered and burnt. Money was paid to the tribes to retire, the captured cannon returned, and peace restored.

No. 16.


Forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Resident, Bushire, with the compliments of the undersigned.


Sd/- F. E. Crow,

H. B. M's Consul.

Bussorah.

December 7th 1906.





2562 .

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 1401.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 21 JAN 1907

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
January 19, 1907.


Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Mr. Barclay No. 3 January 4.	Withdrawal of Turkish troops from Kasaam.

Copy to India 15 Feb 07 Secy 7.

[12]



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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CONSTANTINOPLE.
January 4th, 1906.


Sir:-


With reference to my despatch No.824 of the 27th ultimo I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Basra, according to which 1,050 men have by now arrived there from Kassim, all in a miserable condition. Mr. Crow hears that Sami Pasha has left for Medina and that only 26 soldiers remain in Kassim.

I have &c.,

(Signed) G. Barclay.

The Right Honourable
Sir E. Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.,





2505 Circulates with 109

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 1411.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 21 JAN 1907

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, *and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,
January 19, 1907.


Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Mr. Barclay No. 15 January 8.	Troubles in El Hassa.

Copy to India 15 Feb '07 Secy 7

[12]



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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CONSTANTINOPLE.

January 8th, 1907.

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
Sir:-


I have the honour to forward herewith a Despatch as marked in the margin, from His Majesty's Consul at Basra reporting troubles in El Hassa.

I have &c.,

(Signed) G. Barclay.

is Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.





B A S R A .

December 8th, 1906.


o. 82.
14...).


Sir:-

With reference to my telegram 84 of December 7th I have received the following report regarding the recent troubles in El Hassa.

A letter from Hassa dated October 29th 1322/November 12th 1906 received here by Mahmoud Bey, Tabour Agassi of Hassa, states that twenty days ago the town of Hassa was surrounded day and night by Arabs of the El Ajman and other Bedouin tribes, in consequence of the murder of Abdullah Bin Jaber, a merchant of Hassa. The townsmen fled; 8,000 men of Hassa, 600 infantry and 200 mounted men united and attacked the tribes. During the engagement which followed two lieutenants and 72 infantry were killed and 57 men wounded on the Turkish side, and 85 mules, 125 rifles and one gun were captured by the Arabs. A village named Shigegg belonging

. Barclay, Esq., C.M.G.,
&c., &c., &c.,






belonging to the Seniye department, situated about two hours from Hassa was plundered and burnt by the tribes and many villagers were killed and wounded. In the Hahimiye garden, four soldiers were killed and two sergeants of the gendarmerie wounded and 16 rifles were captured. The inhabitants of other villages gave money and dates to the Arabs to leave them alone and so escaped. The tribes then made peace with the people of Hassa and on receiving 700 rials (£70) restored the captured gun.

I have &c.,


(Signed) F. E. Crow.



belonging to the Sanjiq department, situated about two
hours from Haeea was plundered and burnt by the tribes
and many villagers were killed and wounded. In the
Hafnimiye garden, four soldiers were killed and two
sergeants of the gendarmerie wounded and 16 rifles
were captured. The inhabitants of other villages
gave money and dates to the Arabs to leave them alone
and so escaped. The tribes then made peace with the
people of Haeea and on receiving 700 rials (£70)
restored the captured gun.

I have &c.,

(Signed) P. E. Crow.



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RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 4 JAN 1907

ASIATIC TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[December 17.]

SECTION 1.

[42085] No. 1.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 17.)


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
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 10, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to a telegram received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, an engagement took place at Hassa (presumably El Hofuf is meant) on the 22nd October between Turkish troops and Arab tribes who had attacked the town. The Turks lost a considerable number of men, besides a cannon and many rifles, as well as mules. The Arabs also plundered a village named Shigegg belonging to the Seniye. Eventually, the tribes were bought off, the cannon returned to the Turks, and peace restored.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2260 *r*—1]





Minute Paper.

Register No. [3778] 1968

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O. Sofia, No. 45M. Dated 17, 8 Nov. 1906. Rec. 17, 24

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 Nov	ML	Arabia.
Secretary of State	3	ag	Nejd affairs. Question of a possible Arab Confederacy. Views of the Pol. Agent at Koweit and the Consul at Mohammerah. The Turks and "bin Saood" and "bin Rashid".
Committee	4.	JM.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to FO (1968) 11.12.06
" " Sofia (3778) 23 November 1906

For information


The Political Agent Koweit does not think much of the possibility of an Arab confederacy such as is referred to in the first of these telegrams & Major Cox of 8 Dec. thinks the same of Ibn Rashid (see No. 1879)


Seen Pol. Comm.
11 DEC. 1906

Previous Papers:—

TH 1899 3267

Y 11891. 2000.—6/1906. I. 652.





1968

[Confidential].

No. 2477, dated Bushire, the 21st (received 29th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of my telegram No. 396, dated 10th October 1906, I have the honour to forward copies of communications received from the Political Agent at Koweit, and His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, on the subject of a possible Arab Confederacy.

Koweit No. 1-C., dated 13th October 1906.
Mohammerah No. 52, dated 13th October 1906.
Mohammerah No. 54, dated 17th October 1906.

No. 1-C., dated Camp, the 13th October 1906.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement No. 2379, dated 10th October 1906, in which I am honoured by the request for an expression of my views as to the possible combination between the four Chiefs of Mohammerah, Koweit, Riadh and Hail with the view of forming an Arab Confederacy independent of any Foreign Power and especially of the Porte.

2. In reply, I have the honour to state that I think such a contingency extremely unlikely, and I am also of the opinion that neither Sheikh Mubarak nor Sheikh Khazal can possibly entertain any illusions as to the durability of such a confederacy.

3. First and foremost, the peace patched up between Abdul Aziz bin Saood and Meta'ab bin Rashid seems to be a hollow truce which will be broken on the first opportunity, *i.e.*, as soon as ever one of the conflicting parties sees his way to deal a telling blow at the strength and prestige of the other. It is true that Bin Saood would probably make considerable concessions to keep the Turk out of Nejd and El Kassim, but he can have no confidence in either the ability or willingness of Meta'ab bin Rashid to assist him in such an undertaking.


The Bin Rashid family, on the other hand, are in such low water just now that they would probably welcome Turkish interference and willingly accept a subordinate position under the Turkish authorities, provided the Bin Saood dynasty was destroyed.

Thus the two factions, apart from the jealousy which has now become a second nature to them and the long blood feud account still unsettled, are hopelessly divided on what may be called their foreign policy.

4. Indications have not been wanting to show that the bond that unites the families of As-Saood and As-Subah is a loose one and the Bedouins who live by plunder and lightly transfer their allegiance from one party to the other, as suits their own convenience, will almost certainly cause trouble between the two Chiefs, unless they both show a restraint and moderation utterly foreign to Arab nature. It is, I venture to think, only Bin Saood's dread of Turkish encroachment and dominion that has so far kept him wary of offending Sheikh Mubarak.

5. Nothing serves to unite the interests of As-Subah and Bin Rashid except a regard for the blessings of commerce and the maintenance of order. These considerations are not likely to weigh heavily with either side and least of all with Bin Rashid.

6. On the other hand, it would seem that Sheikhs Khazal and Mubarak have nothing whatever to quarrel about, while they are both large owners of date gardens, both draw a large income from the smuggling of arms and ammunition, both dislike the interference of the Belgian Customs, and both are anxious to maintain their independence, the one of Persian, and the other of Turkish,



dominion. Each can help the other in these questions by advice, information, mutual loans, combinations to raise the price of dates or rifles, etc. These matters alone would be quite sufficient to account for frequent conferences, and I think there is no reason to attribute to them the more far-reaching designs sketched out in the Government of India telegram, the impracticability of which the two Chiefs would be the first to realise.

No. 52, dated the 13th October 1906.

From—W. McDOUALL, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to your endorsement No. 2380 of October 10th to copies of telegrams concerning the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit and Central Arabia, that my views on the subject are practically those expressed in your telegram.

I have no information as to the objects of Sheikh Mubarak's visits, except that he appears to be trying to effect a reconciliation with all his old enemies, and he can from the Sardar Arfa's Palace communicate with people at Basrah and elsewhere without attracting attention. Many of the influential Sheikhs such as Bin Rashid, Ghazban of the Beni Lam and others occasionally communicate with the Sardar Arfa.

As to the Sardar Arfa, from conversations with him, especially when Colonel Meade was here about seven years ago, I am certain that he is fully convinced that he cannot stand alone and, being a Shiah, prefers Persian, if it can last, to Turkish suzerainty. His fear has always been that Persia will break up and then he must find protection against Turkey. He considered the interests of the whole country in the vicinity of the Shatt-el-Arab identical and British negociations with Mubarak raised hopes that protection given to Koweit to the south of the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab would in time lead to protection being given to the north thereof, inhabited by his Arabs.

No. 54, dated the 17th October 1906.

From—W. McDOUALL, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah,


To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of my No. 52 of 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have made enquiries as to communication here between Sheikh Mubarak and Central Arabian Chiefs and am told that when he was here a month ago, a representative of Bin Rashid met him on board the "Iran" and Sheikh Khazal was heard to say "if you three are one I will support you" or words to that effect. On an Arab of Basrah, Ibn Mendil, coming alongside, Sheikh Khazal signed to Bin Rashid's man to withdraw. Nothing as to the subject discussed is known.

Whatever the subject may have been, I see no reason to alter my opinion as expressed in my letter under reference. Sheikh Khazal, even by those not friendly to him, is acknowledged to be the cleverest Sheikh who has ruled in these parts, and though he cultivates friendly relations with other powerful Sheikhs whenever possible, would not do anything to put himself in a false position with either the Persian or Turkish Government.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C. 378 F. D.—7-1-06.—57—B.B.S.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000010



Confidential. (Copy)

No. 2480 of 1906.

British Residency and Consulate General.

Bushire, 21st October 1906.

From

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To

Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla.

*(1879/06)

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No.* 2438, dated 14th October 1906, I have the honour to forward a copy of a


ghdad No. 829, dated)
th October 1906.)

communication received from the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, on the subject of the "bin Saood" and "bin Rashid" representatives.


I have etc.,

Sd. P. Z. Cox, Major,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.




المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000012




Copy of a letter No. 829, dated 8th October 1906, from Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E., Offg. Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Acting British Consul General, Baghdad, to Major P. Z. Cox, C. I. E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter No. 2139, dated the 15th September 1906.

2. With my letter No. 805, dated the 29th September 1906, I sent to you a memorandum of information about Mut'ib ibn Rashid. I regret to say that I can get no reliable information about payments made by the Turkish authorities to Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud. I hear however from a pro-Rashid source that Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud used to get £ T. 30 a month from the Busrah Vilayet, and that he used also to receive annually 100 suits of clothes and some grain. My informant says that these allowances have now been stopped.





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Circulated with 1968

ASIATIC TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy to India 23 November 1906 Enc 47

[November 5.]

SECTION 1.

RECEIVED 17 NOV 1906 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

[37179]

No. 1.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 733. Confidential.)

Sir,

Pera, October 30, 1906.

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's Secret and Confidential despatch No. 413 of the 18th June last, reporting the decision of the Sultan to continue the allowance granted by the Imperial Government to the late Ibn Raschid, Emir of Nejd, to his son and successor, Mitaab-er-Raschid, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Confidential Memorandum communicated to His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad by Mr. Gaskin, containing information on the condition of affairs in the Nejd and the position of the young Emir Mitaab-er-Raschid.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum of Information obtained by Mr. Gaskin.

(Confidential.)

WITH reference to the Turkish occupation,* he informed me that there were only about fifty Turkish soldiers under a Kulaghasy at Boreida, and a similar detachment at Aneza, and the main body, consisting of over 1,000 infantry, a few cavalry with four heavy field guns and five or six lighter pieces, stationed at Sheihiya, a village about five or six hours' ride west-north-west of Boreida, under the command of Sami Pasha.

The Turks are there on sufferance, and do not interfere in any way with the local affairs, and confine themselves to their quarters, only leaving them when going to purchase food or going to the mosque for prayers.

The troops are rationed by their own Government—the Amir does not provide them with anything. They are wretchedly off; many of the officers and men are continually deserting. If no fresh troops are sent to relieve the present garrison before long, no soldiers will be left in Kassim through the wastage by disease and desertions.

As regards the young Amir, he stated that the people of Jabal Shammar are very hopeful of him, and he has gained their affection through his straightforwardness, generosity, and habit of carrying out no undertaking without consulting all the Elders of the Al-Raschid clan and listening to the best advice. He has remitted the tribal taxes for the current year, and reinstituted the payment of annual allowances to the various tribal Chiefs, retainers, and charities on the same scale as that paid by his grandfather. These allowances had been reduced by his father.


After reducing to obedience the Heteim and Shararat tribes occupying the tract of country lying between Teima and Jowf, the Amir, on about the last week of August 1906, attacked the Mateir Arabs, adherents of Bin Sa'ad, in Kassim, and carried away much plunder in the shape of camels, horses, cattle, and sheep.

Regarding the general feeling of the Arabs towards the Turks, my informant declared that there is a growing discontent and dislike towards them because of their unjust demands and harsh treatment; the life of the Arabs is becoming harder every year, and poverty is overshadowing them. Many of the Arab Chiefs, whose incomes amount to 400 or 500 lires—which would be sufficient under ordinary conditions for their needs—are reduced to beggary on account of the exactions of the Turkish officials. The Arabs are longing to throw off the Turks and become independent, or to come under the protection of the Great Powers, as in the case of Bulgaria and Roumelia.† With this view, recently a Hitein Chief, whose brother is imprisoned by

* See note by Major Ramsay.

† This has not been paraphrased, but is what the Arab said.

[2223 *c*—1]



the Turks and not yet released, though the amount of bribes demanded by the officials has been paid, has proposed to the Sheikh of the Muntafik Arabs the formation of a strong confederacy of all the tribes for the purpose of turning the Turks out of Arabia and applying subsequently to the Great Powers for protection. The Muntafik Sheikh did not fall in with the views of the Hitein Sheikh, as the Arabs consider the Hitein are of inferior blood, and a proposal coming from such a source would not be taken up by other Arabs.

My informant also informed me that cereals were very expensive in Jabal Shammar and Kassim, and prices ranged five or six times as high as those on the Euphrates owing to the limited produce available in the regions mentioned. He explained that the fields are irrigated by water drawn from wells by camels, and these animals cannot stand the work, and in two months they become useless and are sold for a fifth of their original price, and though there is plenty of water and arable land, for this reason they find it just as cheap to import their grain from the districts on the Euphrates. He has heard of the recent importations of pumps into Bagdad for purposes of irrigation, and he is very much interested in the matter, as he thinks that these appliances would meet with much favour in the regions indicated, as the whole of the cultivable land may be brought under cultivation by their employment. He understands that the price of Russian kerosene oil necessary for working the oil-engine which drives the pump is about 20 per cent. dearer in Jabal Shammar than at Koweit, from where it will have to be procured, and that proper mechanics will have to be engaged to work the engines, &c., from Bagdad at a higher rate of pay than they receive locally. He wishes to procure definite information as regards a pumping plant capable of raising a similar quantity of water as ten or eleven "bakras"* from a depth of 8 to 9 metres. When the details are forthcoming, he proposes to transmit them to the Amir of Jabal Shammar, and suggest to him the purchase of such a pumping plant for erection at Hayil as a trial. If the venture meets with success, he declares that over 200 plants will be required in the localities mentioned alone. He asked me whether I would assist him in obtaining the details of a suitable plant—a plant that can be carried in pieces, weighing from 2 cwt. to 2½ cwt. each, for transport by camel.

In respect of the appearance of several sections of the Aneza tribe of Arabs on the Euphrates between Musayib and Nedjef, he stated that it was nothing unusual. He explained that it was customary for these Arabs to camp in that neighbourhood during this season of the year so long as the grazing ground roundabout supported their camels, cattle, and flocks.

About fifteen years ago the Aneza fell out with the Amir of Jabal Shammar, and to avoid being raided by the Amir they kept aloof from the lower reaches of the Euphrates, but now that they have come to an understanding with the Amir, they need no longer take that precaution. There are several thousands of tents scattered in groups of 200 to 500 throughout the region mentioned.

(Signed) J. C. GASKIN.

September 24, 1906.

Note by Major Ramsay.

Mr. Gaskin's informant is in a position to have the latest and most accurate information of what is going on in the Ibn Raschid camp and counsels. The interview took place in the house of a Indian resident of Bagdad. I did not take part in it as my movements are carefully watched.

Mut'ib-ibn-Raschid is said to have received an order on the Karbala district for £T. 250 a-month. This is not regularly paid, and the local officials are trying to get a bribe to induce them to pay; this Mut'ib has refused to pay. From another source I hear that the Sultan's Aide-de-camp, who went to take a decoration to Mut'ib, had got as far as Hayil.


(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major.*

September 29, 1906.

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* Water-bags drawn by bullocks, known in India as "charas."

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000016



Minute Paper.

Register No. 1817

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, Foreign, Dated 11 Oct. 1906.
Rec. 27

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	7 Nov		Arabia.
Secretary of State			
Committee			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Hejd affairs. The Turks and Ibn Saood. The latter's allowance from the Turks paid through the Sheikh of Koweit. Allowance of Bin Rashid's son supposed to be paid through Basrah. Desire of Bin Saood to enter into closer relations with the British Govt. Messages from Bin Saood received & Govt. Opinion in Persian Gulf through the Koweit and Katr Chiefs.

Copy to
I.O. 10.11.06
Off. Telegn. & Vice Consular.

Major Cox's letter of 15 Sept. puts pressure on the Govt. of India to allow him to open up relations with the interior. It may be well to repeat the warnings sent by Mr. Brodrick in Feb & Dec. 04.


A Summary of recent correspondence, in continuation of the Memorandum of Feb last is attached.

Previous Papers:—


Y 11891. 2000.—4·1906. L. 652.

Secret Pol. Corresp. 13 NOV. 1906


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
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



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From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
8th February 1904.

Your Foreign Secretary's Letter No. 36, 6th January, to Kemball. No steps should be taken to enter into closer relations with Nejd, or send agents there, without previous sanction of His Majesty's Government.






From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
30th December 1904.


Foreign Secret. Koweit. See Lord Ampthill's telegram of 26th November last. His Majesty's Government desire that it should be clearly understood that their interest and influence are to be confined strictly to coast line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing should be said or done to connect them even indirectly with warfare now in progress in interior. They agree that Knox should give no opinion on advice to be given by Mubarak to Ibn Saoud, but should repeat to former warnings already given (*see* Viceroy's Despatch of 17th December 1903, No. 196, paragraph 12) against entanglements in interior. They do not propose to make temporary withdrawal of Agent a concession to Turks in consideration of reciprocal action, but to reserve absolutely right to send Agent to Koweit from time to time at their discretion.

(111)

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1817/06.

British relations with the Wahabi Amir.

In April 1866 the then Wahabi Amir, Imam Abdullah bin Faysal, entered into a voluntary engagement with the British Govt (in the form of a declaration which was not signed on our side), by which he bound himself

(1) not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in territories under his authority.

(2) not to "injure or attack the territories "of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British "Govt., specially on the kingdom of Muskat, "further than in receiving the Zakat that "has been customary of old."

With the decline of the Wahabi power and the withdrawal of their influence from politics on the coast, the above engagement ceased to be of practical value, & all relations between the Wahabis & ourselves came to an end.

The successes of the present Wahabi Amir, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud, over his rival the Amir of Nejd (Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid) again brought the Wahabi question to the front. In February 1904, when the Govt. of India were considering a proposal to send an Agent to Riadh, the Wahabi capital, for the purpose of collecting information on Central Arabian affairs, Mr. Brodrick telegraphed to the Viceroy


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
as follows:— "No steps should be taken to enter
"into closer relations with Nejd or send
"agents there without previous sanction of H.M.'s
"Govt."

Sir N. O'Conor, who was consulted, while
recognising the advantages of obtaining fuller
information as to affairs in the interior of
Arabia, held that the moment was not op-
portune for the action suggested; and to
this opinion the Govt. of India, after receiving
the views of Col. Kemball the Resident in
the Persian Gulf, subscribed in a despatch
dated 24th March 1904. They considered,
however, that, in view of recent developments
of the situation, there was reason to think that
"it may shortly be incumbent on us to take
"a more lively interest in the affairs of Central
"Arabia"; and after agreeing not to proceed
for the present with the suggestion to send an
Agent to Riadh, they added that "later... when
"the political situation in Nejd has developed,
"and above all if the present representative
"of the Wahabi family .... succeeds in establishing
"& extending his ascendancy, which from the
"latest accounts received seems to be not im-
"probable, we think that it may be desirable
"again to enter into relations with our old ally."

Sir N. O'Conor to Lansdowne, 24

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
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Thus the matter rested for the time being. In the latter part of 1904 the Turks, who had hitherto supported Bin Rashid, made overtures to Bin Saoud, the Wahabi Chief, and the latter applied to his friend & ally, Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit, for advice as to how the Turkish advances should be met. Mubarak approached the Political Agent at Koweit on the subject in Nov. 1904, but Capt. Knox informed him that he had no instructions to give advice & that Bin Saoud should consult his own interests in the matter. On the 30th December 1904 Mr. Brodrick telegraphed to the Govt of India that "H. M's Govt desire that it should be "clearly understood that their interest & "influence are to be confined strictly to "coast line of Eastern Arabia & that "nothing should be said or done to connect them "even indirectly with warfare now in progress "in interior. They agree that Knox should "give no opinion on advice to be given by "Mubarak to Bin Saoud, but should repeat to "former warnings already given against en- "tanglements in interior"

Towards the end of 1905 Bin Saoud, whose successes in Nejd had continued unabated, paid a visit to El Katr & addressed

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


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letters to the Sheikhs of the Piate Coast, announcing his intention of visiting their territories in the following spring. The most important of the Trucial Chiefs, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, conferred personally with the Sultan of Muskat on the situation, both rulers regarding the prospect of Bin Saoud's visit with considerable apprehension.

The Govt of India addressed the Secretary of State on the subject in a despatch dated 11th January 1906, in which they pointed out "how very serious to our prestige & influence "the consequences might be if Bin Saoud should "attack the Piate Coast chiefs or the Sultan "of Muskat, or succeed in extending his "influence over them, & how important it is "that we should prevent, as far as lies in "our power, such a contingency, especially "now that the Wahabi Amir has recognised "the suzerainty of the Sultan." They accordingly proposed that inquiry should be made, either through Sheikh Mubarak of Kowait or through the Sultan of Muskat, as to Bin Saoud's intentions with a view to ascertaining "whether "he is prepared to stand by the engagement "of his predecessors not to offer or injure "British subjects residing in his territories,

285/06



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"and not to interfere with the Arab tribes
"in alliance with the British Govt"; and
that, failing a satisfactory assurance on
his part, he should be warned that inter-
ference in those localities would be re-
garded as an unfriendly act, & that "suitable
"measures would be taken to frustrate it."
"These measures", the despatch concluded,
"might amount, in our opinion, to a more
"stringent embargo on the import of arms
"at Koweit & elsewhere on the Arabian
"coast of the Gulf, or even, in the case of
"an attack being imminent, to actual armed
"~~intervention~~ assistance from British ships to
"the Sheikhs threatened, as might be necessary"

A. Godley's letter
2 Feb. 1906
285/06

In communicating this despatch to the
Foreign Office, some doubt was expressed as to
the practicability of the Govt of India's sug-
gestions, and it was suggested that no steps
should be taken, "in the absence of any
"urgent necessity caused by Wahabi action", until
Sir N. O'Conor had been consulted as regards
the proposal to approach Ibn Saoud otherwise
than through the medium of the Turks.


535/06.

Meanwhile, under orders from the Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Capt. Knox, the Political
Agent at Koweit talked the matter over
informally with Mubarak, & after inquiring

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as to the truth of the reports regarding Bin Saoud's intentions, gave this Sheikh a hint that any interference by the latter Wahabi Amir in the affairs of states in treaty relation with us would not be likely to find favour with the British Govt. Mubarak replied that he regarded Bin Saoud's plans as designed merely to extort money from the Sheikhs on the coast, and that he had himself strongly advised him against persisting in any such attempt. Major Cox, in reporting this conversation to the Govt of India, suggested that he should be authorised to inform all the Trucial Chiefs that the Govt of India "would not regard with complacency the "intrigues of any of them with Bin Saoud."

Maja Cox to Govt of India, no. 51, [illegible]


The Govt of India telegraphed on the 15th March 1906 supporting Major Cox's suggestion, which was approved, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, by Mr. Morley's telegram dated the 9th April.

552/06

2838/06

As regards the warning to Bin Saoud contemplated by the Govt of India, the Foreign Office adopted the views of Sir N. O'Conor, who had been consulted & had recommended in a despatch of 20th March 1906 that any such warning should be conveyed direct to Bin

2834/06



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Saoud, & not through the agency of the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat. Sir N. O'Conor further suggested that Bin Saoud, in the event of his visiting the coast, should be met by a British vessel of war at one of the places which he proposed to visit & told that no tampering with the engagements & conventions of the Trucial Chiefs would be permitted.


In conveying the decision of H. M.'s Govt to the Govt of India, the Secretary of State wrote as follows in a despatch dated the 13th April 1906 :—

"H. M.'s Govt accept the view that a warning "to the Amir would be necessary if he were to "carry out his reported intention. They consider, "however, that it would be better that such "warning should be conveyed to him only in "the event of his appearing upon the Coast, "& that it should then be conveyed to him "directly as proposed by Sir N. O'Conor."

874/06

Bin Saoud's reply to the representations of Mubarak was communicated to the Political Agent Koweit, on the 25th Feb. 1906. Major Cox has described it as a "very courteous "response." The terms of Bin Saoud's letter to Mubarak are scarcely intelligible to

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
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those not acquainted with vernacular modes of expression, but the letter's apparent object is to disclaim any intention of objectionable action. As a matter of fact, Bin Saoud did not visit the Piate Coast. last spring.

The papers now sent home show that Major Cox has again raised the question of entering into closer relations with Bin Saoud. The latter, it should be mentioned, has during the last year defeated & slain his rival Bin Rashid, & appears to be master of the situation in Central Nalia. There is for the moment peace between the warring factions.

6th November 1906.

1817/06.



1877

(Confidential)

No. 2138, dated Bushire, the 15th (received 24th) September 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a despatch* addressed by His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

* No. 62, dated 31st August 1906.

With reference to Mr. Crow's statement as to the channels through which Ibn Saood and Meta'ab bin Rashid respectively receive their allowances, I am addressing the Political Resident at Baghdad and the Political Agent at Koweit on the subject and will forward in due course any further information I may receive from them.

No. 62, dated the 31st August 1906.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah,

To—His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.


With reference to my despatch No. 59 of August 25th, I have the honour to report that I called on Lieutenant-General Sudqi Pasha last Wednesday. He had been ordered to Baghdad and left the same evening. It is uncertain whether he will return to take up his appointment as Commandant at Basrah. Sudqi Pasha stated that he had handed over the Command in El Kasim to Sami Pasha, Acting Mutessarif and Commandant and stayed ten days with him after his arrival. Sami Pasha brought 500 soldiers and one gun with him from Medina. The troops arrived in excellent condition.

According to Sudqi Pasha's account there are 2,500 troops in Nejd and El Kasim. The lines of communications are open and caravans arrive freely and, though supplies are not easily obtainable locally, all necessaries were forwarded to them by caravans.

Information from other sources does not confirm this favourable account. The tale told by the numerous deserters who have from time to time found their way to Koweit and thence the Basrah during Sudqi Pasha's command in Kasim is a very different one. They describe the state of the troops there as pitiable in the extreme and state that provisions are scarce and they are without pay. Sudqi Pasha himself is said to be owed 2,000 Turkish £ for his services.

Sudqi Pasha said that Ibn Saood was jealous of Saleh bin Mohanna's intercourse with the Turkish Officers and that he got the people of Boreyda to sign a *mazbata* complaining of his oppression and then removed him to Riadh. He attributes his removal to personal animosity. Though Mohanna was appointed Kaimakam of Boreyda by the Mushir, the appointment had not been confirmed by Constantinople.

Sudqi Pasha marched from Boreyda to Zilfi and thence travelled by way of Es Safa and Subakeya to Koweit, crossing the northern end of the Dahna between Koweit and Kasim. From Zilfi onwards he found water once every four days. The journey was performed on camels. He brought 142 men with him and had no casualties. He seems to have travelled very quickly. He told me that peace had been established between Ibn Saood and Ibn Rashid but did not think it would last very long. He described Ibn Saood as a desert diplomatist and the late Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid as a desert warrior and said the former displayed considerable ability and adroitness in his dealings while the latter was a fighting man pure and simple. Meta'ab his son is only 21 and Sudqi Pasha thinks his youth will prevent him from taking any active line for the present, but his ambition to make a name for himself and follow in his father's footsteps may lead to a recurrence of hostilities between the rival factions at no distant date. He stated the Arabs had now all retired to their homes and their pastures.



2

The murder of Abdul Aziz bin Jilwa, while on his way to Koweit with letters from Ibn Saood, was, I am informed, perpetrated by a raiding party of Shamar Arabs who had not heard the news of peace being proclaimed.

I learn that the allowance granted by the Turkish Government to Ibn Saood is by recent arrangement paid through the Sheikh of Koweit, who deducts it from the land tax due to the Government on his Fao property. Meta'ab's allowance is supposed to be paid through Baghdad, but I have not heard of his receiving anything as yet.

I can obtain no confirmation of the report from Jeddah, mentioned in Your Excellency's despatch of 7th July, that Ibn Saood had ordered the Arab Sheikhs and tribes in Nejd to abstain from communication with Turkish officers and troops and to stop carrying their mails and supplies. Sudqi Pasha seems to have been on very friendly terms with Ibn Saood who visited him several times during his recent visit to Boreyda and brought his retainers and many Arab Sheikhs with him. The troops have no doubt suffered from want of money and though there was little or no fighting they must necessarily have endured great hardships.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW.


No. 12.

Copy forwarded to His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General, with the compliments of the undersigned.

BASRA ;
6th September 1906.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.

G. C Press, Simla.—No. C-294 F.D.—10-10-06.—67—BBC.



1877

No. 2181, dated Bushire, the 16th (received 24th) September 1905.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Government, a copy of the communication marginally quoted which I have received from the Political Agent at Koweit, on the subject of the aspirations of Bin Saood to enter into closer relations with the British Government.

Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, No. 313, dated the 28th August 1905.

2. In the same connection, I have the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of my letter No. 64 of 23rd February last to your address.

Subsequently when touring on the Arab Coast in May last I had an opportunity of meeting Sheikh Jasim bin Thani at his summer quarters at Lusail, and on that occasion he expressed himself to much the same effect on behalf of Bin Saood, saying that the latter was now strong enough to drive the Turks out of Nejd and Al Hassa and asking whether in the event of his coming down to the coast, the British Government could not see their way to give him the same measure of protection by sea as they gave to Sheikh Mubarak and other Arab Chiefs on the Coast, in pursuance of their traditional policy of preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf. He added that it would be a simple matter for Bin Saood to meet a British officer at the coast, if that course were considered desirable.

In reply, I told Sheikh Jasim that this was a question to which I could not give him any definite answer offhand and without instructions from the Government of India.

Just at that time the news of the death of Bin Rashid at the hands of his rival reached the coast and the situation seemed so kaleidoscopic that I delayed making any report to Government until matters had crystallised somewhat.

I have now received from Captain Knox a communication from Sheikh Mubarak to much the same effect as the foregoing. We have thus been approached from three directions and I think there can be no doubt that these representations may be held to have been inspired by Bin Saood personally.


3. Bin Rashid's death at the hands of his rival had an important influence on the situation, and as the Government of India have been informed, the three cornered peace of which the possibility was indicated in paragraph 2 of my letter No. 620 of 18th March has lately taken shape.

Whether it will endure on its own merits or whether the Turks will at once set themselves to undo it, it is impossible to prophesy, but seeing that the present Bin Rashid is a mere youth of 18, it is hardly likely that he will be able to make any serious stand against Bin Saood for some time to come. The juncture is consequently a convenient one for an examination and review of the political situation in Central Arabia and of our attitude towards Bin Saood and I venture to hope that Government will take advantage of it for that purpose.

4. While I believe I am right in thinking that His Majesty's Government regard with no favour the idea of the Turks establishing themselves in Nejd,* I am at the same time aware that it has been a recognised principle of their policy not to allow themselves to become involved in the tempestuous politics of Central Arabia. Nevertheless it must be conceded that we have principles and interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative doctrine of aloofness above mentioned, and I cannot see that these are in any way served by our carrying that doctrine to an extreme point and by our treating the predominant Arab element in Nejd with an active neglect which not only places us in an

* (1) Foreign Department telegram No. 1748-E. A., dated 19th May 1904.
(2) Foreign Department letter No. 3397-E.B., dated 8th October 1904.

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unnecessarily unfavourable position for safeguarding the other interests referred to but which, persevered in, may be mistaken for hostility on our part and may engender a reciprocation of that sentiment on the part of the Wahabi Chief.

5. Thus it will be remembered that Bin Saood formally appealed to us for protection in a letter to me, dated 2nd May 1904, but no reply on behalf of Government to that communication was ever authorised, and at the present time no practical *modus vivendi* between the Arab and ourselves can be said to exist.

Vide telegram Resident to Foreign Department, dated 16th May 1904.

The inconvenience of this became apparent in connection with the intention attributed to Bin Saood of visiting Oman, which has created so much apprehension in the minds of the Pirate Coast Chiefs during the past year. Had they known that any sort of friendly understanding existed between the Residency or Government and Bin Saood, both the Sultan of Muscat and the Trucial Chiefs would have been fortified with the consequent knowledge that any attempt on the part of the Wahabi to make a descent upon Oman would involve a preliminary rupture with us. In the absence of any such entente all we could do was to get Sheikh Mubarak to give him a hint that any such action on his part would be regarded with disfavour by us. It is true that it appeared afterwards that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had expressed the opinion that we should deal with Bin Saood direct, but meanwhile it had become necessary to take action locally in the most expeditious way open to us. As a matter of fact this course met with a very courteous response from Bin Saood as reported to Government at the time.

Vide correspondence received with Foreign Department endorsement No. 2020-E.B., dated 17th May 1905.

Resident to Foreign Department No. 773, dated 5th April 1905.

6. Another matter in regard to which we lose by not being on any sort of terms with the Wahabi is the question of piracy in the northern part of the Gulf. There is good reason to suppose that, had we friendly relations with him, Bin Saood would be able to give us considerable assistance in running down notorieties like the outlaw Ahmed bin Salman, who yearly commits more or less serious depredations during the pearling season.

7. At the present epoch, as before mentioned, peace reigns in the land, and if we have any intention of establishing some measure of friendly intercourse with the Ruler of Nejd, the present seems to be the time for us to do so. If on the other hand we persevere in our policy of ignoring him altogether and leaving his appeals unanswered and if we allow the Turks to revive the strife in Central Arabia, which theoretically they have now no excuse for doing, it will be small matter for wonder if we make him our bitter enemy for the future.


I hesitate to make premature suggestions as to the terms which might figure in any agreement made, as I am aware that the problem is a delicate one and requires examination by a lens of longer focus than I can command, but I think I may say without temerity that I should welcome any degree of friendly understanding which would facilitate my dealings with the Trucial Chiefs and which would render it possible and unobjectionable for our officers to make occasional tours in the country and thereby to acquire accurate information regarding the topography, tribes, and tribal politics of the interior, in respect of which our present store of knowledge is very meagre.

In these latter connections, I solicit reference to the following items of previous correspondence:—

(i) The latter part of letter No. 69, dated ~~26th~~ 24th March 1904, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State.

(ii) Despatch from Sir Nicolas O'Conor to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 189, dated 20th March 1906, in which His Excellency advocated the arrangement of a meeting between Bin Saood and a British representative on one of our Government ships at some convenient point on the Coast. If this could

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3

take place, we should at all events know first hand what were the Arab's ambitions and what undertakings he was prepared to give in regard to matters which concerned us.

In any case, I trust that I may be placed in a position to give an authoritative reply to the enquiries of Sheikh Jasim and Sheikh Mubarak, for the information of their ally.

No. 313, dated Koweit, the 28th August 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


I have the honour to inform you that, at an interview that I had to-day with Sheikh Mubarak, he referred to the letters that Abdur Rahman bin Feysul bin Saood wrote in the year before last to your address and to the letter that reached me shortly after my arrival at Koweit, and seemed anxious again to persuade me that it would be to the advantage of the English to take Bin Saood under protection.

2. One of the arguments he used was that, with Nejd in security and Bin Saood under British protection, a caravan would start daily from Koweit for the interior and all its loads would be of Indian merchandise. He also said that Nejd contained with the tribes upward of three millions of men.


3. It is clear that Bin Saood and probably Mubarak himself are uneasy about the late activity of the Turks in El Kasim. Sheikh Mubarak declares now that the Turkish soldiers in Nejd are still 3,000 men.

4. In reply, I said to Sheikh Mubarak that he might rest assured that I would report this conversation to you.

G. C. Press, Simla.—Cash F. D.—9-10-06—30.—K.S.W.



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1817

T E L E G R A M. P.

From. Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

To. The Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign Department, Simla.

No.378.


Dated the 2nd

October. 1906


Received the 3rd.

Please see para 7 of my letter No.2181 dated the 16th September. An apparently well-founded report has since been communicated by Knox to the effect that the Turkish authorities have written to Bin Rashid asking why he made peace with Bin Saood and stating that his Action in doing this was unauthorised.

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&



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1877

Telegram. P.


From --- The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla,

To ----- Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire.


No.S-100.

Dated the 8th October 1906.

Please see your telegram dated 2nd October regarding Nejd affairs. The report of frequent visits of Sheikh Mubarak to Sheikh Khazal and of the reconciliation between Bin Rashid and Bin Saeed point to the possibility of these Chiefs being actuated by desire to form compact to secure their independence of Turkish or other Foreign domination. Please telegraph if you have any reason to suppose that they contemplate anything of the kind.



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Register No. 2838

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from FO. Dated 27 April 1906. Rec. 30

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 April		Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State	3		Question of visit by Ibn Saood to the territories of the Trucial Chiefs and Oman. Concurrence of FO. in Govt. of India's proposed instructions to Major Cox.
Committee	4.4		
Under Secretary.	9		
Secretary of State			

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
Send ag 9 of 06 Sent + Ptd 9/4/06

D/T: Telegram to Viceroy


Previous Papers:—
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Y 10789. 3000.—3/1905. I. 305.



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DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched † 9 April 1906.

SECRETARY OF STATE

†

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrorum)

Foreign Secret. Your (Secret) Telegram of 15th March. Ibn Saood.

Your proposal as to warning the Trucial Chiefs is approved by His Government.


J.L.
A.P.B
W.Lee

Copy to India. (+.P) 20 April


70 (+) 10 April
(P) 14 April

Approved Pol Committee
9 APR 1906

13773. L 2486. 1000.—11/1903.



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2838 10/1.552

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 10543.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
- 3 APR 1906

FOREIGN OFFICE
April 2, 1906.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, regarding the proposed visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the warning which the Government of India propose to instruct Major Cox to address to the Trucial Chiefs on this subject.


I am,

Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



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Minute Paper.

Register No. 2832

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated 31 March
Rec. 2 April } 1906.

Formally acknowledged 31 March

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	3 April		Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State	3		Reported intention of Ibn Saood to visit the territories of the Trucial Chiefs and Oman. Sir N. O'Conor considers (and Sir E. Grey concurs) that the warning to Ibn Saood should be conveyed directly to him.
Committee	4.4.		
Under Secretary.....	9		
Secretary of State			

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190
SECRETARY'S Nº

Despatch to India.

Sign 10 Apr 06


From the latest information from the Persian Gulf - (Kuwait 2-3-4-6) it seems very probable that Ibn Saood will abandon his projected visit to the Pirate Coast & Oman. The contingency against which the Govt. of India wish to provide may not therefore occur. A Despatch is, however, submitted forwarding the correspondence

Ibn of Ibn Saood means son of Saood & does not distinguish which son is referred to. The Bushire list gives the name as Abdul Aziz & the Political Agent's letter of the 6th March as Abdul Rahman.


Previous Papers:—

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Y 10789. 2000.—3/1905. I. 506.



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2834/06

India Office, London,
13th April 1906.

Secret,
No. 15.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

Reported intention of Abdul Aziz bin Saood to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman.

I have received the letter of Your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, No. 7 (Secret), dated 11th January last, informing me of the reported intention of the Wahabi Amir Abdul Aziz bin Saood to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman, and of his threatened interference with the affairs of those districts.

2. In view of the serious consequences which would follow such action by the Amir, you recommend that, in the event of his not giving satisfactory assurances as to his intentions, a warning should be addressed to him that any attempt on his part to interfere in Oman or along the Arab coast either with the Chiefs or with their subjects will be regarded as an unfriendly act, and that suitable measures will be taken to frustrate it.

3. I forward herewith, for the information and guidance of Your Excellency's Government, a copy of correspondence* with the Foreign Office on the subject.

* To Foreign Office, dated 22nd February 1906.
From ditto, dated 1st March 1906.
From ditto, dated 31st March 1906, with enclosure.


4. His Majesty's Government accept the view that a warning to the Amir would be necessary if he were to carry out his reported intention. They consider, however, that it would be better that such warning should be conveyed to him only in the event of his appearing upon the Coast; and that it should then be conveyed to him directly, as proposed by Sir N. O'Conor.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) John Morley.


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ENCLOSURES.

Enclosure No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.

India Office,
22nd February 1906.

Sir,

With reference to my letter of the 29th April 1904 as to the affairs of Nejd, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a further Secret Letter* from the Government of India on the subject of a visit which the Wahabi Amir Abdul Aziz bin Saood is reported to be intending to make to the Pirate Coast and Muscat in the coming spring.

* No. 7, Secret, dated 11th January 1906, and enclosures.


It will be observed that, on the 5th December 1905, the Government of India authorised enquiries being made of the Sheikh of Koweit as to Bin Saood's intentions, but that the result has not yet been reported. In the meanwhile the Government of India, in view of the serious consequences which would ensue if Bin Saood should succeed in establishing his ascendency over the Trucial Chiefs or the Sultan of Muscat, suggest that he should be approached either through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat or other suitable channel, with a view to ascertaining whether he is prepared to stand by the Declaration† of his predecessor not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in his territories, and not to interfere with the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government. In regard to this I am to observe that the declaration made in 1866 was not proposed, or even formally accepted, by the British Government, and it contained a reference to the claim of the Wahabis upon the customs of Muscat. The Government of India further suggest that, in the event of Bin Saood's failing to give the necessary assurance, he should be warned that any attempt on his part to interfere in Oman or on the Pirate Coast would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and that suitable measures would be taken to frustrate it. These measures in the opinion of the Government of India might consist either of a more stringent embargo on the import of arms at Koweit and elsewhere, or, in the case of necessity, of actual armed assistance from British ships to the Sheikhs threatened.

† *See* Declaration of the Wahabi Amir, dated 21st April 1866. (Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. X., p. 116).

The serious consequences which might arise from the re-establishment by Bin Saood of the Wahabi dynasty throughout the centre of Arabia were referred to in the Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 16th May 1904, No. 373, and the question is further complicated if, as appears to be the case, Bin Saood has been recognised by the Turkish Government and has acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan. It will be observed that the Government of India consider that it would be useless and undesirable to bring pressure to bear on Bin Saood through the Turkish authorities.

So far as Muscat is concerned I am to observe that the French Government is conjointly with the British Government interested in its independence, and, in the event of interference by the Wahabis with the Trucial Chiefs, the measures proposed by the Government of India might not be effective. For instance, such control as we may be able to exercise over the importation of arms into Arabia is limited to arms imported by British subjects. The questions raised by the Government

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of India are thus complicated, and in view of our desire to refrain from any entanglements with the rulers of Nejd, it seems desirable to take no steps, in the absence of any urgent necessity caused by Wahabi action, until His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been consulted on the proposal to approach Bin Saood otherwise than through the Turkish authorities.

The suggestion of the Government of India that, in the event of Bin Saood's failing to give satisfactory assurances, a more stringent embargo should be placed upon the traffic in arms, appears to raise a further difficulty by conveying the implication that in the contrary event the Government of India would be prepared to acquiesce in the import of arms by the Sheikh of Koweit. Mr. Morley is aware that in June 1904* it was decided to defer measures which were then under consideration for preventing the import of arms into Koweit. He would, however, be reluctant to approve any permanent departure from the established policy of His Majesty's Government of maintaining an effective control over the arms traffic in these waters.

* *See* Sir T. Sanderson's letter, dated 21st June 1904.

I have, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

Enclosure No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.

No. 6632. Foreign Office,
1st March 1906.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo, relative to the proposed visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast and Muscat.

I am to inform you that a copy of your letter has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople for his observations, and that a further communication will be addressed to you on receipt of his reply.

I am, &c.,
E. GORST.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Enclosure No. 3.

Foreign Office to India Office.

No. 10,403. Foreign Office,
31st March 1906.

Sir,


With reference to the letter from this Office of the 1st instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople regarding the projected visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast and Muscat.

It will be observed that Sir N. O'Conor is of opinion that any warning given to the Amir respecting his relations with the Trucial Chiefs and Muscat will be more effective if conveyed to him directly rather than through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat, and I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in this view.

I am, &c.,
E. GORST.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

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Annex.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir E. Grey.

No. 189. Confidential. Constantinople,
20th March 1906.

Sir,


I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Despatch No. 92, of the 1st instant, in which you were so good as to ask for my observations on a letter from the India Office enclosing correspondence relative to the projected visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast and to Muscat in the spring.

While I quite concur in the view of the Secretary of State for India that serious complications would ensue should the Ameer succeed in establishing his ascendancy over the Trucial Chiefs and Muscat, and that it would be well to convey to him a warning that his action in those parts must be limited by respect for our engagement with the tribes with which we have treaties, I am disposed to think that such warning will be more effective if conveyed directly rather than through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat.


As regards Moubarek, it seems fairly certain that, in view of the more friendly relations which have recently been established between him and the local Turkish Authorities of Basra, the Porte would at once get news of our communication to Abdul Aziz, and would in all probability take steps to neutralize its effect. I would therefore suggest, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, that our warning would be more effective if it could be arranged that a vessel of war should meet Abdul Aziz at one of the places along the coast which he proposes to visit, and he were given clearly to understand that no tampering with the engagements and Conventions of the Trucial Chiefs will be allowed.

I have, &c.,
N. R. O'Conor.

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x00003e



No
13 April 1906

Off:
India
Secret N° (15)

My dear,

I have received the letter of Govt in the Foreign Dept., N° 7 Secret, dated 11th Jan? last informing me of the reported intention of the Wahabi Amir Abdul Aziz bin Saood to visit the Persian Coast and Oman, and of his threatened interference with the affairs of those districts.


2. In view of the serious consequences which would follow such action by the Amir Bn Saood, I recommend that, in the event of his not giving satisfactory assurances as to his intentions, a warning should be addressed to him that any attempt on his

Approved Pol. Com'ee.,
9 APR. 1906

Copy to F.O.
20 April 1906.

Copy to F.O.

S.10




part to interfere in Oman
or along the Arab Coast either
with the Chiefs or with their
subjects will be regarded as an
unfriendly act, and that
suitable measures will be
taken to frustrate it.


3. I forward herewith, for the
information & guidance of Y/Es,
Govt, a copy of correspondence with
the Foreign Office on the subject.

4. H.M. Govt accept the
view that a warning to [the] Bon
Saood [Amir] would be necessary if he
were to carry out his reported
intention. They consider, however,
that it would be better that such
warning should be conveyed to
him only in the event of
his appearing upon the Coast;


and

To F.O. 22nd Feb. 1906
From F.O. 1st March "
" " 31 "
with Enclosure.


and that it should then be
conveyed to him directly as
proposed by Sir N. O'Conor.
(Sd) John Morley.
7
6



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Encl. 3 2834 W 552 (150)

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 10403.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

FOREIGN OFFICE
March 31, 1906.

Sir:-

With reference to the letter from this Office of the 1st instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, herewith, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople regarding the projected visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast and Muscat.

It will be observed that Sir N. O'Conor is of opinion that any warning given to the Amir respecting his relations with the Trucial Chiefs and Muscat will be more effective if conveyed to him directly rather than through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat, and I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in this view.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,


humble Servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

5



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000044



py.

CONSTANTINOPLE,
March 20th, 1906.

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nfidential.
040[illegible]).


Sir:-


I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Despatch No.92 of the 1st instant, in which you were so good as to ask for my observations on a letter from the India Office enclosing correspondence relative to the projected visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast and to Muscat in the Spring.

While I quite concur in the view of the Secretary of State for India that serious complications would ensue, should the Ameer succeed in establishing his ascendancy over the Trucial Chiefs and Muscat, and that it would be well to convey to him a warning that his action in those parts must be limited by respect for our engagement with the tribes with which we have treaties, I am disposed to think that such warning will be more effective if conveyed directly rather than through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat.

As

r Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.







As regards Moubarek, it seems fairly certain that, in view of the more friendly relations which have recently been established between him and the local Turkish Authorities of Basra, the Porte would at once get news of our communication to Abdul Aziz and would in all probability take steps to neutralize its effect. I would therefore suggest, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, that our warning would be more effective, if it could be arranged that a vessel of war should meet Abdul Aziz at one of the places along the coast which he proposes to visit, and he were given clearly to understand that no tampering with the engagements and Conventions of the Trucial Chiefs will be allowed.

I have &c.,

(Signed) N. R. O'Conor.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Minute Paper.

Register No. 656

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 11 M., Dated 15 March 1906
Rec. 31

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	3 Apr	
Secretary of State	3	
Committee	4.4.	
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Persian Gulf.

Question of a visit by Ibn Saood to the Trucial Chiefs' territory and Oman. Rumours that the visit will not come off. Message to the Sultan from an emissary of Ibn Saood.

Copy to

Copy to F.O. 9.4.06.

It seems very probable that Ibn Saood will now abandon his intention to visit Oman and the Pirate Coast.


The Sheikh of Koweit has, on his own initiative, written to Ibn Saood on the subject for information.


P.S. It will be observed that the

Seen Pol. Corresp. 9 APR. 1906

Previous Papers:—
2838

Y 10789. 2000.—3/1905. I. 336.


to The Sultan)
telegram (the text of which is given in the
last paper) is signed by Sheikh Jassim
who had recently intimated to the Political
Agent at Bahrein that he (Sheikh Jassim)
considers himself subject to Shaikh Esa
of Bahrein



656

[Confidential.]

RECEIVED 7 APR 1906 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

No. 63, dated Bushire, the 23rd February (received 6th March) 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit a further report from Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of Ibn Saood's alleged intention to visit Northern Oman, in continuation of my letter No. 51 of the 4th instant.

2. Sheikh Mubarak's suggestion that Ibn Saood's overtures to the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast are merely a plan for obtaining financial support (or blackmail) from them, is probably well founded, as from another communication in connection with Nejd affairs which I am addressing by this mail to Government, it will be apparent that his position in Nejd is so unsettled at present as to make it improbable that Ibn Saood would be in a position to turn his serious attention to the Trucial Coast. At the same time I see no objection to the issue of the admonition recommended in paragraph 5 of my last communication above quoted.

3. In regard to Sheikh Mubarak's attitude, it seems possible that his temporary disapproval of Ibn Saood is due to the fact that while his own relations with the Turks are getting more friendly, Ibn Saood's are becoming decidedly strained, and this means no doubt that the latter is less inclined than before to be guided by the Sheikh of Koweit's advice in his relations with the Porte.

No. 34, dated the 3rd February 1906.

From—Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of correspondence ending with my Camp No. 1, dated 19th January 1906, on the subject of Ibn Saood's projected visit to the Pirate Coast and Oman, I have the honour to inform you that Sheikh Mubarak visited me yesterday morning and of his own accord introduced this topic of conversation and informed me that he had written to Ibn Saood on the subject. He again assured me that he had every hope that the visit would not come off and that Ibn Saood's only object was money.


2. This uncalled for return to the subject suggests to me that Sheikh Mubarak has strong objections to Ibn Saood being served by any port but Koweit and that we may reckon on Sheikh Mubarak's support in this matter.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 5149 F. D.—16-3-06—67—W. G. B.


7

6

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x00004b



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x00004c



[*Confidential.*]

No. 64, dated Bushire, the 23rd February (received 6th March) 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department endorsement No. 429-E. B., dated 30th January 1906, I have the honour to furnish the following information bearing on the situation in Nejd.

2. On the 12th instant, I received a communication from the Political Agent, Bahrein, to the effect that an emissary of Ibn Saood named Musaad bin Suweilim had arrived at Bahrein *viâ* El Bida and had called at the Agency. He informed Captain Prideaux that Ibn Saood felt himself strong enough to turn the Turks out of Hassa and Katif and then wished to enter into treaty relations with us, allowing us if we desired to keep a Political Officer in Hassa or Katif in return for our protecting him from a sea attack from the Turks.

Captain Prideaux expressed his personal doubts as to whether Ibn Saood was strong enough to free himself from the Turks, and otherwise refrained from giving any encouragement to Musaad's suggestions, and the old gentleman left the Agency in a somewhat disappointed mood saying that he intended to proceed to Bushire by the next mail for medical treatment.

3. On the same date three Nejdi Arabs arrived in Bushire and I had their movements watched as reported in item No. 180 of this Office Political Diary for the week ending 18th February 1906. They proved to be Musaad bin Suweilim and two companions. They stayed with Najaf bin Ghalib, the Koweiti merchant living in Bushire, and on the 18th instant they sent a long and expensive telegram to His Majesty the Sultan in Romanized Arabic of which I attach a translation. It will be seen that it actually purports to come from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani but was evidently sent on behalf of, and in communication with, Ibn Saood.

With reference to the first-named veteran, it is interesting to note that at the end of the telegram, as transliterated for delivery to the telegraph office, he describes himself;

"Kayem Mekam Kaze Katr ve reiese ashayeraha ve kebayelleha al abdusadek Jassim al Sani."

I am doubtful whether this is intended to mean;

"Kaim Mukam *of the Kaza of Katr* and Chief of its clans and tribes, the faithful slave Jassim al Thani" or;

"Kaim Mukam *and Kazi of Katr* and Chief of its clans and tribes, the faithful slave Jassim al Thani"


Whichever it be, Sheikh Jassim poses as the humble slave of His Majesty the Sultan, whereas in a letter to the Political Agent, Bahrein, which must have been written about the same time as the above telegram, he rather went out of his way to mention the fact that he considered himself subject to Sheikh Esa of Bahrein.

4. The position seems to be that Ibn Saood is exasperated by the neglect of the Turks to suppress Ibn Rashid, and that he (Ibn Saood) and Sheikh Jassim, whose sympathies are with him, are sitting on the hedge at present and apparently sent this representative, Musaad bin Sweilim, with instructions to sound the British representative in the first place, and, if he received no encouragement from the latter, to proceed to Bushire and send the above telegram to the Sultan.

My informant tells me that the Arabs expected to receive their reply *viâ* Basrah and it was therefore no use their remaining here longer. They left again for Bahrein on the 21st instant, and I may mention that they did not visit the Residency during their stay in Bushire.

5. I am forwarding a copy of this communication to His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, for information.

5150 F. D.



2

Translation of a telegram despatched in Romanized Arabic to His Majesty the Sultan, Constantinople, from Bushire by a representative of Ibn Saood and Sheikh Jassim bin Thani, on the 18th February 1906.

To

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, Commander of the Faithful, May God uphold his Imperial Throne with Glory and Victory.

Whereas my devotion, honesty, sincerity, friendliness, zeal and sense of honour do not allow me to discontinue tendering advice to my religion, my Government and my Sultan, whether they are accepted or not, a petition was previously made by this loyal slave suggesting the undesirability of employing a body of Imperial troops against Ibn Saood—a course for which there was no necessity.

The effect of my advices is now apparent as also are the disturbances caused by interested persons who are unable to derive profit in cash, money, or opportunity except by creating difficulties and troubles like these under reference.

Indeed I stated my opinion on the occurrence of each incident which I considered harmful to the Turkish Empire and to its faith and its subjects, and which emanated from Amir Abdul Aziz bin Rashid from the time when Amir Mohamed died and the affairs of the State passed into the hands of the said Abdul Aziz bin Rashid.


He massacred the faithful and plundered their property; he put men to death and killed children; and disturbance became general in the country, and the lawless Arabs were encouraged to infest the roads and highways along which the dependents of the Government dwelt.


When things came to this pass pious men seeing the harm suffered by Musulmans, came forward and solicited Ibn Saood to ward off difficulties which befell them in their sorry plight. Accordingly Ibn Saood arose and joined them. He expelled the evil-doers and wicked persons and secured tranquillity to the country and people by his excellent behaviour and high character and by his righteous services to the Great Lord, the Commander of the faithful, and the successor of the Prophet of God of the two worlds. He still remains ready to render service, and submissive to Government, and protects all the roads, and all the people testify to this. He is beloved by everybody in general. Ibn Saood has indeed repeatedly, invoked favour saying that he is an obedient servant of the Commander of the faithful and that he is neither schismatic nor a rebel. On the other hand, according to what I hear, Ibn Rashid ceases not to supply material for suspicion to interested persons and to give them bribes with a view to their making misrepresentations and accusations; and therefore all the Musulmans beseech the Great Lord and Commander of the Faithful not to listen to the statements of such interested persons who are the enemies of the State and of the faith, and who are liars and false accusers. Similarly I pray that this my counsel may not be treated with indifference; and the order and command rest with His Majesty; and may Peace rest upon Mahomed and his family.

(from) Kaim Mukam 1 } Kazi of the Kaza { of Katr and Chief of its
" " 2 } { clans and tribes,


JASIM AL THANI.

G. I. C. P.O.—No. 5150 F. D.—7-3-1906.—35.—L. G. G.


P.S As regards the suggested word "indifference"
for "complacency" as proposed by the Govt. of India, it must
be remembered that we can never be quite sure
that the hints
INDIA OFFICE
WHITEHALL, S.W.
Vernacular newspapers
Sir Arthur Godley
552
The FO have asked whether
we want their views as to the
proposed warning to the Trucial
Chiefs.
Perhaps the Dept might
write at once. When has been
by all the Members of the
Committee
23.3.06
I agree but would much prefer
"indifference" as the last word
23.3.06



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Minute Paper.

Register No. 552

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Telegram Letter from Viceroy,

Dated 15 March 1906.
Rec. 16

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	16 Mar		Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State	16		Reported intention of Ibn Saood to visit the territories of the Trucial Chiefs and Oman. Govt. of India propose to authorise Major Cox to issue the warning to the Trucial Chiefs suggested in 2nd Clause of para: 5 of his letter No. 51 dd. 4 Feb.
Committee	19.3.		
Under Secretary.....	23	RR	
Secretary of State	23		

Copy to F.O. (+) 16.3.06 (2) 26.3.06 2 Secs 0123 March

Secy. 13

Sign Jan. 23/3.


The warning proposed to be issued to the Trucial Chiefs is to the following effect:- that, as general unrest prejudicial to the commercial interests of the Coast would inevitably result from intrigues between them and Ibn Saoud, the Govt. of India would not view such proceedings with complacency. [See No. 535 attached]

Dft. to F.O.


Previous Papers:—

TH 535.

Y 10780. 2000.—3/1903. I. 505.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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the V. I. P.
F.O.

Book
70

24 March/06


Sir.

In continuation my letter of the 22nd February last on the subject of the reported intention of the Wahabi Emir to visit the Persian Coast, I am directed by the Secretary Morley to request that you will draw the attention of Secretary Sir E. Grey to the telegram from the Viceroy on this subject of the 15th March* and to the letter from Major Cox of the 5th Inst. of which No. 51 of the 4th February last.†


Subject

+ Enclosure to F.O. 16 March 06

† " " " 13 " "


Subject to Sir L. Peg's
Concurrence Mr. Morley proposes
to authorise the Govt. of India
to instruct Major Cox to warn
the Trucial Chiefs that, in
view of the general unrest,
prejudicial to our commercial
interests on the Coast, which
would result from intrigues
between them and the Emir
Abdul Aziz bin Saoud, the
Govt. of India would not view
such proceedings with complacency.

(Sd) A. Godley.



552 1/4 535

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

RECEIVED 16 MAR 1906 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM Viceroy


DATED Calcutta. 15th March 06

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 5.10 p.m.


Foreign Secret. Nnsaood Nejd. Please see letter from Major Cox, No: 51, dated 4th February, sent with Foreign Secretary's weekly letter of 22nd February. Pending reply to our Secret Despatch, No: 7, (906) External, dated 11th January 1906, we propose to authorise Major Cox to give warning to Trucial Arab Chiefs proposed in second clause of para 5 of his letter, No: 51. Addressed Secretary of State. Repeated to Bushire.

7

6



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Register No. 535

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 8M, Dated 22 Feb Rec. 12 March 1906.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 March	WLL	Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State	15	AG	Proposed visit to Oman and the Piratical Coast of Abdul Aziz bin Saood. Attitude of the Trucial Chiefs. Letter to bin Saood from the Sheikh of Koweit discouraging the proposal. View of Mubarak that bin Saood will not persist in his design.
Committee			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to FO 13/3/06 (see within)

(Cired with 554/06)

For information

Captain Knox's letter of 19 Jan gives the results of the enquiries which he was ordered by the Govt of India to make from Sheikh Mubarak as to Bin Saood's intentions. What the Sheikh says does not remove the cause for anxiety discussed in the Govt of India's letter of the 11 Jan forwarded to the FO & communicated by them to the W Office for his opinion.


(285/06)

A copy of these papers has been sent to the FO, who will doubtless forward them at once to the W. Office. No other action seems at present necessary.


Previous Papers:—

2738/05
285

Y 19789. 2000.—9/1905. I. 306.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000058



535

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 12 MAR 1906

No. 51, dated Bushire, the 4th (received 13th) February 1906 (Confidential).

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In reply to Foreign Department letter No. 4441-E. B., dated 5th December 1905, regarding the possibility of an endeavour by Abdul Aziz bin Saood to visit Oman and the Pirate Coast, I have the honour to attach copies of correspondence which has since passed in that connection between myself and the Political Agent, Koweit.

No. 97, dated 17th January 1906, from Resident, Bushire, to Political Agent, Koweit.
No. 1, dated 19th January 1906, from Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, Bushire.

2. Even allowing a modicum of discount upon the views expressed by Sheikh Mobarek, the probability is that they are primarily well founded.

At the same time the question of the spread of Wahabi influence is one with regard to which we need to maintain a very vigilant attitude, and I should have addressed Government on the subject on my recent return from Beraimi had I not found the Foreign Department letter under reply, awaiting me at Bushire.

3. The Sheikh of Abu Thabi at a confidential interview which he asked me to give him on the *Lawrence* spoke to me very strongly on this question. The Government of India will have learnt from paragraph 2 of Captain Trevor's previous communication that Sheikh Zaeed was sufficiently disturbed by bin Saood's missive to proceed to Maskat and discuss the situation with the Sultan, and I found him still much exercised at heart.

No. 513, dated 29th October 1905.


It is not surprising that being, as he is, the leader of the Hinawi element in Northern Oman (as the Sultan of Maskat is further south), and having been himself instrumental in the final extinction of Wahabee influence from Beraimi and the Pirate Coast in 1870, Sheikh Zaeed, and his kinsman the Sheikh of Debai, should regard the contingency of the appearance of bin Saood with much anxiety.

4. Nor is there, on the other hand, much cause for wonder if, as is the case, the Ghafiri Section of the Trucial Chiefs, that is to say, all except Abu Thabi and Debai, should regard bin Saood's overtures with favour, if not with pleasurable excitement. An indirect result of them has been that Shargah and Hamriyeh, and Shargah and Umm-el-Kowein, who have respectively for a long time been on strained terms, have lately made the support of the Beni Katab Bedouins in a quarrel with Sheikh Zaeed on the Beraimi side, an occasion for reconciliation among themselves, as Ghafiris, for united resistance to Sheikh Zaeed, whom, as the most powerful Chief on the Coast and as a Hinawi, they regard with jealousy and distrust.

I did my best to impress upon Sheikh Zaeed the folly of inducing a combination of the other Sheikhs against himself by proceeding to extremities with the Beni Katab, and I am glad to hope from the Residency Agent's recent reports that he has found a pacific solution of his quarrel with them; so that any cause for actual unrest is for the present removed; I think, however, that I have said enough to show that the progress of bin Saood's fortunes will be keenly watched on the Pirate Coast by all parties.

5. Sheikh Zaeed was very anxious that the Government of India should take steps to prevent any movement of bin Saood towards the Pirate Coast, and that imperative orders should be issued to the Ghafiri Sheikhs not to intrigue with him.

Beyond the sign which we have already made through Sheikh Mobarek, as now reported, there seems little else that we can do at present, but if the Government of India approve, I see no objection to my giving all the Trucial Sheikhs, both Ghafiri and Hinawi, to understand that on the grounds that general unrest prejudicial to our commercial interests on the Coast would inevitably result,



the Government of India would not view with complacency the intrigues of any of them with bin Saood.

The existing impression on the Trucial Coast undoubtedly is that as long as bin Saood restricts his movements to the land, the British Government will as heretofore refrain from interfering in any way; but the political situation has been so much modified in the last 35 years, that I can hardly think that in regard to the present problem a strict adherence to tradition would be a safe policy for us to pursue.

I beg to be favoured with the views and instructions of Government as early as may be possible.

No. 97, dated 17th January 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit.

I have the honour to forward a copy of a communication from the Government of India, regarding the reported ambition of bin Saood to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman. This was one of the matters which I had hoped to discuss with you personally at Busrah last week, but as you know, I was prevented from proceeding there at the last minute.

No 4441-E. B., dated 5th December 1905.

2. The position is briefly this:—

Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman has shown by letters which he has addressed to some of the Trucial Chiefs that he has some idea of attempting to re-establish the old Wahabee influence which his forefathers formerly acquired in Oman and of paying a preliminary visit to the Pirate Coast in connection with that aspiration.

His interference in the affairs of the Trucial Chiefs or with subjects of the Sultan of Maskat would obviously be a most undesirable contingency; and the Government of India consider that our best means of preventing it is through the medium of Sheikh Mubarak. Hence their desire that you should sound him on the subject.

In order that it may not appear that we attach very great importance to the reports at present existing, it would be better that you should in the first instance discuss the matter with Sheikh Mubarak, not as if you were acting on the instructions from Government, but as if on a casual reference from me. You might tell him, as is the case, that during a tour on the Trucial Coast from which I have just returned, I heard from some of the Sheikhs that Abdul Aziz bin Saood had been writing to them about a visit which he said that he contemplated paying to their country; and then ask him if he thinks that bin Saood seriously contemplates such a thing. You could go on to say that you cannot suppose that Government would approve of any interference by bin Saood in the affairs of Chiefs in treaty relation with us, and that you would advise Sheikh Mubarak as our friend and that of bin Saood to discourage the latter from the project should bin Saood consult him in the matter.

Please report as early as possible the results of your interview.

No. 1, dated Camp Jahra, the 19th January 1906.


From—Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter No. 97, dated Bushire, 17th January 1906, on the subject of bin Saood's projected visit to the Pirate Coast and Oman.

2. This morning, I took the opportunity of discussing the matter with Sheikh Mubarak on the lines indicated at the close of paragraph 2 of your letter quoted above.

3. Sheikh Mubarak informed me that he had heard of bin Saood's plans which he regarded as a mere attempt to extort money from the various coastal chiefs; that he had written already to bin Saood, pointing out to him the

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
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
impolicy of a confession, on the part of a ruler, to lack of funds; and further reminding him that bin Rashid was only scotched not killed; that bin Saood's power in Nejd was anything but finally established; that he had neither funds nor transport for a policy of aggression in the direction of Oman and that the first fruits of such an attempt would be that Sheikh Mubarak would break off relations with him.

4. The Sheikh, in conclusion, said that he did not suppose that, after this letter, bin Saood would persist in his design, though Sheikh Mubarak would not undertake to answer for the opinions and policy of an ignorant savage.

5. The Sheikh and I were quite alone at this interview and I have done my best to render accurately the substance of his remarks. It would appear that Sheikh Mubarak by no means approves entirely of bin Saood; he complains that there is a want of system and organisation in El-Riadh and that bin Saood is not the man to attain to the position of his forefathers. Recently, the Sheikh has been constantly complaining of the degeneracy of the Arabs and the utter want of security and order outside the limits of his own territories, but I have been unable, so far, to learn what recent occurrences have given rise to these complaints.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4436 F. D.—17-2-1906.—67.—J. A.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 6662.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

2728 / 1/4.285

Encl. 2

Copy to India 9.3.06
Secy's no. 10.
in Secret Despatch No. 15 of 13 April 1906

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPT. 2 MAR 1906

FOREIGN OFFICE

March 1, 1906.

(circd. with 2834/06)

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, relative to the proposed visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast and Muscat.

I am to inform you that a copy of your letter has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople for his observations, and that a further communication will be addressed to you on receipt of his reply.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

E Gorst


The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

TH

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Minute Paper.

Register No. 285

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Secret Letter from India, No. 7, Dated 11 / Rec. 27 January 1906.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	7 Feb	VCR
Secretary of State	?	ag
Committee	12 -	Mn.
Under Secretary.....	21	VCR
Secretary of State	21	ag

SUBJECT.

Persian Gulf.

Proposed visit of Abdul Aziz-bin Abdul Rahman-bin-Saood to the Pirate Coast and Oman. Suggestion that he be asked through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat whether he adheres to the engagements of his predecessors regarding

Copy to India 23 February Secy. 8.

British subjects in his territories and Arab tribes in alliance with the British Govt.

Send second draft. Mn. 24.2.06.

Off to 70

The early history of our relations with the Wahabi Amirs of Nejd is given in Aitchison Vol X pages 101-106, & the text of the Darin Abdul Aziz Amir's engagement of 1866, on the basis of which the Govt of India proposes to proceed now is found at page 116. A Memorandum is attached dealing with the present aspects of the question.

The Texts of our treaties with the Chiefs of the Pirate Coast are attached. They provide that the Chiefs will not have dealings with any Power other than the British Govt & that they will not on any account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise


Despatch to India No 15 Secret, dated 13 April 1906 (2834)

Previous Papers:—


TH 1768/05 707 (see 30/5/06)

T 10789. 2000.—9/1905. I. 506.

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"give for occupation" any part of their territory) save
"to the British Govt."; or, in some cases "without the assent
"of the British Govt."
As regards Muscat, besides the Treaty of 1862 guaran-
-teeing his independence, jointly with France, we have
our Engagement, (copy attached) with the Sultan of 20 March 1891, by
which the Sultan binds himself & his successors not
"to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation
"save to the British Govt. the Dominions of Muscat & Oman
"or any of their Dependencies"



Summary of information as to Bin Saoud's relations with the Turks, extracted from the Government of India's monthly Memoranda


closure to ...ia letter No.

Memorandum - 7 Feb 1906

In 1904 the forces of Ibn Rashid and Bin Saoud were repeatedly in conflict. After the former's defeat in April 1904 the Turks sent up infantry and artillery in his support. Bin Saoud then appealed for British* protection. Ibn Rashid, however, met with no success and in August 1904 the Wali of Busrah offered to make Bin Saoud Ruler of Nejd, and suggested his writing a submissive letter to the Mushir of Baghdad.

Bin Saoud scored another victory in September 1904 and then consulted Mubarak as to the advisability of writing to the Turks. Subsequently the Turkish Ministry of War told the Military Attaché at Constantinople that Bin Saoud had made his submission after this victory, and that,

... of 1904, page 3.
... of 1904, page 4.
... of 1904, page 5.
... see note on page 3]
... of 1904, page 7.



Enclosure in India letter No.

that, in consequence, a further military expedition, which Turkey had contemplated, would not be sent. The reported submission was confirmed at Koweit, where Captain Knox was informed that Bin Saoud's father had written a letter to the Vali of Busrah. The Vali, in reply, accepted Bin Saoud's offer of service, and a meeting was arranged at Koweit between Mubarek and Bin Saoud's father and the Vali. This took place in February 1903; a letter is said to have been written on the occasion by Mubarak and Bin Saoud's father, asking the Sultan's pardon for Bin Saoud.

In March Bin Saoud was reported to have been made Ruler of Nejd, and to have received Turkish honours and decorations. In May 1903 Bin Saoud's father sent to the Sultan a telegram expressive of loyalty.

Information received in June 1903 was to the effect that Bin Saoud was to govern Nejd nominally as a Turkish official (Kaimmakam), Jebel Shammer being assigned to Ibn Rashid, and the district of

256 of 1904, p.

17 of 1905, par.


46 of 1903, par.

68 of 1903, par.

112 of 1903, p.

133 of 1903, p.

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
Enclosure in
India letter No.

3

of Kassim being governed directly by the Porte. But the news received in August
177 of 1903, page 4. was that Ibn Rashid had occupied a position in Kassim and was meditating an attack on Aneyza, with the support of Turkish troops; while Bin Saoud was marching on Kassim.

Since August nothing further of importance has been heard about Bin Saoud till the transaction reported in the present papers.

In connection with Bin Saoud's
5 of 1904. appeal for British protection, in May 1904, the Government of India suggested that the appointment of a Resident at Koweit and abstention from interference with the importation of




of arms for Bin Saoud might become necessary. Sir N. O'Conor thought that his representations would not induce the Turks to cease to support Ibn Reshid. He did not see

on what grounds he could press the Turks to desist from helping the Amir who was the party attacked without appearing as a distinct partisan of Bin Saud; and pointed out that, on grounds of general policy, there were objections to preventing the Turks from assisting the Amir against Bin Saud whose apparent object is to re-establish the Wahabi dynasty throughout Central Arabia, the result of which might in the near future be fraught with serious consequences and might imperil our authority at Koweit, where, in the existing condition of affairs, our influence is yearly growing stronger. Sir N. O'Conor's idea was that we should confine ourselves for the present to maintaining int ct the territory of Koweit and awaiting developments, but that, if the Turks persisted, as he anticipated, in assisting the Amir, it might be expedient to reconsider the question of appointing a Resident at Koweit.

[Sir N. O'Conor No. 373, 16 May (1)
and telegram No. 19
23 May (1)]
(2648/04)


The Government of India, to whom these views were referred, suggested that (1002/05) Sir N. O'Conor should inform the Porte that we had no desire to assist Bin Saoud directly or indirectly, but that, if as a result of Turkish support, Ibn Reshid became unduly powerful, our interests in Eastern Arabia might



might be injuriously affected. They held that our prestige at Koweit would be impaired if by preventing Mubarek from assisting Bin Saoud and by stopping the importation of arms, we allowed the Turkish support of Ibn Rashid to lead to Ottoman supremacy in Nejd. But British authority at Koweit would not be imperilled by the success of Bin Saoud. Their conclusions were that an Agent should be sent to Koweit and that the arms trade there, which was proceeding briskly, should not be interfered with.

In June 1904 the Foreign Office instructed Sir N. O'Conor, in addressing the Porte on the subject of Turkish activity, to make such use as he thought fit of the arguments

sent



put forward by the Government of India.
It does not appear from our records
what action, if any, Sir M. O'Conor
took upon their despatch.

A Political Agent was sent to
Koweit in August 1904. With regard
to the importation of arms at Koweit
for Bin Saoud, he was instructed
not to interfere with the existing
trade*, and when approached by
Mubarek, in November 1904, on the
question of advising Bin Saoud,
he informed the Sheikh that he had
no instructions to give advice and
that Bin Saoud should consult
his own interests (in the matter of
communicating with the Turks).


In December 1904 the Viceroy
was informed that His Majesty's
Government desired it to be clearly
understood that British interest
and influence were to be confined
strictly to the coast-line and that
nothing

India Letter No. 191 of 1904

Pol. 1855 of 1904

* See telegram from Viceroy 24 June '04

Pol. (3499 of 1904)




nothing should be said or done to connect them, even indirectly, with the warfare then in progress in the interior. They agreed that the Agent at Koweit should give no opinion on the advice to be given by Mubarek to Bin Saoud.

As regards the import of arms at Koweit, the Sheikh in 1900 issued a proclamation prohibiting it. The proposals for making this prohibition effective, which were dropped in 1902, were to extend to Koweit, Turkey, Bahrein, and the Trucial Chiefs' Coast. the Sultan of Muscat's prohibition (issued in 1898) of the export of arms to


Letter to F.O. 18 May 1902.

Letter to F.O. of June 1902 and F.O. of 21 June 1902. (7504/04)



to Persia and British India, and also,
in order to facilitate the right of search;
to obtain the consent of the Porte to
our ships being allowed to search, in
the Turkish territorial waters of the
Gulf, vessels, including those flying
the Turkish flag, suspected of carrying
arms. The real difficulty, however,
is that Muscat is an entrepôt for
arms, the import of which cannot be
prohibited by the Sultan without the
consent of the French, the United States
of America and other Powers having
treaties with Muscat, either specifically
providing for freedom of trade or
for most-favoured-nation treatment.
Whilst this import continues, no
preventive measures are likely really
to check a smuggling trade from
Muscat to Persia and the Arabian
Coast.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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


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It may be added that in 1881
and 1888 we appear to have given the
Sultan of Muscat certain assistance
on the occasion of risings at Dhofar.
In 1895, on the occasion of a rebellion
(supposed to be in the interests of Zanzibar)
which promised at first to be successful,
a ship of war was sent to protect
British interests, with instructions to
adopt an attitude of the strictest
neutrality towards the rival parties.
In 1897, on the occasion of a fresh
rebellion at Dhofar, we complied with
a request of the Sultan for the
assistance of a ship of war, subject
to conditions, with a view to the susceptibilities
of the French Government to whom we
had explained our attitude, that she
should


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
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should help only with guns and not land any force and that nothing should be done which would imply encroachment on the independence of the Sultan. The presence of this vessel sufficed to secure the restoration of the Sultan's authority without bloodshed.


المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.
I do not like entering into direct
communications and relations with the
Wahabi ruler. There is no analogy between
1866 & 1906.
In 1866 the Wahabi envoy exactly reversed
the process - He asked us to adjust
differences and voluntarily undertook not
to injure or attack the tribes of Muscat
provided he received his customary payments.
We did not propose (accept) the undertaking. Sir
at that time laid stress on two points
i that we should not guarantee any
settlement made by the Wahabis with
Muscat whose ruler then was very
weak,
ii that no treaty should be made with
the Wahabis without the sanction of the
Home authorities.
I may add that at that time the French
interest in Muscat was weak, and that
we did not recognise Turkish sovereignty over
7
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Negd.


To revive the self imposed assurance
given by Imam abdulla bin Feysal
in 1866 under the very altered conditions
of the present time seems to me a
serious step. We should revive the
question of the Muscat customs payment;
we should give occasion to France to
object (for she shares with us the duty
of protecting Muscat against the Wahabis):
and we should annoy Turkey especially as
the Wahabis now recognise Turkish suzerainty.
I think we should wait until the
Wahabis show signs of interference, &
warn the Turks that they are responsible.
Of course if the Wahabis do attack
the tribes & we have a ship available




we should no doubt attack the
invaders if possible. But such
attacks are not easy; & there seems
no advantage in threatening to attack
before there is any sign of invasion. As to
the arms traffic we cannot stop it as Abdulla not threaten
to 20 to 40. other nations will not agree to stop their arms.
I would forward to the F.O. fearing not
the danger of getting into any engagements
with the Wahabis, & trusting upon
the risk of raising claims on Muscat
under the undertaking of 1866.

W. Seddarer

19. 2





Fair Copy of draft approved by Political Committee, 20 February 1906.

Encl. 1.

India Office
22 Febry. 1906

Under Secretary of State
Foreign Office.

Sir,


With reference to my letter of the 29th April 1904 as to the affairs of Nejd, I am directed by Mr Secy Morley to enclose, to be laid before the Secy of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a further Secret Letter from the Govt. of India on the subject of a visit which the Wahabi Amir Abdul Aziz bin Saood is reported to be intending to make to the Persian Coast & Muscat in the coming spring.

It will be observed that on the 5th December 1905 the Govt of India authorized enquiries being made of the Sheikh of Koweit as to Bin Saood's intentions, but that the result has not yet been reported. In the meanwhile the Govt. of India, in view of the serious consequences which would ensue if Bin Saood should succeed in establishing his ascendancy over the

Book 50

No 7. Secret, dated 11 Jan 1906 and Enclosures


S 10.



the Inland Chiefs or the Sultan of Muscat, suggest that he should be approached either through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat or other suitable channel, with a view to ascertaining whether he is prepared to stand by the declaration of his predecessor not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in his territories, and not to interfere with the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government. In regard to this I am to observe that the declaration made in 1846 was not proposed, or even formally accepted, by the British Govt, and it contained a reference to the claim of the Wahabis upon the customs of Muscat. The Govt. of India further suggest that, in the event of Bin Saood's failing to give the necessary assurance, he should be warned that any attempt on his part to interfere in Oman or on the Pirate Coast would be regarded as an unfriendly act


and

See declaration of the Wahabi Amir, of 21 April 1866 (Aitchison's Treaties Vol x p 116)



and that suitable measures would be taken to frustrate it. These measures in the opinion of the Govt. of India might consist either of a more stringent Embargo on the import of arms at Kowait and elsewhere, or, in the case of necessity, of actual armed assistance from British ships to the Sheikhs threatened.


The serious consequences which might arise from the re-establishment by Bin Saood of the Wahabi Dynasty throughout the centre of Arabia were referred to in the Despatch from H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople of the 16th May 1904, No. 373, and the question is further complicated if, as appears to be the case, Bin Saood has been recognised by the Turkish Govt. and has acknowledged the Suzerainty of the Sultan. It will be observed that the Govt. of India consider that it would be useless and undesirable to bring pressure to bear on Bin Saood through the Turkish authorities.



So far as Muscat is concerned I am to observe that the French Govt. is conjointly with the British Govt. interested in its independence, and in the event of interference by the Wahabis with the Omani Chiefs the measures proposed by the Govt. of India might not be effective. For instance, such control as we may be able to exercise over the importation of arms into Arabia is limited to arms imported by British subjects. The questions raised by the Govt. of India are thus complicated, and in view of our desire to refrain from any entanglement with the rulers of Nejd, it seems desirable to take no steps, in the absence of any urgent necessity caused by Wahabi action, until H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople has been consulted on the proposal to approach Ibn Saood otherwise than through the Turkish authorities.

The

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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The suggestion of the Govt. of India that in the event of Bin Saood's failing to give satisfactory assurances a more stringent Embargo should be placed upon the traffic in arms appears to raise a further difficulty by conveying the implication that in the contrary event the Govt. of India would be prepared to acquiesce in the import of arms by the Sheikh of Koweit. Mr Morley is aware that in June 1904 it was decided to offer measures which were then under consideration for preventing the import of arms into Koweit. He would, however, be reluctant to approve any permanent departure from the established policy of HM Govt. of maintaining an effective control over the arms traffic in these waters.


(Sd) AGodley.

See Sir J. Sanderson's letter 21 June 1904.


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Dft to the Govt of India
No.


Sir,

With reference to my letter of the 29th April 1904 as to the affairs of Nejd, I am directed by Mr. Secy Morley to enclose, to be laid before the Secy of State for Foreign Affairs, Copy of a further Secret letter from the Govt of India on the subject of a visit which the Wahabi Amir Abdul Aziz bin Saood is reported to be intending to make to the Pirate Coast & Muscat in the coming Spring.

It will be observed that on the 5th December 1905 the Govt of India authorised inquiries being made of the Sheikh of Koweit as to Bin Saood's intentions, but that the result has not yet been reported. In the meanwhile the Govt of India in view of the serious consequences which would ensue if Bin Saood should succeed in

Foreign Dept No. 7 Secret External
dd 11 Jan 1906
(with enclosures)

Approved Pol. Com'ee.,
20 FEB. 1906
(as altered)




in establishing his ascendancy
over the Tribal Chiefs of the
Sultan of Muscat, Suggest that
~~the Amir~~ he should be approached
either through the Sheikh of Koweit
or the Sultan of Muscat or
other suitable channel, with
a view to ascertaining whether
he is prepared to stand by
the [Engagements] of his predecessors
not to oppose or injure British
subjects residing in his territories,
and not to interfere with the
Arab tribes in alliance with
the British Govt. & the Govt of
India further suggest that, in
the event of ~~the Amir~~ Bin Saoods failing
to give the necessary assurance,
he should be warned that any
attempt on his part to interfere
in Oman or on the Piratical Coast
would be regarded as an unfriendly
act

The P.R. Comm. wrote upon
reduction


See Declaration of the Wahabi Amir of [illegible]
(Aitchison's Treaties Vol X p 116)

The Pol. Comm. wrote. insert:-
In regard to this I am to observe
that the declaration made in 1866
was not proposed, or even formally
accepted, by the British Govt., and
it contained a reference to the
claim of the Wahabis upon the
customs of Muscat.



act & that suitable measures would be taken to frustrate it. These measures in the opinion of the Govt of India might consist either of a more stringent embargo on the import of arms at Koweit & the Coast, or, in the case of necessity, of actual armed assistance from British Ships to the Sheikh threatened.

The serious consequences which might arise from the re-establishment of the by Bin Saood of the Wahabi Dynasty throughout the Centre of Arabia were referred to in the despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of the 16th May 1904, No 373, & the question is further complicated if, as appears to be the case, Bin Saood has been recognised by the Turkish Govt and has acknowledged the Suzerainty of the Sultan. It will be observed that the Govt of




q India consider that it would be useless & undesirable to bring pressure to bear on Bin Saood through the Turkish authorities.

[In the circumstances Mr. Morley agrees with the Govt of India that it is necessary to provide against our relations with the Sultan of Muscat & the Trucial Chiefs being disturbed by any action of Bin Saood, whether taken independently or under the Suzerainty of the Sultan. But he would be glad to be favored with Sir E. Grey's opinion on the course of action which the Govt of India propose should be pursued with a view to establishing an understanding with Bin Saood.]

The suggestion of the Govt of India that in the event of Bin Saood's failing to give satisfactory assurances a more stringent embargo should

So far as Muscat is concerned, I am [illegible] The P.A. Comm would have inserted A for this paragr.

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
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
INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

So far as Muscat is concerned, I am to observe that the French Govt is conjointly with the British Govt interested in its independence, and in the event of interference by the Wahabis with the friendly chiefs the measures proposed by the S. of S might not be effective. For instance, such control as we may be able to exercise over the importation of arms into Arabia is limited to arms imported by British subjects. The questions raised by the S. of S are thus complicated, and in view of our desire to refrain from any entanglements with the rulers of Nejd, it seems desirable to take

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No steps, in the absence of any
unforeseen action by the Wahabis,
until H. M. ambassador at
Constantinople has been consulted
on the proposal to approach
Ibn Saood otherwise than
through the Turkish authorities.



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
Should be placed upon the traffic in arms appears [to imply] that in the contrary event the Govt of India would be prepared to acquiesce in the import of arms by the Sheikh of Koweit. Mr. Morley is aware that in June last it was decided to defer measures which were then under consideration for preventing the import of arms into Koweit. He would, however, be reluctant to approve any permanent departure from the established policy of H.M. Govt of maintaining an effective control over the arms traffic in these waters.

W. Lee


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Engagement with Chiefs of the Pirate Coast

Extract from Enclosures in Government of India Letter No. 99, Secret, dated 7th June 1892.

No. 29, dated Bushire the 15th March 1892.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c., to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter No. 133 C.E., dated 24th November 1891, I have the honour to forward, in quadruplicate, in English and Arabic, for ratification by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, an agreement concluded with the six Trucial Chiefs on the Pirate Coast.

2. The Chief of Abu Dhabi expressed the hope that he would receive the protection of the British Government, and the same consideration from myself that he had met with from my predecessor. I told him that I could readily give him a promise as regards the second point, but that without specific instructions, I could not pledge Government to any particular course of action, though this would doubtless be what was most appropriate to each occasion as it arose.

3. As the agreement of 22nd December 1880, signed by the Chief of Bahrain, contained no provision against a disposal of territory, I thought it desirable to obtain a document to that effect from him, and thus complete the series for the whole coast. The Sheikh preferred one identical in terms with that signed by the Trucial Chiefs to a declaration in a single article, and it has, therefore, been executed in that form, though the first two clauses are really superfluous in his case. I trust that my action in this respect will meet with approval.

I, Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, viz. :—

1st.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2nd.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3rd.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Abu Dhabi, 6th March 1892, corresponding to 5th Shaaban 1309 Hijri.

Signature of Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.


Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

S. 23.

7

6



I, Rashid bin Maktum, Chief of Debai, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs, and successors, to the following conditions, viz. :—

1*st*.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2*nd*.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3*rd*.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Debai, 7th March 1892, corresponding with 8th Shaaban 1309.

Signature of Rashid bin Maktum, Chief of Debai.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I, Homeid bin Rashid, Chief of Ajman, in the presence of Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs, and successors, to the following conditions, viz. :—

1*st*.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2*nd*.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3*rd*.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Ajman, 7th March 1892, corresponding with 8th Shaaban 1309.

Signature of Homeid bin Rashid, Chief of Ajman.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.


H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I, Saggar bin Khalid, Chief of Shargah, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs, and successors, to the following conditions, viz. :—

1*st*.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2*nd*.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: غير معروف
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x00007e



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3*rd*.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Shargah, 7th March 1892, corresponding to 8th Shaaban 1309.

Signature of Saggar bin Khalid, Chief of Shargah.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I, Hamaid bin Abdullah, Chief of Ras-al-Khaimah, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs, and successors, to the following conditions, viz. :—

1*st*.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2*nd*.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3*rd*.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

Dated Ras-ul-Khaimah, the 8th March 1892, corresponding with 9th Shaaban 1309.

Signature of Hamid bin Abdullah, Chief of Ras-al-Khaimah.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE.
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I, Ahmad bin Abdullah, Chief of Umm-al-Kawain, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, viz. :—

1*st*.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2*nd*.—That without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3*rd*.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

Dated Umm-al-Kawain, 8th March 1892, corresponding with 9th Shaaban 1309.


Signature of Ahmad bin Abdullah, Chief of Umm-al-Kawain.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.



4

I, Esau bin Ali, Chief of Bahrain, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, viz.:—

1*st*.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2*nd*.—That without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3*rd*.—That, I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

Dated Bahrain, 13th March 1892, corresponding with 14th Shaaban 1309.


Signature of Esau bin Ali, Chief of Bahrain.

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.



Muscat Engagement 20 March 1891

From Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

Secret, No. 85.

Simla,
2nd June 1891.

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's Secret Despatch No. 32, dated the 7th November 1890, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a Declaration dated the 20th of March 1891, obtained from Seyyid Feysal bin Turki, Sultan of Muskat and Oman, whereby His Highness engages, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Muskat and Oman or any of their dependencies.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.
" F. S. ROBERTS.
" P. P. HUTCHINS.
" D. BARBOUR.
" A. E. MILLER.
" H. BRACKENBURY.
" R. C. B. PEMBERTON.

Praise be to God alone!

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between His Highness Seyyid Feysil bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muskat and Oman, on the one part, and Colonel Edward Charles Ross, Companion of the Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of the British Government, on the other part, that the said Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muskat and Oman, does pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Muskat and Oman or any of their dependencies.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable Bond Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muskat and Oman, and Colonel Edward Charles Ross, Companion of the Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the former for himself, his heirs and successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures on this ninth day of Shaaban one thousand three hundred and eight (A. H.) corresponding to the twentieth day of March (A.D.) 1891.

Signature of His Highness SEYYID
FEYSAL BIN TURKI BIN SAEED,
Sultan of Muskat and Oman.

E. C. Ross, Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.


Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla on the twenty-third day of May 1891.


H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

S. 7.

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Declaration respecting the Independence of Muscat and Zanzibar - 1862.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, taking into consideration the importance of maintaining the independence of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and of His Highness the Sultan of ZanZibar, have thought it right to engage reciprocally to respect the independence of these Sovereigns.

The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, and the Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being furnished with the necessary powers, hereby declare, in consequence that their said Majesties take reciprocally that engagement.


Witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.


Done at Paris,
The 10th March 1862.

(Sd) Cowley.
,, De Thouvenal.

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No. 7 of 1906.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

RECEIVED 27 JAN 1906 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE JOHN MORLEY, O.M.,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 11th January 1906.*

SIR,


We have the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of the correspondence detailed in the annexed list, regarding a proposed visit of Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Saood to the Pirate Coast and Oman, and to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with Mr. Brodrick's Secret despatch No. 24, dated the 29th April 1904, on the subject of our relations with the Wahabi dynasty.

It will be seen that Abdul-bin-Saood, who has been staying in El Katr, has addressed letters to the Trucial Chiefs, expressing his intention of visiting their territories in the spring; and that the Chief of Abu Dhabi has conferred personally on the subject with the Sultan of Maskat, who is much agitated at the idea that the Amir of Nejd may possibly visit Oman. His Highness considers that, should Abdul Aziz make his appearance anywhere on the shores of Oman, it would be the signal for all the Ghaferi tribes to rise against him.

2. Reports from our local officers in the Persian Gulf seem to point to the recent reassertion by the Wahabi dynasty of its former position in Nejd acquiring a permanent character. The cessation of hostilities in Nejd has left Bin Saud free to expand in other directions; and the visit of Sheikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi to Maskat shows that the situation is actually the cause of some anxiety to the Trucial Chiefs, of whom the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi is the most important. We, therefore, consider it very necessary that a course of action should be concerted at an early date, so that we may be prepared for developments. On being apprised of Ibn Saood's intention to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman in the ensuing spring, we directed* Major Cox to ascertain the facts from Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit. We desire, however, to point out how very serious to our prestige and influence the consequences might be, if Ibn Saood should attack the Pirate Coast Chiefs or the Sultan of Maskat, or succeed in extending his influence over them, and how important it is that we should prevent, as far as lies in our power, such a contingency, especially now that the Wahabi Amir has recognised the suzerainty of the Sultan.

* See letter No. 4441 E.-B., dated the 5th December 1905.

3. In our Secret despatch No. 69 (External), dated the 24th March 1904, we contemplated the possibility of having to revive the treaty relations which existed with the Wahabi Amirs, in case Ibn Saood should succeed in establishing and extending his ascendancy. Now that the latter has come into power, and has given out that it is his intention to extend his influence towards Oman and the coast generally, it seems to us desirable to ascertain whether he is prepared to




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stand by the engagement of his predecessors not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in his territories, and not to interfere with the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government. His Majesty's Government will no doubt agree with us that it would be both useless and undesirable to bring pressure to bear on Ibn Saood through the Turkish authorities, since his proceedings at El Hassa and in Nejd, as reported in the recent diaries from the Persian Gulf, indicate that he would not be likely to pay any attention to the remonstrances on their part; while we should be serving Turkish interests by involving ourselves in complications with the Wahabi Amir. We would therefore suggest that, if His Majesty's Government see no objection, this enquiry be made from Ibn Saood through Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit or the Sultan of Maskat or other suitable channel, and that he be warned, in the event of his unwillingness to give the necessary assurances or to declare his intentions as affecting British interests in Oman or along the Arab coast, that any attempt on his part to interfere in that locality or with the Chiefs and their subjects would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and that suitable measures would be taken to frustrate it. These might amount, in our opinion, to a more stringent embargo on the import of arms at Koweit and elsewhere on the Arabian coast of the Gulf, or even, in the case of an attack being imminent, to actual armed assistance from British ships to the Sheikhs threatened, as might be necessary.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servants,



List of Enclosures in Secret despatch No. 7 (External), dated the 11th January 1906, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
1	No. 498, dated the 15th October 1905.	The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Movements of Muhammad Abdul Wahab of Darein.
2	Extract from the diary of dency for the week ending	the Persian Gulf Political Resi- 15th October 1905.	Abdul Aziz Ibn Saood's visit to Katr.
3	Extract from the diary of dency for the week ending	the Persian Gulf Political Resi- 22nd October 1905.	Visit of certain Arab Chiefs to Debai.
4	No. 513, dated the 29th October 1905.	The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Proposed visit of Ibn Saood to the Pirate coast and Oman.
5	Extract from the diary of dency for the week ending	the Persian Gulf Political Resi- 29th October 1905.	Affairs of Abu Dhabi, Um-el-Kowein, and Ajman.
6	No. 4441 E.-B., dated the 5th December 1905.	To the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Proposed visit of Ibn Saood to the Pirate Coast and Oman.


L. Russell.

Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.


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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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1906.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


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
SECRET.
External.

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Enclosures of a letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 7, dated the 11th January 1906.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000089





Encl. no. 1.

No. 498, dated Bushire, the 15th (received 23rd) October 1905.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, I.A., Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf,

To—S. M. Fraser, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translation of the marginally noted news-letter * which I have received from the Residency Agent, Shargah, reporting, *inter alia*, the movements of the notorious Mohamed Abdul Wahab of Darein in Katif district.

*No. 137, dated 15th September 1905, with enclosure.

Already received 1768/05

Translation of a news letter No. 137, dated 15th September 1905, from the Residency Agent, Shargah, to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

On the 11th Jamadi Thani 1323 (13th August 1905) the Chief of Debai proceeded to the village of Hatta for the purpose of repairing a spring for irrigation of date trees, etc. He returned to Debai on the 23rd Jamadi Thani (25th August 1905) and it appears that he has appointed one of his men, named Abdullah bin Bauker who belongs to the Lariyeh Ajam tribe to look after the spring.

On the 14th Jamadi-Thani (16th August 1905) Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab arrived at Debai by the mail steamer from Bombay.

When he landed at Debai from the mail steamer the Chief of Debai's *locum tenens* fired a salute of 2 guns and hoisted his flag on the Government House. This Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab is a merchant and deals in pearls but he is a resident of Darein in the District of Katif, and a Turkish subject. He visits Bahrein, Katr and Bombay.

It appears that Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab is the bearer of presents sent to all the Chiefs of the (Pirate) Coast from Abu Dhabi to Um-el-Kowein, by a Bania named Nakandas Jowerjin residing at Bombay.


Every Sheikh has been sent a silver tray, weighing 130 miskals and one pair of Binoculars and one Brocade Shawl with a letter. I beg to forward herewith a copy of one of the letters for your information.

Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab arrived at Shargah on the 21st Jamadi-Thani (23rd August 1905). The Chief of Shargah fired a salute of 2 guns and hoisted his flag on the Government House, and entertainments were given in his honour by the Chief of Shargah and some of the inhabitants of that place. He remained at Shargah for 3 days and handed to the Chief the presents sent with him by Nakandas Bania adding a small bundle containing silk cloth, Abba, (cloak) a watch, etc. He then returned to Debai. On embarking on the boat at his departure for Debai, he distributed Rs. 500 amongst the servants of the Chief of Shargah.

The Chief of Ajman had sent 2 dromedaries to Mohamed. He, however, did not accept them and returned them to the Chief sending Rs. 100 as a present at same time from himself to the Chief. The Chiefs of Shargah and Debai had each sent 2 dromedaries to Mohamed Abdul Wahab. He accepted them and despatched them to Bahrein by the mail steamer.

Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab tried to bring about a reconciliation between the Chief of Shargah and his uncle Sheikh Salem bin Sultan. The latter, however, did not agree that the reconciliation should be effected through him (Mohamed) saying "you are a foreigner and an understanding should be made by one who should (always) be present to see that it is not infringed."

I have heard that a friendship exists between the Headman of Fujeira and Sheikh Salem bin Sultan and that the former has invited the latter to come to Fujeira as his guest and has prepared for him some presents in the shape of dates, etc., and awaits Sheikh Salem's arrival at Fujeira.



It appears that, if no reconciliation is effected between the Chief of Shargah and Sheikh Salem, the latter will join the Headman of Fujeira and Zed-el-Helali, the Head of Shehiyeen against the Chief of Shargah and take possession of the villages belonging to the latter in the mountainous districts of Ras-el-Kheima and Shargah. But this fact has not become public as yet.

Most of the inhabitants of Shargah and Ras-el-Kheima inwardly desire to be ruled by Sheikh Salim bin Sultan. If the latter attacks Ras-el-Kheima and Shargah even with only 100 men, the towns-people will join him. But Sheikh Salem is an old man and does not like fighting and quarrels and only desires means of subsistence from the Chief of Shargah; but the Chief does not agree to grant him the same and, I think, that, if the case remains in this state, Sheikh Salem will take some measures to involve the Chief in trouble. Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab gave Sheikh Salem bin Sultan $400 and 20 bags rice as a present.


Translation of a letter, dated 15th Jemadi-ul-Awal 1323 (19th July 1905) from Nakandas Jowerjin to the Sheikh.

You have of course heard the news of the marriage of (my) son Subbagh. We have sent marriage gifts to some of our friends. As you are one of the most respectable friends of ours, we send you, through Sheikh Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab Pasha a present, *viz.*, a silver tray and a pair of binoculars which I request you to accept and oblige us.

My son Subbagh sends you salaams.

G. G. Press, Simla.—No. C516 F. D.-27-10-05.—67—H. C. G.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x00008c



Enclo. no. 2

Extract from the Diary of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week ending 15th (received 23rd) October 1905.

* * * * * * *

SHARGAH.

13. *5th October 1905.*—Abdul Aziz Ibn Saood has addressed letters to the Trucial Chiefs in which he announces his visit to El Katr and his having effected reconciliation between the El Murrah, Beni Hajir and Ajman tribes. He also expresses his intention of visiting the Chief's territories in the spring. He left El Katr and went to the watering place Azarnookeh.

14. Chief of Abu Dhabi is reported to have sent the letter received by him from Ibn Saood to the Sultan of Maskat and he himself proposes to go to Maskat to confer with His Highness on the subject. The Residency Agent, Shargah, has been instructed to keep a careful watch and report future developments.

= 1768/05

Enclo. no. 3.

Extract from the Diary of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week ending the 22nd October 1905.

* * * * * * *

SHARGAH.

1. *27th September 1905.*—Sheikh Zaeed-bin-Khalifa, Chief of Abu Dhabi, came to Debai on 23rd September with a view to endeavouring to effect a reconciliation with his wife, who recently left him and went to live at Debai with her father. The latter is Sultan bin Naser Sweidi whom Sheikh Zaeed has been trying to settle at Zoara (a disputed peninsula between Shargah and Ajman). Sheikh Zaeed's mother was a relative of Sultan bin Naser.

2. The Chiefs of Shargah, Ajman and Um-el-Kowein came to Debai to see Sheikh Zaeed, and matters about which there were disagreements between them, were discussed. Sheikh Zaeed asked the Chief of Um-el-Kowein to refrain from entering into any relations with the Bedouins, assuring him that if he was afraid of them, he would support him, against them. The Chief of Um-el-Kowein, though he inwardly wishes to maintain his relations with the Bedouins, especially the Beni Kutb, has accepted Sheikh Zaeed's advice. The Chiefs then returned to their territories where they were visited by Sheikh Zaeed later on.

— do —

* * * * * * *

Enclo. no. 4.

No. 513, dated Bushire, the 29th October 1905.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, I.A., Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a report * which I have received from the Residency Agent at Shargah, together with the enclosures.† From the latter it will be seen that Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Saood visited Katr during the hot weather and that he proposes to visit the Arab Coast and Oman in the spring. These facts were briefly noted in the Diary of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week ending 15th October 1905, and it was stated that the Chief of Abu Dhabi proposed to confer with His Highness the Sultan of Maskat on the subject.

* No. 149, dated 5th October 1905.


† (1) Letter dated 22nd August 1905, from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Saood to the Chief of Debai.
(2) Letter dated 29th August 1905, from Khalid bin Abdullah es Sowedi to the Chief of Abu Dhabi.
(3) Letter from Amer bin Shaban (undated) to the Chief of Abu Dhabi.

2. I have now heard that Sheikh Zaeed-bin-Kalifah duly visited Maskat and that the Sultan is much agitated at the idea that the Amir of Nejd may possibly visit Oman. His Highness considers that should Abdul Aziz make his appearance anywhere on the shores of Oman, it would be the signal for all the Ghaferi tribes to rise against him.

3. I think it is unlikely that Bin Saood will endeavour to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman, but the appearance of the Wahabi Amir in this quarter would certainly cause trouble, and I think that steps should be taken to prevent his making any such visit, should it appear later that he seriously contemplates doing so.

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I therefore submit this report with the request that the Government of India will be pleased to favour me with instructions as to what action should be taken, should such a contingency arise.

Translation of a letter No. 149, dated 5th October 1905, from the Residency Agent, Shargah, to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I beg to forward herewith copy of a letter from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman, Amir of Nejd, to the Chief of Debai. He has addressed similar letters to the other Chiefs.

Herewith is also enclosed copy of a letter from Khalid-bin-Abdulla-es-Soweidi residing at Katr to the Chief of Abu Dhabi, and of the letter from Amer bin Shaban of Beni Hajir to the Chief of Abu Dhabi. They all contain reports regarding the aforesaid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman.

The Chief of Abu Dhabi has despatched the letter received by him from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman, to His Highness Syed Fysel, Sultan of Maskat, and intends proceeding to Maskat by the mail steamer which is due at Debai from Bussorah on the 6th October 1905. I have learnt from the Chief of Abu Dhabi that he intends to confer with His Highness Syed Fysel, regarding the proceedings of Abdul Aziz, Amir of Nejd, who will probably visit the Arab Coast.

Translation of the purport of a letter dated 20th Jemad-es-Sani 1323 / 23rd August 1905 from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Saood to the Chief of Debai.

Our state is good by God's grace. I write to inform you that I came to these parts in consequence of the disagreement which had taken place between the Yam tribe (*i.e.*, Ajman).

I visited Katr and effected a reconciliation between them and punished the offenders.

I proposed to stay there to look into certain affairs, but it became too hot—the heat of this country is well known—and I will, if God please, visit these parts without fail when the spring comes. My object in doing so is to look into certain affairs. I thought it desirable to inform you of this.

Hamad-el-Hareibi will furnish you with further particulars.

Translation of a letter dated 27th Jemad-es-Sani 1323 / 29th August 1905 from Khalid-bin-Abdullah-es-Soweidin to Sheikh Zaeed-bin-Khalifah.

I have received your esteemed letter and was glad to hear of your welfare. Sheikh Hamadan's letter has been received and gladdened me.

I write to furnish you with the news of Bin Saood and the Bedouins. After his arrival at El Hassa, he remained there for several days and he was given a grand entertainment. He summoned them (the inhabitants) and issued Bills on them. No one could reject the Bills. He has appointed three Sheikhs at El Hassa for hearing complaints and imprisoning people. The Askers (Turkish soldiers) were obedient to his orders. He made peace between the Bedouins. And Bin Saood will take action against whomsoever found guilty of having committed robberies.


Mazyad and Nawleh-bin-Sherim of Al Murreh, Bin Shaban of Beni Hajir and Mansoor-bin-Ghanim of Kheyarin came to him and were reconciled with him. He made peace between them and Ajman and other tribes and proceeded to a watering place named Azarnookeh to-day.

Mansoor-bin-Ghanim came to me, gave me this news and brought me a complimentary letter from him informing me of this arrangement.

After the peace was made the representative of Mari (Al Murreh) went to Baeej and that of Beni Hajir proceeded to Araij.

As regards Ali-bin-Ahmed (El Khalifah of Bahrein), the Christians summoned him to Bushire and told him either to remain as before, that is to say, as a wicked man (Shaki) or to undergo five years' imprisonment at Maskat. He preferred to undergo imprisonment and proceeded to Maskat.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Translation of the purport of a letter (undated) from Amer-bin-Shaban to the Chief of Abu Dhabi.

I beg to inform you that I visited Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Saood and found him to be a highly qualified person like his relatives or rather superior. I was reconciled to him; and he made peace between me and the Ajmans and others.

By God! Oh Zaeed! my eyes did not fail to see the trays, tents, house furniture, coffee pots of Constantinople make, belonging to Bin Rashid (which were with Bin Saood). Your turn has come now.

He said "Oh Amer, by God, I will explore the country belonging to my father and grandfather, from Maskat to Jealan."

Oh! Zaeed, I saw that he turned his eyes (towards you). I asked him whether he had a good intention or a bad one. He said he would act upon God's will. I said "Zaeed is the Imam of the Arab Coast and has relations with your people at Katif and El Hassa, and this fact is not hidden." He said he would do everything properly. He is a man of high account. As to El Hassa by God, the day he made his entry there, his men took charge of the local administration; and he deprived that place of all its valuables.

Extracts from the Diary of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week ending 29th October (received 7th November) 1905.

MASKAT.

* * * * *

20. Sheikh Zaeed-bin-Khalifa, the Chief of Abu Dhabi, arrived at Maskat on 18th by S. S. *Madura*, accompanied by his son and Sultan-bin-Dhiyab; His Highness the Sultan, with Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki, met him on the steamer.

* * * * *

SHARGAH.

25. It appears that, in spite of the advice of the Chief of Abu Dhabi to the contrary (*vide* last week's Diary entry No. 1), the Chief of Um-el-Kowein took with him Abdulla-bin-Ali and Khalifah-bin-Abdalla, head men of the Béni Kutb, to Ajman, and reconciled them to the Chief of that place. They then came to Shargah and entered into an offensive and defensive alliance, which, it is believed, is aimed at the Chief of Abu Dhabi.

No. 4411-E. B, dated Fort William, the 5th December 1905.

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 513, dated the 29th October 1905, requesting to be furnished with instructions as to the attitude you should adopt, should Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Saood endeavour to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman.

2. The Government of India, while noting your view as to the improbability of the visit taking place, are of opinion that the matter is sufficiently serious to justify immediate action; and they are inclined to think that the best way of exercising pressure on Bin Saood with a view to preventing the visits, might be through the channel of the Sheikh of Koweit who controls, to a large extent, the supply of arms for Nejd, which must still be a matter of importance to Bin Saood.


3. The Political Agent at Koweit is, therefore, authorized, unless you see any objection, to make enquiries of Sheikh Mubarak as to the facts. A report should in that case be sent of the results of the interview.

4. Since the present rumour appears to be somewhat indefinite, care should be taken at the present stage not to give too official a character to any communication that may be made to Sheikh Mubarak.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3224 F. D.—21-12-1905.—54—N. N. B.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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1906.

FORT WILLIAM.


FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.


External.

No. 7, DATED THE 11TH JANUARY 1906.

List of Enclosures.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x000092



1906.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


SECRET.
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
No. 7, DATED THE 11TH JANUARY 1906.

Letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Proposed visit of Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Saood to the Pirate Coast and Oman.

Foreign Office Press—No. 364—8-1-06—44.





Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
1855 7
1904.

Subject:

Koweit Flag.

7

6

This file contains the following papers :—

YEAR.

1905. P. 2653 1278

1906. P. 873 893 313 1307 2010 2205

1907. P. 2789


19 . P.


Memoranda.

☞ If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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Register No. 2789

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Minute Paper.

Letter from F.O.

Dated 16 March 1907.

Rec. 18

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	18 March		Koweit.
Secretary of State	19		The proposed distinctive flag. Views
Committee	20		of Sir N. O'Conor regarding our attitude
Under Secretary.....			towards Mubarak. His proposal that Mubarak
Secretary of State			should first fly the new flag in his Konak, or other
			first buildings at Koweit.

Copy to

COPY TO INDIA
22 March 1907
SECRETARY'S No. 12

Presumably the Foreign Office will in due course answer our letter of the 24th January last.

In the meantime Sir N. O'Conor's despatch is circulated for information.

Secn Pol. Corr'ce.,
26 MAR. 1907

See Anglo-Turkish Convention - 1913

3079/13

Previous Papers:—


2205


Y 11891. 2000.—4/1906. L. 652.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

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2789

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 6373
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED
18 MAR 1907
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
March 16 , 1907.


Reference to previous letter:
India Office January 24.


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir N. O'Conor No. 105 February 18	Koweit Flag

[12]

6





[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

ASIATIC TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 18 MAR 1907

[February 26.]

SECTION 1.

[63]

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 105.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 18, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 45 of the 1st instant, sending me a despatch, with its inclosures, from the Secretary of State for India, respecting the Koweit flag.

I had the honour to report my view of the question in my despatch No. 358, Confidential, of the 23rd May, 1906, but I venture to make a few additional remarks now on the broader aspects of the question.

After mature consideration His Majesty's Government entered into a special agreement with the Sheikh of Koweit, which, on the one hand, imposed certain restrictions upon him, while, on the other, it implied more or less a guarantee of protection and the integrity of his territory. This agreement is decidedly of importance as regards our future negotiations respecting the *débouché* of the Bagdad Railway. It is not formally or officially acknowledged by the Ottoman Government, yet it has weight with them, and would influence their course of action under certain circumstances. It is, moreover, a difficulty in the way of the Germans, which I think has already accounted in some degree for their desire to come to an understanding with us in regard to the Bagdad Railway. Any exhibition of weakness on the part of His Majesty's Government, or of a desire to shirk the consequences of our agreement with Koweit, would materially affect our position, which is a political factor in the situation which, I venture to think, His Majesty's Government ought not lightly to ignore.

As regards the question as to whether the Sheikh of Koweit should be pressed to keep his promise of flying a distinctive flag on Koweit craft, I am inclined to share the opinion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the effect that we should use great care in the matter, and choose a propitious opportunity for making the suggestion, the more so as, should His Highness act as we urge him to do, I do not see how we can honourably or with credit refuse him protection, and we may unnecessarily have raised a very troublesome question.


We have already marked our connection with Koweit by the appointment of a Resident, and, I believe, by the establishment of a British post office, as well as sundry other ways.


I would suggest that the Sheikh should at first fly the new flag in his Konak, or other Government buildings at Koweit, where we should have no difficulty in affording him protection if the Turkish Government attempted, which is very unlikely, to interfere with his action. The Imperial Government will thus get accustomed to the change, and the way will be prepared for its adoption by degrees on the high seas.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[2361 cc—1]





Register No. 2205/06

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 193, Dated 27 Dec/06. Rec. 12 Jan/07. 190 .

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	17 Jan		Koweit.
Secretary of State	19		Sheikh Mubarak not disposed to adopt the distinctive flag unless fortified by an assurance that he will not be permitted to suffer from the advice given him in this connection by the Pol. Agent. As to whether H.M's Govt. are prepared to give such a guarantee.
Committee	19.		
Under Secretary.....	22		
Secretary of State	23		

23. Jan.

Copy to India 25 Jan '07 Secy 4


Should we not indicate our own view?

When the question of the discontinuance of the Turkish flag by the Sheikh of Koweit was considered in 1901, Lord Lansdowne did not consider that H.M. Govt. would be justified in advising the Sheikh to discontinue it. The question then dropped, until it was revived by Lord Curzon's Govt. in December 1904. It was then referred to Sir N. O'Conor, who saw no objection to the adoption by the Sheikh of a distinctive flag for Koweit vessels, while retaining his present flag (Turkish) for use in Koweit. Lord Lansdowne, therefore, agreed to a

Previous Papers:—

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Y 11891. 2000.—4/1906. I. 632.



a recommendation in this sense being made to the Sheikh.


Major Cox had a conversation with Sheikh Mubarak on the subject in July 1906. He did not at first like the idea on the ground that his people might not understand it, and that it would increase the enmity of the Turks towards him. However, he finally agreed to use his present flag (Turkish) with the word "Koweit" in Arabic letters added on the fly.


Last June (1906) final instructions were given, with the concurrence of the F.O., to the Govt. of India to authorise the Pol. Agent to advise Sheikh Mubarak to bring the new flag into use. It now appears that Mubarak is afraid of the consequences to himself & his subjects from the resentment of the Turks, & will not act unless he gets an indemnity from us.

There does not seem to be any real reason why the Turks should object. The flag remains the Turkish flag with merely a distinction upon it to show that it belongs particularly to Koweit. But it has been recognised on the coast & in the Gulf as the British flag (just as in the case of British Colonies in Africa) & on the other hands that the Turks are in fact likely to object: and it seems to be a question on which Sir N. O'Conor's advice would be useful, whether it would be possible to secure immunity to Koweit, if Mubarak adopts our advice, by diplomatic means.


Dft. to F.O.

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INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.
6



an opinion in the draft
to the effect that, though
it might have been worth
while to have this distinctive
mark put upon the Koweit
flag if we could count on
the Turks letting it pass
it does not seem worth
while to incur the risk
of trouble with the Turks
over a matter which ~~is~~
~~really a very~~ can have
but very small importance
seeing that the flag will
still be the Turkish flag
J.T.P. 22/1/07



Fair Copy of draft approved by Pol. Comee 22 Jan '07.

24 January 1907


Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 5th June last relative to the proposed use of a distinctive flag by the Sheikh of Koweit, I am directed by Mr Secretary Morley to transmit, for the information of the S. of S. for I.A. a copy of a letter from the Govt. of India reporting that Sheikh Mubarak hesitates to act in accordance with the advice given to him, unless he receives an assurance from H.M.G. that he will not be allowed to suffer for it.

As Sir E Grey is aware, the proposal is, not that Koweit vessels should

No 193 Secret II. 27 Dec 1906 rec'd.

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



discontinue the use of the Turkish flag, but that they should use that flag with the word "Kuweit" written upon it in Arabic letters.

It is a matter for the consideration of the S of S. for F.A. whether Sir N O'Conor should in the first instance be invited to express an opinion whether the Turkish authorities are likely to resent the proposed action on the part of the Sheikh. Should he apprehend that such would be the case, Mr Morley thinks that the advantage to be gained would be so trifling that it is not worth while to press the proposal any further.

(Sd) A. Godley

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x0000a2


(176)
See above for draft
Sir.
with reference to your
letter of the 5th June last
relative to the proposed use
of a distinctive flag for the
Sheikh of Koweit, I am
directed by the Secretary
of State to inform you for the
information of the Govt. of India,
a copy of a letter from the
Govt. of India reporting that
Sheikh Mubarak hesitates
Approved Pol. Com'ee.
22 JAN. 1907
(with alterations.)
No. 193 Secret
24 Dec/06 to Vendor.
6





back in accordance with the advice given him, unless he receives an assurance from H.M.G. that he will not be allowed to suffer for it.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the proposal is, not that Koweit vessels should discontinue the use of the Turkish flag, but that they should use that flag with the word "Koweit" written upon it in Arabic letters [just as ~~in the case of the use of the British flag by~~ British Colonies, (note the British flag) Corporations &c (with distinctive emblems)]


The P.R. Office would omit the part in brackets

G.S.H.


Approved Pol. Com'ee.,
22 JAN. 1907



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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2205

No. 193 of 1906.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 12 JAN 1907

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE JOHN MORLEY, O.M.,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 27th December 1906.*

SIR,


We have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your telegram, dated the 13th June 1906, regarding the adoption by the Sheikh of Koweit of a distinctive flag for his shipping, and to forward a copy of the marginally-noted letters from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject.

(1) No. 2416, dated the 14th October 1906, with enclosures.
(2) No. 2478, dated the 21st October 1906.

2. It is clear from Captain Knox's report, dated the 30th September 1906, that Sheikh Mubarak is not disposed to adopt the distinctive flag unless he is fortified by an assurance that he will not be permitted to suffer from following the advice given him in this connection by the Political Agent. The grant of such an assurance might, however, involve us in responsibilities of a somewhat extended character, since the opportunities which the Turks enjoy of inflicting injury on the Sheikh and his subjects are by no means confined to Koweit territory, in respect of which we are already pledged to defend him. We note, however, that it was recognised* by Sir N. O'Conor, whose views were apparently accepted by His Majesty's Government, that in the event of the Sheikh's accepting our advice, it was incumbent on His Majesty's Government to see that he did not suffer from the consequences in so far as they depended on the action of the Turkish Government.

* *Vide* his letter to Sir Edward Grey, No. 358, dated the 23rd May 1906.


3. The position is not devoid of difficulty owing to the suspicions entertained of our intentions by the Turkish Government, but if the Embassy at Constantinople believe that some means can be found of securing the Koweitis against injury at the hands of the Turkish officials at Basrah and other Turkish ports, we venture to suggest, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, that the recognition of this obligation might now unobjectionably be conveyed to Sheikh Mubarak, more especially as from Major Cox's letter of the 21st October 1906 it appears that the Central Turkish Customs have gone so far as to insist on treating Koweit and even Bahrein as ports of the Turkish Empire,



and it may be desirable to take some steps to controvert this action. If, however, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to give such a guarantee, we propose to direct Captain Knox to take no further steps in the matter.

We have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your most obedient, humble servants,

Minto.
Kitchener
Wemyss Reid
W. Ede Richards.
J. P. Hewett
Ardagh
Edmondson



1906.

FORT WILLIAM.


FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


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Enclosure of a letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 193, dated the 27th December 1906.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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[Confidential.]

No. 2416, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 22nd) October 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department Endorsement No. 3183-E.B., dated 31st July 1906, on the subject of a distinctive flag for Koweit, and to forward a copy of the Political Agent's report of what has since passed between himself and Sheikh Mubarak on the subject.

No. 380 of 30th September 1906.

2. In view of the fact that once to me personally, and again in the presence of Major Knox and myself, as reported in the communications marginally-noted, Sheikh Mubarak approved the pattern and expressed his readiness to fly it, it is annoying to learn that he hesitates to adopt it now, though he has agreed to issue the articles which bear a coloured picture of the same flag.

(1) Resident to Foreign, No. 337, dated 16th July 1905.
(2) Resident to Foreign, No. 620, dated 18th March 1906 (accompaniment).

At an ordinary time Major Knox would no doubt have suggested to the Sheikh that after the trouble gone to in the matter the Resident and Government would find it difficult to understand his going back on his undertaking, but it is so important at the present moment that the atmosphere between him and the Political Agent should remain clear, that as far as the latter personally was concerned it was perhaps as well that he left the matter where he did for the time being, instead of pursuing the subject.

3. There can be little doubt that Sheikh Mubarak's specific object in acting as he has, is that surmised by Major Knox in paragraph 5 of his letter, and I venture to hope that the Government of India will be pleased to recommend His Majesty's Secretary of State to authorise the accord of some measure of guarantee in connection with the use of the flag, on the lines suggested.

No. 380, datad Koweit, the 30th September 1906.

From—Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to inform you that, at an interview I had with Sheikh Mubarak at the Agency on the 29th instant, I showed him the books and flags forwarded under cover of your No. 2130, dated 14th September 1906.

2. Sheikh Mubarak at once agreed to the issue of the ships' articles but demurred to the use of the flag which he said was sure to get him into trouble with the Turkish authorities at Basrah.


I suggested that it might be possible to fly the flag in the Persian Gulf and Indian waters and to avoid using it in the Shatt-el-Arab, but the Sheikh replied that the Turks would be sure to hear of it and would retaliate by oppressive measures not on the boat that flew the flag but on all Koweit boats indiscriminately.

4. In the absence of instructions, I did not feel justified in expressing surprise at his failing to keep his promise made to you to use the flag. Sheikh Mubarak did not show any marked aversion to the new flag but he cited the cases of Abdul Aziz bin Salim bin Badar;* and of the Agent of the Firm of Shubaili who, he said, were still languishing in prison at Koniat, asking what offence they had committed and receiving no reply. He also mentioned a case of which I had not heard previously when an Agent of Sheikh Mubarak was enlisted and taken to El Hassa and eventually bought a substitute to replace himself. The

* Foreign Department endorsement No. 49-E.B., dated 5th January 1906.
† Resident to Foreign Department No. 87, dated 12th February 1905.

P. Z. C.

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case seems to have been running for some two years and the Turkish authorities were probably acting legally under the conscription or the matter would have been mentioned before.


5. It was obvious that the inference I was intended to draw was that the Sheikh, though far too polite to say so, felt no confidence in our ability or willingness to protect him or his friends outside Koweit against Turkish intrigues and tyranny. He said that the Belgian trouble was nothing compared to the Turkish. In another discussion, he said that he did not care what went on in Koweit itself, as he could always give an explanation that would satisfy the Turkish authorities, that what went on outside was what troubled him.

With reference to the arms clause in the book, he remarked that the Turkish authorities refused to allow any boat to carry more than three rifles for self protection, a number that in the Shatt-el-Arab was quite inadequate.

6. It is, I venture to think, probable that Sheikh Mubarak would willingly adopt the flag, provided he received a guarantee that "His Majesty's Government would see that the Sheikh does not suffer for following the advice given to him" and I am sure that such a guarantee would improve our relations with the Sheikh to a marked degree.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C365 F. D.—31-10-06.—27.—P.L.G.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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[Confidential.]

No. 2478, dated Bushire, the 21st (received 29th) October 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—Sir Louis W. Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to report the following, for the information of the Government of India.

2. It was rumoured locally some three weeks ago that certain packages for Sheikh Mubarak, overcarried to Basrah, had been detained by the Customs there for duty, which the British India Steam Navigation Company demurred to pay. I was awaiting confirmation from Koweit or Basrah before mentioning the incident to Government.


Mr. Consul Crow has since been good enough to send me news of it and writes that the cargo in question has been impounded and a demand for full duty made on the ground that Koweit is Ottoman territory and has no Custom House. He adds that the Central Turkish Customs have issued strict orders for the treatment of Koweit and Bahrein as ports of the Turkish Empire for Customs purposes, and that His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople think it undesirable to raise any question as to the status of Keweit for the sake of the duty on two bales of goods. He has accordingly advised the British India Agents to endeavour to re-ship the goods to Bombay.

3. The decision of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was no doubt arrived at after full consideration of the circumstances, and I am not prepared to question the wisdom of it.


On the other hand, I think the Government of India will realise from the past history of our dealings with the Ruler of Koweit that this is just one of those incidents which Sheikh Mubarak most resents, and which inevitably impress him with the timidity of our support; and that as long as it is considered necessary that our policy in regard to him should follow such lines, the Government of India cannot expect Sheikh Mubarak to be whole-hearted or single-minded in his dealings with their local representatives.

There is no direct evidence to show that his recent hesitation to carry out his undertaking in regard to the use of the distinctive flag is due to this incident, but I may say this, that if I had known of it in time, I should have asked Captain Knox to postpone any communication to Mubarak with a view to the introduction of the new flag, until a more propitious opportunity presented itself.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C. 378F.D.—7-11-06.—57—B.B.S.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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1906.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

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
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No 193, DATED THE 27TH DECEMBER 1906.


Letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Proposals connected with the suggested adoption by the Sheikh of Koweit of a distinctive flag for his shipping.

Foreign Office Press—No. 160—21-12-06—54.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x0000b0



Register No. 2070

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 246 M., Dated 15 Nov. 1906. Rec. 1 Dec.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	6 Dec	
Secretary of State	7	
Committee	7.	
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Koweit.

The adoption of a distinctive flag by the Sheikh. Mubarak hesitates to adopt it now though he has agreed to issue the articles. "Timidity of our support" of Mubarak. The case of the over-carriage to Busrah of certain packages for the Sheikh which were detained by the Turkish Customs for duty.

Copy to
F.O. 11.12.06

For information

It will be observed that the Govt. of India have taken no action on the suggestion in para 3 of Major Cox's letter of 13 Oct. (Page 2) that the Govt. of India should be asked to authorize further guarantees being given to the Sheikh to induce him to fly the flag

Secret Pol. Com'ee 11 DEC. 1906


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
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Y 11801. 2000.—4/1906. L. 652.

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2010

[Confidential.]

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT - 1 DEC 1906

No. 2478, dated Bushire, the 21st (received 29th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to report the following, for the information of the Government of India.

2. It was rumoured locally some three weeks ago that certain packages for Sheikh Mubarak, overcarried to Basrah, had been detained by the Customs there for duty, which the British India Steam Navigation Company demurred to pay. I was awaiting confirmation from Koweit or Basrah before mentioning the incident to Government.

Mr. Consul Crow has since been good enough to send me news of it and writes that the cargo in question has been impounded and a demand for full duty made on the ground that Koweit is Ottoman territory and has no Custom House. He adds that the Central Turkish Customs have issued strict orders for the treatment of Koweit and Bahrein as ports of the Turkish Empire for Customs purposes, and that His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople think it undesirable to raise any question as to the status of Koweit for the sake of the duty on two bales of goods. He has accordingly advised the British India Agents to endeavour to re-ship the goods to Bombay.


3. The decision of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was no doubt arrived at after full consideration of the circumstances, and I am not prepared to question the wisdom of it.


On the other hand, I think the Government of India will realise from the past history of our dealings with the Ruler of Koweit that this is just one of those incidents which Sheikh Mubarak most resents, and which inevitably impress him with the timidity of our support; and that as long as it is considered necessary that our policy in regard to him should follow such lines, the Government of India cannot expect Sheikh Mubarak to be whole-hearted or single-minded in his dealings with their local representatives.

There is no direct evidence to show that his recent hesitation to carry out his undertaking in regard to the use of the distinctive flag is due to this incident, but I may say this, that if I had known of it in time, I should have asked Captain Knox to postpone any communication to Mubarak with a view to the introduction of the new flag, until a more propitious opportunity presented itself.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C. 378F.D.—7-11-06.—57—B.B.S.

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[Confidential.]

RECEIVED IN - 1 DEC 1906

No. 2416, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 22nd) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department Endorsement No. 3183-E.B., dated 31st July 1906, on the subject of a distinctive flag for Koweit, and to forward a copy of the Political Agent's report of what has since passed between himself and Sheikh Mubarak on the subject.

No. 380 of 30th September 1906.

2. In view of the fact that once to me personally, and again in the presence of Major Knox and myself, as reported in the communications marginally-noted, Sheikh Mubarak approved the pattern and expressed his readiness to fly it, it is annoying to learn that he hesitates to adopt it now, though he has agreed to issue the articles which bear a coloured picture of the same flag.

(1) Resident to Foreign, No. 337, dated 16th July 1905.
(2) Resident to Foreign, No. 620, dated 18th March 1906 (accompaniment).

At an ordinary time Major Knox would no doubt have suggested to the Sheikh that after the trouble gone to in the matter the Resident and Government would find it difficult to understand his going back on his undertaking, but it is so important at the present moment that the atmosphere between him and the Political Agent should remain clear, that as far as the latter personally was concerned it was perhaps as well that he left the matter where he did for the time being, instead of pursuing the subject.

3. There can be little doubt that Sheikh Mubarak's specific object in acting as he has, is that surmised by Major Knox in paragraph 5 of his letter, and I venture to hope that the Government of India will be pleased to recommend His Majesty's Secretary of State to authorise the accord of some measure of guarantee in connection with the use of the flag, on the lines suggested.

No. 380, datad Koweit, the 30th September 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to inform you that, at an interview I had with Sheikh Mubarak at the Agency on the 29th instant, I showed him the books and flags forwarded under cover of your No. 2130, dated 14th September 1906.

2. Sheikh Mubarak at once agreed to the issue of the ships' articles but demurred to the use of the flag which he said was sure to get him into trouble with the Turkish authorities at Basrah.


I suggested that it might be possible to fly the flag in the Persian Gulf and Indian waters and to avoid using it in the Shatt-el-Arab, but the Sheikh replied that the Turks would be sure to hear of it and would retaliate by oppressive measures not on the boat that flew the flag but on all Koweit boats indiscriminately.

4. In the absence of instructions, I did not feel justified in expressing surprise at his failing to keep his promise made to you to use the flag. Sheikh Mubarak did not show any marked aversion to the new flag but he cited the cases of Abdul Aziz bin Salim bin Badar;* and of the Agent of the Firm of Shubaili who, he said, were still languishing in prison at Konia†, asking what offence they had committed and receiving no reply. He also mentioned a case of which I had not heard previously when an Agent of Sheikh Mubarak was enlisted and taken to El Hassa and eventually bought a substitute to replace himself. The

* Foreign Department endorsement No. 49-E.B., dated 5th January 1906.
† Resident to Foreign Department No. 87, dated 12th February 1905.

P. Z. C.

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case seems to have been running for some two years and the Turkish authorities were probably acting legally under the conscription or the matter would have been mentioned before.


5. It was obvious that the inference I was intended to draw was that the Sheikh, though far too polite to say so, felt no confidence in our ability or willingness to protect him or his friends outside Koweit against Turkish intrigues and tyranny. He said that the Belgian trouble was nothing compared to the Turkish. In another discussion, he said that he did not care what went on in Koweit itself, as he could always give an explanation that would satisfy the Turkish authorities, that what went on outside was what troubled him.

With reference to the arms clause in the book, he remarked that the Turkish authorities refused to allow any boat to carry more than three rifles for self protection, a number that in the Shatt-el-Arab was quite inadequate.

6. It is, I venture to think, probable that Sheikh Mubarak would willingly adopt the flag, provided he received a guarantee that "His Majesty's Government would see that the Sheikh does not suffer for following the advice given to him" and I am sure that such a guarantee would improve our relations with the Sheikh to a marked degree.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C365 F. D.—31-10-06.—27.—P.L.G.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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


Mr Hardy
1307
15 Aug 06
2205
INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.
The 14/8.
Under Secretary of State


With reference to the Sec. of State's question as to the "true reason" for our action in the matter of the Koweit flag, it may be explained that the question was first raised in 1901, when it was decided to do nothing in view of Turkish susceptibilities. The matter was again raised in Govt. of India Letter of 8 Dec '04 in connection with the question of our right to "protect" Koweitis at Bushire - the Persian Custom

[Ext. No. 2247A/04]

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


Customs having recently treated a Number
of Koweit Dhows with unnecessary severity,
& the Persian Govt. having refused redress.
But of course this question of our right to
protect our Koweits is part of the larger
question of our policy towards Koweit; &
the real reason for persuading the Sheikh
to adopt a Special flag is undoubtedly our
desire to establish the quasi-independence
of Koweit with a view to strengthening our
position in the Gulf generally, and to




securing a status in the discussions as to the
Terminus of the Bagdad Railway.

The Govt. of India propose for a separate
Koweit flag was approved by the FO on the
18th Feb 05 [No 2653] after consultation
with Sir W O'Conor. And the price sent
instructions to the Resident to advise the
Sheikh to bring the new flag into use, these
given in our telegram of 13 June 06, with
the approval of the FO [No 3113]. These
instructions were given with a free know-
-ledge of the parties of the possibility of
difficulties with the Turks. As regards



As regards the minor question of the protection of Koweitis in Persia, the Persian Govt. has hitherto been obdurate & refused to recognize our right. The Sheikh knows, now that he has started his Persian flag, will expect us to protect his Arabs from molestation by the Persian Customs (see Cox's letter page 18 of enclosures)

11 Aug 06 PZ Cox



Minute Paper.

Register No. 1307

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Reg's Letter from India, No. 28M., Dated 12 July 1906. Rec. 30 July

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	2 Aug	RK	Koweit.
Secretary of State	3	CG	Correspondence regarding the adoption of a distinctive flag by the Shaikh of Koweit.
Committee	5/8.	Th.	
Under Secretary.....	11 Aug	RK	
Secretary of State	13	CG	(The Persian Gulf and Koweit.)

14. Th.

Copy to IO 23 August

Is there any real reason for this strictly distinctive flag? The ground is identical.

The Shaikh of Koweit has authorised on board his vessels for arms in case of detention by Turkish vessels, a practice which would be a mistake as implying the quasi independence of Koweit.

5/8.

This distinctive flag is to be used for the purpose of obtaining the protection of the British Flag.

Seen Pol Com'ee. 7 AUG. 1906

for information.

See Major Cox's letter of 18 March '06 as to the agreement arrived at with the Shaikh as to the pattern of the flag: from the enclosures to which it will be seen that no progress has been made in the matter of the protection of Koweitis in Persian Territory. [Page 17].

The adoption of the new flag was authorised by us on the 6th June (No 3113)


Previous Papers:—


TH 893 3113/06

Y 11801. 2000.—4/1903. I. 652.

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1307

[Confidential.]

No. 337, dated Bushire, the 16th (received 24th) July 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—S. M. Fraser, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 943-E. B., dated 4th March 1905, and in continuation of my telegram of 14th instant, I have the honour to report the action taken by me in the direction of advising the Sheikh of Koweit to adopt a distinctive flag for use on vessels belonging to himself or his subjects.

2. I first broached the subject with Sheikh Mubarak at the end of April, but he was out in camp at the time and as there was little privacy to be got, it was not possible to discuss patterns in detail. He did not like the idea at first, on the ground that his people would not know what to make of the change, and that such a course would increase the enmity of the Turks towards him For this reason he would not agree to a flag of new design, but I explained that this did not seem essential : that all that was required was for his dhows to carry a flag that could be unmistakably recognised as his, and the use of which would make it impossible for Customs Officials at Persian Gulf and other ports to say that they could not distinguish Koweit dhows from any other craft flying the Star and Crescent. I went on to suggest that some addition to, or variation of, the flag that he now hoisted would perhaps meet the case and asked him to let me make out some specimens for him, and also designs for ships, articles which might also be useful in conjunction with the flag. To this he agreed, and I had intended to arrange the details in communication with the Political Agent. Unfortunately however Captain Knox fell ill with appendicitis a few days later and subsequently proceeded on leave, and as the matter was of some delicacy it seemed advisable to wait for an opportunity to conclude negotiations with him myself. This I have now done.

3. I had a long interview with Sheikh Mubarak regarding this and other matters on 12th instant. I first showed him the four flags of which specimens accompany. Of these No. A, in a book of recent date in my possession, is shown as the Standard of the Khedive of Egypt, and I thought it might be of interest to Sheikh Mubarak to see that though the device was still broadly speaking that of the Star and Crescent, it was easily distinguishable from the flag which he now flies. I then showed him the other three and discussed the merits of each with him. He came to the conclusion that No. 1, the Turkish flag with Koweit written across it in the Arabic character, was the simplest pattern for him to adopt, but he did not make any special objections to either of the others, and if Government consider that a greater divergence from the flag would be advisable, I have little doubt that he would accept any reasonable modification without demur, *e.g.*, the Crescent or the 3 Crescent design, or either of them with Koweit written across it as in the pattern selected. A different type of flag altogether, except it be the British Flag, he will not accept, of that I feel sure.


If the flag chosen is approved I think it would be an easier flag to make if the Arabic letters of Koweit were in a little larger type, and if I arrange to have a seal-pattern made up here, perhaps sanction could be accorded to my indenting on the Ordnance Department for others, as in the case of the Trucial Chiefs.

4. I also discussed with him the form of a certificate which it would seem useful for his dhows to carry in conjunction with the flag ; and a specimen of the form provisionally approved by him, subject to the concurrence of Government, is attached. If it is considered unobjectionable I would solicit authority to get some printed at the Government Press in cheque book form with counterfoils.

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2

No. 346, dated Bushire, 22nd (received 31st) July 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—S. M. Fraser, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 337, dated 16th July 1905, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter with enclosure since received by me from Sheikh Mubarak in confirmation of what passed at our interview the day before.

2. It will be noticed that he speaks of our advice to him in the matters referred to as "directions," I think it well therefore to point out that this has no significance; it is a common form of speech in which the writer thinks it polite to speak of himself as being in the humble position of receiving our orders, I need hardly say that I merely asked his views, and gave him mine.

3. As regards the ( ) or Articles, these were discussed between us as being, in some form, a necessary adjunct to the flag, for the reasons which he explains, and the design, of which I forwarded a copy with my letter last week, was that provisionally decided upon by us in consultation.

It is difficult to make out from Sheikh Mubarak's present letter whether he means to suggest that on further consideration the pattern first chosen is perhaps too elaborate for the taste of his subjects, who might not take the trouble to get them filled in, or whether he proposes to have it in addition to the original one selected. I will take steps to find out exactly what he does mean. Meanwhile I forward a copy, with translation, of the document which he has sent me.

4. The point to be borne in mind is that more often than not Persian Customs officials at Gulf Ports do not know Arabic and are not familiar with Sheikh Mubarak's seal or signature; it is therefore not surprising if they refuse to take cognizance of some irregular slip of paper produced by a Nakhoda and asserted to be a credential from the Sheikh of Koweit.

5. It was for this reason that I thought that it would be an additional advantage to have an English translation of the Articles alongside the Arabic, so that after getting his paper filled in and signed in Arabic by the Sheikh, the Nakhoda could, if he wished, get the English equivalents written up at the British Agency above the Sheikh's signature.

A certificate in such a form as that submitted with my last report would moreover seem to serve the useful purposes both of furnishing indirect evidence of the close relations between the Sheikh and ourselves, and also of the fact that the flag depicted at the head of the Articles is not the Turkish Flag but a distinctive flag adopted by Sheikh Mubarak as an independent Ruler for the use of his own subjects.

Translation.

Dated the 9th Jemad-el-Aval 1323 (13th July 1905).

From—Sheikh Mubarak-el-Subah, Chief of Koweit,


To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

After compliments.—With reference to your verbal instructions regarding the storage of coal at Koweit (be assured that), whether it be in regard to coal or any other matter, I will gratefully comply with any directions which the High Government may be pleased to give with your notice.

With regard to Bubiyan, it is well known to be my territory and the post which was located on it was placed there without my consent and by force, and I am unable to resist this Government (that is the Porte). If also the British

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Government direct that I should let them have a place on Bubiyan (for coal) I am ready to do so, with the object of getting rid of the former (Turkish) post.

As regards myself, I am content by reason of the *care** and protection which are extended to all those who take refuge under your shadow of whom I am one and pleased God by your *care*† and protection I shall derive distinction *and prosperity*.‡ I am under your command and will do whatever you may order and see fit.

* (Favour?)
† (Favour?)
‡ (Not in the Arabic text.)

As regards the flag it will be the old type but the one with the word "Koweit" in it has my approval in order to make things clear. But the explanation will be by means of the Articles ( ) which the boat-owners take (with them), for it will be possible for the flag to be taken in addition by some vessel not belonging to my subjects and hoisted when the need for it arises. Your high opinion will look into this.

Enclosed is the copy of the Article, and if you approve it, the order is with you.

May you be preserved.

Copy of Article ( ) which I give under my signature to the boats of my subjects, the people of Koweit.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To those who may see this my writing such as the sea-farers, inhabitants of the ports and the Great friendly Powers, the Boat called _____ owned by _____ who is one of my subjects, inhabitant of Koweit. We hope from the orders and knowledge of the Great and friendly Powers that, on seeing and perusing this, they will treat the vessel in a becoming manner, as required by the principles, laws, compacts and *obligations*§ of the Friendly Powers.

§ Ties?)

Issued and given to the bearer _____ so that it may not be hidden.

Dated _____ of the month of _____

(Signature) The Chief of Koweit.

MUBARAK-EL-SUBAH.

[Note.—The marginal remarks are by the Hakim Sahib.]

No. 3086-E B., dated Simla, the 11th August 1905.

From—S. M. Fraser, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Rear-Admiral Edmund Poe, C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station.

I am directed to transmit to Your Excellency copies of correspondence as marked in the margin* on the subject of a proposal that the Sheikh of Koweit should adopt a flag distinct from the Turkish for use on vessels belonging to himself or his subjects.

I am to invite your attention to the specimens of possible flags which have been submitted by the Political Resident and to enquire which of them, if any, can, in your opinion, be recommended to the Sheikh, due regard being had to the considerations advanced in paragraph 7 of the despatch from the Government of India

*(1) Letter No. 203, dated 2nd July 1904, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
(2) Secret despatch No. 230-Ex., dated the 8th December 1904, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.
(3) Letter from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 12th January 1905.
(4) Telegram, dated the 1st March 1905, from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.
(5) Letter from the Foreign Office to the India Office, dated the 18th February 1905.
(6) Letter No. 337, dated the 16th July 1905, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (with enclosures in original—*to be returned*).
(7) Letter No. 346, dated the 22nd July 1905, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and enclosures.

3

to the Secretary of State, No. 230-Secret External of December 8th last and in Major Cox's letter No. 337-Confidential of July 16th. The Government of India will also be glad to learn your views as to the suitability of the enclosed certificate form.

I am to request that Your Excellency will kindly return the flag specimens and certificate form when replying to the present letter.


No. 1462, dated *Hyacinth* at Colombo, the 23rd August 1905 (Confidential).

From—Vice-Admiral George Atkinson Willes, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, No. 3086-E.B., relative to the proposal that the Sheikh of Koweit should adopt a flag distinct from the Turkish for use on vessels belonging to himself or his subjects.

2. I consider that pattern flag, marked I, enclosed in your letter, "defaced" as proposed by Arabic characters indicating the word "Koweit," is the most suitable flag for the Sheikh to adopt, but I suggest that in addition to the Arabic characters, the word "Koweit" should be placed on the flag in Roman capitals, to prevent any official who might be ignorant of Arabic from pleading that he did not understand; thus



3. With regard to the suitability of the certificate form, the last paragraph of the form, if worded on the lines of the certificates carried by British shipping, would run as follows:—


"I hereby certify that the vessel, the particulars of which are prefixed to this my certificate, belongs to , a subject of the Sheikh of Koweit, and that the above particulars are true."

(*Signature of Sheikh.*)

4. I further suggest that, if a Belgian Customs official in a vessel under Persian colours again boards dhows outside the three-mile limit of Persian territorial waters, the vessel be shadowed by one of His Majesty's ships in the Gulf, which should anchor and weigh with her on all occasions, to prevent such proceedings. Probably this would cause the Persian authorities to ask for explanations. They should then be told that the General Act of the Brussels Conference does not of itself confer any powers of search or detention for the enforcement of the Act, and that their ships have not, therefore, any authority to search or detain vessels in time of peace, apart from the powers conferred on them within Persian territorial waters under local regulations, and when special arrangements have been made with the Governments of other Powers in the territorial waters of those countries respectively.

4

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754161.0x0000c0



No. 4040-E. B., dated Simla, the 1st November 1905 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marginally noted relative to the adoption of a distinctive flag and certificate, for his shipping, by the Sheikh of Koweit.

No. 337, dated the 16th July 1905.
No. 346, dated the 22nd July 1905.

2. In reply, I am to enclose a copy of a letter No. 1462, dated the 23rd August 1905, from the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, and to say that, if you see no objection, you may recommend the adoption, by Sheikh Mubarak, of the form of certificate and of the pattern of flag as amplified by His Excellency Vice-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes.

3. In the event of the Sheikh of Koweit agreeing to your recommendations, you should endeavour to get the pattern flag made locally, but if this is not found feasible, or if further information is required, the matter should be settled by you in direct communication with the Ordnance Officer in charge of the Bombay Arsenal to whom the necessary instructions will be issued.

No. 538, dated Bushire, the 16th November 1905 (Confidential).

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Foreign Department letter No. 4040-E.B., dated the 1st instant, relating to the adoption of a distinctive flag and shipping certificate by the Sheikh of Koweit.

2. I am having specimens of the flag and certificate made in the form amended, as recommended by His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile, I have the honour to inquire whether, in the possible event of Sheikh Mubarak objecting to the English superscription, the Government of India would be willing to fall back on the alternative flag bearing the Arab letters only?

It would no doubt be convenient to have the English letters as well, but I do not attach very great importance to it, and even if the Sheikh prefers not to have the English superscription now, there would probably be little difficulty in getting him to acquiesce in the addition of it later on.

Soliciting the favour of an early reply.

No. 4576-E. B., dated Fort William, the 11th December 1905 (Confidential).

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,


To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 538, dated the 16th November 1905, enquiring whether in the possible event of Sheikh Mubarak objecting to the English superscription, the Government of India would be willing to fall back on the alternative flag bearing the Arab letters only.

2. In reply, I am to say that if you should consider that the susceptibilities of the Sheikh are likely to be offended by your pressing on him the additional superscription, you may, in the contingency foreseen by you, modify the flag accordingly. I am, however, to point out that the superscription which has been proposed is traced not in letters peculiarly English, but in the Roman character which may be regarded as common to all European nations, and that the adoption of the transliteration is made the more advisable by the activity of the Belgian officials of the Persian Maritime Customs service, who might plead ignorance of the meaning of a purely Arabic device.

5

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C-145 F. D.—26-6-06.—6—R.S.W.





[*Confidential.*]

No. 630, dated Bushire, the 18th (received 27th) March 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department letter No. 4576-E.B., dated 11th December 1905, on the subject of a distinctive flag accompanied by printed Certificates of Nationality, to be used by vessels belonging to Sheikh Mubarak or his subjects.

2. I have just returned from a visit to Koweit. I had taken over with me a specimen flag and printed certificates made up with additions recommended by Vice-Admiral Sir George Atkinson-Willes, and discussed them with the Sheikh at an interview which he had with the Political Agent and myself on the 7th instant.

Naval Commander-in-Chief to Foreign Department, No. 1452, dated 23rd August 1905, paragraph 2.

He readily confirmed acceptance of the certificate, now in printed form, with the exception of item "5.—Name of Master". He explained that this entry would be useless and perhaps misleading as Nakhodas so constantly change.

There is truth in this, and as the other details of the certificate will amply identify any vessel, I recommend that it be eliminated as he suggests.

3. As to the flag, I regret to say that Sheikh Mubarak would not accept it as it stood, *i.e.*, with the word "Koweit" in the Roman as well as the Arabic character.

When the flag was first displayed to him, he forthwith asked permission to explain what seemed to him the objections to his adopting it, and added that if, after hearing them, I were to decide that they were not weighty, he would be prepared to introduce the flag. What he went on to say however amounted to a good deal more than this.

He proceeded to recapitulate all his old grievances against the Turks, much as he had at my interview with him on the subject on 12th July last.× In conclusion he said he would adopt the flag as it stood if we would give him a written guarantee to protect him from any unpleasant consequences from the Turks which might result to him from the use of it.

Resident to the Government of India, No. 387, dated 13th August 1905, paragraph 3.

On my probing his misgivings it became evident that it was the inscription in the Roman character in which he saw so much difficulty. The nature of this addition and the reasons for it were fully explained to him, and he was informed that it was the Admiral, as a sailor, who had specially recommended it in order that it might enable the identity of the Koweit flag to be readily understood by Belgian Customs officials or other Europeans who could not read the oriental character.

My explanations, however, did not dispel his objections, and therefore, subject to the final views of Government, the only thing to do seemed to be to make the best of the flag without the English inscription, which Sheikh Mubarak adhered to his previously expressed readiness to adopt.

4. As the word "Koweit" has now been eliminated, I have had the letters كويت made a little larger and submit a specimen flag for favour of inspection, together with the printed certificate as finally accepted by Sheikh Mubarak.

In the first instance it will, I think, be advisable to supply the Sheikh gratis with—


one dozen Bunting Flags $4\frac{1}{2}' \times 2\frac{1}{2}'$, and

five hundred certificates in two books of 250 each;

914 F. D.

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and if Government are pleased to approve of this suggestion, I beg that, in order to save time, instructions together with the respective patterns may issue from the Government of India direct to the Ordnance Officer in charge of the Bombay Arsenal and to the Superintendent, Government Printing, to supply me with the articles now asked for, and to comply with my future indents.

5. When handing them over to Sheikh Mubarak, the Political Agent might let him know the cost price per flag and per book and offer to obtain them for him at those prices in future.

6. There is one aspect of the question of the introduction of this flag and certificate which I should not omit, in conclusion, to commend to the wise attention of Government.

The flag will have been introduced at our recommendation and the certificate will bear an English translation which, it is suggested, might conveniently be verified as a "true translation," when desired by our Political Agent at Koweit.

Under these circumstances, Sheikh Mubarak is, I think, entitled to expect that the holders of the flag and certificate will, when in trouble, receive the effective assistance or "good offices" of the Resident, and other British officials to whom they may apply.

The question of the status of Koweit subjects is, I am aware, a delicate one, and exercises the attention of His Majesty's Government.

I venture to hope that it may soon be found possible to achieve some definite understanding with the Persian Government on the subject as the uncertainty of the existing position presents constant practical difficulties to this Residency.

In this connection I attach copies of the communications last exchanged between His Majesty's Legation and myself in regard to the general question, from which it will be seen that so far the Persian Government has not even conceded to Koweitis the privileges accorded to Afghans; the alternative recommendation of the Government of India, *vide* their despatch No. 230, dated 8th December 1904, to His Majesty's Secretary of State.

(1) Minister to Resident, telegram No. 136, dated 1st November 1905.
(2) Resident to Minister, telegram No. 151, dated 17th November 1905.
(3) Minister to Resident, telegram No. 137, dated 20th November 1905.
(4) Resident to Minister, telegram dated 21st November 1905.

Telegram No. 136, dated the 1st November 1905.

From—E. Grant Duff, Esq., His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram 137. I am informed by Mushir-ed-Dowleh that he has recommended Koweitis to the Ministry of Customs and the authorities in the Gulf.

If latter has not been done, pray inform me.

Telegram No. 151, dated the 17th November 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—Evelyn Grant Duff, Esq., His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.


Re treatment of Koweitis. Please refer to your telegram No. 136 and previous correspondence.

Two Arabs, claimed and supported by the Sheikh of Koweit, have been importuning this Residency for relief against unjust action, or inaction of the local authorities, since August last.

In the meantime, receipt of any instructions since last June, or since my reference to you on October 8th, is denied by the Karguzar and Director of Customs.

In order that I can show same to local authorities, can you get Mushir-ed-Dowleh to give you text of the order which he professes to have sent?

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As my continued failure to procure relief is very prejudicial to my relations with the Sheikh of Koweit, I hope that some effective arrangement will be pressed for.

Telegram No. 137, dated the 20th November 1905.

From—Evelyn Grant Duff, Esq., His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

The strained relations between Persia and Turkey, in regard to the frontier dispute at Vazneh, is at present a complication to the Koweitis question.

In asking me to leave the matter '*in statu quo*' pending a settlement of the above dispute, the Mushir-ed-Dowleh states that he has telegraphed to Bushire, instructing the local authorities to prevent awkward cases arising in which Koweitis are involved.

The Mushir proposes eventually to allow British intervention on behalf of these people, who, according to treaty with Turkey, will be regarded and treated as subjects of Turkey.


As these proposals do not seem practicable, I should be glad of your views regarding them.

I fear a reference to Foreign Office will be necessary for this and the Bahrein question.


Telegram, dated the 21st November 1905.


From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—Evelyn Grant Duff, Esq., His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

We evidently cannot admit the right of the Turkish Consul, Bushire, to protect Koweitis, and for this reason the Mushir's proposals are impracticable. In the event of the Turkish Consul protecting them, our own intervention would become meaningless and gratuitous.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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COUN
6



KOWEIT.

CERTIFICATE.

ورقة القبول

1. Name of Vessel _____ ١. اسم الخشبة _____

2. Tonnage _____ ٢. عدد الكر _____

3. Name of Owner _____ (with father's name). ٣. اسم مالك الخشبة (مع اسم ابيه) _____

4. Nationality of Owner _____ ٤. رعيت من صاحب الخشبة _____

5. Number of Crew _____ ٥. عدد البحرية _____

6. Number of Masts _____ ٦. عدد الدقل _____

7. Rig _____ ٧. صفة الخشبة _____

8. Number of Arms for Protection _____ ٨. عدد الاسلحة لاجل المحافظة _____

I hereby certify that the vessel the particulars of which are prefixed to this my Certificate, belongs to _____, a subject of the _____, and that the above particulars are true.

الذي اعطي التصديق باني الخشبة المذكور تفاصيلها فوق تصديقنا هذا متعلقة الى _____ لحد رعايا _____ والشرحات المذكورة اعلاه صحيحة

(*Signature of Sheikh.*) _____ صحيح شيخ _____

Date _____ *Place* _____ تاريخ _____ محل _____

* *Note.*—The name of the Nakhula could be included in a separate "clearance" note if found necessary.

P. Z. Cox.

COUNTERFOIL.

ورقة القبول

١. اسم الخشبة _____

٢. عدد الكر _____

٣. اسم مالك الخشبة (مع اسم ابيه) _____

٤. رعيت من صاحب الخشبة _____

٥. عدد البحرية _____

٦. عدد الدقل _____


٧. صفة الخشبة _____

٨. عدد الاسلحة لاجل المحافظة _____

الذي اعطي التصديق باني الخشبة المذكور تفاصيلها فوق تصديقنا هذا متعلقة الى _____ لحد رعايا _____ والشرحات المذكورة اعلاه صحيحة


صحيح شيخ _____

تاريخ _____ محل _____



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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No. 2635-E. B., dated Simla, the 23rd June 1906.

From—V. Gabriel, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,


To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 630, dated the 18th March 1906, submitting a specimen of the modified pattern of flag and of the form of shipping certificate which the Sheikh of Koweit has expressed himself as finally willing to accept.

2. I am to forward a copy of each of the marginally noted* telegrams and to request that the necessary instructions may be issued to Captain Knox in the matter. One dozen bunting flags of the pattern proposed and of the required dimensions; and 500 certificates printed in two books as desired by you, will shortly be forwarded to you for supply gratis to the Sheikh.

* (1) Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 2064-E. B., dated 18th May 1906.
(2) Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 2054-E B., dated 19th June 1906.

The Ordnance Officer in charge of the Bombay Arsenal, and the Superintendent of Government Printing will be requested to intimate to you the cost prices respectively of the articles in question, and to comply with your future indents on payment.


G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C145 F. D.—27-6-06.—60.—E.B.C.




RECEIVED IN
29 AUG 1906
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, with reference to the latter's letter of the 23rd instant, relative to the adoption of a distinctive flag by the Sheikh of Koweit, has the honour, as therein requested, to return herewith the drawings of the proposed flag, which were sent in original.


Foreign Office,

August 29, 1906.

6



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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
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
Enclos. to Letter No. 337 dated 16th July, 1905 from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

ورقة القول	ورقة القول	CERTIFICATE.
اسم الخشبه	اسم الخشبه	1. Name of vessel.
عدد الطن	عدد الطن	2. Tonnage.
اسم مالك الخشبه اسم ابيه	اسم مالك الخشبه اسم ابيه	3. Name of owner. (With father's name.
رعيه من صاحب الخشبه	رعيه من صاحب الخشبه	4. Nationality of owner.
اسم النوخذا اسم ابيه	اسم النوخذا اسم ابيه	5. Name of master. (With father's name).
عدد البحريه	عدد البحريه	6. Number of crew.
عدد الدقل	عدد الدقل	7. Number of masts.
صفة الخشبة	صفة الخشبه	8. Rig.
عددالا سلحة لاجل المحافظة	عددالا سلحة لاجل المحافظة	9. Number of arms for protection.
يصير التصديق ان هذه الخشبه ملك احد رعايا حاكم الكويت	يصير التصديق ان هذه الخشبه ملك احد رعايا حاكم الكويت	Certified that the above vessel belongs to , a subject of the Chief of Koweit.
محل امضاء الحاكم	محل امضاء الحاكم	(*Signature of Sheikh.*)
محل تاريخ	محل تاريخ	*Place*— *Date*—

4826 F. D.—S E—428-407—Dec.




المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000008


A
Personal Standard of H. H. The Khedive of Egypt.
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


المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00000a


Flag provisionally chosen by Shaikh Mubarak.
For selection.
I.





المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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For selection. II.
6




المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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For selection. III.
6



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000010



Minute Paper.

Register No. 3/13

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from P.O.,

Dated 5 June 1906.
Rec. 6

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6 June		Koweit.
Secretary of State	7		Flag question. Concurrence of Sir Elgey in proposal that the Sheikh should be advised to bring the new flag into use. Probable Turkish Objections.
Committee	7/6		
Under Secretary.....	12.		
Secretary of State			

Copy to

COPY TO INDIA
15th June 1906
SECRETARY'S No. 24

9 words print in bracketts
Send
CG
13 June 06

Sent
13/6/06

The PO concurs in the proposal that the Sheikh should be authorised to use the new flag, in spite of the possibility of difficulties with the Turks hinted at by Sir W O'Conor. This title however has never been ignored & its existence was indicated in the Govt of India's telegram of 18 May last, & in our letter to PO of 23 May

Dft. Telegram to Viceroy.

Previous Papers:—


893.

TH


Y 11891. 2000.—4/1906. L. 652.


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


المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000012


Off. telegram
Viceroy
The PA Cmtee would omit the words in brackets
to clear
Foreign Secret. Your telegram 18th ult. Koweit. Political Agent may be instructed [to take suitable opportunity] to advise Sheikh to bring new flag into use
W. Clr
Approved Pol. Com'ee., 12 JUN. 1906 (as altered)
Secret
13/6/06
Copy to India (+P) 22 June
Secy's 25.
7.0. (P) 21 June.
6



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000014



3113

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 18125.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 6 JUN 1906

FOREIGN OFFICE
June 5, 1906.


Sir:-


With reference to your letters of the 19th and 23rd ultimo, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Morley, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the proposed use of a distinctive flag by the Sheikh of Koweit.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey concurs in the suggestion, contained in your letter of the 23rd instant that the Political Agent at Koweit should be instructed to advise the Sheikh to bring the new flag into use.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,
Charles Hardinge.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.





Constantinople,
May 23,1906.

18125
MAY 28 1906


No. 358.
Confidential.

Sir,


In reply to your Telegram No.92 of yesterday informing me that the Sheikh of Koweit has agreed to use the Turkish Flag but with the addition in Arabic letters written across it of the word Koweit, I have the honour to make the following remarks:-

It is probable that the Turkish Government will object and demonstrate with the Sheikh as soon as they become aware of the innovation and it is almost certain that the Sheikh, in pursuance of his usual policy, will endeavour to mitigate his offence in the eyes of the Sultan, whatever may be the language he holds to the British Resident, by alleging that the alteration was urged upon him by the British Government. It is ~~probable~~ improbable, however, that the Imperial

The Right Honourable
Sir Edward Grey Bart
Etc., etc., etc.,



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000018



Imperial Government will so far resent the Sheikh's action as to refuse Koweit dhows carrying the obnoxious flag "pratique" in Turkish Ports, but if they should do so it will, I think, be incumbent on His Majesty's Government to see that the Sheikh does not suffer for following the advice given to him .

Apart from this it seems to me to be in consonance with our general policy in regard to Koweit that the Sheikh should adopt some special and visible sign of his quasi-independence and I do not know that any better emblem of his peculiar political position than that now proposed could easily be found.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,


Sir,

your most obedient,


humble servant,

Sd. N. R. O'Conor

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00001a



Register No. 893

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Telegram / Letter from Viceroy, Dated 18 May 1906. Rec. 19

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	19 May	WLL	Koweit.
Secretary of State	21	ag	Flag. Present Turkish pattern with Koweit in Arabic letters to be used. Enquire whether there is any objection to its being brought into use in view of present relations with Turkey.
Committee	21.V.	JMc.	
Under Secretary.....	22.	PML	
Secretary of State			

Copy to 7.0. + 19/5/06 P 28 May

COPY TO INDIA 25 May 1906 SECRETARY'S No. 21

Sign ag 22 May 06.

Off. to I.O.

H.M. Govt. agreed to the adoption by the Sheikh of Koweit of a distinctive flag in February last year. The Sheikh permits H.M. Ships to search his vessels for arms, and the object is to distinguish Koweit vessels from Turkish vessels, which we are not permitted to search. (para 7 Indian letter 8 XII 04 No 230)

Previous Papers:—

893


TH

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
Y 11891. 2000.—1/1906. I. 652.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00001b



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00001c



210

23 May 1906.

Sir.


With reference Sir Thomas (now Lord) Sanderson's letter of the 18th February 1905 with regard to the use of a separate flag by the Sheikh of Koweit, I am directed by Secretary Morley to enclose for the information of the L.S.S. for F.O., a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy on the subject.

It will be seen that Sheikh Mubarak has agreed to use a

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I.V.S. P.
P.O.


Approved Pol Com'tee.,
22 MAY 1906



a flag of the existing Turkish pattern, but with a distinctive mark, viz. the word "Koweit" in Arabic letters written across it.

Should there be no objection, on account of existing relations between H. M. Govt. and the Sublime Porte, Mr. Morley would suggest that the Political Agent at Koweit might be instructed to advise the Sheikh to bring the new flag into use.

(Sd.) A. Godley
F. O. 7/10



893

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM

+ Viceroy

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 19 MAY 1906

DATED Simla 18 May 1906

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 7.30. p.m.


(2653/05)


Foreign Secret. Your telegram 1st March 1905 Distinctive flag for Koweit shipping. It has been settled with Sheikh that he should use present Turkish pattern with Koweit written across it in Arabic letters. Is there any objection in view of present relations with Turkey to flag being brought into use

Copy to India (P.)
25 May.
Secy. 21.

6

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Register No. 873

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT

Sec. of St.'s Letter from India, No. 17 M. Dated 26 April 1906.
Rec. 12 May

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	16 May	WLL	Koweit
Secretary of State	17	ACJ	Major Cox's interviews with Sheikh Mubarak. Possible rapprochement between Sheikh Mubarak, Bin Rashid, & Bin Saood. Mubarak's attitude to British & to Turks: the arms question. Distinctive flag for Koweit &c. &c.
Committee	18/5	JM	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Sir G. Sclater

~~Previous Papers:—~~
Copy to I. O. 17 May.

For information
Maja Cox visited Koweit last March & had an interview with Sheikh Mubarak at which Capt. Knox was present. The principal subjects discussed at this interview were:—

(1) Mubarak's suggestion of a three-cornered agreement between himself & the two rival Sheikhs in Nejd — Bin Saood & Bin Rashid. The terms of this compact which would apparently be anti-Turkish in character, would involve the partition of Central Arabia between the three Sheikhs.


It may be remarked that Bin Rashid has since been reported to have been annihilated by Bin Saood. (Govt. of India's telegram of 29 April '06)

Seen Pol. Corresp. 22 MAY. 1906 (with 893)

Previous papers:—
285/06
1905/05

T.T.

T 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.



(2) Mubarak's relations with Bin Saood

(3) Visit of Nasir, the Bahrein outlaw, to Koweit.

(4) The question of a distinctive flag for Koweit. Mubarak has accepted the British proposals in this respect, & also in regard to articles of shipping. The superscription on the flag of the word "Koweit" in Roman, as well as in Arabic, characters was not insisted upon, as the Sheikh objected.

This is in accordance with the Govt of India's decision, see para. 17 of External Memorandum for November 1905. (1905/p5)


(5) The affairs of the late Yusuf bin Ibrahim, the instigator of the proposed attack on Koweit in 1902 (it did not take place)

(6) Mubarak's general position, more especially in relation to the Turks.

The covering letter shows that, in the opinion of Major Cox, Mubarak's attitude towards ourselves is satisfactory, & that his improved relations with the Turkish authorities at Basra, will, if kept within reasonable limits, be convenient to us.

As regards the arms question, the position is less satisfactory; pending a decision on the general question of arms traffic in the Gulf, Major Cox does not know quite what line to take with the Sheikhs, & prefers to avoid the subject.

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Mr. 285/06
1905/05

873

RECEIVED IN
12 MAY 1906
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

[*Confidential.*]

No. 620, dated Bushire, the 18th (received 27th) March 1906.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Having spent three days at Koweit during last week, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a few observations regarding the present aspect of affairs there.

I met Sheikh Mubarak on three occasions, and on 7th instant had a lengthy interview with him at the Agency, for the details of which I beg reference to the attached memorandum drawn up for me by Captain Knox who was likewise present.

It will be seen that during it several topics were touched upon, some of which are subjects of separate correspondence.

2. The trend of our conversation regarding the affairs of Central Arabia, which was started by Sheikh Mubarak, is of some significance. The possibility of the Ruler of Koweit smoking the calumet of peace with Bin Rashid, and Mubarak's own vision of a three-cornered compact between himself, Bin Rashid and Bin Saood, which would in practice probably be found to amount to a defensive alliance for resistance to Turkish expansion in Nejd and Hassa, is an interesting, if somewhat utopian, prospect to contemplate.

+(Rec 777/06)

It is to be feared however that Sheikh Mubarak's own ambitions, as indicated in the second of the conditions suggested by him to Bin Rashid, are likely to form the chief obstacle to such a development.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that in the course of the strife of the last few years both Bin Saood and Bin Rashid must have been brought to realise what a strong position the Ruler of Koweit, territorially situated as he is, occupies both strategically and politically in relation to them, and they evidently see the advantage of maintaining friendly relations with him.

In connection with Bin Saood's doings I may remark it is possible that his recent telegram to the Porte was sent to disarm suspicion preparatory to some further move, as recent reports from Bahrein show that the Turks are now having trouble at Hofuf, in which it seems possible, if not probable, that Bin Saood has had an indirect hand.

3. As for Sheikh Mubarak's attitude towards ourselves, I do not consider that on the whole it gives any present cause for dissatisfaction or anxiety; rather the contrary. As long as the practical expression of his sentiments in regard to us undergoes no change, the improvement of the relations between Mubarak and the Turkish authorities at Basrah, within reasonable limits, is rather a convenience to us than otherwise. The Sheikh's treatment of our Agent and his invariable demeanour towards myself could not be more satisfactory and sensible than it is. He has always treated Captain Knox exceedingly well; more so than ever lately, and it is a matter of satisfaction to me as it will, I am sure, be to Government that our representative seems clearly to have gained Sheikh Mubarak's personal regard, and that he is visited freely in a friendly way by many of the Sheikh's subjects. He is thus making useful influence of a kind which seems to be all we require at present and which we can legitimately cultivate.

6

285/06


It is only in regard to the arms question that the position at the present moment leaves much to be desired, and this is partly owing to the fact that the general question of the Gulf arms traffic is *sub judice*. I do not know quite what line to take with the Sheikh in the event of our having an exhaustive exchange of views in this connection, and until I am sure of our intentions it seems better for me to keep off the subject and avoid any specific discussion with him.

(831/06)

4. The question of the conveyance of the Turkish postal bag to Al Hassa, of which a good deal has been said, has I think been somewhat misunderstood, and I concur with the Political Agent in thinking that there

5628 F. D,

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is nothing in the existing working arrangement which need cause us to take exception to, or be exercised by, Sheikh Mubarak's connection with it.

Note of a conversation between the Resident in the Persian Gulf and Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit, dated 7th March 1906.

On 7th March 1906, at 4 P.M., the Sheikh of Koweit returned the informal visit paid by the Resident on the previous day.

The present interview lasted about an hour and a half, and Sheikh Mubarak was friendly and cordial as usual.

(1) The prospects of peace in the Interior.

The Sheikh informed the Resident that he thought he would be interested to hear that he had lately, on 24th February (29th Zi-ul-Haj), received a letter from Bin Rashid couched in friendly language and proposing that Sheikh Mubarak should be on the same terms of friendship with him as the Rulers of Koweit had been with his uncle and grandfather before him. The Sheikh said that he had replied to Bin Rashid that he, Mubarak, was a man who loved peace and quietness and would welcome friendly relations with him, provided that Bin Rashid would keep within his own boundaries and not harass his neighbours, and was really sincere in his desire for peace.

The Resident, in the way of friendly interest, asked how peace could be arranged between the two; whether a personal meeting would be necessary or whether trusted messengers would be sent.

The Sheikh replied that it would be done by correspondence and that a meeting would be unnecessary. He proceeded to sketch the terms on which, in his opinion, a reconciliation between him and Bin Rashid could be considered practicable.

These were:—

(i) That Bin Rashid should have Chhaffa (Kaffa) and Hail, and the Bedouins of Jebel Shammar.

(ii) That he, Bin Sabah, should have Koweit, Aneyza, Boreyda, Sedeyr, and Washm and should control the tribes occupying them.

(iii) That Bin Saood should have Nejd and the Wadi Dowasir.

The Resident asked if Sheikh Mubarak thought that he would be able to keep the parties to their agreement with himself and with one another; and the Sheikh replied that he could.

The Resident then asked whether under such circumstances Bin Rashid would have sufficient income to enable him to live without harrying his neighbours, and Sheikh Mubarak replied that he would have Hail and Chhaffa, the Zakat of Shammar and the produce of forays on the Harb and Aneyza tribes between Hail and Medina.

Asked what view the Turks would, in his opinion, take of this triple alliance, Sheikh Mubarak replied that they would undoubtedly regard it with disfavour.


(2) The relations between Bin Subah and Bin Saood.

The Resident then asked whether the relations between Sheikh Mubarak and Bin Saood continued the same as formerly; to which Sheikh Mubarak replied that they did, and that Bin Saood still listened to his advice. Major Cox then thanked the Sheikh for his co-operation in ascertaining the truth regarding Bin Saood's alleged intention to visit Oman.

Mubarak rejoined that Seyyid Feisal of Maskat had also written to him and that he had told His Highness that there was no cause for apprehension, and that Bin Saood had quite enough to do where he was for some time to come.

A reference was then made to the long telegram sent from Bushire to Constantinople through Jasim bin Thani on behalf of Bin Saood. Sheikh Mubarak was asked what inference he drew from the fact that Bin Saood had not consulted him before, and regarding its despatch. The Sheikh said that he had received full details from Bin Saood's messenger, Mussad bin Suweilim,

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who sent the telegram, but admitted that he had heard nothing on the subject direct from the Bin Saood family or from Abd-ur-Rahman. He thought this was because the telegram had been inspired by Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, of whom he spoke in no very favourable terms.

(3) Visit to Koweit of Nasir bin Mubarak the outlaw relative of the Sheikh of Bahrein.

Sheikh Mubarak next mentioned that Nasir bin Mubarak of the El Khalifah family had just been paying him one of his periodical visits and had only left a couple of days before. He continued that Nasir had told him of his meeting with Captain Prideaux, and had gone on to ask him (Sheikh Mubarak) to put in a good word for him to the Resident with a view to a reconciliation being effected between himself and Sheikh Esa.

Sheikh Mubarak agreed with the Resident in thinking that Sheikh Esa would resent any overtures on behalf of Nasir Mubarak, and that it would be difficult to alter the latter's circumstances during Sheik Esa's lifetime.

(4) A distinctive flag for Koweit.

The Resident then introduced the topic of the flag and ships' articles to be carried by Koweit vessels.

It may be mentioned here that the Resident had brought with him a specimen flag of the pattern previously selected by Sheikh Mubarak with the addition of the word "Koweit" in Roman letters as well as Arabic.

The "articles" were read over to the Sheikh and it was explained that it was proposed that the English translation should be verified by the signature of the Political Agent, and this the Sheikh considered would be an advantage. Sheikh Mubarak approved of the "articles" with the exception of the item "Name of Nakhoda." To this he objected, as the Nakhodas were always changing.

The Sheikh then inspected the flag, and after doing so said that he would lay before the Resident what appeared to him the objections to the use of the flag as now shown him, and that then, if the Resident did not consider the objections of any weight, he would be prepared to order his subjects to adopt the new pattern.

The Sheikh then explained his objections at some length. He recited his grievances against the Turks and their oppression in the matter of his Fao date gardens and their ingratitude for all he had done in their behalf. He clearly showed that he considered that all the trouble he experienced at their hands was due to his friendly attitude towards the British Government.

He said in conclusion that he would accept the flag as it stood if we would give him a written guarantee to protect him against any consequences that might arise to him from its use.

It proved, on further enquiry, that it was the addition of the English characters to which he objected. The reason for this addition was thoroughly explained to him, but the explanation did not remove his objections and he was therefore told that the European lettering was only a useful addition and not an essential, and he then expressed himself as quite ready to adopt the flg, without the English letters, and combined with the "Articles," for use by his subjects.


(5) The late Yusuf bin Brahim of Doura.

Sheikh Mubarak next informed the Resident that Bin Rashid had sent a messenger to Meshhed Ali, who had laid hands on all the money belonging to *Yusuf bin Brahim in that place.

Sheikh Mubarak then went on to explain that he too had claims against the house of Bin Brahim; that account books, in Arab merchants' dealings, were the only evidence, and that the deposits belonging to himself in the hands

* The principal instigator of the Lattuff on Koweit in 1902. He died near Hail in January 1906.

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of Abdul Aziz bin Brahim, the present representative, amounted to Rs. 1,30,000, and that the advances against him were Rs. 70,000 showing a balance of Rs. 60,000 in his favour.

He said that Abdul Aziz at present resided at Surat in the Bombay Presidency and would certainly contest the claim, and that he (Sheikh Mubarak) would be glad of assistance from the Resident to enable him to obtain a settlement of the accounts and the payment of the balance due to him. He said he would be glad to appoint an Agent who would take the account books to Bombay for examination.

In this connection Sheikh Mubarak seemed to be only putting forward a feeler and did not make any definite proposals.


(6) The general position of Sheikh Mubarak's affairs.

In conclusion the Resident asked Sheikh Mubarak whether he could inform Government that his affairs generally were, as they seemed to be, in a satisfactory and prosperous condition. Mubarak replied that they were. Asked, "as regards the Turkish authorities?" he rejoined, "yes; just at present they are satisfactory but it costs me £1,500 Turkish a year in douceurs to their officials to maintain that position."

The Sheikh then expressed his gratitude for the amount of British protection received; declared that the peace and rest he now enjoyed were, he knew, the result of British support; and that he desired no other or better protectors. He concluded by referring to the pleasant relations which existed between himself and the British representative.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 5628 F. D.—31-3-6—67—W. G. B.

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Minute Paper.

Register No. 1278

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 294., Dated 20 July Rec. 8 Augt. 1905.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	11 Aug	RR	Koweit.
Secretary of State	11	ag	Question of a special Koweit flag.
Committee	12	SRD	Major Cox has prepared flag designs and draft articles for Nakhodas of Koweit ships: and he will consult the Sheikh on them on his next visit.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to I.O. 28.8.05

For information.

(This has been approved by H.M. Govt.).

Seen Pol. Com'ee., 17 AUG. 1905

Previous Papers:—


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Y 10780. 2000.—3/1905. I. 506.


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[Confidential.]

1278

8 AUG 1905

No. 310, dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 10th) July 1905.


From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,


To—S. M. FRASER, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 943-E.B., dated 4th March 1905, I have the honour to inform you that I have fully discussed the question of his adopting a new flag, with Sheikh Mobarek, and had it not been for Captain Knox's illness and departure on leave, I should have hoped ere this to have submitted detailed proposals for the consideration of Government.

2. I have prepared flag designs and draft articles for the Nakhodas of Koweit ships, and will show them to Sheikh Mobarek and discuss them with him at my next visit. I shall then be in a position to furnish a full report, which may be expected at an early date.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C 375 F. D.—13-9-05.—67.—E. A. D'S.





Register No. 2653

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O., Dated 18 Feby. 1905.
Rec. 20

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	21/2	RR	Koweit.
Secretary of State	21	ag	
Committee	22	SOB	Sir NO'Conor sees no objection to the adoption by the Sheikh of a distinctive ensign for Koweit vessels while retaining his present flag for use in Koweit.
Under Secretary.....	28.	RR	
Secretary of State			


Previous Papers:—
2247A/04

Send. ag 1 March 05
Send 1.3.05
Copy to India.
Draft. telegram to the Viceroy.


COPY TO INDIA
8 March 1905
SECRETARY'S INS. 9

Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.

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DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched + 1st March 1905.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrorum)


Foreign Secret. Your Secret Despatch No. 230 of 8th December last, paragraph seven. Proposed recommendation of Sheikh of Koweit is approved, namely that he should adopt distinctive colours for shipping purposes, Sheikh retaining present flag for Koweit.

Copy to I.O. (P) 10 March


Copy to India, (P & +) 10 March

13773. I. 2486. 1000.—11/1903.

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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00002d



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2653

RECEIVED 20 FEB 1905 POLITICAL DEPT.

FOREIGN OFFICE.
February 18th, 1905.

Sir:-

With reference to the last paragraph of your letter of January 12th I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state for the information of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who is now on leave of absence in this country, has been consulted in regard to the proposed communication to the Sheikh of Koweit relative to the use of a separate ensign.

Sir N. O'Conor does not see any objection to the adoption by the Sheikh of a distinctive ensign for Koweit vessels while retaining his present flag for use in Koweit and Lord Lansdowne agrees that such a recommendation might be made to the Sheikh as suggested by the Government of India.

I am,


Sir,

Your most obedient,


humble Servant,

T Sanderson

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



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No. 230 of 1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 8th December 1904.*

SIR,

We have the honour to address you regarding our relations with Koweit with special reference to the question of the protection which His Majesty's Government are prepared to grant to subjects of the Sheikh in Persian territory.

2. The question is one which has been brought into prominence by the action of the Customs Department of the Persian Government, whose officious activity has recently produced a series of incidents which have roused a strong popular feeling at Koweit, and appear to be dictated by a deliberate policy to destroy our prestige and influence with the Arabs of the western shore of the Gulf. The details of these occurrences are narrated in the enclosures of this despatch, and their principal features may be briefly stated :—

(*a*) In April 1904, Mons. Dambrain, then Director-General of Customs at Bushire, while cruising in the "Muzaffari" overhauled a Koweit dhow which he apparently suspected of carrying arms. The vessel, which was stopped out of sight of land, was taken to Lingah, where her cargo was found on examination to be innocent. She was detained, however, for some days, and was not finally released until her master had been fined a sum of 25 tomans for an alleged technical breach of Customs regulations.


(*b*) In June one Mubarak-bin-Khalifa was detained with his vessel for eight days at Sheivah and twenty-one days at Lingah on suspicion of an alleged offence against the Customs. Pending an investigation of the charge, he was required to surrender, as security, a part of his cargo, and eventually, rather than incur further delay, abandoned this portion of his freight, and left with his vessel for Koweit.

(*c*) In the same month a vessel of Sheikh Mubarak's, the "Mussallim", sailing between Koweit and Fao with a cargo of wood and dates, was fired on and held up for search by Belgian Customs officials in the Shat-el-Arab.

(*d*) In September a Koweit vessel, the "Teyser", bound for Basrah, was seized in the Shat-el-Arab by the Customs ship "Muzaffari", and was only released on payment of a fine of twice the value of each of twelve rifles which were declared by the master to be carried for purposes of defence against pirates, a statement which was not improbably true.

(*e*) In June a Koweit subject, employed by the British India Steam Navigation Company as a pilot for their mail steamers, was accused of having committed an assault on a Negro at Bushire. The Political Resident wished to use his good offices on behalf of the accused, but the Turkish Consular Agent claimed to defend him, on the ground that he was a Turkish subject.

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
The matter was referred to Tehran, where Sir Arthur Hardinge arranged that the case should be removed to the Court of the Foreign Office Agent or Karguzar, so as to allow of a representative of the British Consulate-General attending at the trial. In agreeing to this course, however, the Persian Government expressly intimated that their consent was based on the British nationality of the Arab's employment, and abstained from committing themselves to an acceptance of either the British or Turkish view as to the international status of Koweit. Mention of this incident has been added, as the issue involved is the same, though the case is of a somewhat different character to those preceding, and we do not propose any further action in regard to it.

3. The present is not the first occasion on which the question of the status of Koweit subjects has come under review. The point was raised in 1900 in connection with the importation of certain arms into Persia by a merchant said to be a subject of the Sheikh. Our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was then informed by Lord Lansdowne that Koweit was not under formal British protection, though we had promised the Sheikh our good offices; that natives of Koweit could not be claimed as British protected persons, nor would they be justiciable by British Consular Tribunals in Persia. It was added that interference to protect any Koweit subject was undesirable, and that action on the part of the Resident was unnecessary until he was appealed to, but that endeavours should be made to ascertain the facts as to the man's nationality and the Sheikh's wishes as to resisting Turkish claims to jurisdiction over him.

4. In the recent cases we are left in no doubt as to the nationality of the affected parties or as to the wishes of Sheikh Mubarak, who has requested our assistance in formal and strongly worded communications addressed to our Political Agent at Koweit. We have not overlooked the fact that His Majesty's Government have intimated that they are not prepared to declare a formal protectorate over the Sheikh's territories, and have even admitted that Koweit is within the Turkish Empire. The latter pronouncement, however, was accompanied by the important qualification that the authority of the Sublime Porte is of an entirely unsubstantial character, and that in fact the Chief enjoys a large measure of practical independence. By his engagement of the 23rd January 1899, the Sheikh virtually placed the conduct of his external relations in our hands, and he now naturally looks to the British Government to assist his subjects when in trouble with officials of the Persian Government. In 1902 he was formally assured of British protection against an attack on Koweit, and he has repeatedly been informed that His Majesty's Government will lend him their good offices, so long as he adheres to their advice. The visit of His Excellency Lord Curzon, in December 1903, was regarded as a further declaration of our intention to protect and befriend him; while the recent appointment of a British Agent to reside at Koweit or, as we now understand from your recent telegrams, to pay periodical visits to Koweit, has led the Sheikh and his subjects to expect a larger measure of support than they have hitherto received. We feel strongly that it is incumbent upon us to assist him to the utmost of our powers, and that failure to do so must lead not only to a complete loss of the influence which we have acquired over the Sheikh who plainly warns us that he will be obliged to seek other relief if we are unable to put a stop to Persian tyranny over his sea-faring subjects, but also to a serious decline of our prestige throughout both the Arabian and Persian coasts of the Gulf. The prospect of the latter result is one which, in view of the evident designs of other Powers in these regions, we could not regard with equanimity.

5. The repudiation of Turkish pretensions to treat as subjects of the Sublime Porte natives of Koweit territory is no new thing. In 1902, in connection with the "Lapwing" incident, His Majesty's Consul at Basrah directly challenged a claim to this effect preferred by the Wali of Basrah. But fortunately, in connection with the present cases, it is unnecessary to raise this issue with the Turkish authorities, or to take any action which need bring us into direct conflict with the Porte at a moment when, we understand, His Majesty's Government are anxious to avoid complications in that quarter. All

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


that is required is that we should arrive at an understanding with the Persian Government as to the status of subjects of the Sheikh within the dominions of the Shah, but this is a point as to which we hold that our relations with the Sheikh and his direct demand for our protection no longer permit the attitude of the British Government to remain undefined. So far, it will be observed from the correspondence of which we have the honour to enclose copies, the local officials of the Persian Customs Department have declined to admit the right of our representatives to intervene on behalf of Koweit subjects. We suggest that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should now be authorised to explain to the Persian Government that we claim recognition of Koweitans as British protected persons. Should the Shah's Ministers question our pretension, they might be informed of the terms of our agreement concluded with the Sheikh in 1899, and it might be pointed out that our right to intervene, by virtue of similar treaties, on behalf of subjects of the Trucial Chiefs, has already been recognised and acted upon. At the least, it might be required that Koweitans should be entitled to the same privileges as Afghan subjects in Persia, on whose behalf it has been arranged that "the friendly recommendations and wishes of the British Government should be accepted".

6. As regards the specific incidents which have made it necessary to raise the general question, we consider that in cases (*a*) and (*b*), in the absence of satisfactory explanation by the Customs Department, there is good ground for a claim to compensation. In respect of (*c*), we think that the Sheikh is clearly entitled to an apology; while as regards (*d*), without entering into the question of the doubtful claim of the Persian Government to exercise a right of search on the waters of the Shat-el-Arab—against this we understand that the Porte have already entered a protest at Tehran—we hold that, in the particular instance, their action was entirely unjustified, inasmuch as the vessel in question was bound not for a Persian, but for a Turkish port, while the confiscated arms may reasonably be taken to have been required for purposes of self-protection. The insecurity of the Shat-el-Arab is notorious; we have recently had occasion to urge that representations should be made to the Persian Government regarding a grave outrage on a British vessel in the estuary; and we understand that the Persian Government have themselves lately admitted the propriety of native craft carrying arms in these waters. In this case also, therefore, we would press for pecuniary amends. The Persian Government may rest assured of our anxiety to check the traffic in arms, but, even assuming that their proceedings were directed solely to the repression of illicit trade, and were in no way inspired by a desire to harass a *protégé* of the British Government, we are unable to countenance high-handed action, such as that of the Persian Customs officials in the present instance. We have purposely abstained from mention of the further case in which a vessel sailing from Koweit was admittedly found to have concealed on board 28 rifles, in respect of which suspicions may reasonably exist that they were contraband, whether intended for a Turkish or Persian destination.

7. It will be observed that, in connection with this subject, Major Cox has raised the question of the flag flown by Koweit vessels. The matter was considered in 1901, and it was then decided that, in view of the objections which the Sublime Porte might raise to any change as involving a disturbance of the *status quo*, it was preferable to abstain from advising the adoption of another flag. We agree with the Resident, however, that there would be a distinct advantage if Koweit ships hoisted a distinctive ensign, and, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, we would propose to approach the Sheikh on the subject. Should the Sheikh agree to the proposal, and should the Porte hereafter raise objections, we would point out that we have an agreement with the Chief whereby we are entitled to search Koweit craft for contraband arms, and that being desirous of avoiding any risk of detaining a Turkish ship by mistake for a Koweit vessel—a very possible contingency if both fly the same flag—we had recommended the Sheikh to adopt distinctive colours for shipping purposes, while retaining his present flag for use in Koweit.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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8. We are forwarding a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) AMPTHILL.

" E. F.-G. LAW.

" E. R. ELLES.


" A. T. ARUNDEL.

" H. ERLE RICHARDS.

" J. P. HEWETT.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000034



1904.

FORT WILLIAM.


FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

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
No. 230, DATED THE 8TH DECEMBER 1904.

List of Enclosures.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000035



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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1904.


FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


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Enclosures of a letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 230, dated the 8th December 1904.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000037



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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(224)

Enclo. No. 1.

Telegram, dated the 30th June 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

A Persian subject has brought a charge of causing him hurt against a Koweit Arab who is in the permanent paid employ of the British India Steam Navigation Company as pilot for steamers carrying His Majesty's mails. Both on grounds of his employment and his alien nationality, I wish to give the Arab the good offices of this Consulate to the extent of sending a representative to be present at the trial in order to see that no injustice is done, as there is reason to expect. My suggestion is acquiesced in by the Foreign Office Agent, but he said that owing to the Governor's misrepresentation case is complicated by Turkish Consular Agent who claims to protect the Arab as a Turkish subject. Both the Governor and I have declined to recognise this claim. The case could probably be settled with despatch if Your Excellency would move the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to instruct the Foreign Office Agent to dispose of it, and admit the Resident's representative at the trial. He says that he is quite ready to do so. Meanwhile the Arab will, with concurrence of local authorities, remain in my custody. (Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge.)

Enclo. No. 2.

Telegram, No. 2214-E. A., dated the 9th July 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


Please refer to your telegram of the 30th June. The Turks claim to protect the Koweit Arab. Please send by post the reply received from Sir A. Hardinge. (Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.)

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
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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1144 F. D.—13-7-04.—62.—C. G. P. S.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000039



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Encl. No. 3

No. 208, dated Bushire, the 3rd July 1904.

From—Major P. Z Cox, C.I.E, Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram of 30th June, repeating a message sent by me to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, on the subject of good offices which it was desired to extend to a Koweit Arab in the employ of the British India Company as Mail Pilot, I have the honour to append for information a paraphrase of His Excellency's reply.

Telegram dated the 2nd July 1904.

From—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., Tehran,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Bushire.


Your telegram of 30th June. In reply to a message from me yesterday, Mushir-ed-Dowleh has promised to obtain the Shah's authority to issue instructions in the sense which you desire, as he agrees that the British nationality of the Arab's employment enable the Persian Government to comply, without committing themselves either to British or Turkish views regarding the status of Koweit.

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
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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1797 F. D.—1-9-04.—54—C. G. xx 5.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00003c



Enclo. No. 4

(226)

No. 203, dated Bushire, the 2nd July 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Certain cases have recently occurred in which the Nacodas of Koweit dhows appear to have been needlessly oppressed by Belgian Customs officials, and the Residency Agent at Lingah asks to be informed definitely as to what amount of protection he is entitled to afford them.

2. In one case the late Director-General of Bushire Customs, Monsieur Dambrain, while cruising in the "Muzafferi" last April, overhauled a Koweit dhow at sea, between Hindarabi and Kais Island in the hopes of finding arms in her. Being unable to search her at sea he towed her in to Lingah where he had her cargo taken out and detained her several days. Finding her cargo innocent (it consisted of wooden rafters from Kishm) he allowed it to be put back, but (as if to show that his action was justified) he found the Nacoda guilty of neglecting some technical detail of Customs Regulations and fined him 25 tomans.

The Nacoda went straight back to Koweit and complained to Sheikh Mubarek that in the first place he had been seized on the high seas out of sight of land, and that secondly, though his cargo was innocent and he had not intentionally committed any breach of rules, he had been delayed for several days and eventually fined 25 tomans.

The Director-General was approached informally by my predecessor, and the process was repeated by me but without any satisfactory result.

3. A second complaint has now been received from the Residency Agent at Lingah, giving details of another case in which he alleges that a Koweit dhow, with a certificate from Sheikh Mubarek to say that the dhow and cargo were Koweit owned, has been mulcted of 20 bags of wheat and has been detained several days. This case is still under correspondence.

4. It is not however with regard to individual cases or the details of them that I have thought it necessary to trouble Government. My object is to invite the consideration of the Government of India to the general question of the extent to which protection or good offices can now be afforded to subjects of the Sheikh of Koweit when in difficulties of the kind above explained.

It is evident to me that if we wish to maintain our influence with Sheikh Mubarek, much less to strengthen it, we must accept some responsibility to see ordinary justice meted out to his subjects in places where we have Agents, as far as lies in our power. I am also inclined to deduce from one or two local incidents that there is some tendency on the part of local officials, possibly prompted from outside, to make a special set against Koweit subjects at the present time.

With an Agent at Koweit and in view of Sheikh Mubarek's energetic entreaties, we shall henceforward be in a stronger position to use our influence in the direction desired; and while on this subject, I venture to inquire whether we might not now press the Sheikh to adopt a distinctive device for his flag, which would enable the vessels of his subjects to be identified.

At present the fact that Koweit dhows fly the Turkish flag unaltered in any way makes it easy for Customs officials to ignore their Koweit origin, and encourages Turkish Consular representatives who wish to obtrude their expensive protection.

Translated extract from a letter dated 31st March 1904, from Sheikh Mubarek to the Resident.


After giving details of the seizure and detention of a Koweit dhow * *

"And we will not endure this treatment and your sense of honour will not permit that those who are under your protection shall be treated in such a way.

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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00003d



"Therefore have I made this appeal to you.

"And in this connection, when we see that we get protection from you we shall feel honoured and so will our subjects. And such treatment is hoped for and is an attribute of your glorious Government.


"If, on the other hand, you take no notice of this and such tyranny over our subjects who ply their seafaring pursuits is not put a stop to by you, then we shall be obliged to look out for some other condition of affairs which will give us relief from it. The result of it is that all our subjects who travel are in a state of alarm, and all we ask of you is to see that the trade of our seafaring subjects is not brought to a standstill by such treatment, etc. * *

"Finally we beg your kind solicitude for the protection of all our subjects in any direction which will honour them and preserve them from tyranny.

"May you be preserved, and salaams."

2

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1143 F. D.—12-7-04.—62.—C. G. 22 5.



Enclo. No. 5

No. 254, dated Bushire, the 13th August 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 208, dated 3rd July 1904, regarding the Arab pilot Khalid, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

No. 114, dated the 4th August 1904.

No. 114, dated Bushire, the 4th August 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, &c.,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to refer to the case of the Arab pilot Khalid, regarding which we have been in telegraphic correspondence.

In his telegram No. 46 of 12th July, Mr. Grant Duff informed me that instructions had been sent three days previously to Bushire for the speedy disposal of the case in the presence of a Residency representative, but it was not till 14th that orders were received by the Karguzar. He took up the case on 16th, and admitted my Vice-Consul and Assistant Surgeon Lobo.

The circumstances were found to be that the parties were good friends, dined and got drunk in company, and in the morning the negro found he was wounded. Neither party could remember how it happened.

The wound was a very simple one and was under treatment at our dispensary, and was going on very well, when the man was prevented from coming by the Derya Begi's order and practically kept in custody by him.

On the negro's appearance at the trial, the wound was examined by a Persian doctor and our Assistant Surgeon, and found to have a plug inside it, so as to aggravate the wound and keep it open!


It was taken out, and the wound is quite healed, and the man completely recovered.


The Karguzar disposed of the case on 16th, as far as he was concerned, but had to report his conclusions to Tehran. Nearly three weeks have now elapsed, and he has received no orders. The pilot Khalid having been in custody at the Residency for five weeks, and the British India Company being in urgent need of his services, I released him on 21st instant after taking security, and a guarantee from the Company that they would keep him on board their steamers and produce him when required.

Foreign Office Press—No. 967—26-8-04—52.

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Enclo. No. 6.

Telegram, dated the 13th September 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have received the following telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah. *Begins*: It is reported that, without referring to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, a Customs steamship has arrived at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab and is looking for contraband. *Ends*. He says that he will withdraw the guard and will not be responsible for the safety of the Shat-el-Arab if the boat remains there. If he withdraws the guard it is probable that robbery will be omitted.

(Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge; repeated to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.)

Enclo. No. 7.

Telegram, dated the 18th September 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram dated 14th September, Director-General, Customs, in "Persepolis" has now joined "Muzafferi" in Shat-el-Arab and both are busy. It is important that "Merlin" or other ship should be sent back as soon as possible.

(Addressed Foreign; repeated the Political Agent at Maskat for Senior Naval Officer. Tehran informed.)

Enclo. No. 8. Telegram No. 3136-E.A., dated the 21st September 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

Please refer to Major Cox's telegrams dated the 14th and 18th September 1904, respectively. Under the Agreement of 1902 the Sheikh was to be subordinate to the Ministry of Customs only. The Arabistan Customs were separated from the Gulf Customs. Does not the visit of the Bushire Director in "Persepolis" constitute a direct violation of the arrangement between the Persian Government and the Sheikh.


We have no information if the Sheikh omitted to lend his boats to the local Customs officers as provided in the arrangement, but, if he did not, the presence in his jurisdiction of outside Customs vessels appears to require explanation, more especially as his approval is required to the appointment of such officers.

(Repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.)


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G. C. Press, Simla.—No 2144 F. D.—21-9-04—54—C. G. as S.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000042



Enclo No. 9

Telegram, dated the 24th September 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

My telegram of 14th and 18th September last. Persepolis and Muzaffari returned Bushire yesterday, bringing one Koweit dhow. Am enquiring into reasons for seizure.

Enclo No. 10.

Telegram, dated Bushire, the 27th September 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Please refer to your telegram No. 73, dated the 23rd September 1904. I have heard on good authority that on the 24th September 1904, the Director of Customs at Mohammerah submitted the following report to the Ministry of Customs:—*Begins.* Having received a report to the effect that a large number of rifles had been shipped from Maskat for Gosbah, which is at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab, where there is no Custom-house, I sent Muzaffari there for a few days simply to seize the arms. 42 rifles and nearly 6,000 cartridges have been found and confiscated. Muzaffari left some days ago for Bushire. *Ends.*

He does not mention having applied to the Sheikh for boats, I am having enquiries made at Mohammerah. Two Koweit dhows have been seized apparently between Gosbah and Fao, one of them which had 14 rifles on board was released on payment of a fine of 800 tomans under protest: the other which had 28 rifles on board has been detained at Bushire pending the payment of a fine of 1,200 tomans.


McDouall's good offices have been accepted unofficially, but the Director-General says that he is unable to discuss the matter here as the report has been submitted to Tehran.

Address to the Legation at Tehran.


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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 2287 F. D.—3-10-04.—61.—B. B. C.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Encl. No. 11

Telegram No. 162, dated the 30th September (received 1st October) 1904.

From—E. Grant Duff, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Tehran,

To—L. W Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Please see your telegram, dated the 21st September. The Director of Customs states that the steamer *Muzafferi* has been sent to confiscate arms at Gusbah. I am pointing out to him that Mohammerah Customs are not under the orders of the Bushire or the Arabistan Customs and that the despatch of the steamer without apparently consulting the Sheikh of Mohammerah was unjustifiable and likely to lead to misunderstanding.

The Persian Government do not know that we are aware of their written agreement with the Sheikh (please see Sir A. Hardinge's despatch No. 167, dated the 5th December 1902).

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356.
Proceedings Nos. 340.

Addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department and repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


Encl. No. 12


Telegram, dated Bushire, the 30th September 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have addressed the following telegram to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran :—" My telegram No. 79 of 27th September. His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah reports as follows :—*Begins.*—The Sheikh never refused to lend his steam-boat. *End of Message* ".





Enclo No 13

No. 332, dated Bushire, the 24th September 1904 (Confidential).

From—Captain A. P. Trevor *for* Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegrams of the 14th and 19th September, on the subject of the proceedings of the "Persepolis" and "Muzafferi" in the Shatt-el-Arab, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of two letters,* addressed by Mr. Consul McDouall to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, reporting the dissatisfaction of the Sardar Arfa with the Customs arrangements in Arabistan, and his objection to the despatch to the Shatt-el-Arab, without his permission, of the Customs steamer 'Muzafferi".

* Nos. 7 and 8, dated the 16th September 1904.

No. 7, dated Mohammerah, the 16th September 1904 (Confidential).

From—W. McDouall, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to report that, on the evening of the 11th instant, the Sardar Arfa sent to inform me that his official at Gusbah at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab reported that the Imperial Customs steamer "Muzafferi" was there, and was stopping and searching boats of all kinds, and he was afraid there might be trouble, as he could not be everywhere at once. His Excellency, as the Customs had thus assumed the policing of the river, was very glad to be relieved of that expense, and would remove his patrols in a few days' time if the vessel remained, and inform us officially that he was no longer responsible for the safety of the river which had been assumed by the Customs. Therefore I sent a telegram to Basrah to be sent to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, giving the above facts, and Haji Rais Tujar promised that the patrols should not be removed for a few days to give time for a reply to be received. I have seen the Sardar Arfa twice on this subject. He points out that, although he is supposed to be head of the Customs, the "Muzafferi" has been sent into his jurisdiction without his being informed: secondly, as Governor, he should have been warned in order to take steps to prevent trouble by sending men of his own to be present at the searching of suspected boats. He understands they stop both sea and river boats and their boats enter the creeks, so that a collision might occur with the tribesmen in the absence of his men. Thirdly, he is warden of the marches (Sarhaddar), and the Shatt-el-Arab being the border between Turkey and Persia, complications with Turkey may arise over the actions of the "Muzafferi"; and if the Turkish authorities at Basrah ask for an explanation, he has none to give. He also reiterated what he had said regarding withdrawing the patrols, and wished His Majesty's Minister to be informed that he might take any action, if advisable.

In the event of his withdrawing the patrols, there is, in my opinion, a likelihood of a recrudescence of piracy in the river. I also believe that interference with the tribesmen, in the absence of the Sardar Arfa's men, is likely to lead to trouble.


No. 8, dated Mohammerah, the 16th September 1904 (Confidential).

From—W. McDouall, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to report that the Sardar Arfa is making certain complaints to the Minister of the Interior at Tehran, of which he wishes you to be informed, but not with a view to asking for support in the matter.

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
In the firman given him in connection with the Customs, it is distinctly stated that the Directorship-in-Chief (Riasat-i-kul) of the Customs of Arabistan is his: that, as there are no capable local men, Mons. Waffelaerat and Mons. Mirzayanty are to be sent to be in charge of the Customs under his Directorship and orders, and his Directorship is under the Ministry of Customs. He undertakes to carry out the orders of the Ministry of Customs, and to lend his private steamers, when required, for preventive service. This Directorship appears to be practically ignored, but whether this is the fault of the local Customs or the Ministry he does not know. Clerks have been appointed without reference to him, and other small matters show that the local Directorate ignore his headship.

Again, the Customs of Arabistan is not under Bushire as is shown by the firman above, yet the Bushire administration have sent the "Muzafferi" into the Shatt-el-Arab to search for arms and other contraband, and, on the Captain reporting that he had arrested two sailing boats with arms, the Bushire Director ordered him to bring them to Bushire. The Captain could not do this, so brought them to Mohammerah, and telegraphed to Bushire for the "Persepolis" to come for them.

Some months ago the Cashier of the Mohammerah Customs embezzled moneys belonging to the Customs and absconded to Karachi, where he was arrested. The Sardar Arfa, at the request of the Customs, issued a warrant to two of his guards to receive the prisoner and bring him to Mohammerah, and his signature and position were authenticated at this Consulate. On this warrant the prisoner was extradited and brought to Mohammerah, and detained at the Customs House. After a preliminary examination, at which the Sardar Arfa was represented, Mons. Waffelaert being transferred to Bushire, took the prisoner with him, and handed him over to the custody of the authorities at Bushire, although the offence was committed in the jurisdiction of Arabistan. From this it appears that the Customs wish to ignore his position as Governor, as well as that of supreme Director of the Customs of Arabistan, and he considers it necessary to report this to the Central Government.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1470—6-10-04—40.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Enclo. No. 14

Extracts from the Diary of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf for the week ending 24th September 1904.

* * * *

MOHAMMERAH.

* * * *

13. *September 13th, 1904.*—The Customs steamer "Muzafferi" arrived from the mouth of the river with two native boats (bum) in tow, which she had seized on account of having arms on board. One belongs to Koweit and had 28 rifles and ammunition concealed in the sides of the vessel, and the other which belongs to the Shatt-el-Arab had 12 rifles.

14. *September 14th, 1904.*—The "Muzafferi" left during the night for the mouth of the river, where she had left her boats. The two boats are under detention pending the arrival of the Persian gun-boat "Persepolis."

* * * *

BUSHIRE.

* * * *

23. *September 23rd, 1904.*—H. P. M. S. "Persepolis," with the Director-General of Customs on board, accompanied by the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi," returned to Bushire. They brought a dhow belonging to Koweit with them.

* * * *

Enclo. No. 15

No. 336, dated Bushire, the 24th September (received 1st October) 1904.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, for Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 332 of to-day's date on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian gun-boat *Persepolis*, and Revenue steamer *Muzafferi*, in the Shat-el-Arab, I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a communication* I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, together with a copy of a petition from Sheikh Mubarak, regarding the seizure of Koweit boats by the *Muzafferi*.

* No. 24, dated the 4th September 1904.

2. The two vessels returned to Bushire yesterday having a dhow in tow. This dhow is believed to be the Koweit dhow captured with 28 rifles on board—*vide* entry No. 13 in my diary for the week ending 24th September 1904.

It is reported that another Koweit dhow was seized with ten rifles on board, but was released at Mohammerah on payment of a fine of 8,000 krans.

I am making further enquiries into the matter, and also asking the Director General of Customs on what grounds these dhows were seized.

No. 24, dated the 14th September 1904.


From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy (with translation) of a letter received from Sheikh Mubarak, in which he complains of a fresh set of acts of interference with Koweit vessels on the part of the Customs Administration of Persia.

2. I have not had time to verify the allegations, as the letter only reached me yesterday, and Sheikh Mubarak is anxious that you should be acquainted with his complaint without delay.

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3. I am afraid, however, that these constant complaints prove a deliberate policy on the part of the Persian Government, of which the object is to destroy our prestige and influence with the Arabs of the western shore of the Gulf. The initiation of this policy was marked by the abortive attempt to occupy Abu Musa and Tamb and, since that failed, the policy has been continued by constant vexations, petty acts of oppression on Arab dhows, especially those hailing from Howeit, and it has now culminated, if I have been correctly informed, in a wanton and unjustifiable insult to an independent Chief under British protection.

4. One of the most oppressive and vexatious forms of this policy is the invariable assumption by the Customs Department that the Arab Nakhoda is in the wrong, and must prove his innocence. I will instance the case of an unfortunate, named Mubarak-bin-Khalifa.

5. This man was detained at Lingah for twenty-one days, having been brought from Sheivah, where he had already been detained eight days for the purpose. Twenty bags of grain were taken from him as security, and he was told to wait and prove his innocence. There is fairly strong evidence that his wheat cargo for which he was unable to account satisfactorily was legitimate, and, having come under a pass from the Persian port of Mashur, was, six months latter, re-exported from Koweit, but this naturally took time to prove. The case has my attention.

6. Finding his other cargo rotting during his detention, Mubarak made his escape, and put out to sea. The Belgians have detained him, and some of his crew, pending trial for a month, and have confiscated twenty bags of his grain for an offence which, there is reason to believe, he never committed, and has yet to be proved, against him, but for this last heinous offence in disobeying their order to wait and prove his innocence, he is to be persecuted in every Persian port, in which he dares to show his face. They have caught him once already, and attached a small boat of his, but could not manage to detain the man himself, who is now in Koweit.

7. It is perhaps unnecessary to call to your remembrance the case, on your office records, of the Koweit boat which, it is alleged, was searched unsuccessfully for arms in the open sea, and then towed into territorial waters and heavily fined for a technical breach of the Customs Regulations.

8. This extraordinary assumption that Arab Nakhodas are bound to prove that they have not committed an offence against the Customs Department can have only one result, where on the one side we have a well-regulated department, armed with clerks, regulations, and engines of oppression of every description, and on the other ignorant Nakhodas seldom able even to read and write.


9. The feeling in Koweit itself is very bitter against the Belgians, and might at any time, lead to acts of retaliation on Persians, and thus the situation would become acute and dangerous.

10. If the Customs Administration persist in this course of conduct, the only remedy that appears to me at all likely to meet the situation is that one of our gun-boats should attend the *Muzafferi* and *Persepolis*, wherever they go, especially in the open sea, and whenever they overhaul a boat hailing from the western shores of the Gulf, the Commander of the gun-boat should insist on having a clear *primâ facie* case against the boat being made out to his satisfaction or the immediate release of the vessel.

11. The alleged interference with boats bound for Basrah will no doubt form the subject of a protest from the Turkish local authorities, and I would venture to suggest that His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah be addressed on the subject.

12. In conclusion, I would crave indulgence for this hastily written preliminary report. The whole subject is under the close and anxious attention of Sheikh Mubarak and myself, and I hope, at leisure, to submit more fully matured proposals for the solution of the very important difficulties involved therein.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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(*Translation*).

Dated the 13th September 1904 (2nd Rajab 1322).

From—Sheikh Mubarak-us-Subah, Chief of Koweit,

To—Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit.


After compliments.—We petition you that the Persian ship, in which are posted Belgians, is now cruising from the buoy to Gusbah within the Shat-el-Arab, and seized vessels, and searches them, and delays them on their journeys; that it has seized our boom and bellum which voyage between here and Fao, bringing wood and dates for us, and delayed them some days, and they (the boom and bellum) told them that they were our private boats, and that their work was between Koweit and Fao, bringing wood and dates, and after this vexation they let them go.

And now they have seized a boat of our subjects going to Basrah from Koweit, and have taken their arms which all the boats carry for protection from pirates, and this matter is well known to all the Governments.


Every boat carries a small gun for saluting purposes on return to their country and arms, according to the number of the crew in her, as piracy in Basrah is notorious. Now they have posted soldiers in her, and taken her small arms to the number of 12, and delayed the boat.

And now a letter from the Nakhoda of the boat has reached us, saying that they had seized them at the buoy, and towed the boat into Kasbah in front of the house of the servant of Sheikh Khazal, Ruler of Mohammerah, and they left soldiers in the boat, and kept her in custody with him. And may you remain guarded!

2576 F. D.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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
Telegram, dated the 3rd October 1904.


From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Please refer to your telegram No. 77, dated the 30th September, regarding Persian ships of war in the Shat-el-Arab. His Majesty's Consul at Basrah reports that the acting Vali has protested through the Persian Consul-General at Basrah to the Persian Government against the gunboat stopping and searching vessels bound for Basrah and that he has telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior on the subject. Addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Tehran, and repeated to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

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Enclr. to No. 17

No. 341, dated Bushire, the 1st October 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, *for* Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter No. 83, dated 23rd September 1904, from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi" in the Shatt-el-Arab.

2. In reply to a reference from me, Mons. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, states that the "Muzafferi" did, in fact, capture two Koweit dhows, one of which was released on payment (under protest) of a fine of 8,000 krans and the other of which was brought to Bushire to be detained till a fine of krans 18,000 is paid. Mons. Waffelaert added that it was not in his power to discuss the matter further at Bushire, as a report of the capture had already been despatched to Tehran, presumably from Mohammerah.

3. The position of British Consular officers in Persia with regard to Koweit subjects is at present so undefined that, in view of Mons. Waffelaert's attitude, it seems unlikely that very much will be effected here.

4. A copy of this communication, with its enclosure, has been sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

No. 83, dated the 23rd September 1904.

From—W. McDouall, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,
To—Major P. Z Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, &c.

With regard to the seizure of native craft by Customs S.S. "Muzafferi", I have the honour to report that the owner of a Koweit bum made a complaint to His Majesty's Consul at Basrah who sent him to me. I have no instructions as to whether Koweit subjects are entitled to more than good offices, and enquired from the Customs authorities if they would accept my intervention on behalf of Koweit subjects. Mons. Waffelaert, Acting Director-General, Bushire, informed me that at Bushire, as he had no orders from Tehran to recognise the right of His Majesty's Consulate-General to represent Koweit subjects, there was an understanding that, pending instructions, any action of the Consulate-General should be unofficial, and suggested that the same should be done here to which I agreed.

Mons. Waffelaert said that, as it would take some time to settle the case, and reference would have to be made to Tehran, to avoid delay to the vessels, he was prepared to accept payment of a fine under protest, the fine to be twice the value of the rifles, estimated at thirty tomans each, and the vessels could then be liberated; when the case had been settled, and amount of fine fixed if anything to be returned to the owner it would be returned.


The owner of bum accepted this on my advice, and has received a receipt, stating that the amount was paid under protest.

The owners are Abdulla-bin-Muhammad and Alwan-bin-Hosein who state that they bought the vessel two years ago from Abdul Aziz Angri, in whose name the register was issued by Sheikh Mubarak.

The vessel is the bum "Teyser", Nakhoda Ali-bin-Muhammad Mubarak. She was bound from Koweit for Sabiliyat near Basrah to load dates.

The case for the vessel is that they carried twelve rifles and twelve hundred cartridges for the defence of the vessel and did not conceal that they had these rifles on board: that they were bound for Sabiliyat in Turkish territory, where their owner is awaiting them and had no intention of communicating with Persian territory: that the river being the border they were not in Persian waters: that as they were to load dates for sale at the Bedouin villages between Ras-el-Had and Fartag and on, they had brought these arms for protection.

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The Customs case is that the rifles were concealed and were new with the full complement of cartridges : that as the importation of arms is prohibited in Turkey as well as Persia it is of no importance where they were bound. If the vessel can prove that the rifles were not for sale, I am of opinion that twelve rifles are not an excessive amount, as piracies often occur off the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, and all vessels therefore should carry sufficient arms to protect themselves ; and the Bedouin coast is also unsafe.

A second bum, Nakhoda Ghanim, is also understood to belong to Koweit. She had twenty-eight rifles concealed on board, and this fact is not denied, she had some bundles of hides consigned to Basrah to which port she was bound. She was captured near the inner buoy and can only put forward that she was bound for a Turkish port and was not within Persian jurisdiction. This vessel has been taken to Bushire, as the owner cannot pay a fine. The fine demanded would come to more than the value of the vessel, and the owner's entire capital was invested in these rifles and the vessel which is mortgaged already.

The "Teyser" proceeds to Sabiliyat where I can communicate with her; she will be there for at least a fortnight. I enclose herewith the deposition of the Nakhoda and, if necessary, he will swear an affidavit in these terms.

The owner states he can get evidence at Koweit that the rifles were purchased for the defence of the vessel only.

If the presence of the owner, Nakhoda, and others is necessary in Bushire to support or prove their claim for a refund of the fine and return of the arms, I would beg to be informed as soon as possible.

Deposition of Ali-bin-Muhammad Mubarak, Nakhoda of the bum "Teyser" of Koweit.

I, Ali-bin-Muhammad, Nakhoda of the bum "Teyser", state as follows:—

The vessel left Koweit for Sabiliyat to load. On the 10th September, Saturday, was off the Turkish fort at Fao tacking up the river. At midnight two boats from the S.S. "Muzafferi" came and asked what I had. I said "nothing". They then asked if I had any arms. I replied "yes, we have twelve rifles for the eighteen men of the crew for the protection of the vessel, two are here and ten below". They then searched the vessel and detained her three days and then brought her to Mohammerah. These arms were bought for the protection of the vessel, as she was bound for Yemen after loading, that is for the villages beyond Ras-el-Had and two years ago having no arms I was attacked and robbed there.

I solemnly declare and am prepared to take oath that the above statement is true in every particular.


Seal of ALI-BIN-MUHAMMAD.

Deposed and sealed by the said Ali-bin-Muhammad at Mohammerah this twenty-third day of September 1904, before me.

W. McDOUALL,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1528—11-10-04—60.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x000050



Encl. No. 18


Telegram, dated 10th (received 11th) October 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,


To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Please refer to my telegram of the 27th September and letter No. 341, dated the 1st October, regarding the detention here of Koweit dhows pending the payment of 18,000 krans. Under instructions from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf the Nakhoda has been imprisoned instead of merely being detained, I have requested the Governor to make the man over to me for disciplinary purpose. The Governor has to-day given me an evasive reply that Director General of Customs says that the matter does not concern the Governor and that I should apply to the Customs Department. I had already written demi-officially on the subject to the Director General without eliciting a reply from him. I would suggest that the British Minister, Theran, should be moved by the Government of India to take necessary steps. I should like to be informed whether Koweit subjects should receive benefits from the additional article of the reglement which fixes the maximum fine at Rs. 1,000.

2576 F. D.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Encl. etc. 19

No. 355, dated Bushire, the 15th October 1904.

From—The Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of previous correspondence ending with my telegram of 10th instant on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue gunboat "Mozaffar" in the Shat-el-Arab, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter* from Captain Knox, Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of the detention and search of a "boom" belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit.

* No. 32, dated 26th September 1904, with enclosures.

2. Captain Knox's letter explains the case fully, and it is unnecessary for me to comment on it at length. In regard to the last paragraph, however, I beg to give the following remarks:—

Acting on the complaint of Sheikh Mubarek sent to me by Captain Knox under cover of his letter No. 24, dated 14th September 1904 (a copy of which was sent to the Government of India with my letter No 336, dated 24th September 1904), I approached Monsieur Waffelaert on the subject of the alleged seizure of a "boom" and a "bellum" belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit, and received the following reply:—

> "As regards the "boom" and the "bellum" belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit, I beg to inform you that the "Mozaffar" has operated searchings in many dhows which she has come across, among which there have in fact been a "boom" and a "bellum" of which one was coming from Basrah, and the other going to Manjouhi; from what I have been able to gather from the Commander none of these (that is of the 2 mentioned) appertain to the Sheikh of Koweit, as also appears from the one's origin and the other's destination."

I am again addressing the Director-General of Customs in view of the information in Captain Knox's letter, which was unfortunately delayed a week by missing the mail steamer at Fao.

3. I have had the opportunity of conversing with Captain Knox on this subject, and I think that undoubtedly popular feeling has been much roused in Koweit by the high-handed proceedings on the part of the Persian Customs Department, and especially by the minute search of a boat belonging to the Sheikh.

4. I trust, therefore, that the Government of India will be pleased to take such action as they think fit to prevent such occurrences in future, and if necessary to cause the Customs Department to make some explanation and apology to the Sheikh for the behaviour of their employés on this occasion.

5. A copy of this communication has been sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

No. 32, dated the 26th September 1904.

From—Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, etc., Bushire.

I have the honour to forward herewith four statements of the Nakhoda and three sailors of the boom "Musallini," property of Sheikh Mubarek, which, it was alleged, was stopped by the servants of the Imperial Customs Department of Persia on or about the 15th instant.

2. The statements which were recorded separately present the usual discrepancies to be found when a number of ignorant witnesses, incapable of correct observation, are examined, but I see no reason to doubt the general

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truth of their story. Witness No. 2 is obviously unreliable, as it will be an easy matter to prove that the boom reached Fao and did not, as he asserts, return to Koweit at once without being searched.

3. I would venture to suggest that there are two matters on which it is specially necessary to call for an explanation from the Customs Department. The reckless firing of ball cartridge into the air in the direction of Fao at such close quarters as the Shat-el-Arab must be a proceeding attended with considerable risk to person and property. As we have a telegraph station at Fao and Sheikh Mubarek's followers and employés form, I understand, the bulk of the population of the place, on this score alone, apart from whatever protest, the Ottoman local authorities may see fit to present, I venture to think that we should be justified in protesting strongly against the action of the Customs' servants.

4. Further, I would ask that the Customs Department be called on for an explanation as to why Sheikh Mubarek's private boom was searched at all. It is difficult to imagine that a well known boat like this, always on the run between Koweit and Fao, was not recognised by the crew of the Persian jolly boat even at a distance; but, even granting this, after the explanation furnished by the crew of the boom, the minute search conducted over Sheikh Mubarek's private boat can only be construed by me into a deliberate and purposeless insult.

5. I have already explained in my letter No. 24, dated 14th instant, that popular feeling in Koweit is greatly excited over this incident and I have heard remarks, though not from any responsible quarter, asking why the English, who have been so long in the Gulf, permit such high-handedness on the part of the Persian Government. The report which has recently reached Koweit that an English man-of-war has appeared at the mouth of the Shatt and that the Belgians promptly decamped has been received with undisguised satisfaction.

6. I have only to add that, with reference to Sheikh Mubarek's letter of which a translation was forwarded under cover of my letter quoted in the preceding paragraph at an interview I had with Sheikh Mubarek this morning, he informed me that the mention of the bellum was based on incorrect information. The boom only was detained and searched.

STATEMENT No. 1.

Name	Migrin.
Father's name	Ibrahim-bin-Sauad.
Age	30 years.
Occupation	Nakhoda.
Residence	Koweit.

Ten days ago, I left Koweit in the boom "Musallini," property of Sheikh Mubarek. We left at night. We entered the Shatt about 10 A.M. and saw the Belgian boat just before we entered the Fao creek. They were in the jolly boat belonging to the "Mozaffar." All the five men in her were Persians. There was not a single Christian. They shot at the boom four times at about 25 paces distance. They used ball cartridge. I said to them—"This is the boom of Sheikh Mubarek taking the post. Do not shoot." They replied—"We must search your boat." They fired high through the sail and no one was hurt and we have sewn up the holes. They said—"We are searching for arms" and searched the entire boat. When they found nothing, they went away. They kept us waiting for the purposes of their search about an hour and then let us go. After that day, we have had no trouble with the Belgians.


Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

STATEMENT No. 2.

Name	Abdulla.
Father's name	Ahmed.
Age	40 years.
Occupation	Khalassi.
Residence	Koweit, but his family came from Hassa.

2

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Ten days ago, I left Koweit in the boom named "Musallini," property of Mubarek-us-Sabah. We left at night and reached the Shatt about morning. We saw the Belgians near the buoy (central) about a mile or less from the entrance to the Fao creek. I don't know how many Belgians there were. They were in a jolly boat belonging to the "Mozaffar." There were perhaps eight men. And among them was one Belgian, at least he appeared to be a Christian. The others were Persians and Muhammadans. They fired at us four times from about 200 yards away. No damage was done. They did not hit the boat. We knew it was ball cartridge from the noise of the bullets. We went straight off and returned to Koweit.

N.B.—This man was extraordinarily frightened and I am afraid that the fear of being led off to instant execution afterwards made him conceal a good deal of what he knew.—S. G. K.

Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

STATEMENT No. 3.

Name	Salim.
Father's name	Yakoob.
Age	50 years.
Occupation	Sailor.
Residence	Basrah.

About 10 or 12 days ago, I left Koweit in the boom "Musallini," property of Sheikh Mubarek. We left at night for Fao. We saw the Belgians at Gusbah. There were six men in the jolly boat. The jolly boat was coming off from Gusbah in the direction of Fao. The jolly boat was from the man-of-war at Gusbah. They shot at us four times. They were about 100 yards away or more. They shot ball but did us no harm. They hit nothing at all in the boat. The boom stopped and we all said—"This is the boom of Sheikh Mubarek. It takes the post to Fao." They said—"We must search it." They searched the boom and found nothing. When they found nothing, they went off to Gusbah and we went to Fao and anchored by the Sheikh's house. This all happened in the afternoon and we were kept waiting from the afternoon until the evening over this business. Of the six men in the boat, one was a Belgian and the rest were Persians.

Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

STATEMENT No. 4.

Name	Feroz.
Father's name	Salim.
Age	25 years.
Occupation	Sailor.
Residence	Zayria near Fao.

Ten days ago, I left Koweit in the boom named "Musallini" property of Sheikh Mubarek. We left Koweit at night for Fao. We reached Fao about midday. On the way, we met the jolly boat of the Belgians in front of Fao at the head of the creek. They fired at us four times. We were none of us killed or wounded. They fired at about 25 paces distance. They did not hit the boat but they hit the sail. There were six men in the jolly boat. They were all of the same colour. They were none of them Persians but all Belgians. I did not say anything, but the other men in the boom said— "This is the boom of Sheikh Mubarek. There are no arms in it." The Belgians said—"We do not know Sheikh Mubarek. We have to search for arms." They spoke to us in Arabic. Our boom stopped and the Belgians got in and lighted a candle and went through the cabin and hunted all over; they found nothing. They went off and another jolly boat came and opened the Nakhoda's box and found nothing in it. There were seven men in the second jolly boat. They

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searched among the sail and among the bundles of date wood and found nothing. Then that lot also went off to the man-of-war, the small one, belonging to the Persians. We went off and anchored in the head of the creek. We were delayed about an hour.

Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

(Sd.) S. G. KNOX, *Captain*,

Political Agent, Koweit.

No. 34, dated the 27th September 1904.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of previous correspondence and especially with reference to my confidential No. 28,* dated 18th September, to your address, I have the honour to forward a translation of a letter received from Sheikh Mubarek in which he complains that two vessels belonging to Koweit subjects have been seized by the servants of the Imperial Customs of Persia in the Shat-el-Arab.

* Not forwarded, being unimportant. 15-10-04. S. G. K.

2. I have since heard that one of the vessels has been released after the payment of a fine of £ 100 and the confiscation of the arms found therein and that the other boat has been taken to Bushire.

Dated 5th Rajab 1322=(16th September 1904).

From—SHEIKH MUBAREK-US-SUBAH, Chief of Koweit,


To—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, Political Agent, Koweit.

The ships of our subjects of Koweit which travel to Basrah, great and small, carry arms according to the number in the boat, Nakhoda, steersman and crew; and that has been done for the past three years for self-protection from pirates, who are notorious in Basrah; and the officials of the Turkish Government and of the Ruler of Mohammerah, Sheikh Khazel Khan, who protects the Shatt, see that and have not prevented them because of the necessity, for the object of the people of the ships is the protection of themselves and their property.

And now the Persian ship, in which are the Belgians, has occupied the Shatt between the buoy and Fao and has seized two vessels belonging to our subjects of Koweit and with them their arms, which were only in case of need they have annoyed them to the utmost and have seized the weapons and taken the boats to Mohammerah; and now news has reached us that they will also take the aforesaid boats to Bushire. And these matters are contrary to the rules of Government of the present day and we hope from your fair justice and your protection that you will not acquiesce in the vexation of our subjects, the people of Koweit who have sought shelter with your precious Imperial Government. Therefore we have petitioned to you in full. We hope you will take notice of this affair and may you remain guarded, etc.

C. Press, Simla.—No. C-709 F. D.—26-10-04.—60.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Encl. No. 20

Telegram dated the 25th (received 26th) October 1904.

From—Captain Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My letter regarding Koweit dhow. Nakhoda still in confinement with local authorities. Director General, Customs, has referred matter to Tehran. But has received no reply.

Encl. No. 21 Telegram dated the 11th November 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Koweit Dhows. Please refer to my telegram dated the 25th October 1904. The Customs Department are endeavouring to induce Nakhodah to execute deeds of gifts of dhows in favour of the Persian Government by holding out promises of pardon. Soonnee Imam here reports that he has been approached on behalf of the Customs and Nakhodah to draw up the documents but has postponed action pending the receipt of our advice. Believe Nakhodah is a part owner of the dhows. It is probable that pressure will be put on to force Imam's hands. The matter may be temple (*sic*) if a transfer is effected.

Complicated.?

Early orders in this case are solicited.

Encl. No. 22 Telegram dated 14th (received 15th) November 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,


To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Referring to previous correspondence ending with my telegram dated 11th November regarding Koweit dhow, local Customs state that orders received from Tehran Saturday confirming their *proces verbal* and ordering article 32 of "Reglement" to be enforced, *viz.*:—confiscation of Dhow and everything on board and imprisonment of Nakhoda until fine equal to twice the value of contraband articles is paid.


Addressed Foreign, with Viceroy, repeated Simla.

2576 F. D.

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Gulf. 23

No. 386, dated Bushire, the 13th November 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, I.A., *for* Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to correspondence ending with my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of translation of a letter* from Sheikh Mubarek which I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, regarding the ill-treatment which certain Koweit Nakhodas have received at the hands of Belgian officials of the Persian Customs Administration.

* Dated the 19th October 1904.

2. The Nakhoda of the dhow to which the Sheikh refers is still in custody together with a companion, and the dhow is still detained.

In answer to all queries the Director-General of Customs replies that the entire case was referred to his Central Administration at Tehran, and that he can take no action without orders from the Ministry which have not yet been received.

Translation of extract from letter, dated 19th October 1904, from Mubarek us Subah, Ruler of Koweit, to Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit.

* * * * * * *

1. And as for the Belgians who seized the boats of our subjects in one of which was 10 rifles and in the other 24 rifles.

2. As for the 10 rifles, they belonged to one of the people of Bussorah and the Nakhoda was not aware of what had been added and wrapped up by the owner.

3. And the 24 rifles were in two boxes belonging to one of the people of Zubair; the barrels were in one box and the butts in another and equally the Nakhoda of the boom knew nothing about it except that there were two boxes containing goods.

4. And the boat of the Belgians seized them and fined the boom in which there were 10 rifles, 6,000 krans and released it. And the Belgians took the other boom to Bushire and imprisoned the Nakhoda and demanded from him krans 12,000.


5. Now the crew of the boom are my subjects and are under the protection of the Government. It is, therefore, necessary that the Belgians should hand over the boats either to the Consul of the British Government at Mohammerah or to the Resident in Bushire, and the punishment they deserve should be at your hands, for we also are prohibiting all our ships from the carrying of arms and restraining them; but, in a case like this, it will be hard on them, for they do not know what the consignor loads and we remain watching events as they pass over us unjustly and have explained the state of affairs to you. Then let not what we have mentioned to you pass into (neglect—forgetfulness). These are matters injurious and may you remain safe.

* * * * * * *


G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 8-949 F. D.—23-11-04.—60—J. D.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Enclo. No. 24


Telegram No. 83 C., dated the 28th November 1904.

From—Foreign with Viceroy's Camp,


To—The Resident, Bushire.

Your telegram 14th November. From Macdouall's letter 23rd September we understand dhow in question admittedly had concealed on board 28 rifles which may reasonably be presumed contraband, we are unable therefore to assist. In case of dhow having only twelve rifles required for defence of vessel we have suggested representation to Persian Government. Copy of despatch follows.

2576 F. D.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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Encl. No. 25.

No. 335, dated Bushire, the 20th November 1904.

From —The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

In continuation of my letter No. 335, dated 14th October 1904, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the following report on the subject of the search of a boom belonging to Sheikh Mubarek by the Persian Customs ship *Muzaffer*.

On the 27th October I addressed Monsieur Waffelaert giving him a précis of the statements of the crew of the Sheikh's boom and pointing out that the boom was apparently examined close to Fao and asking him to enquire into the matter.

On the 3rd of November (on the return of the *Muzaffer* to Bushire) Monsieur Waffelaert replied, and I have the honour to enclose a copy of his communication for the information of the Government of India.

Monsieur Waffelaert appears to be under the impression that any native craft can be searched in any place on suspicion of having "contraband" on board.

The Sheikh's "boom" plies between Koweit and Fao taking mails, bringing firewood, etc., and even if it had firearms on board, it seems to me that the matter would lie between Sheikh Mubarek and the Turkish authorities.

The action of the *Muzaffer* undoubtedly caused a great deal of irritation throughout the Arab Coast, and if such high handed actions on the part of the Customs continue, I think the Arabs may possibly attempt some kind of reprisals.

If therefore the Government of India agree that indiscriminate searching of native craft in the Shat el Arab is contrary to International Law and custom, I trust that they will be pleased to take steps to prevent the Persian Customs Department from abusing the rights of search in this way.

Dated the 3rd November 1904.

From—Monsieur E. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, Bushire,

To—Captain A. P. Trevor, First Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


In continuation of my letter No. 6642 of the 27th ultimo I beg to state that from the inquiry instituted from the Commander of S. S. *Muzaffer* it follows that the boat has detained many "booms" and "Bellums" but has never kept them longer than it was necessary for searching the inside of the craft.


The Commander of our boat does not recollect anything particular about the boom *Mosalim*, but the mere fact of the crew's shouting out that the vessel belonged to Sheikh Mubarek was not sufficient to prove that the boat did not carry contraband goods.

Besides, beyond searching in the boat no harm whatever has been done neither to the craft or to the crew.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2571 E. A.—7-12-1904.—60—L. G. R.

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Enclo. of No. 26.

No. 397, dated Bushire, the 20th November 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.


In confirmation of my telegram of the 14th November 1904, I have the honour to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the Director-General of Customs has informed me that the Koweit dhow belonging to Abdul Aziz bin Farah of Koweit, which has been detained here, will now be confiscated. Instructions have been issued by the Central Customs Administration that the Nakhoda of the dhow will be imprisoned until the fine of 18,000 krans is paid, or until further orders.

2. I submit that this is an exceedingly high-handed proceeding as there was absolutely no evidence brought forward at the investigation at Mohammerah (*vide* Mr. Consul McDouall's report sent with my letter No. 341, dated 1st October 1904) to show that the rifles were intended for Persia.

3. Monsieur Waffelaert also declares that "all articles on board" will also be confiscated under Article IV of the Act of the 5th Ramzan 1317. I have pointed out that only articles used to conceal the contraband goods should be confiscated, but Monsieur Waffelaert does not agree, and the question has been referred to Tehran. There were on board the dhow 4 bales of canvas belonging to one Haji Mukhbil of Bahrein consigned by him to Suleiman bin Mahmud-el Thakeir of Busreh, and it was in connection with a request made by me that Haji Mukhbil's canvas should be returned, that the question of Article IV of the Act of 5th Ramzan came up.

G. I. C. P. O. No. 2523 F. D.—5-12-1904—54—W. D'C.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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
244

List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 230 (External), dated the 8th December 1904, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
1	Telegram, dated the 30th June 1904.	From Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Reported the occurrence at Basrah of a case of assault on a Persian subject by a Koweit Arab employed as a pilot for steamers by the British India Steam Navigation Company.
2	Telegram No. 2214 E.-A., dated the 9th July 1904.	To ditto ditto ...	Instructed to furnish the Government of India with a copy of the reply received from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.
3	Letter No. 208, dated the 3rd July 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	In compliance with above instructions, furnished the required information.
4	Letter No. 203, dated the 2nd July 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported two incidents connected with interference with Koweit dhows by the Persian Belgian Customs officials, and requested instructions on the subject of the grant of good offices to Koweitis. Also suggested the adoption by the Sheikh of Koweit of a distinctive device for his flag.
5	Letter No. 254, dated the 13th August 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Forwarded a copy of the report submitted to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, on the subject of the trial of the Koweit Arab pilot for assault on a Persian subject.
6	Telegram, dated the 13th September 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported the arrival of a Persian Customs steamship at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab in search of contraband.
7	Telegram, dated the 18th September 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported that the Director-General, Persian Customs, Bushire, in the "Persipolis" had joined the "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab.
8	Telegram No. 3136 E.-A., dated the 21st September 1904.	To Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.	Referred to above communications, and asked whether visit of the Bushire Director-General of Customs did not constitute a direct violation of the arrangement between the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.
9	Telegram, dated the 24th September 1904.	From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported return to Bushire of the "Persipolis" and the "Muzafferi" with a Koweit dhow in tow.
10	Telegram, dated the 27th September 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported further details connected with the object of the visit of the Persian vessels "Persipolis" and "Muzafferi" to the Shat-el-Arab.
11	Telegram No. 162, dated the 30th September 1904.	From Mr. E. Grant Duff, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.	Intimated action taken with respect to visit of the "Muzafferi" to the Shat-el-Arab.
12	Telegram, dated the 30th September 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Repeated report received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah that Sheikh had not refused to lend his steamboat.
13	Letter No. 332, dated the 24th September 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Forwarded copies of communications received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, reporting the dissatisfaction of the Sardar Arfa with the Customs arrangements in Arabistan, and his objection to the despatch to the Shat-el-Arab, without his permission, of the Customs steamer "Muzafferi."

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
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Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
14	Extracts	From the diary of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf for the week ending the 24th September 1904.	Proceedings of the Persian vessels "Persepolis" and "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab and their returns to Bushire with a Koweit dhow.
15	Letter No. 336, dated the 24th September 1904.	From the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Forwarded a report from the Political Agent, Koweit, regarding the seizure of Koweit dhows by the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi".
16	Telegram, dated the 3rd October 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported the filing of a protest with the Persian Government by the Wali of Basrah against the action of the Persian ships in stopping and searching vessels bound for Basrah.
17	Letter No. 341, dated the 1st October 1904.	From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Forwarded, with his remarks, a reference received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab.
18	Telegram, dated the 10th October 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reports the action taken with respect to the detention of the Nakhoda of the Koweit dhow brought to Bushire pending the payment of a fine of krans 18,000.
19	Letter No. 355, dated the 15th October 1904.	From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Submitted, with remarks, a report by the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab.
20	Telegram, dated the 25th October 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported the continued confinement of the Nakhoda of the Koweit dhow by the local Customs authorities.
21	Telegram, dated the 11th November 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported the desire of the Customs Department to induce Nakhoda of Koweit dhow seized and detained at Bushire to execute deeds of gifts of dhows in favour of the Persian Government by holding out promises of pardon.
22	Telegram, dated the 14th November 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reports receipt of orders by local Customs from Tehran, confirming their action, and directing Article 32 of "Règlement" to be enforced entailing confiscation of dhow and everything on board and imprisonment of Nakhoda until fine equal to twice the value of contraband articles is paid.
23	Letter No. 386, dated the 13th November 1904, and enclosures.	From ditto ditto ...	Submitted, with his remarks, an extract from a letter received by the Political Agent, Koweit, from Sheikh Mubarak, complaining against the action of the Belgian officials of the Persian Customs administration in having seized and detained certain Koweit dhows.
24	Telegram No. 83 C., dated the 28th November 1904.	To the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Informed that, as regards the Koweit dhow which had 28 rifles on board, presumably contraband, the Government of India were not prepared to interfere, but, as for the dhow which carried 12 rifles, a representation would be made to the Persian Government.

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
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
Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
2[illegible]	Letter No. 395, dated the 20th November 1904.	From the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Forwarded a copy of the reply received to his communication from Mons. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, Bushire, in respect to the interference with the private boom of the Sheikh of Koweit.
26	Letter No. 397, dated the 20th November 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Furnished further details in regard to the contemplated action to be taken with respect to the Koweit dhow detained at Bushire.

C. L. S. RUSSELL,
Offg. Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

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1904.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

No. 230, DATED THE 8TH DECEMBER 1904.


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
Letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Relative to the protection which His Majesty's Government are prepared to grant to subjects of the Sheikh of Koweit in Persian territory.

Foreign Office Press—No. 665—7-12-04—54.

6





Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
1855
1904.

6

Subject:

Koweit :- States of Koweitis in Persia.

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YEAR.

1904. P. 1364 3445 2247 a

1905. P. 2616 2664 560 2737 2747 661 2936 3299

19 . P.


19 . P.

Memoranda.


☞ If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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Minute Paper.

Register No. 3299

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated 22, 23 Aug. 1905.
Rec. 23, 24

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	25 Aug		Persia.
Secretary of State	25		Status of Koweitis in Persia. Persian
Committee	26		enquiries at Constantinople established the fact
Under Secretary.....			that Koweitis are regarded as Ottoman subjects.
Secretary of State			Interview of Sir A Hardinge with the Mushir-ed-
			Dowleh on 21 June

Copy to

25 August 1905

So far, at least, Sir A. Hardinge's negotiations with the Persian Govt. in regard to this matter do not look promising.

For information.


Seen Pol. Committee
30 AUG. 1905

Previous Papers:—


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Y 10780. 3000.—3/1905. I. 506.



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3299

RECEIVED IN 24 AUG 1905 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

ARABIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[August 12.]

SECTION 3.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 119.)

Foreign Office, August 12, 1905.

Sir,


I HAVE received your despatch No. 139, Confidential, of the 21st June last, reporting a conversation with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh respecting the status of Koweit Arabs in Persia.

I approve your language to his Excellency on this occasion.


I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

[2119 *m*—3]



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3299

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RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 23 AUG 1905

ARABIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[August 5.]

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 139. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Gulahek, June 21, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to previous correspondence closing with your Lordship's despatch No. 78 of the 13th ultimo, that I to-day asked the Mushir-ed-Dowleh if the Persian Government had arrived at any decision respecting the status of Koweit Arabs in Persia.

His Excellency replied that the result of his inquiries at Constantinople had been to establish the fact that the Sublime Porte regarded all Koweitis as Ottoman subjects, and would strongly object to their being protected in Persia by any other Power. What ought he under these circumstances to do, bearing in mind that the Persian Government did not want to have a quarrel on the subject with Turkey?

I said that I fully agreed with his Excellency that good relations between the two neighbouring Mahommedan Empires were most desirable, but, on the other hand, if Koweitis were oppressed by the Persian Customs authorities, it was natural that the Sheikh of Koweit should, in virtue of his special arrangements with us, apply to us for redress, and I thought, in the interest of Persian pilgrims and traders in the Arab regions more or less affected by his influence, that he should not, by applying to us in vain, be tempted to resort to reprisals. It was for the Persian Government to decide whether he was, *de facto*, sufficiently independent of Turkey to do this if provoked, and to be guided in its policy accordingly. I again repeated that we had no desire to embarrass Persian relations with the Porte by any ostentatious protection of Koweitis in this country, but only wished, in fulfilment of our obligations to Sheikh Mubarak, to afford to them such effectual if officious assistance as we from time to time extended to Afghans.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh said that he would write to the Shah and report what I had said, unless I preferred to let the matter stand over until His Majesty's return to Persia, and that in the meantime he would direct the Customs and other Persian officials in the Gulf to avoid giving occasion to awkward questions by treating Koweitis with harshness. I replied that, whilst unwilling to press his Excellency too hard on a matter which I admitted to be delicate, I thought it would be well that he should again communicate my suggestions to the Shah without waiting for His Majesty's return. I added that the orders which he had suggested giving the Persian Customs and other officers on the Gulf appeared to me to be very judicious, and likely, if loyally carried out, to assist in tiding over the present difficulty.


It is not probable that any definite decision will be taken till the Shah's return on a question as to which the Persian Government is clearly anxious to procrastinate, but the knowledge that we may again raise it in a form likely to embarrass them may make the Persian authorities more careful in their treatment of Koweit dhows and subjects.

I have, &c.


(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

[2119 *c*—1]

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3075

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ARABIA. [May 13.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 13, 1905.*

I HAVE considered, in communication with the Secretary of State for India, your despatch No. 57 of the 16th March, reporting your conversation with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh regarding British intervention on behalf of Koweit Arabs in Persia.


The action which you have taken, as well as the language which you used to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh on this subject, is entirely approved by His Majesty's Government.

You should use your discretion as to taking further steps in the matter.


I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

[1973 *n*—3]



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3075

ARABIA.

[May 13.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 159.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 13, 1905.*


WITH reference to previous correspondence, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* relative to the question of British intervention on behalf of Koweit Arabs in Persia.

Sir A. Hardinge's description of the relations of Turkey with Koweit in his conversation with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh appears to have been correct, and I consider that it may be safely and conveniently adopted in any discussions with the Turkish Government on Koweit affairs.


I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

* Sir A. Hardinge, No. 57, March 16, 1905.

[1973 *n*—2]



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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3026

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PERSIA. [February 6.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 6, 1905.*

KOWEIT subjects in Persia. Government of India's despatch of the 8th December, 1904.


Am I to make representations to the Persian Government in this sense? Russian and Turkish, and perhaps German, Representatives here would doubtless persuade them not to comply with our desires, but I could always point out that retaliation might be used on Persian subjects in Koweit, and that, in view of the overland pilgrim traffic through Nejd or Jebel, it is to Persia's interest to remain on good terms with the Sheikh Mubarak.

I might get them to send an informal hint to their officials in the south to refrain from molesting Koweit subjects and dhows, but I think they would most likely stick at formally recognizing our protectorate over the place.


Mr. Grant Duff has already been asked by the Customs Department as to what is the political status of Koweit subjects in Persia, but he evaded answering till he knew what your Lordship's views were on this somewhat delicate question.

(Repeated to India.)

[1822 *f*—2]



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Minute Paper.

Register No. 2936.

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O., Dated 4 May 1905. Rec. 5

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	5 May	
Secretary of State	6	
Committee	6	
Under Secretary.....	9.	
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Persian Gulf.

As to British intervention on behalf of Koweit Arabs in Persia. Report by Sir A. Hardinge of his communications with the Persian Govt.

Copy to India 12 May 1905 Secy 19

10 May 1905.

Sir.

In reply to Sir E. Grant's letter of the 4th inst. on the subject of Sir A. Hardinge's communication to the Persian Govt. upon British intervention on behalf of Koweit Arabs in Persia, I am directed to say that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal to approve Sir A. Hardinge's action, and to authorise him to use his discretion

The U. S. of State, Foreign Office.


Aff. Pol. Louis 9 May 1905.

Previous Papers:—


TH 2747

Y 10780. 2000.—3/1905. I. 535.

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2936 M-2747

FOREIGN OFFICE,
May, 4, 1905.

Sir:-

I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for India copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reporting his communications with the Persian Government in regard to British intervention on behalf of Koweit Arabs in Persia.


A. Hardinge No 57 March 16, 1905.

Sir A. Hardinge's description of the status of Koweit is, in Lord Lansdowne's opinion, a correct one and his negotiations with the Persian Government seem likely to have a favourable result.


His Lordship would propose to inform Sir A. Hardinge that his action is approved and to authorize him to use his discretion as to taking further steps in the matter.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,
Hurst

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



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TEHRAN,


16th March 1905.

My Lord:-

I have the honour to report in continuation of my telegram No.33 of to-day's date that on receipt of Your Lordship's latest instructions respecting the status of Koweit Arabs in Persia, I spoke on this subject to Monsieur Naus. His Excellency informed me that the orders telegraphed by his Department to the Belgian Customs Officials in the Persian Gulf, of which he gave me in confidence the enclosed copy, had been issued by the desire of the Mushir ed Dowleh, with whom he advised me to discuss them.

The Mushir ed Dowleh stated in reply to my enquiries that his own action was the result of a protest made by the Turkish Consulate at Bushire against the acquiescence of the Persian Government in the intervention of His Majesty's Residency on behalf of a native of Koweit. I may mention that the Arab concerned was a pilot employed on a British India steamer and that when the case, which so far as I recollect was one of assault arose,


Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
&c., &c., &c.



arose, I prevailed on the Persian Foreign Office to instruct the Bushire authorities to allow Major Cox's intervention and exclude that of the Turkish Consul, by pointing out that the former might be justified, without raising the political question, on the ground of the Koweit Arab's being a sailor on a British ship.

As a consequence of this Turkish protest, the Persian Government had made enquiries, by the Shah's commands, of its Embassy at Constantinople, and the latter had reported that the Sublime Porte objected to natives of Koweit being treated in Persia otherwise than as Ottoman subjects. The Mushir ed Dowleh added that they had always been so treated in the past, that is to say that they had been subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Persian tribunals and authorities as neither Persia nor Turkey grant exterritorial rights to the subjects of the other within their respective territories, but the intervention and representations of the Turkish Embassy and Consuls on their behalf had been recognized in all extra-judicial matters in which they had complaints against the Persian authorities or Persian subjects. This, it should be noted,


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noted, puts Koweitis in a position different from that of Afghans, who having no regular treaty or diplomatic relations with Persia, are treated, except in so far as "our good offices" are allowed on their behalf, on the same footing as natives of Persia.

I explained to the Mushir ed Dowleh that in our view Koweit was de facto independent of Turkey, which had not established or maintained an effective control over the country, although the Sheikh recognized in common with most orthodox Sunnis outside Africa, the religious authority of the Sultan as Caliph and was moreover the owner of large estates in the Vilayet of Bussorah. On these latter grounds the Turkish Government, I believed, claimed him as its subject, much as it asserted, without enforcing it, a claim to sovereignty over many other chiefs in Arabia, such as the Sheikh of Bahrein and the Ameer of Nejd. Sheikh Mubarak Ibn Sabah however repudiated this claim and had entered into certain arrangements with His Majesty's Government bearing some resemblance to those made by us with other Arab chiefs in the Persian Gulf, in virtue of which we had under-

taken




undertaken to extend our good offices to his subjects, when outside Koweit. If the Persian Government recognized, as they seemed to have done in their instructions to Monsieur Waffalaert, that Koweit was politically separate from and independent of Turkey, would there be any objection to allowing the Sheikh to entrust the protection of his subjects in Persia to His Majesty's Representatives, much as Swiss citizens were protected by the French Legation, or at least to recognizing such a limited intervention by us on their behalf, as we exercised under a "dast-khat" of the late Shah in the case of Afghans?

The Mushir ed Dowleh asked what view would be taken of such a claim by us on behalf of Koweit subjects (1) in Turkey (2) in other foreign states. Would the French Consul at Bushire for example admit the intervention of the Residency in a suit between a French citizen and a native of Koweit?

I said I felt certain that in Turkey the Turkish authorities would insist on treating Koweitis as Ottoman subjects. This however proved nothing, as they

put

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


put forward the same claim in the case of Tunisians and Algerines (or at least used to do so when I was at Constantinople) notwithstanding the fact that Tunis had been a French protectorate for a quarter of a century and Algiers a French possession for sixty years. As regards other foreign powers, I was not aware that any opportunity had arisen for any discussion with them on the question, Koweit having no intercourse with any States except those on the shores of the Persian Gulf. If such a case as he had supposed for the sake of argument were to arise with the French, the French Consul would either admit our intervention or an exchange of views would follow on the political issues at stake similar to that now taking place between His Excellency and myself. I have since sent His Excellency a French geographical work, based on Elisée Reclus'Géographie Universelle, which whilst describing Bahrein as a Turkish dependency, includes Koweit among the States of "independent Arabia".

His Excellency observed that it was somewhat remarkable that no such test case as he had suggested should

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


as yet have arisen and that we should now for the first time last year have had occasion to intervene on behalf of Koweitis. I said this seemed to me quite intelligible as it was only within quite a recent period that Europeans other than Englishmen had concerned themselves with the trade or politics of the Persian Gulf or that an European customs administration, with its strict and precise procedure, had raised questions which in the days of the old farmers had been left to be dealt with in a much more irregular and haphazard fashion. The strict repression of the traffic in arms, in connection with which the Sheikh had complained to us of the harsh treatment of Koweit dhows by the Persian authorities, was moreover a comparatively modern feature.

The Mushir ed Dowleh said he could not give me an answer off hand as to the view which the Persian Government would take of my proposal, but that he would submit the whole question, which would require rather careful consideration, to the Shah and I think it not improbable that he may consult, not the Russians, but

one


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one or two representatives less decidedly identified
with opposition to our interests in the Gulf, such as
those of France and Germany, before giving me a defin-
ite answer. From a Persian point of view it is pro-
bably more desirable that Koweit subjects oppressed or
robbed by the Persian authorities should be under the
lethargic protection of Turkey rather than the strenuous
care of a British Resident, and the Persian Government
certainly regards Turkish influence in the Gulf with
much less fear and distrust than it does ours. This
last consideration may however induce it out of prudence
to lean rather to our view than to that of Turkey and
while I think that it will hesitate for a long time
to commit itself on one side or the other, I am not
without hope that a working understanding may be arriv-
ed at, especially if we can get the Persians to admit,
which they seem inclined to do, that Koweit is de fac-
to independent.

I told the Mushir ed Dowleh that I thought it would
be to Persia's interest to maintain good relations with
Koweit, as the Sheikh was on friendly terms with the

Ibn




Ibn Saud dynasty which had apparently re-established its authority over the greater part of Nejd and thus controlled the overland Persian pilgrim route from the holy cities of Irak Arabi to Medina. Koweit was moreover becoming every year an increasingly important commercial centre and it would be to the advantage of the Persian Government to secure friendly treatment for Persian subjects proceeding there for trade or travelling as pilgrims across Jabel Shammar and Nejd, by a conciliatory attitude towards the political views of the Sheikh and the commercial interests of his subjects visiting Persia. His Excellency made a note of this last observation and repeated that my representations would receive the most careful attention.

I have sent him the enclosed written reminder of our conversation, but have thought it better to avoid formulating in writing any views about the status of Koweit.

I have &c.,

(Signed) Arthur H. Hardinge.

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Copy.

T E H E R A N,
16th March, 1905.


Your Excellency:-

I have not thought it necessary to trouble Your Excellency with a recapitulation of our conversation of yesterday's date respecting the status of Koweit Arabs in Persia, but I would beg to remind Your Excellency of your promise to consider the points which I had the honour to submit to you on that occasion and to ask you at your earliest convenience to give me a reply on them for transmission to His Majesty's Government.


I avail &c.,

(Signed) A. Hardinge.

His Excellency
The Mushir ed Dowleh.



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
A. Suite rapport 29 Octobre 6649.

Vous devez par ordre Ministre Affaires Etrangères vous refuser correspondre avec Consul anglais au sujet affaires concernant habitants Koweit. S'il insiste encore écrivez lui officiellement de s'adresser par intermediaire Légation au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a Téhéran.


B. Copie procès verbal concernant habitants Koweit ne doivent être communiqué ni Consul anglais ni Consul turc.

(Signé) Naus.

10. 3. 1905.



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Minute Paper.

Register No. 661

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, Govt of M., Dated 16 March 1905. Rec. 1 April

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6 April		Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State	6	as	Settlement of the case of a Koweit subject who was accused of wounding a Persian negro at Bushire.
Committee	7	SOA	Sale & disposal of a Koweit dhow wrecked on the Island of Hormuz.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to F.O. 12.4.05.

For information.

Consul Shakespear seems to have acted judiciously in the matter of the wrecked dhow


Seen Pol. Corresp., 10 APR. 1905

Previous Papers:—


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Y 10780. 2000.—3/1905. I. 506.



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661

Extracts from the diaries of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the weeks ending respectively, the 5th and 19th February 1905.

Bushire.

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25. February 2nd. - The case in which Khaled bin Khamis, a Koweit subject and a pilot in the service of the British India Steam Navigation Company, was accused in June last of having wounded with a knife Ghulam Ali, a Persian negro, has been settled by payment of a fine of Rs. 200. The case was tried by the Karguzar (Persian Foreign Office Agent) Bushire in the presence of a representative from this Residency and the Karguzar's decision was communicated to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who authorised him to settle it as he proposed. The Turkish Vice-Consul tried to intervene early in the case on the alleged ground that Khaled, being a Koweiti, was a Turkish subject, but his pretensions were not allowed.


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Bunder Abbas.


8. February 7th. His Majesty's Consul and Assistant Resident visited Hormuz, Larak, Henjam and returned to Bunder Abbas today.

At

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At Hormuz the Kalantar or Persian Governor of the island called upon Lieutenant Shakespear and consulted him with regard to the disposal of the relics of a Koweit dhow and cargo which had recently been wrecked on the island and saved by the Kalantar's men. The owner and Nakhoda were Koweit and Maskat subjects respectively, and out of a crew of 17, eight men had been drowned. The Deputy Governor of Bunder Abbas had sent a message to the Kalantar directing him on no account to permit the Customs authorities to remove the salvaged property.


Contrary messages came from the Customs Director, and subsequently a number of tufangchis arrived and had evidently been instructed to remove the goods by force.


His Majesty's Consul accordingly refrained from any intervention, but informed those concerned that, in the event of any complaint being received from Koweit or Maskat subjects in regard to the salvaged goods now to be removed, the Customs Department would be held responsible.

In the evening Lieutenant Shakespear left for Larak island.

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Minute Paper.

Register No. 2747

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated 16 March 1905.
Rec. 17

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	17 March	[illegible]	Koweit.
Secretary of State	17	[illegible]	Status of Koweit Arabs in Persia.
Committee	18	[illegible]	Action of Persian Govt. was result of Turkish protest. As to view of Foreign Powers of status of Koweit.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
2737.

Sent to India.
For information.


A protest made here on 18 Jan by the Turkish Ambassador was not communicated to us by the FO till the 14th Instant. The it was referred to in the telegram to Sir A Hardinge of 9 Feb.

Secret Pol Corr'ce., 21 MAR 1905


(2737/05)
(2616/05)

Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.

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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x00008b



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No. 2737

RECEIVED 17 MAR 1905 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

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
The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copies of a telegram, as marked in the margin, relating to the Status of Kowcit Arabs in Persia.


Hardinge No. 33 March 16, 1905.

Foreign Office,

March 16, 1905.

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Cypher. Sir A. Hardinge Teheran. R 10.55 a.m. 4.30 P.m. March, 16, 1905.

No 33.

Your Telegrams Nos 7 and 17.


Status of Koweit Arabs.


M. Naus having informed me that directions issued to Customs Department were due to orders of Mushir-ed-Dowleh, I spoke to latter in the sense of Your Lordships instructions. He said that action taken was the result of protest by Turkish Government against the interference of Resident in Koweit cases at Bushire and enquiries of Persian Embassy at Constantinople: but he seemed willing to admit that Koweit was de facto independent of Turkey and promised to submit for Shah's consideration my proposal to treat its subjects on the same line as Afghans.

He asked, but I evaded a direct reply, what view other foreign Powers took of its status which makes me think that he may consult other Representatives for instance French & German before giving me a definite reply.

Addressed to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent to India.

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Minute Paper.

Register No. [2737] 540

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India No. 8 M. Dated 23 Feb. 14, 15 March. 1905.
Letter from F.O. 14 & 15 March. (2737) Rec. 14 & 15 March.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15 March	MK	Koweit.
Secretary of State	16	as	Interference by Belgian Customs officials of the Persian Govt. with Koweit subjects and property. Report by Major Cox. As to jurisdiction of Turkey and Persia in the Shatt-el-Arab. Treatment of Koweitis in Persia. Turkish representation regarding British protection of Koweitis.
Committee	16	5/13.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
2616 1247/05
2664 40/06

Copy to India (2737)
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
The conclusion as to the division of jurisdiction in the Shatt el Arab between Turkey & Persia is similar to that arrived at here in 1896, when the question as to the right of Turkey to search for arms &c. was under discussion

Secret Pol. Corr'ce., 21 MAR. 1905 (with 2737)


COPY TO INDIA (2737) 17 March 5
SECRET REGY'S No 11.

TH 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1156.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 11, dated Bushire, the 14th January 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of this office telegram, dated 22nd September, and with reference to the communications from the Foreign Department detailed in the margin, I have the honour to submit details of those cases of interference by Belgian Customs officials with Koweit subjects or property, which are up to now unsettled or may be regarded as still being a source of irritation at Koweit.

Telegram from Foreign with Viceroy, dated the 1st December 1904.
Foreign Department endorsement No. 4209-E.B., dated the 15th December 1904.
Foreign Department endorsement No. 115-E.B., dated the 9th January 1904.

2. I am as yet unable to report further regarding the incident which recently took place at Fao, in which the Agent for the care of Sheikh Mubarek's property there was involved, as His Britannic Majesty's Consul has not been able to conclude the further investigation and report which I am expecting from him. The Political Agent at Koweit has at the same time been away in camp in co-operation with Mr. J. G. Lorimer, so that he has not been available for obtaining further information.

3. I now append separate précis of the detailed facts of six cases numbered respectively (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), (*f*), and (*g*). The first four of these have already been briefly dealt with in paragraph 2 of despatch No. 230, dated 8th December, from the Government of India, to the Secretary of State for India, of which a copy was forwarded to me under Foreign Department endorsement No. 4209-E.B.

I will briefly comment on the items in detail:—

(*a*) This case was mentioned to Government incidentally in this office letter No. 203 of 2nd July 1904, and remains in *statu quo*, the Customs having refused to refund the fine imposed.

In reference to it Sheikh Mubarek addressed me a long complaint, in the course of which he wrote:—

> "We cannot endure this treatment, and your sense of what is right will surely not permit that those who are under your protection shall suffer in this way. If you afford us relief you will do us honour, and for such actions your great Government is noted. If you neglect to do so and if this tyranny is not put a stop to, then we must seek some other state of things which will relieve us of it. At present all my subjects who travel for trade are in a state of terror."


I had to inform the Sheikh on 6th July that the Customs had refused to comply with my representations and that I was still not unmindful of the matter, but had had to report it to the Government of India for orders.

(*b*) This case was only just alluded to in paragraph 3 of my letter No. 203 before mentioned, and was reported to be "still under correspondence." Its further developments have been most unsatisfactory and have resulted in much hardship to the Nakhoda of the dhow in question, who appears to deserve substantial compensation both for the loss of his goods and for the harassing protraction of his case over a period of six months.

(*c*) Requires no special comment here, as the Government of India have already expressed their opinion on it, and there has since been no further development.

4087 F. D.

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(*d*) The same remarks apply to this case also, which is at present under reference to the Persian Government.

(*e*) This is the case of the Pilot Khalid. I last addressed the Government of India on the subject in this office letter No. 254, dated 13th August.

The Persian Government having been silent on the matter for some five months, I thought that on receiving their Karguzar's report they had wisely decided to let the matter die a natural death. Such probably was the case. But realising perhaps from Reuter's telegram of 13th November regarding the withdrawal of our Agent at Koweit, that we were not prepared to take up a strong position in regard to Sheikh Mubarek, they have within the last few days begun to interest themselves again in the case. I hope, however, that I may be able to settle it locally with the Karguzar without the necessity of troubling higher authority with it again.

(*f*) This is the case to which the Government of India have alluded at the end of paragraph 6 of their despatch No. 230 above mentioned, and have decided not to press it. I am not sure, however, whether, when they arrived at this decision, this office letter No. 397, dated 20th November, had been considered.

It is common report at Mohammerah and Bussorah, that these 28 rifles were intended for the Nakib of Bussorah, but I quite understand the difficulty of pressing a case in which the arms, even if not bound for Persia, were evidently being smuggled. It will be noted, however, from the précis of the case appended and from Captain Trevor's observations at the end of paragraph 3 of his letter No. 397, that there were also innocent goods on board belonging to Bahrein and Koweit subjects, who had shipped them in the ordinary way, and that these have been included in the confiscation.

The case of these unoffending persons seems to deserve independent consideration, and the principle governing the seizure of their merchandise has been referred to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran whose decision is awaited.

Foreign Department telegram No. 4207-E.B., dated 15th December 1904, regarding the boundaries of jurisdiction on the Shatt-el-Arab, refers to this case. I still await information on this point from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, who I think has been away from head-quarters. I have sent him a reminder on the subject.

Mr. McDonall writes, from a Mohammerah point of view, that there appears to be nothing definitely laid down, but that in practice Sheikh Khazzal accepts the view that the deep channel used by the largest steamers represents the dividing line of jurisdiction.


I will report separately on this question as soon as all available material is to hand.

(*g*) Alleged confiscation of some merchandize belonging to a Koweit subject from a Persian dhow.

This case has not hitherto been reported to Government, and at present sufficiently strong evidence has not been obtained to make it any use approaching the Customs in the matter or to ask the Government of India to take any action in regard thereto.

4. Apart from the cases of Koweit subjects with the Persian Customs, and reverting to the original inquiry made in the telegram from Foreign with Viceroy, dated 1st December, I am led to believe that Sheikh Mubarek is, generally speaking, a good deal aggrieved by alleged oppression of Koweit dhows in matters of quarantine at Bussorah, but until I receive details from the Political Agent at Koweit on his return from camp, I am not in a position to submit a satisfactory report in this connection, and beg leave to postpone it. I believe that this grievance is not a very pressing one at the present time.

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CASE (a).

Seizure of a Koweit dhow owned by Yusuf and Abdulla bin Abdul Kader, by the S.S. "Muzaffer".

MARCH 1904.

In March 1904, the Residency Agent, Lingah, reported that the Persian Customs Revenue Steamer *Muzaffer* had brought in tow a boat under Turkish colours which she had overtaken opposite Chiroo; that the boat belonged to the Koweit subjects above mentioned and was commanded by Nakhoda Rashid bin Freh; that she had shipped "chandals" (rafters) at Kuran (on the island of Kishm) for Koweit; that as the Nakhoda could not produce a Customs pass for the chandals the Director of Customs, who was on board the *Muzaffer*, wished to search the boat for contraband; that finding it inconvenient to carry out a search in the open sea, the Director had ordered the vessel to be taken in tow in spite of the protests of the Nakhoda who had nothing contraband on board; that on arrival at Lingah the boat was searched, and in spite of the fact that no contraband articles were found on board the Nakhoda was fined 100 tomans ostensibly for not possessing the Customs papers for his cargo; the Nakhoda stated that the papers were with the owner of the cargo at Kishm and wrote to him for the same. He then applied to the Turkish Consular Agent for assistance, and the latter approached the Director-General, but without success, so that in order to avoid unlimited detention the Nakhoda paid 100 tomans and eventually got his boat released. The papers were ultimately produced and the fine was reduced to 25 tomans.

The Chief of Koweit, who had meanwhile been petitioned by the Nakhoda, addressed the Resident on 31st March 1904, strongly protesting against the action of the Belgian Customs Administration.

The Director-General was then addressed on the subject, and in reply declared that the vessel was seized between the island of Keis and the mainland, and that she was fined 25 tomans as the Nakhoda did not possess the necessary Customs documents.

As it was not known whether the vessel was seized within the 3-mile limit or not, enquiries were made both from Sheikh Mubarek and the Director-General. The former insisted that the boat was seized at sea out of sight of land, whereas the latter stated that it was overtaken in latitude 26° 40′ 30″ N., longitude 54′ 7″ E., between the island of Keis and the mainland. The Director-General refused to refund the fine.

The Resident had then to inform the Sheikh of Koweit that the Director of Customs had refused to yield in any way to our representations and that the case was therefore being represented to the Government of India. Mention of it was included in the Resident's letter No. 203, dated 2nd July 1904, to the address of the Foreign Secretary.

CASE (b).

Detention of Koweit dhow of Nakhoda Mubarak bin Khalifa at Shivoh.


Seizure of 20 bags of wheat and the jolly boat of the vessel which has since been destroyed while in hands of Customs.

MAY AND JUNE 1904.

This dhow which is the property of a Koweit subject, named Yusuf bin Munis, left Koweit with a cargo of dates and wheat on or about the 14th May 1904.

On arrival at Shivoh (near Lingah), the first port at which she called, the Customs Mudir there demanded of the Nakhoda a Customs pass for his cargo. The Nakhoda explained that as he came from Koweit he possessed no such paper, but that he held a certificate from Sheikh Mubarek to the effect that both dhow and cargo were from Koweit. The Mudir refused to accept this

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and declared that the wheat was doubtless fraudulently shipped from some Persian port and accordingly seized 20 bags of it. After detaining the boat for about 5 days the Mudir gave the Nakhoda a letter on the Customs Director at Lingah; the Nakhoda carried this to the addressee who took the same view as his subordinate at Shivoh and added that the vessel must await the decision of the Customs Inspector who was expected to arrive shortly; or, if the Nakhoda did not choose to wait, must land all his cargo. After a couple of days the Inspector arrived, and declined to acknowledge the authenticity of the Sheikh's letter, told the Nakhoda that he would refer the matter to Bushire and that pending orders from there he and his vessel would be detained.

The Nakhoda finding that although he had been detained about three weeks he had failed to get any definite reply and being unable to afford to waste any more time lest he should lose his chance of selling his dates, left the 20 bags at the Customs House and sailed for the Arab Coast to dispose of the rest of his cargo, which he found was rotting. At the same time he sent a petition representing the matter to Sheikh Mubarek. The latter on receiving the Nakhoda's complaint wrote to this Residency under date the 22nd June protesting against the action of the Customs authorities and enclosing a Customs Jowaz obtained from the Persian Port of Mashoor whence the wheat had been originally imported into Koweit.

The Director-General of Customs was addressed on the subject by this Residency and was asked to state on what grounds the wheat had been confiscated and whether he could see his way to release it. In reply, the Director-General stated that he was writing to Lingah for particulars. He subsequently wrote on the 16th July that as the Nakhoda had declared that the wheat had been shipped at a Persian Port, but had failed to produce the necessary Customs pass, 20 bags wheat had been taken charge of as a security pending production of the necessary papers: that before the matter had been definitely settled, the Nakhoda had left in his dhow without giving any notice, and that therefore he had directed the sub-offices to seize the Nakhoda on his arrival. He concluded by enquiring whether he was bound to furnish any explanation to the Residency on behalf of Koweit subjects. He was informed that as the Nakhoda was a Koweit subject, the Resident considered he was entitled to give the man his Consular good offices.

About the same time the Government of India were addressed with a view to ascertaining how far British protection was to be extended to Koweit subjects, and it was suggested that the Chief of Koweit might be advised to use a distinctive flag for Koweit boats.


Meanwhile on the 5th July the Residency Agent at Lingah reported that the dhow in question had been seized with her Nakhoda at Mokam by the Customs authorities. The Nakhoda was subsequently released through the intervention of the Zabit of Mokam and left in his boom for Koweit, but his jolly boat was detained.

After a good deal of correspondence, Monsieur Waffelaert ultimately wrote that in view of a promise he had made to the Resident he was "prepared to be completely lenient towards the above Nakhoda, and as an exceptional case release the 20 bags of wheat in question" and that they were at the disposal of the owner. He appeared to be under an impression that the Nakhoda's jolly boat had been restored to him. This, however, on reference to Lingah proved to be incorrect and the jolly boat was found to have been wrecked while under detention of the Customs at Mokam.

This case had now dragged on till the end of November, and on December 3rd the question of compensation for the loss of the jolly boat was broached to the Director-General, but he replied on 7th December refusing to entertain it and declined to correspond further with the Residency in regard to Koweit subjects.

The bags of wheat have not yet been taken over by the owner and are no doubt spoilt long ere this, so that the owner has lost both his jolly boat and his 20 bags of wheat. Probable value in all about Rs. 300.

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5

CASE (*c*).

Detention and search of a dhow belonging to Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit named the "Muselim."

SEPTEMBER 1904.

Sheikh Mubarak having heard that his boat named *Muselim*, which habitually plies between Koweit and Fao on his own business, had been stopped, detained and searched by a boat from the Persian Customs steamer *Muzaffer* about the middle of September 1904, wrote to the Political Agent, Koweit, strongly protesting against the action of the *Muzaffer*. The Political Agent in forwarding the Sheikh's complaint stated that the feeling in Koweit itself was very bitter against the Belgian officials of the Persian Customs owing to this incident and the seizure of Koweit boats in the Shatt-el-Arab and might lead to retaliation. He also stated that the men for the *Muzaffer* were in the habit of firing ball cartridges at random when stopping a boat and had done so in this case.

The case was represented to the Director-General of Customs, Bushire, who, after some letters had been exchanged with this office, replied, under date 3rd November 1904, that the *Muzaffer* "has detained many 'booms and bellums,' but has never kept them longer than it was necessary for searching the inside of the craft". He added that "the Commander of our boat does not recollect anything particular about the boom *Muselim*, but the mere fact of the crews shouting out that the vessel belonged to Sheikh Mubarak was not sufficient to prove that the boat did not carry contraband goods".

No satisfaction was obtained and the matter was, therefore, reported to the Government of India in this office letter No. 395 of 20th November 1904.

CASE (*d*).

Detention of the Koweit Dhow "Teysir" by the S.S. "Muzaffer" in the Shatt-el-Arab. Seizure of arms found in her and imposition of fine on her Nakhoda.

SEPTEMBER 1904.

News reached Bushire from Mohammerah in the middle of September 1904 that the Persian Customs Steamer *Muzaffer* had been searching all sailing vessels going up the Shatt-el-Arab for arms without reference to the Chief of Mohammerah in whose jurisdiction the operations were conducted. The Chief was greatly exercised at these proceedings and sent a complaint to the Persian Minister of the Interior.


On the 23rd September His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, reported that His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, had sent to him the owner of a Koweit boat named *Teysir*, Nakhoda Ali bin Muhammed Mubarak, which had been seized by the *Muzaffer* for having 12 rifles and 1,200 cartridges on board.

The owner stated that the vessel was bound for Sibiliyat near Bussorah to load dates, and the arms and ammunition had been taken on board at Koweit for protection against pirates in the Shatt-el-Arab and the villages between Ras-el-Had and Fartag; that the arms had not been concealed; that the vessel had no intention of communicating with Persian territory; that while she was tacking up the river off the Turkish fort at Fao, she met boats from the *Muzaffer* and was seized.

On His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, representing the case to the Director-General of Customs, he stated that the rifles were concealed and new, with full complement of cartridges and that *as the importation of arms was prohibited in Turkey as well as Persia, it was immaterial whither they were bound.*

He suggested that, as it would take some time to settle the case and a reference would have to be made to Tehran, the owner may pay a fine of

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double the value of the rifles under protest and get his vessel released. The owner, under the advice of the Consul, adopted the suggested course and paid Krans 8,000.

Sheikh Mubarak on hearing of the proceedings of the *Muzaffer* made a complaint to the Resident through the Political Agent, Koweit, and the matter is before the Government of India, who are in communication with His Majesty's Legation, Tehran. The Wali of Bussorah has protested to the Persian Government against Persian gunboats stopping and searching vessels in the Shatt-el-Arab proceeding to Bussorah.

The Government of India decided (*vide* telegram No. 83-C., dated 28th November 1904) to represent case to the Persian Government on the grounds that the arms were evidently for the defence of the dhow.

Still pending.

CASE (*f*).

Seizure of a Koweit dhow, Nakhoda Ghanum, by the S.S. "Muzaffer" in the Shatt-el-Arab, for having 28 rifles on board. Subsequent confiscation of dhow and imprisonment of Nakhoda and confiscation of innocent goods.

SEPTEMBER 1904.

About the middle of September 1904 the Persian Customs steamer *Muzaffer* while searching sailing vessels for arms near the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab came across a Koweit boat commanded by Nakhoda Ghanum and seized it for having 28 rifles concealed on board.

She was brought up to Mohammerah, where the Director of Customs offered to release her on receiving a fine of Krans 18,000 which he said could be paid under protest. As the fine demanded was more than the value of the boat, which was, moreover, mortgaged, the owner could not accept the terms.

The Director-General of Customs, Arabistan, then wired to the Director-General of Customs, Bushire, who went up to Mohammerah in the Persian gunboat *Persepolis* and brought the Koweit boat in tow to Bushire, the *Muzaffer* following.

At Bushire Nakhoda Ghanum was at first placed under ordinary detention, but later on consigned to a room in the Government House set apart for prisoners. He was then approached by a Customs representative with a suggestion that if he signed a paper making over his boat to the Customs, he would be released. Before complying with the suggestion, he communicated with the Residency through his head priest and was advised not to do so pending receipt of a reply to a reference which was being made to the Government of India—*vide* Captain Trevor's telegram dated 11th November 1904.

Meanwhile, on the 12th November, orders were received by the local Customs authorities to definitely confiscate the boat, together with all her cargo and confine the Nakhoda pending payment of the fine.

The dhow was put up to auction on 26th November, but no buyer came forward and she still remains unsold. The Nakhoda was released as nothing more could be got out of him and returned to Koweit on the 7th December.

Four bundles canvas and some skins belonging to Bahrein and Koweit subjects which were shipped quite innocently in this boat for Bussorah were confiscated and sold for the benefit of the Persian Government, the endeavours of this Residency to get the Director-General of Customs to release them proving unavailing. The case was reported to the Government of India in this office letter No. 397, dated 20th November 1904.


CASE (*g*).

Alleged confiscation of goods belonging to a Koweit subject, Yusuf-el-Haris, found in Persian dhow.

AUGUST 1904.

In August 1904 the Chief of Koweit sent to the Resident a complaint from Yusuf-el-Haris, one of his subjects, to the effect that the Persian Customs

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7

Revenue Steamer *Muzaffer* overtook a Persian sailing vessel off Maghoo (near Lingah) which had among her cargo 20 cases vermicelli and one case containing 17 compasses and 6 yards broad-cloth on board for him, examined the vessel's cargo, demanded a Customs pass which not being forthcoming 1 case vermicelli and the case of compasses and broad-cloth were removed from her. Yusuf stated that the goods were consigned to him from Karachi in a Bahrein boat and were to be transhipped at Bahrein for Koweit, but that on the Nakhoda of the Bahrein boat finding near Basidu a Persian boat bound for Koweit, they were transhipped to her at sea. It was after this transhipment that the *Muzaffer* met the boat bound for Koweit. The Nakhoda of this dhow is a resident of Koweit, but a Persian subject, as also were the crew.

On the matter being represented by the Residency to the Director-General of Customs, Bushire, he replied as follows:—


"On the 1st July last, on our way to Cherek, we came across a big boat flying the Persian flag. Having stopped the boat we learned that it belonged to Haji Mahomed Dilomy. From the statements which Khalifa bin Abdulla, the nephew of the said Haji Mahomed, made in reply to my* questions, it resulted that the boat came from Khamir, a Persian port, near Bunder Abbas, where she had been to sell her cargo of wheat and barley. The Nakhoda declared now to have on board 20 cases vermicelli and 13 bags dried beans shipped at Khamir for Dilom. In searching the boat we found the statement regarding the quantity of the goods correct. To my demand to produce the Customs Cabotage Jowaz, the Nakhoda replied that the documents were sent to Dilom by post. This kind of proceeding appearing to me very strange, I demanded that two cases vermicelli and one bag beans should be deposited as a guarantee with us and to be released on presentation of the necessary documents. As to the box of 17 compasses and 6 yards broad-cloth, we did not see any of them on board the said boat."

* Moses Khan, Armenian assistant.


The above answer was communicated to the Political Agent, Koweit, who informed Sheikh Mubarak of it. Sheikh Mubarak thereupon sent the Nakhoda of the vessel and Yusuf-el-Haris to the Political Agent, who took down their statements. The Nakhoda declared that the *Muzaffer* confiscated the boxes containing vermicelli, broad-cloth and compasses, but his unsupported statement alone will not be accepted by the Customs, and although endeavours have since been made to obtain corroboration from the crew of the vessel and from the Nakhoda of the Bahrein vessel from which the goods were transhipped, so far we have been unable to find them, and Yusuf-el-Haris was not himself present when the goods were transhipped.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4087 F. D.—27-1-05.—49—W. G. B.

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No. 89, dated Bushire, the 29th January (received 7th February) 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—S. M. Fraser, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In Foreign Department telegram No. 4207-E. B., dated 15th December 1904, in connection with the confiscation of a Koweit Dhow by the Persian Customs, I was instructed to report the existing practice as to the division of jurisdiction on the Shatt-el-Arab and as to the powers exercised by the riparian authorities over non-Persian and non-Turkish subjects.

2. In reply I have the honour to attach copies of communications received on the subject from His Majesty's Consuls at Bussorah and Mohammerah.

3. According to personal conclusions to which both officers have been brought, it seems that usage, or supposition based on incidents that have occurred, recognises the deep water channel used by steamers as the dividing line, but it will be understood that the point is one with regard to which specific inquiries from local authorities has not been desirable, and it seems probable that if the issue were actually raised, Turkey would and could reasonably claim, under article 2 of the Treaty of Erzeroum, to exercise jurisdiction over the whole river, excepting only the anchorage outside Mohammerah Town. If half the river, opposite that part of the eastern bank occupied by Persian tribes, had been then claimed by Persia, they would not have been under the necessity of stipulating for the special concession granted them under the terms of Article 2, of liberty of navigation from the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab to the point of contact of the two frontiers.

If, again, we presume half the river opposite the eastern bank occupied by Persian subjects to have been left to Persia, this would have caused the jurisdiction over the river to take the following form when reduced to paper and this surely would have been specially provided for in the Treaty of Erzeroum, whereas only the anchorage at Mohammerah, a natural and necessary reservation, is mentioned therein.

4. Mr. Monahan's observation to the effect that the Turks can exercise no jurisdiction over non-Ottoman vessels in their waters without the usual Consular concurrence would no doubt apply to vessels of civilised powers consularly represented, but so far as the traffic of native craft in the Gulf is concerned, I have no doubt that the Turks would and do exercise jurisdiction over Dhows not flying the flag of any of the said civilised powers.

5. So far as the results of inquiries thus made affect the question of the seizure of Dhows by the Persian Customs, they seem to demonstrate clearly that the action of the Belgian officials in the Shatt-el-Arab cannot be justified diplomatically.


A copy of this letter has not been sent to His Majesty's Legation.

Purport of two communications received from His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, dated the 29th December 1904 and 14th January 1905, respectively.

1. There appears to be no definite rule.

On one occasion when a question arose as to the ownership of a newly found island, it was decided that the channel used by large steamers was the dividing line and the island being on the Persian side of that, was held to be Persian. This was about 20 years ago.

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The Sheikh accepts this and his patrols do not cross the said channel.

2. On the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab the boundary acknowledged is the Khayen creek opposite the lowest end of the long island above Faylieh, *i.e.*, about 5 miles from the embouchure of the Karun. (Admiralty Chart No. 1235.)

3. My impression is that the Turks claim sovereignty over the river. The Treaty of Erzeroum gives the left bank below Mohammerah to Persia and free right of navigation from the sea to the point of contact between the two frontiers.

On the other hand, the question of actual boundaries and kindred problems have never been finally defined or settled diplomatically and there is therefore only local usage to go on and that recognises the deep water channel as the border.

Up to some years back we had constant complaints that Turks had interfered with boats coming to Mohammerah, and when some issue was raised in connection with Fao quarantine, the Turks, I believe, shelved the question by ordering all boats to go to Bussorah to do quarantine there. After this those craft only going to Mohammerah were not interfered with.


No. 2, dated the 21st January 1905.

From—J. H. Monahan, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, Bussorah,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

With reference to your telegram I have the honour to inform you that the centre line of the steamship channel is understood here to divide the Turkish from the Persian jurisdiction, but that Dowasar Island which is Turkish is an exception. The Turkish authorities can exercise no jurisdiction over non-Ottoman vessels in their waters without the usual Consular concurrence.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4579 F. D.—10-2-1906.—57—F. K. E.

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2737

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POLITICAL DEPT.

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
...nfidential.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copies of a telegram, as marked in the margin, relating to the treatment of natives of Koweit in Persia.


...C. Harding
No. 17
...uary, 24, 1905.

Foreign Office,
March, 15th, 1905.


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
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F.O. letter 14 March 05 2737 Mr. 2/16

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RECEIVED IN 15 MAR. 1905 POLITICAL DEPART

ARABIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 18.]

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Musurus Pasha to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received January* 18.)


MUSURUS PACHA présente ses compliments au Marquis de Lansdowne, et a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de sa Seigneurie que, d'après les informations fournies à la Sublime Porte par l'Ambassade Impériale à Téhéran, le Consul Britannique à Bouchir a fait des démarches auprès des autorités de cette dernière ville au sujet de la saisie, par les dites autorités, d'un navire chargé d'articles de contrebande destinés aux habitants de Koueit.

Comme les Agents du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'ont point le droit de couvrir de leur protection les habitants de Koueit, où le *statu quo* doit être observé, conformément à l'entente intervenue, l'Ambassadeur de Turquie vient, sur l'invitation de son Gouvernement, prier le Marquis de Lansdowne de vouloir bien munir le Consul Britannique à Bouchir d'instructions en conséquence.


Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 18 *Janvier*, 1905.


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
Copy Russia 17 March 1905



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INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.
Sir Arthur Godley
If Mr Brodrick has no
objection to the FO draft, I might
perhaps tell the FO that he
concurs, at once, without waiting
for Committee
I agree





Register No. 2662

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O., Dated 20 Feb. 1905.
Rec. 21

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	22 Feb		Persia.
Secretary of State	23		Position of Koweit Arabs in Persia.
Committee			Sir A. Hardinge sounded the Minister of Customs. The latter was understood to say that Persian govt regarded Koweit as independent State.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
2616

Sent to India.

A D.O. from the FO is submitted herewith, enclosing for Mr Brodrick's concurrence, the draft of the reply which Lord Lansdowne proposes to send to Sir A Hardinge's telegram.

There seems no objection to the draft reply. Presumably he does not wish to make the Persian Govt believe that we endorse their view of the independence of Koweit

F.O. W.


Four replies from FO to Sir A Hardinge (Telegram 24 Feb) see No 2737

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
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Y 9955. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.

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
Feb 20. 1905

Dear Ritchie,


I enclose copy of a Tel. from Sir A. Hardinge N°. 16 of Feb. 17. respecting the protection of Koweit Arabs in Persia (Copies will be sent to you officially).

I also enclose the draft of a reply which Lord Lansdowne has

(See No. 273/05)


has approved subject to
the concurrence of the India
Office.
Will you kindly let me
know whether you concur?
Yours very truly
P.P. Maxwell

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000a8


2662

h/. 2616

RECEIVED
21 FEB 1905
POLITICAL DEPT.


Confidential.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copies of a telegram, as marked in the margin, relating to Koweit Arabs in Persia.


Foreign Office,

February, 20, 1905.

Hardinge
No. 16
February 17, 1905



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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CONFIDENTIAL.


Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received February* 17, 11 P.M.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 17, 1905, 4·40 P.M.


KOWEIT. Before sending in note in sense of your telegram No. 7, I sounded Minister of Customs on question. He said that action of Customs was due to orders given them early in December last by Mushir-ed-Dowleh to decline to admit intervention either of British or Turkish Representative on behalf of Koweit Arabs. I understood him to say that Persian Government regarded Koweit as independent State. Under these circumstances, perhaps your Lordship may prefer to reconsider proposed course.

If I can first get an official declaration by Persian Government that they regard Koweit as independent, and then communicate text or substance of Sheikh's Agreement with ourselves, this would strengthen our claim to ask that Koweit Arabs should be treated on same lines as Afghans. Would there be any objection to acquainting Persian Government officially, but, if need be, confidentially, with these arrangements? Should I simply ask for Afghan treatment, they might demand to be officially informed on what ground we claim it.

(Repeated to Bushire and India.)



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Minute Paper.

Register No. 2616

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O.,

Dated — 3 Feby. 1905.

Rec. 9

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	9 Feb	RK
Secretary of State	10	as
Committee		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State		

SUBJECT.

Koweit.

Question of protection of Koweit subjects in Persian territory. Same privileges as have been conceded to Affghans in Persia should be obtained if possible. Instructions to Sir A Hardinge.

Previous Papers:—

29247A

Copy to India.

For information

+ telegram to Viceroy -

Sent + 13.2.05


Seen Pol. Corr'ee. 16 FEB. 1905

COPY TO INDIA 10 Feb 1905 SECRETARY'S No. 6


TH

Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1156.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000ad



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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000ae



DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched + 13th Feby. 1905.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


(Vafrorum)

Your Secret Despatch No. 230 of the 8th December last paragraph 5. Hardinge instructed 9th February endeavour to obtain from Persian Govt. for natives of Koweit same privileges as conceded to Afghans.


Copy to Fo. (P) 26 Feb

Copy to India. (+P) 24 Feb.

13773. I. 2486. 1000.—11/1903.



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000b0



2616

RECEIVED
9 FEB 1905
POLITICAL DEPT.

...fidential.


With reference to the India Office letter of January 12,

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copies of a telegram, as marked in the margin, relating to Koweit Arabs in Persia.


...A. Harding
...o. 7.
...uary, 9. 1905.

Foreign Office,

, 190 .



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000b2



Sir to Sir A. Hardinge. F.O. 1.10 P.M. February, 9, 1905.

No 7.


Your Telegram No 11. (Koweit Arabs in Persia)

[Koweit Arabs in Persia]


We do not consider it advisable to claim natives of Koweit as British protected persons. You should however endeavour to obtain from Persian Government the same privileges as have been conceded to Afghans in Persia viz "That the friendly recommendations and wishes of the British Government on their behalf should be accepted."

Report result by telegraph.

Turkish Ambassador has protested against intervention of His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.



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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000b4



Minute Paper.

Register No. 2247A SECRET DEPARTMENT

Letter from India, No. 230. Dated 8 Dec. 1904. Rec. 24

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	2 Jan	RK	Koweit.
Secretary of State	3	AG	
Committee	5	SJB	Question of protection of Koweit subjects in Persian territory. Recent piracies on Koweit boats. Renewed proposal for a special Koweit flag.
Under Secretary	10	RK	
Secretary of State	10	AG	
	11	SJB.	

Previous Papers:—
1856
1965
124.3/07 d.

Aff. & H.O.

I think the Indian Govt are disposed to go too fast in Koweit.
SJB.
3/1

Yes & they can't allow to defeat themselves object by so doing


It is within H.O. province
Matter for Indian Office
Ans

I would not object to send to Admty
to enquiries to that


Copy to India
13 January 1905
TH Secy to

Y 9933. 2000—6/1904. I. 1130.

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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000b5



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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
INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

I would not mention afghanistan as there is no analogy between our protectorate over afghanistan, so long as we control the foreign relations of the amir, and kuweit in regard to which we have admitted turkish suzerainty. Therefore I do not sign.


W. Lee

Jan. 10. 1905


المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000b7



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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
المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754162.0x0000b9



taken up by H. M.'s Govt. in
your letter above referred to.

It appears to Mr. Brodrick
that, though natives of Koweit
cannot be regarded as British
protected persons or be justiciable
by the British Consular tribunals
in Persia, ~~there would be no~~
~~objection to claiming~~ for them
in Persia the same privileges
as have been conceded to
Afghans in Persia, viz. that
"the friendly recommendations

it is for consideration
whether we should
claim /



wishes of the British Govt. on
their behalf "should be
accepted".


With regard to the question
of the flag raised in the
7th paragraph of the Govt. of India
letter, Mr. Brodrick wishes to
place his views with
Lord Lansdowne's views.

The present proposal differs
to Mr. Brodrick to be distinct
from that which was negatived
by Lord Lansdowne in your
letter of 24th Sept. 1901.


(Sd.) Godley

Should this principle be recognised
by the Persian Govt., the question of
a claim to compensation being
pressed in particular cases on behalf
of aggrieved natives of Koweit might
then be considered.

(2366/02)



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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2247A

No. 230 of 1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPT. 24 DEC 1904

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 8th December 1904.*

SIR,

We have the honour to address you regarding our relations with Koweit with special reference to the question of the protection which His Majesty's Government are prepared to grant to subjects of the Sheikh in Persian territory.

2. The question is one which has been brought into prominence by the action of the Customs Department of the Persian Government, whose officious activity has recently produced a series of incidents which have roused a strong popular feeling at Koweit, and appear to be dictated by a deliberate policy to destroy our prestige and influence with the Arabs of the western shore of the Gulf. The details of these occurrences are narrated in the enclosures of this despatch, and their principal features may be briefly stated :—


(*a*) In April 1904, Mons. Dambrain, then Director-General of Customs at Bushire, while cruising in the "Muzaffari" overhauled a Koweit dhow which he apparently suspected of carrying arms. The vessel, which was stopped out of sight of land, was taken to Lingah, where her cargo was found on examination to be innocent. She was detained, however, for some days, and was not finally released until her master had been fined a sum of 25 tomans for an alleged technical breach of Customs regulations.

(*b*) In June one Mubarak-bin-Khalifa was detained with his vessel for eight days at Sheivah and twenty-one days at Lingah on suspicion of an alleged offence against the Customs. Pending an investigation of the charge, he was required to surrender, as security, a part of his cargo, and eventually, rather than incur further delay, abandoned this portion of his freight, and left with his vessel for Koweit.

(*c*) In the same month a vessel of Sheikh Mubarak's, the "Mussallim", sailing between Koweit and Fao with a cargo of wood and dates, was fired on and held up for search by Belgian Customs officials in the Shat-el-Arab.

(*d*) In September a Koweit vessel, the "Teyser", bound for Basrah, was seized in the Shat-el-Arab by the Customs ship "Muzaffari", and was only released on payment of a fine of twice the value of each of twelve rifles which were declared by the master to be carried for purposes of defence against pirates, a statement which was not improbably true.

(*e*) In June a Koweit subject, employed by the British India Steam Navigation Company as a pilot for their mail steamers, was accused of having committed an assault on a Negro at Bushire. The Political Resident wished to use his good offices on behalf of the accused, but the Turkish Consular Agent claimed to defend him, on the ground that he was a Turkish subject.




The matter was referred to Tehran, where Sir Arthur Hardinge arranged that the case should be removed to the Court of the Foreign Office Agent or Karguzar, so as to allow of a representative of the British Consulate-General attending at the trial. In agreeing to this course, however, the Persian Government expressly intimated that their consent was based on the British nationality of the Arab's employment, and abstained from committing themselves to an acceptance of either the British or Turkish view as to the international status of Koweit. Mention of this incident has been added, as the issue involved is the same, though the case is of a somewhat different character to those preceding, and we do not propose any further action in regard to it.

3. The present is not the first occasion on which the question of the status of Koweit subjects has come under review. The point was raised in 1900 in connection with the importation of certain arms into Persia by a merchant said to be a subject of the Sheikh. Our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was then informed by Lord Lansdowne that Koweit was not under formal British protection, though we had promised the Sheikh our good offices; that natives of Koweit could not be claimed as British protected persons, nor would they be justiciable by British Consular Tribunals in Persia. It was added that interference to protect any Koweit subject was undesirable, and that action on the part of the Resident was unnecessary until he was appealed to, but that endeavours should be made to ascertain the facts as to the man's nationality and the Sheikh's wishes as to resisting Turkish claims to jurisdiction over him.

4. In the recent cases we are left in no doubt as to the nationality of the affected parties or as to the wishes of Sheikh Mubarak, who has requested our assistance in formal and strongly worded communications addressed to our Political Agent at Koweit. We have not overlooked the fact that His Majesty's Government have intimated that they are not prepared to declare a formal protectorate over the Sheikh's territories, and have even admitted that Koweit is within the Turkish Empire. The latter pronouncement, however, was accompanied by the important qualification that the authority of the Sublime Porte is of an entirely unsubstantial character, and that in fact the Chief enjoys a large measure of practical independence. By his engagement of the 23rd January 1899, the Sheikh virtually placed the conduct of his external relations in our hands, and he now naturally looks to the British Government to assist his subjects when in trouble with officials of the Persian Government. In 1905 he was formally assured of British protection against an attack on Koweit, and he has repeatedly been informed that His Majesty's Government will lend him their good offices, so long as he adheres to their advice. The visit of His Excellency Lord Curzon, in December 1903, was regarded as a further declaration of our intention to protect and befriend him; while the recent appointment of a British Agent to reside at Koweit or, as we now understand from your recent telegrams, to pay periodical visits to Koweit, has led the Sheikh and his subjects to expect a larger measure of support than they have hitherto received. We feel strongly that it is incumbent upon us to assist him to the utmost of our powers, and that failure to do so must lead not only to a complete loss of the influence which we have acquired over the Sheikh who plainly warns us that he will be obliged to seek other relief if we are unable to put a stop to Persian tyranny over his sea-faring subjects, but also to a serious decline of our prestige throughout both the Arabian and Persian coasts of the Gulf. The prospect of the latter result is one which, in view of the evident designs of other Powers in these regions, we could not regard with equanimity.

5. The repudiation of Turkish pretensions to treat as subjects of the Sublime Porte natives of Koweit territory is no new thing. In 1902, in connection with the "Lapwing" incident, His Majesty's Consul at Basrah directly challenged a claim to this effect preferred by the Wali of Basrah. But fortunately, in connection with the present cases, it is unnecessary to raise this issue with the Turkish authorities, or to take any action which need bring us into direct conflict with the Porte at a moment when, we understand, His Majesty's Government are anxious to avoid complications in that quarter. All

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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


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that is required is that we should arrive at an understanding with the Persian Government as to the status of subjects of the Sheikh within the dominions of the Shah, but this is a point as to which we hold that our relations with the Sheikh and his direct demand for our protection no longer permit the attitude of the British Government to remain undefined. So far, it will be observed from the correspondence of which we have the honour to enclose copies, the local officials of the Persian Customs Department have declined to admit the right of our representatives to intervene on behalf of Koweit subjects. We suggest that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should now be authorised to explain to the Persian Government that we claim recognition of Koweitans as British protected persons. Should the Shah's Ministers question our pretension, they might be informed of the terms of our agreement concluded with the Sheikh in 1899, and it might be pointed out that our right to intervene, by virtue of similar treaties, on behalf of subjects of the Trucial Chiefs, has already been recognised and acted upon. At the least, it might be required that Koweitans should be entitled to the same privileges as Afghan subjects in Persia, on whose behalf it has been arranged that "the friendly recommendations and wishes of the British Government should be accepted".

6. As regards the specific incidents which have made it necessary to raise the general question, we consider that in cases (*a*) and (*b*), in the absence of satisfactory explanation by the Customs Department, there is good ground for a claim to compensation. In respect of (*c*), we think that the Sheikh is clearly entitled to an apology; while as regards (*d*), without entering into the question of the doubtful claim of the Persian Government to exercise a right of search on the waters of the Shat-el-Arab—against this we understand that the Porte have already entered a protest at Tehran—we hold that, in the particular instance, their action was entirely unjustified, inasmuch as the vessel in question was bound not for a Persian, but for a Turkish port, while the confiscated arms may reasonably be taken to have been required for purposes of self-protection. The insecurity of the Shat-el-Arab is notorious; we have recently had occasion to urge that representations should be made to the Persian Government regarding a grave outrage on a British vessel in the estuary; and we understand that the Persian Government have themselves lately admitted the propriety of native craft carrying arms in these waters. In this case also, therefore, we would press for pecuniary amends. The Persian Government may rest assured of our anxiety to check the traffic in arms, but, even assuming that their proceedings were directed solely to the repression of illicit trade, and were in no way inspired by a desire to harass a *protégé* of the British Government, we are unable to countenance high-handed action, such as that of the Persian Customs officials in the present instance. We have purposely abstained from mention of the further case in which a vessel sailing from Koweit was admittedly found to have concealed on board 28 rifles, in respect of which suspicions may reasonably exist that they were contraband, whether intended for a Turkish or Persian destination.

7. It will be observed that, in connection with this subject, Major Cox has raised the question of the flag flown by Koweit vessels. The matter was considered in 1901, and it was then decided that, in view of the objections which the Sublime Porte might raise to any change as involving a disturbance of the *status quo*, it was preferable to abstain from advising the adoption of another flag. We agree with the Resident, however, that there would be a distinct advantage if Koweit ships hoisted a distinctive ensign, and, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, we would propose to approach the Sheikh on the subject. Should the Sheikh agree to the proposal, and should the Porte hereafter raise objections, we would point out that we have an agreement with the Chief whereby we are entitled to search Koweit craft for contraband arms, and that being desirous of avoiding any risk of detaining a Turkish ship by mistake for a Koweit vessel—a very possible contingency if both fly the same flag—we had recommended the Sheikh to adopt distinctive colours for shipping purposes, while retaining his present flag for use in Koweit.



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
8. We are forwarding a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

We have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your most obedient, humble servants,

Amptill

E. H. Law.


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A. Z. Arundell
H. Erle Richards
J. P. Hewett



List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 230 (External), dated the 8th December 1904, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
1	Telegram, dated the 30th June 1904.	From Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Reported the occurrence at Basrah of a case of assault on a Persian subject by a Koweit Arab employed as a pilot for steamers by the British India Steam Navigation Company.
2	Telegram No. 2214 E.-A., dated the 9th July 1904.	To ditto ditto ...	Instructed to furnish the Government of India with a copy of the reply received from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.
3	Letter No. 208, dated the 3rd July 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	In compliance with above instructions, furnished the required information.
4	Letter No. 203, dated the 2nd July 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported two incidents connected with interference with Koweit dhows by the Persian Belgian Customs officials, and requested instructions on the subject of the grant of good offices to Koweitis. Also suggested the adoption by the Sheikh of Koweit of a distinctive device for his flag.
5	Letter No. 254, dated the 13th August 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Forwarded a copy of the report submitted to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, on the subject of the trial of the Koweit Arab pilot for assault on a Persian subject.
6	Telegram, dated the 13th September 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported the arrival of a Persian Customs steamship at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab in search of contraband.
7	Telegram, dated the 18th September 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported that the Director-General, Persian Customs, Bushire, in the "Persipolis" had joined the "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab.
8	Telegram No. 3136 E.-A., dated the 21st September 1904.	To Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.	Referred to above communications, and asked whether visit of the Bushire Director-General of Customs did not constitute a direct violation of the arrangement between the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.
9	Telegram, dated the 24th September 1904.	From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported return to Bushire of the "Persipolis" and the "Muzafferi" with a Koweit dhow in tow.
10	Telegram, dated the 27th September 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported further details connected with the object of the visit of the Persian vessels "Persipolis" and "Muzafferi" to the Shat-el-Arab.
11	Telegram No. 162, dated the 30th September 1904.	From Mr. E. Grant Duff, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.	Intimated action taken with respect to visit of the "Muzafferi" to the Shat-el-Arab.
12	Telegram, dated the 30th September 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Repeated report received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah that Sheikh had not refused to lend his steamboat.
13	Letter No. 332, dated the 24th September 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Forwarded copies of communications received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, reporting the dissatisfaction of the Sardar Arfa with the Customs arrangements in Arabistan, and his objection to the despatch to the Shat-el-Arab, without his permission, of the Customs steamer "Muzafferi."


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Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
14	Extracts	From the diary of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf for the week ending the 24th September 1904.	Proceedings of the Persian vessels "Persipolis" and "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab and their returns to Bushire with a Koweit dhow.
15	Letter No. 336, dated the 24th September 1904.	From the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Forwarded a report from the Political Agent, Koweit, regarding the seizure of Koweit dhows by the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi".
16	Telegram, dated the 3rd October 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported the filing of a protest with the Persian Government by the Wali of Basrah against the action of the Persian ships in stopping and searching vessels bound for Basrah.
17	Letter No. 341, dated the 1st October 1904.	From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Forwarded, with his remarks, a reference received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab.
18	Telegram, dated the 10th October 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reports the action taken with respect to the detention of the Nakhoda of the Koweit dhow brought to Bushire pending the payment of a fine of krans 18,000.
19	Letter No. 355, dated the 15th October 1904.	From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Submitted, with remarks, a report by the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi" in the Shat-el-Arab.
20	Telegram, dated the 25th October 1904.	From Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.	Reported the continued confinement of the Nakhoda of the Koweit dhow by the local Customs authorities.
21	Telegram, dated the 11th November 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reported the desire of the Customs Department to induce Nakhoda of Koweit dhow seized and detained at Bushire to execute deeds of gifts of dhows in favour of the Persian Government by holding out promises of pardon.
22	Telegram, dated the 14th November 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Reports receipt of orders by local Customs from Tehran, confirming their action, and directing Article 32 of "Règlement" to be enforced entailing confiscation of dhow and everything on board and imprisonment of Nakhoda until fine equal to twice the value of contraband articles is paid.
23	Letter No. 386, dated the 13th November 1904, and enclosures.	From ditto ditto ...	Submitted, with his remarks, an extract from a letter received by the Political Agent, Koweit, from Sheikh Mubarak, complaining against the action of the Belgian officials of the Persian Customs administration in having seized and detained certain Koweit dhows.
24	Telegram No. 83 C., dated the 28th November 1904.	To the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Informed that, as regards the Koweit dhow which had 28 rifles on board, presumably contraband, the Government of India were not prepared to interfere, but, as for the dhow which carried 12 rifles, a representation would be made to the Persian Government.

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
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
Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
25	Letter No. 395, dated the 20th November 1904.	From the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,	Forwarded a copy of the reply received to his communication from Mons. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, Bushire, in respect to the interference with the private boom of the Sheikh of Koweit.
26	Letter No. 397, dated the 20th November 1904.	From ditto ditto ...	Furnished further details in regard to the contemplated action to be taken with respect to the Koweit dhow detained at Bushire.

L. Russell.

Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.




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
Foreign Office,
Calcutta, the 15th Dec. 1904.

Memo: for the India Office.

File the India Office be so good as to substitute this Copy of the Enclosure of Despatch No. 130 for the advance rough Copy sent with the signed Original despatch sent by the last mail, to save time, as the Enclosures could not be completed in time for issue.



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
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
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Enclosures of a letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 230, dated the 8th December 1904.

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Encl. No. 1.

Telegram, dated the 30th June 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

A Persian subject has brought a charge of causing him hurt against a Koweit Arab who is in the permanent paid employ of the British India Steam Navigation Company as pilot for steamers carrying His Majesty's mails. Both on grounds of his employment and his alien nationality, I wish to give the Arab the good offices of this Consulate to the extent of sending a representative to be present at the trial in order to see that no injustice is done, as there is reason to expect. My suggestion is acquiesced in by the Foreign Office Agent, but he said that owing to the Governor's misrepresentation case is complicated by Turkish Consular Agent who claims to protect the Arab as a Turkish subject. Both the Governor and I have declined to recognise this claim. The case could probably be settled with despatch if Your Excellency would move the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to instruct the Foreign Office Agent to dispose of it, and admit the Resident's representative at the trial. He says that he is quite ready to do so. Meanwhile the Arab will, with concurrence of local authorities, remain in my custody. (Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge.)

Encl. No. 2.

Telegram, No. 2214-E. A., dated the 9th July 1904.


From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla,


To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Please refer to your telegram of the 30th June. The Turks claim to protect the Koweit Arab. Please send by post the reply received from Sir A. Hardinge. (Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.)

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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1144 F. D.—13-7-04.—82.—C. G. D. & S.





Enclo. No. 3.

No. 208, dated Bushire, the 3rd July 1904.

From—Major P. Z Cox, C.I.E, Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram of 30th June, repeating a message sent by me to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, on the subject of good offices which it was desired to extend to a Koweit Arab in the employ of the British India Company as Mail Pilot, I have the honour to append for information a paraphrase of His Excellency's reply.

Telegram dated the 2nd July 1904.


From—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., Tehran,


To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Bushire.

Your telegram of 30th June. In reply to a message from me yesterday, Mushir-ed-Dowleh has promised to obtain the Shah's authority to issue instructions in the sense which you desire, as he agrees that the British nationality of the Arab's employment enable the Persian Government to comply, without committing themselves either to British or Turkish views regarding the status of Koweit.

3

G. G. Press, Simla.—No. 1797 F. D.—1-9-04.—55—C. G. S.





Encl. 4 to 4

No. 203, dated Bushire, the 2nd July 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Certain cases have recently occurred in which the Nacodas of Koweit dhows appear to have been needlessly oppressed by Belgian Customs officials, and the Residency Agent at Lingah asks to be informed definitely as to what amount of protection he is entitled to afford them.

2. In one case the late Director-General of Bushire Customs, Monsieur Dambrain, while cruising in the "Muzafferi" last April, overhauled a Koweit dhow at sea, between Hindarabi and Kais Island in the hopes of finding arms in her. Being unable to search her at sea he towed her in to Lingah where he had her cargo taken out and detained her several days. Finding her cargo innocent (it consisted of wooden rafters from Kishm) he allowed it to be put back, but (as if to show that his action was justified) he found the Nacoda guilty of neglecting some technical detail of Customs Regulations and fined him 25 tomans.

The Nacoda went straight back to Koweit and complained to Sheikh Mubarek that in the first place he had been seized on the high seas out of sight of land, and that secondly, though his cargo was innocent and he had not intentionally committed any breach of rules, he had been delayed for several days and eventually fined 25 tomans.

The Director-General was approached informally by my predecessor, and the process was repeated by me but without any satisfactory result.

3. A second complaint has now been received from the Residency Agent at Lingah, giving details of another case in which he alleges that a Koweit dhow, with a certificate from Sheikh Mubarek to say that the dhow and cargo were Koweit owned, has been mulcted of 20 bags of wheat and has been detained several days. This case is still under correspondence.

4. It is not however with regard to individual cases or the details of them that I have thought it necessary to trouble Government. My object is to invite the consideration of the Government of India to the general question of the extent to which protection or good offices can now be afforded to subjects of the Sheikh of Koweit when in difficulties of the kind above explained.

It is evident to me that if we wish to maintain our influence with Sheikh Mubarek, much less to stengthen it, we must accept some responsibility to see ordinary justice meted out to his subjects in places where we have Agents, as far as lies in our power. I am also inclined to deduce from one or two local incidents that there is some tendency on the part of local officials, possibly prompted from outside, to make a special set against Koweit subjects at the present time.

With an Agent at Koweit and in view of Sheikh Mubarek's energetic entreaties, we shall henceforward be in a stronger position to use our influence in the direction desired; and while on this subject, I venture to inquire whether we might not now press the Sheikh to adopt a distinctive device for his flag, which would enable the vessels of his subjects to be identified.


At present the fact that Koweit dhows fly the Turkish flag unaltered in any way makes it easy for Customs officials to ignore their Koweit origin, and encourages Turkish Consular representatives who wish to obtrude their expensive protection.

Translated extract from a letter dated 31st March 1904, from Sheikh Mubarek to the Resident.

After giving details of the seizure and detention of a Koweit dhow * *

"And we will not endure this treatment and your sense of honour will not permit that those who are under your protection shall be treated in such a way.

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"Therefore have I made this appeal to you.

"And in this connection, when we see that we get protection from you we shall feel honoured and so will our subjects. And such treatment is hoped for and is an attribute of your glorious Government.


"If, on the other hand, you take no notice of this and such tyranny over our subjects who ply their seafaring pursuits is not put a stop to by you, then we shall be obliged to look out for some other condition of affairs which will give us relief from it. The result of it is that all our subjects who travel are in a state of alarm, and all we ask of you is to see that the trade of our seafaring subjects is not brought to a standstill by such treatment, etc. * * *

"Finally we beg your kind solicitude for the protection of all our subjects in any direction which will honour them and preserve them from tyranny.

"May you be preserved, and salaams."

2

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1143 F. D.—12-7-04.—12.—C. G. DE S.



Encl. etc

No. 254, dated Bushire, the 13th August 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 208, dated 3rd July 1904, regarding the Arab pilot Khalid, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

No. 114, dated the 4th August 1904.

No. 114, dated Bushire, the 4th August 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, &c.,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to refer to the case of the Arab pilot Khalid, regarding which we have been in telegraphic correspondence.

In his telegram No. 46 of 12th July, Mr. Grant Duff informed me that instructions had been sent three days previously to Bushire for the speedy disposal of the case in the presence of a Residency representative, but it was not till 14th that orders were received by the Karguzar. He took up the case on 16th, and admitted my Vice-Consul and Assistant Surgeon Lobo.

The circumstances were found to be that the parties were good friends, dined and got drunk in company, and in the morning the negro found he was wounded. Neither party could remember how it happened.


The wound was a very simple one and was under treatment at our dispensary, and was going on very well, when the man was prevented from coming by the Derya Begi's order and practically kept in custody by him.


On the negro's appearance at the trial, the wound was examined by a Persian doctor and our Assistant Surgeon, and found to have a plug inside it, so as to aggravate the wound and keep it open!

It was taken out, and the wound is quite healed, and the man completely recovered.

The Karguzar disposed of the case on 16th, as far as he was concerned, but had to report his conclusions to Tehran. Nearly three weeks have now elapsed, and he has received no orders. The pilot Khalid having been in custody at the Residency for five weeks, and the British India Company being in urgent need of his services, I released him on 21st instant after taking security, and a guarantee from the Company that they would keep him on board their steamers and produce him when required.

Foreign Office Press—No. 967—26-8-04—52.





Encl. No. 6.

Telegram, dated the 13th September 1904.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have received the following telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah. *Begins*: It is reported that, without referring to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, a Customs steamship has arrived at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab and is looking for contraband. *Ends*. He says that he will withdraw the guard and will not be responsible for the safety of the Shat-el-Arab if the boat remains there. If he withdraws the guard it is probable that robbery will be omitted.

(Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge; repeated to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.)

Encl. No. 7.

Telegram, dated the 18th September 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram dated 14th September, Director-General, Customs, in "Persepolis" has now joined "Muzafferi" in Shat-el-Arab and both are busy. It is important that "Merlin" or other ship should be sent back as soon as possible.

(Addressed Foreign; repeated the Political Agent at Maskat for Senior Naval Officer. Tehran informed.)

Encl. No. 8. Telegram No. 3136-E.A., dated the 21st September 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.


Please refer to Major Cox's telegrams dated the 14th and 18th September 1904, respectively. Under the Agreement of 1902 the Sheikh was to be subordinate to the Ministry of Customs only. The Arabistan Customs were separated from the Gulf Customs. Does not the visit of the Bushire Director in "Persepolis" constitute a direct violation of the arrangement between the Persian Government and the Sheikh.


We have no information if the Sheikh omitted to lend his boats to the local Customs officers as provided in the arrangement, but, if he did not, the presence in his jurisdiction of outside Customs vessels appears to require explanation, more especially as his approval is required to the appointment of such officers.

(Repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.)

1

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x000009





(301)

Encls. No. 9

Telegram, dated the 24th September 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

My telegram of 14th and 18th September last. Persepolis and Muzaffari returned Bushire yesterday, bringing one Koweit dhow. Am enquiring into reasons for seizure.

Encls. No. 10

Telegram, dated Bushire, the 27th September 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Please refer to your telegram No. 73, dated the 23rd September 1904. I have heard on good authority that on the 24th September 1904, the Director of Customs at Mohammerah submitted the following report to the Ministry of Customs:—*Begins.* Having received a report to the effect that a large number of rifles had been shipped from Maskat for Gosbah, which is at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab, where there is no Custom-house, I sent Muzaffari there for a few days simply to seize the arms. 42 rifles and nearly 6,000 cartridges have been found and confiscated. Muzaffari left some days ago for Bushire. *Ends.*


He does not mention having applied to the Sheikh for boats, I am having enquiries made at Mohammerah. Two Koweit dhows have been seized apparently between Gosbah and Fao, one of them which had 14 rifles on board was released on payment of a fine of 800 tomans under protest: the other which had 28 rifles on board has been detained at Bushire pending the payment of a fine of 1,200 tomans.


McDouall's good offices have been accepted unofficially, but the Director-General says that he is unable to discuss the matter here as the report has been submitted to Tehran.

Address to the Legation at Tehran.

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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 2287 F. D.—3-10-04.—61.—B. B. C.





Encl. No. 11

Telegram No. 162, dated the 30th September (received 1st October) 1904.

From—E. GRANT DUFF, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Tehran,

To—L. W DANE, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Please see your telegram, dated the 21st September. The Director of Customs states that the steamer *Muzafferi* has been sent to confiscate arms at Gusbah. I am pointing out to him that Mohammerah Customs are not under the orders of the Bushire or the Arabistan Customs and that the despatch of the steamer without apparently consulting the Sheikh of Mohammerah was unjustifiable and likely to lead to misunderstanding.

The Persian Government do not know that we are aware of their written agreement with the Sheikh (please see Sir A. Hardinge's despatch No. 167, dated the 5th December 1902).

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356. Proceedings No. 340.


Addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department and repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


Encl. No. 12 Telegram, dated Bushire, the 30th September 1904.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, Assistant to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have addressed the following telegram to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran :—" My telegram No. 79 of 27th September. His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah reports as follows :—*Begins.*—The Sheikh never refused to lend his steam-boat. *End of Message* ".





Encl. to No. 13

No. 332, dated Bushire, the 24th September 1904 (Confidential).

From—Captain A. P. Trevor *for* Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegrams of the 14th and 19th September, on the subject of the proceedings of the "Persepolis" and "Muzafferi" in the Shatt-el-Arab, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of two letters,* addressed by Mr. Consul McDouall to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, reporting the dissatisfaction of the Sardar Arfa with the Customs arrangements in Arabistan, and his objection to the despatch to the Shatt-el-Arab, without his permission, of the Customs steamer 'Muzafferi'".

* Nos. 7 and 8, dated the 16th September 1904.

No. 7, dated Mohammerah, the 16th September 1904 (Confidential).

From—W. McDouall, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to report that, on the evening of the 11th instant, the Sardar Arfa sent to inform me that his official at Gusbah at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab reported that the Imperial Customs steamer "Muzafferi" was there, and was stopping and searching boats of all kinds, and he was afraid there might be trouble, as he could not be everywhere at once. His Excellency, as the Customs had thus assumed the policing of the river, was very glad to be relieved of that expense, and would remove his patrols in a few days' time if the vessel remained, and inform us officially that he was no longer responsible for the safety of the river which had been assumed by the Customs. Therefore I sent a telegram to Basrah to be sent to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, giving the above facts, and Haji Rais Tujar promised that the patrols should not be removed for a few days to give time for a reply to be received. I have seen the Sardar Arfa twice on this subject. He points out that, although he is supposed to be head of the Customs, the "Muzafferi" has been sent into his jurisdiction without his being informed: secondly, as Governor, he should have been warned in order to take steps to prevent trouble by sending men of his own to be present at the searching of suspected boats. He understands they stop both sea and river boats and their boats enter the creeks, so that a collision might occur with the tribesmen in the absence of his men. Thirdly, he is warden of the marches (Sarhaddar), and the Shatt-el-Arab being the border between Turkey and Persia, complications with Turkey may arise over the actions of the "Muzafferi"; and if the Turkish authorities at Basrah ask for an explanation, he has none to give. He also reiterated what he had said regarding withdrawing the patrols, and wished His Majesty's Minister to be informed that he might take any action, if advisable.


In the event of his withdrawing the patrols, there is, in my opinion, a likelihood of a recrudescence of piracy in the river. I also believe that interference with the tribesmen, in the absence of the Sardar Arfa's men, is likely to lead to trouble.

No. 8, dated Mohammerah, the 16th September 1904 (Confidential).

From—W. McDouall, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to report that the Sardar Arfa is making certain complaints to the Minister of the Interior at Tehran, of which he wishes you to be informed, but not with a view to asking for support in the matter.



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
In the firman given him in connection with the Customs, it is distinctly stated that the Directorship-in-Chief (Riasat-i-kul) of the Customs of Arabistan is his: that, as there are no capable local men, Mons. Waffelaerat and Mons. Mirzayanty are to be sent to be in charge of the Customs under his Directorship and orders, and his Directorship is under the Ministry of Customs. He undertakes to carry out the orders of the Ministry of Customs, and to lend his private steamers, when required, for preventive service. This Directorship appears to be practically ignored, but whether this is the fault of the local Customs or the Ministry he does not know. Clerks have been appointed without reference to him, and other small matters show that the local Directorate ignore his headship.

Again, the Customs of Arabistan is not under Bushire as is shown by the firman above, yet the Bushire administration have sent the "Muzafferi" into the Shatt-el-Arab to search for arms and other contraband, and, on the Captain reporting that he had arrested two sailing boats with arms, the Bushire Director ordered him to bring them to Bushire. The Captain could not do this, so brought them to Mohammerah, and telegraphed to Bushire for the "Persepolis" to come for them.

Some months ago the Cashier of the Mohammerah Customs embezzled moneys belonging to the Customs and absconded to Karachi, where he was arrested. The Sardar Arfa, at the request of the Customs, issued a warrant to two of his guards to receive the prisoner and bring him to Mohammerah, and his signature and position were authenticated at this Consulate. On this warrant the prisoner was extradited and brought to Mohammerah, and detained at the Customs House. After a preliminary examination, at which the Sardar Arfa was represented, Mons. Waffelaert being transferred to Bushire, took the prisoner with him, and handed him over to the custody of the authorities at Bushire, although the offence was committed in the jurisdiction of Arabistan. From this it appears that the Customs wish to ignore his position as Governor, as well as that of supreme Director of the Customs of Arabistan, and he considers it necessary to report this to the Central Government.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1470—6-10-04—40.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x000010



Enclo. No. 14.

Extracts from the Diary of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf for the week ending 24th September 1904.

* * * *

MOHAMMERAH.

* * * *

13. *September 13th, 1904.*—The Customs steamer "Muzafferi" arrived from the mouth of the river with two native boats (bum) in tow, which she had seized on account of having arms on board. One belongs to Koweit and had 28 rifles and ammunition concealed in the sides of the vessel, and the other which belongs to the Shatt-el-Arab had 12 rifles.

14. *September 14th, 1904.*—The "Muzafferi" left during the night for the mouth of the river, where she had left her boats. The two boats are under detention pending the arrival of the Persian gun-boat "Persepolis."

* * * *

BUSHIRE.

* * * *

23. *September 23rd, 1904.*—H. P. M. S. "Persepolis," with the Director-General of Customs on board, accompanied by the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi," returned to Bushire. They brought a dhow belonging to Koweit with them.

* * * *

Enclo. No. 15.

No. 336, dated Bushire, the 24th September (received 1st October) 1904.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, for Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 332 of to-day's date on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian gun-boat *Persepolis*, and Revenue steamer *Muzafferi*, in the Shat-el-Arab, I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a communication* I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, together with a copy of a petition from Sheikh Mubarak, regarding the seizure of Koweit boats by the *Muzafferi*.

* No. 24, dated the 4th September 1904.

2. The two vessels returned to Bushire yesterday having a dhow in tow. This dhow is believed to be the Koweit dhow captured with 28 rifles on board—*vide* entry No. 13 in my diary for the week ending 24th September 1904.

It is reported that another Koweit dhow was seized with ten rifles on board, but was released at Mohammerah on payment of a fine of 8,000 krans.

I am making further enquiries into the matter, and also asking the Director General of Customs on what grounds these dhows were seized.


No. 24, dated the 14th September 1904.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy (with translation) of a letter received from Sheikh Mubarak, in which he complains of a fresh set of acts of interference with Koweit vessels on the part of the Customs Administration of Persia.

2. I have not had time to verify the allegations, as the letter only reached me yesterday, and Sheikh Mubarak is anxious that you should be acquainted with his complaint without delay.



3. I am afraid, however, that these constant complaints prove a deliberate policy on the part of the Persian Government, of which the object is to destroy our prestige and influence with the Arabs of the western shore of the Gulf. The initiation of this policy was marked by the abortive attempt to occupy Abu Musa and Tamb and, since that failed, the policy has been continued by constant vexations, petty acts of oppression on Arab dhows, especially those hailing from Howeit, and it has now culminated, if I have been correctly informed, in a wanton and unjustifiable insult to an independent Chief under British protection.

4. One of the most oppressive and vexatious forms of this policy is the invariable assumption by the Customs Department that the Arab Nakhoda is in the wrong, and must prove his innocence. I will instance the case of an unfortunate, named Mubarak-bin-Khalifa.

5. This man was detained at Lingah for twenty-one days, having been brought from Sheivah, where he had already been detained eight days for the purpose. Twenty bags of grain were taken from him as security, and he was told to wait and prove his innocence. There is fairly strong evidence that his wheat cargo for which he was unable to account satisfactorily was legitimate, and, having come under a pass from the Persian port of Mashur, was, six months latter, re-exported from Koweit, but this naturally took time to prove. The case has my attention.

6. Finding his other cargo rotting during his detention, Mubarak made his escape, and put out to sea. The Belgians have detained him, and some of his crew, pending trial for a month, and have confiscated twenty bags of his grain for an offence which, there is reason to believe, he never committed, and has yet to be proved against him, but for this last heinous offence in disobeying their order to wait and prove his innocence, he is to be persecuted in every Persian port, in which he dares to show his face. They have caught him once already, and attached a small boat of his, but could not manage to detain the man himself, who is now in Koweit.

7. It is perhaps unnecessary to call to your remembrance the case, on your office records, of the Koweit boat which, it is alleged, was searched unsuccessfully for arms in the open sea, and then towed into territorial waters and heavily fined for a technical breach of the Customs Regulations.

8. This extraordinary assumption that Arab Nakhodas are bound to prove that they have not committed an offence against the Customs Department can have only one result, where on the one side we have a well-regulated department, armed with clerks, regulations, and engines of oppression of every description, and on the other ignorant Nakhodas seldom able even to read and write.


9. The feeling in Koweit itself is very bitter against the Belgians, and might at any time, lead to acts of retaliation on Persians, and thus the situation would become acute and dangerous.

10. If the Customs Administration persist in this course of conduct, the only remedy that appears to me at all likely to meet the situation is that one of our gun-boats should attend the *Muzaffari* and *Persepolis*, wherever they go, especially in the open sea, and whenever they overhaul a boat hailing from the western shores of the Gulf, the Commander of the gun-boat should insist on having a clear *primâ facie* case against the boat being made out to his satisfaction or the immediate release of the vessel.

11. The alleged interference with boats bound for Basrah will no doubt form the subject of a protest from the Turkish local authorities, and I would venture to suggest that His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah be addressed on the subject.

12. In conclusion, I would crave indulgence for this hastily written preliminary report. The whole subject is under the close and anxious attention of Sheikh Mubarak and myself, and I hope, at leisure, to submit more fully matured proposals for the solution of the very important difficulties involved therein.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x000012



3

(*Translation*).

Dated the 13th September 1904 (2nd Rajab 1322).

From—Sheikh Mubarak-us-Subah, Chief of Koweit,

To—Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit.


After compliments.—We petition you that the Persian ship, in which are posted Belgians, is now cruising from the buoy to Gusbah within the Shat-el-Arab, and seized vessels, and searches them, and delays them on their journeys; that it has seized our boom and bellum which voyage between here and Fao, bringing wood and dates for us, and delayed them some days, and they (the boom and bellum) told them that they were our private boats, and that their work was between Koweit and Fao, bringing wood and dates, and after this vexation they let them go.


And now they have seized a boat of our subjects going to Basrah from Koweit, and have taken their arms which all the boats carry for protection from pirates, and this matter is well known to all the Governments.

Every boat carries a small gun for saluting purposes on return to their country and arms, according to the number of the crew in her, as piracy in Basrah is notorious. Now they have posted soldiers in her, and taken her small arms to the number of 12, and delayed the boat.

And now a letter from the Nakhoda of the boat has reached us, saying that they had seized them at the buoy, and towed the boat into Kasbah in front of the house of the servant of Sheikh Khazal, Ruler of Mohammerah, and they left soldiers in the boat, and kept her in custody with him. And may you remain guarded!

2576 F. D.






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
Telegram, dated the 3rd October 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Please refer to your telegram No. 77, dated the 30th September, regarding Persian ships of war in the Shat-el-Arab. His Majesty's Consul at Basrah reports that the acting Vali has protested through the Persian Consul-General at Basrah to the Persian Government against the gunboat stopping and searching vessels bound for Basrah and that he has telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior on the subject. Addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Tehran, and repeated to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.





Encl. No. 17

No. 341, dated Bushire, the 1st October 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, *for* Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter No. 83, dated 23rd September 1904, from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue steamer "Muzafferi" in the Shatt-el-Arab.

2. In reply to a reference from me, Mons. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, states that the "Muzafferi" did, in fact, capture two Koweit dhows, one of which was released on payment (under protest) of a fine of 8,000 krans and the other of which was brought to Bushire to be detained till a fine of krans 18,000 is paid. Mons. Waffelaert added that it was not in his power to discuss the matter further at Bushire, as a report of the capture had already been despatched to Tehran, presumably from Mohammerah.

3. The position of British Consular officers in Persia with regard to Koweit subjects is at present so undefined that, in view of Mons. Waffelaert's attitude, it seems unlikely that very much will be effected here.

4. A copy of this communication, with its enclosure, has been sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

No. 83, dated the 23rd September 1904.

From—W. McDouall, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,
To—Major P. Z Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, &c.

With regard to the seizure of native craft by Customs S.S. "Muzafferi", I have the honour to report that the owner of a Koweit bum made a complaint to His Majesty's Consul at Basrah who sent him to me. I have no instructions as to whether Koweit subjects are entitled to more than good offices, and enquired from the Customs authorities if they would accept my intervention on behalf of Koweit subjects. Mons. Waffelaert, Acting Director-General, Bushire, informed me that at Bushire, as he had no orders from Tehran to recognise the right of His Majesty's Consulate-General to represent Koweit subjects, there was an understanding that, pending instructions, any action of the Consulate-General should be unofficial, and suggested that the same should be done here to which I agreed.


Mons. Waffelaert said that, as it would take some time to settle the case, and reference would have to be made to Tehran, to avoid delay to the vessels, he was prepared to accept payment of a fine under protest, the fine to be twice the value of the rifles, estimated at thirty tomans each, and the vessels could then be liberated; when the case had been settled, and amount of fine fixed if anything to be returned to the owner it would be returned.

The owner of bum accepted this on my advice, and has received a receipt, stating that the amount was paid under protest.

The owners are Abdulla-bin-Muhammad and Alwan-bin-Hosein who state that they bought the vessel two years ago from Abdul Aziz Angri, in whose name the register was issued by Sheikh Mubarak.

The vessel is the bum "Teyser", Nakhoda Ali-bin-Muhammad Mubarak. She was bound from Koweit for Sabiliyat near Basrah to load dates.

The case for the vessel is that they carried twelve rifles and twelve hundred cartridges for the defence of the vessel and did not conceal that they had these rifles on board: that they were bound for Sabiliyat in Turkish territory, where their owner is awaiting them and had no intention of communicating with Persian territory: that the river being the border they were not in Persian waters: that as they were to load dates for sale at the Bedouin villages between Ras-el-Had and Fartag and on, they had brought these arms for protection.



2

The Customs case is that the rifles were concealed and were new with the full complement of cartridges : that as the importation of arms is prohibited in Turkey as well as Persia it is of no importance where they were bound. If the vessel can prove that the rifles were not for sale, I am of opinion that twelve rifles are not an excessive amount, as piracies often occur off the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, and all vessels therefore should carry sufficient arms to protect themselves ; and the Bedouin coast is also unsafe.

A second bum, Nakhoda Ghanim, is also understood to belong to Koweit. She had twenty-eight rifles concealed on board, and this fact is not denied, she had some bundles of hides consigned to Basrah to which port she was bound. She was captured near the inner buoy and can only put forward that she was bound for a Turkish port and was not within Persian jurisdiction. This vessel has been taken to Bushire, as the owner cannot pay a fine. The fine demanded would come to more than the value of the vessel, and the owner's entire capital was invested in these rifles and the vessel which is mortgaged already.

The "Teyser" proceeds to Sabiliyat where I can communicate with her; she will be there for at least a fortnight. I enclose herewith the deposition of the Nakhoda and, if necessary, he will swear an affidavit in these terms.

The owner states he can get evidence at Koweit that the rifles were purchased for the defence of the vessel only.

If the presence of the owner, Nakhoda, and others is necessary in Bushire to support or prove their claim for a refund of the fine and return of the arms, I would beg to be informed as soon as possible.

Deposition of Ali-bin-Muhammad Mubarak, Nakhoda of the bum "Teyser" of Koweit.

I, Ali-bin-Muhammad, Nakhoda of the bum "Teyser", state as follows:—

The vessel left Koweit for Sabiliyat to load. On the 10th September, Saturday, was off the Turkish fort at Fao tacking up the river. At midnight two boats from the S.S. "Muzafferi" came and asked what I had. I said "nothing". They then asked if I had any arms. I replied "yes, we have twelve rifles for the eighteen men of the crew for the protection of the vessel, two are here and ten below". They then searched the vessel and detained her three days and then brought her to Mohammerah. These arms were bought for the protection of the vessel, as she was bound for Yemen after loading, that is for the villages beyond Ras-el-Had and two years ago having no arms I was attacked and robbed there.


I solemnly declare and am prepared to take oath that the above statement is true in every particular.

Seal of ALI-BIN-MUHAMMAD.

Deposed and sealed by the said Ali-bin-Muhammad at Mohammerah this twenty-third day of September 1904, before me.

W. McDOUALL,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1528—11-10-04—60.



Encls. No. 18.


Telegram, dated 10th (received 11th) October 1904.


From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Please refer to my telegram of the 27th September and letter No. 341, dated the 1st October, regarding the detention here of Koweit dhows pending the payment of 18,000 krans. Under instructions from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf the Nākhoda has been imprisoned instead of merely being detained, I have requested the Governor to make the man over to me for disciplinary purpose. The Governor has to-day given me an evasive reply that Director General of Customs says that the matter does not concern the Governor and that I should apply to the Customs Department. I had already written demi-officially on the subject to the Director General without eliciting a reply from him. I would suggest that the British Minister, Theran, should be moved by the Government of India to take necessary steps. I should like to be informed whether Koweit subjects should receive benefits from the additional article of the reglement which fixes the maximum fine at Rs. 1,000.

2516 F. D.





Enclo. No. 19.

No. 355, dated Bushire, the 15th October 1904.

From—The Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of previous correspondence ending with my telegram of 10th instant on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Revenue gunboat "Mozaffar" in the Shat-el-Arab, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter* from Captain Knox, Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of the detention and search of a "boom" belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit.

* No. 32, dated 26th September 1904, with enclosures.

2. Captain Knox's letter explains the case fully, and it is unnecessary for me to comment on it at length. In regard to the last paragraph, however, I beg to give the following remarks:—

Acting on the complaint of Sheikh Mubarek sent to me by Captain Knox under cover of his letter No. 24, dated 14th September 1904 (a copy of which was sent to the Government of India with my letter No. 336, dated 24th September 1904), I approached Monsieur Waffelaert on the subject of the alleged seizure of a "boom" and a "bellum" belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit, and received the following reply:—

> "As regards the "boom" and the "bellum" belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit, I beg to inform you that the "Mozaffar" has operated searchings in many dhows which she has come across, among which there have in fact been a "boom" and a "bellum" of which one was coming from Basrah, and the other going to Maniouhi; from what I have been able to gather from the Commander none of these (that is of the 2 mentioned) appertain to the Sheikh of Koweit, as also appears from the one's origin and the other's destination."

I am again addressing the Director-General of Customs in view of the information in Captain Knox's letter, which was unfortunately delayed a week by missing the mail steamer at Fao.

3. I have had the opportunity of conversing with Captain Knox on this subject, and I think that undoubtedly popular feeling has been much roused in Koweit by the high-handed proceedings on the part of the Persian Customs Department, and especially by the minute search of a boat belonging to the Sheikh.

4. I trust, therefore, that the Government of India will be pleased to take such action as they think fit to prevent such occurrences in future, and if necessary to cause the Customs Department to make some explanation and apology to the Sheikh for the behaviour of their employés on this occasion.

5. A copy of this communication has been sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

No. 32, dated the 26th September 1904.


From—Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, etc., Bushire.

I have the honour to forward herewith four statements of the Nakhoda and three sailors of the boom "Musallini," property of Sheikh Mubarek, which, it was alleged, was stopped by the servants of the Imperial Customs Department of Persia on or about the 15th instant.

2. The statements which were recorded separately present the usual discrepancies to be found when a number of ignorant witnesses, incapable of correct observation, are examined, but I see no reason to doubt the general

1



truth of their story. Witness No. 2 is obviously unreliable, as it will be an easy matter to prove that the boom reached Fao and did not, as he asserts, return to Koweit at once without being searched.

3. I would venture to suggest that there are two matters on which it is specially necessary to call for an explanation from the Customs Department. The reckless firing of ball cartridge into the air in the direction of Fao at such close quarters as the Shat-el-Arab must be a proceeding attended with considerable risk to person and property. As we have a telegraph station at Fao and Sheikh Mubarek's followers and employés form, I understand, the bulk of the population of the place, on this score alone, apart from whatever protest, the Ottoman local authorities may see fit to present, I venture to think that we should be justified in protesting strongly against the action of the Customs' servants.

4. Further, I would ask that the Customs Department be called on for an explanation as to why Sheikh Mubarek's private boom was searched at all. It is difficult to imagine that a well known boat like this, always on the run between Koweit and Fao, was not recognised by the crew of the Persian jolly boat even at a distance; but, even granting this, after the explanation furnished by the crew of the boom, the minute search conducted over Sheikh Mubarek's private boat can only be construed by me into a deliberate and purposeless insult.

5. I have already explained in my letter No. 24, dated 14th instant, that popular feeling in Koweit is greatly excited over this incident and I have heard remarks, though not from any responsible quarter, asking why the English, who have been so long in the Gulf, permit such high-handedness on the part of the Persian Government. The report which has recently reached Koweit that an English man-of-war has appeared at the mouth of the Shatt and that the Belgians promptly decamped has been received with undisguised satisfaction.

6. I have only to add that, with reference to Sheikh Mubarek's letter of which a translation was forwarded under cover of my letter quoted in the preceding paragraph at an interview I had with Sheikh Mubarek this morning, he informed me that the mention of the bellum was based on incorrect information. The boom only was detained and searched.

STATEMENT No. 1.

Name	Migrin.
Father's name	Ibrahim-bin-Sauad.
Age	30 years.
Occupation	Nakhoda.
Residence	Koweit.

Ten days ago, I left Koweit in the boom "Musallini," property of Sheikh Mubarek. We left at night. We entered the Shatt about 10 A.M. and saw the Belgian boat just before we entered the Fao creek. They were in the jolly boat belonging to the "Mozaffar." All the five men in her were Persians. There was not a single Christian. They shot at the boom four times at about 25 paces distance. They used ball cartridge. I said to them—"This is the boom of Sheikh Mubarek taking the post. Do not shoot." They replied—"We must search your boat." They fired high through the sail and no one was hurt and we have sewn up the holes. They said—"We are searching for arms" and searched the entire boat. When they found nothing, they went away. They kept us waiting for the purposes of their search about an hour and then let us go. After that day, we have had no trouble with the Belgians.


Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

STATEMENT No. 2.

Name	Abdulla.
Father's name	Ahmed.
Age	40 years.
Occupation	Khalassi.
Residence	Koweit, but his family came from Hassa.

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المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x00001c



Ten days ago, I left Koweit in the boom named "Musallini," property of Mubarek-us-Sabah. We left at night and reached the Shatt about morning. We saw the Belgians near the buoy (central) about a mile or less from the entrance to the Fao creek. I don't know how many Belgians there were. They were in a jolly boat belonging to the "Mozaffar." There were perhaps eight men. And among them was one Belgian, at least he appeared to be a Christian. The others were Persians and Muhammadans. They fired at us four times from about 200 yards away. No damage was done. They did not hit the boat. We knew it was ball cartridge from the noise of the bullets. We went straight off and returned to Koweit.

N.B.—This man was extraordinarily frightened and I am afraid that the fear of being led off to instant execution afterwards made him conceal a good deal of what he knew.—S. G. K.

Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

STATEMENT No. 3.

Name	Salim.
Father's name	Yakoob.
Age	50 years.
Occuption	Sailor.
Residence	Basrah.

About 10 or 12 days ago, I left Koweit in the boom "Musallini," property of Sheikh Mubarek. We left at night for Fao. We saw the Belgians at Gusbah. There were six men in the jolly boat. The jolly boat was coming off from Gusbah in the direction of Fao. The jolly boat was from the man-of-war at Gusbah. They shot at us four times. They were about 100 yards away or more. They shot ball but did us no harm. They hit nothing at all in the boat. The boom stopped and we all said—"This is the boom of Sheikh Mubarek. It takes the post to Fao." They said—"We must search it." They searched the boom and found nothing. When they found nothing, they went off to Gusbah and we went to Fao and anchored by the Sheikh's house. This all happened in the afternoon and we were kept waiting from the afternoon until the evening over this business. Of the six men in the boat, one was a Belgian and the rest were Persians.


Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

STATEMENT No. 4.

Name	Feroz.
Father's name	Salim.
Age	25 years.
Occuption	Sailor.
Residence	Zayria near Fao.

Ten days ago, I left Koweit in the boom named "Musallini" property of Sheikh Mubarek. We left Koweit at night for Fao. We reached Fao about midday. On the way, we met the jolly boat of the Belgians in front of Fao at the head of the creek. They fired at us four times. We were none of us killed or wounded. They fired at about 25 paces distance. They did not hit the boat but they hit the sail. There were six men in the jolly boat. They were all of the same colour. They were none of them Persians but all Belgians. I did not say anything, but the other men in the boom said— "This is the boom of Sheikh Mubarek. There are no arms in it." The Belgians said—"We do not know Sheikh Mubarek. We have to search for arms." They spoke to us in Arabic. Our boom stopped and the Belgians got in and lighted a candle and went through the cabin and hunted all over; they found nothing. They went off and another jolly boat came and opened the Nakhoda's box and found nothing in it. There were seven men in the second jolly boat. They

3



searched among the sail and among the bundles of date wood and found nothing. Then that lot also went off to the man-of-war, the small one, belonging to the Persians. We went off and anchored in the head of the creek. We were delayed about an hour.

Dated Koweit, the 25th September 1904.

(Sd.) S. G. KNOX, *Captain*,

Political Agent, Koweit.

No. 34, dated the 27th September 1904.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of previous correspondence and especially with reference to my confidential No. 28,* dated 18th September, to your address, I have the honour to forward a translation of a letter received from Sheikh Mubarek in which he complains that two vessels belonging to Koweit subjects have been seized by the servants of the Imperial Customs of Persia in the Shat-el-Arab.

* Not forwarded, being unimportant. 15-10-04. S. G. K.

2. I have since heard that one of the vessels has been released after the payment of a fine of £ 100 and the confiscation of the arms found therein and that the other boat has been taken to Bushire.

Dated 5th Rajab 1322 = (16th September 1904).

From—SHEIKH MUBAREK-US-SUBAH, Chief of Koweit,

To—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, Political Agent, Koweit.


The ships of our subjects of Koweit which travel to Basrah, great and small, carry arms according to the number in the boat, Nakhoda, steersman and crew; and that has been done for the past three years for self-protection from pirates, who are notorious in Basrah; and the officials of the Turkish Government and of the Ruler of Mohammerah, Sheikh Khazel Khan, who protects the Shatt, see that and have not prevented them because of the necessity, for the object of the people of the ships is the protection of themselves and their property.

And now the Persian ship, in which are the Belgians, has occupied the Shatt between the buoy and Fao and has seized two vessels belonging to our subjects of Koweit and with them their arms, which were only in case of need they have annoyed them to the utmost and have seized the weapons and taken the boats to Mohammerah; and now news has reached us that they will also take the aforesaid boats to Bushire. And these matters are contrary to the rules of Government of the present day and we hope from your fair justice and your protection that you will not acquiesce in the vexation of our subjects, the people of Koweit who have sought shelter with your precious Imperial Government. Therefore we have petitioned to you in full. We hope you will take notice of this affair and may you remain guarded, etc.

4

C. Press, Simla.—No. C-760 F. D.—26-10-04.—60.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x00001e



Encl. No. 20.

Telegram dated the 25th (received 26th) October 1904.

From—Captain Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My letter regarding Koweit dhow. Nakhoda still in confinement with local authorities. Director General, Customs, has referred matter to Tehran. But has received no reply.

Encl. No. 21.

Telegram dated the 11th November 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Koweit Dhows. Please refer to my telegram dated the 25th October 1904. The Customs Department are endeavouring to induce Nakhodah to execute deeds of gifts of dhows in favour of the Persian Government by holding out promises of pardon. Soonnee Imam here reports that he has been approached on behalf of the Customs and Nakhodah to draw up the documents but has postponed action pending the receipt of our advice. Believe Nakhodah is a part owner of the dhows. It is probable that pressure will be put on to force Imam's hands. The matter may be temple (*sic*) if a transfer is effected.

Complicated. ?

Early orders in this case are solicited.

Encl. No. 22.

Telegram dated 14th (received 15th) November 1904.


From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,


To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Referring to previous correspondence ending with my telegram dated 11th November regarding Koweit dhow, local Customs state that orders received from Tehran Saturday confirming their *proces verbal* and ordering article 32 of "Reglement" to be enforced, *viz.*:—confiscation of Dhow and everything on board and imprisonment of Nakhoda until fine equal to twice the value of contraband articles is paid.

Addressed Foreign, with Viceroy, repeated Simla.

2576 F. D.





(312)

Enclo. No. 23.

No. 386, dated Bushire, the 13th November 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, I.A., *for* Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to correspondence ending with my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of translation of a letter* from Sheikh Mubarek which I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, regarding the ill-treatment which certain Koweit Nakhodas have received at the hands of Belgian officials of the Persian Customs Administration.

* Dated the 19th October 1904.

2. The Nakhoda of the dhow to which the Sheikh refers is still in custody together with a companion, and the dhow is still detained.

In answer to all queries the Director-General of Customs replies that the entire case was referred to his Central Administration at Tehran, and that he can take no action without orders from the Ministry which have not yet been received.

Translation of extract from letter, dated 19th October 1904, from Mubarek us Subah, Ruler of Koweit, to Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit.

* * * * * * *

1. And as for the Belgians who seized the boats of our subjects in one of which was 10 rifles and in the other 24 rifles.

2. As for the 10 rifles, they belonged to one of the people of Bussorah and the Nakhoda was not aware of what had been added and wrapped up by the owner.

3. And the 24 rifles were in two boxes belonging to one of the people of Zubair; the barrels were in one box and the butts in another and equally the Nakhoda of the boom knew nothing about it except that there were two boxes containing goods.


4. And the boat of the Belgians seized them and fined the boom in which there were 10 rifles, 6,000 krans and released it. And the Belgians took the other boom to Bushire and imprisoned the Nakhoda and demanded from him krans 12,000.

5. Now the crew of the boom are my subjects and are under the protection of the Government. It is, therefore, necessary that the Belgians should hand over the boats either to the Consul of the British Government at Mohammerah or to the Resident in Bushire, and the punishment they deserve should be at your hands, for we also are prohibiting all our ships from the carrying of arms and restraining them; but, in a case like this, it will be hard on them, for they do not know what the consignor loads and we remain watching events as they pass over us unjustly and have explained the state of affairs to you. Then let not what we have mentioned to you pass into (neglect—forgetfulness). These are matters injurious and may you remain safe.


* * * * * * *

C. C. Press, Simla.—No. 6-949 F. D.—23-11-04.—60—J. D.

C949FD



المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x000022



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
Enclo. No. 24.


Telegram No. 83 C., dated the 28th November 1904.

From—Foreign with Viceroy's Camp,
To—The Resident, Bushire.

Your telegram 14th November. From Macdouall's letter 23rd September we understand dhow in question admittedly had concealed on board 28 rifles which may reasonably be presumed contraband, we are unable therefore to assist. In case of dhow having only twelve rifles required for defence of vessel we have suggested representation to Persian Government. Copy of despatch follows.

2576 F. D.





Encl. No. 25.

No. 395, dated Bushire, the 20th November 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

In continuation of my letter No. 355, dated 14th October 1904, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the following report on the subject of the search of a boom belonging to Sheikh Mubarek by the Persian Customs ship *Muzaffer*.

On the 27th October I addressed Monsieur Waffelaert giving him a précis of the statements of the crew of the Sheikh's boom and pointing out that the boom was apparently examined close to Fao and asking him to enquire into the matter.

On the 3rd of November (on the return of the *Muzaffer* to Bushire) Monsieur Waffelaert replied, and I have the honour to enclose a copy of his communication for the information of the Government of India.

Monsieur Waffelaert appears to be under the impression that any native craft can be searched in any place on suspicion of having "contraband" on board.

The Sheikh's "boom" plies between Koweit and Fao taking mails, bringing firewood, etc., and even if it had firearms on board, it seems to me that the matter would lie between Sheikh Mubarek and the Turkish authorities.

The action of the *Muzaffer* undoubtedly caused a great deal of irritation throughout the Arab Coast, and if such high handed actions on the part of the Customs continue, I think the Arabs may possibly attempt some kind of reprisals.

If therefore the Government of India agree that indiscriminate searching of native craft in the Shat el Arab is contrary to International Law and custom, I trust that they will be pleased to take steps to prevent the Persian Customs Department from abusing the rights of search in this way.

Dated the 3rd November 1904.

From—Monsieur E. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, Bushire,

To—Captain A. P. Trevor, First Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


In continuation of my letter No. 6642 of the 27th ultimo I beg to state that from the inquiry instituted from the Commander of S. S. *Muzaffer* it follows that the boat has detained many "booms" and "Bellums" but has never kept them longer than it was necessary for searching the inside of the craft.


The Commander of our boat does not recollect anything particular about the boom *Mosalim*, but the mere fact of the crew's shouting out that the vessel belonged to Sheikh Mubarek was not sufficient to prove that the boat did not carry contraband goods.

Besides, beyond searching in the boat no harm whatever has been done neither to the craft or to the crew.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2571 E. A.—7-12-1904.—60—L. G. R.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/10/50 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100035754163.0x000025





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Encl. No. 26.

No. 397, dated Bushire, the 20th November 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,


To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.


In confirmation of my telegram of the 14th November 1904, I have the honour to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the Director-General of Customs has informed me that the Koweit dhow belonging to Abdul Aziz bin Farah of Koweit, which has been detained here, will now be confiscated. Instructions have been issued by the Central Customs Administration that the Nakhoda of the dhow will be imprisoned until the fine of 18,000 krans is paid, or until further orders.

2. I submit that this is an exceedingly high-handed proceeding as there was absolutely no evidence brought forward at the investigation at Mohammerah (*vide* Mr. Consul McDouall's report sent with my letter No. 341, dated 1st October 1904) to show that the rifles were intended for Persia.

3. Monsieur Waffelaert also declares that "all articles on board" will also be confiscated under Article IV of the Act of the 5th Ramzan 1317. I have pointed out that only articles used to conceal the contraband goods should be confiscated, but Monsieur Waffelaert does not agree, and the question has been referred to Tehran. There were on board the dhow 4 bales of canvas belonging to one Haji Mukhbil of Bahrein consigned by him to Suleiman bin Mahmud-el Thakeir of Busreh, and it was in connection with a request made by me that Haji Mukhbil's canvas should be returned, that the question of Article IV of the Act of 5th Ramzan came up.

G. I. C. P. O. No. 2523 F. D.—5-12-1904—54—W. D'C.





1904.


FORT WILLIAM.


FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

No. 230, DATED THE 8TH DECEMBER 1904.

List of Enclosures.





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1904.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


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
No. 230, DATED THE 8TH DECEMBER 1904.

Letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Relative to the protection which His Majesty's Government are prepared to grant to subjects of the Sheikh of Koweit in Persian territory.

Foreign Office Press—No. 665—7-12-04—54.





Register No. 3445

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT

Letter from F.O. Dated 3 Rec. 5 Dec. 1904

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	6 Dec	BK	Persia.
Secretary of State			
Committee	7	as	The Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Customs Dept. despatch of the Persian Govt. vessel "Mozafferi" to the Shatt-el-Arab. The Sheikh's complaints to the Persian Govt. The capture of two Koweit dhows.
Under Secretary			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
3437

Copy to India (if papers not sent direct)

For information.

There are two points raised

(1) The interference by the ~~Belgian~~ Customs Dept. with the rights of the Sheikh of Mohammerah

(2) The question of their right to deal with Koweit boats, whose destination is Turkish territory.


There is also (3) the incidental point as to how taking up the case of Koweit boats.


Seen Pol. Com'ee.
13 DEC.

COPY TO INDIA (If papers not sent direct)
23 Dec 1904
SECRETARY'S No. 52

Rets 23.365

Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.





3445

No. 3437

RECEIVED
5 DEC 1904
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Foreign Office,

December, 3, 1904.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying dispatch from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran relating to the Persian Customs Steamer "Mozafferi" in the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab.

I am to request that this document may be returned after perusal.

I am,

Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble Servant,

The Under-Secretary of State,

India Office.

Grant Duff No 198 December 8, 1904





Register No. 1364

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, No. 28M., Dated 14 July 1904. Rec. 2 Aug.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6 Aug	VK	Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State	8	ag	Suit of a Persian subject against a Koweit Arab at Bushire. Question of affording the Arab the good offices of H.M.'s Consulate general.
Committee	9	SWB	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
2566/00

Copy to FO
19/8/04

For information.


It was laid down in FO letter of 21 Nov 1900 & their telegram of 22 Nov 1900 to the Consul General Bushire that as "Koweit is not under formal British "protection, Natives of that country "cannot be claimed as British protected "persons or be justiciable in British "Consular Tribunals in Persia"


There seems no objection to the "good "offices" given in this case of Mejia Cox

(2566/00)

Seen Pol. Corresp.
12 AUG. 1904


TH 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.






From Viceroy, 4th July 1904.

...gn Secret. Please refer to your telegram of the 1st instant. Koweit. Assistant Surgeon for Post Office is at Bushire, and was to start forthwith with Major Knox, selected for Political Agent. In compliance with your telegram of 24th ultimo, departure of both has been deferred, but in view of reported arrival of Turkish troops at Hagaieja, which is serious disturbance of *status quo*, we trust that Porte will be pressed for very early reply about Bubyan, or that the officers may be allowed to proceed to Koweit. It is worth mentioning that at Bushire the Turkish Consul-General is claiming to represent Koweit Arab, though the Persian Governor is prepared to recognise the right of the British Consul-General to protect him.





1304

Mr. 2566/00

322

(Copy)

Telegram P.

From----- Major P. Z. Cox, C. I. E.,
Offg: Political Resident, Persian Gulf.


To ------ The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla.


Dated, Bushire the 30th June 1904.

addressed to Sir
A Hardinge

A Persian subject has brought a charge of causing him hurt against a Koweit Arab who is in the permanent paid employ of the British India Steam Navigation Company as Pilot for steamers carrying His Majesty's mails. Both on grounds of his employment and his alien nationality I wish to give the Arab the good offices of this Consulate to the extent of sending a representative to be present at the trial in order to see that no injustice is done as there is reason to expect. My suggestion is acquiesced in by the Foreign Office Agent, but he said that owing to the Governor's misrepresentation, and case is complicated by Turkish Consular Agent who claims to protect the Arab as a Turkish subject. Both the Governor and I have declined to recognise this claim. The case could probably be settled with despatch if Your Excellency would move the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to instruct the Foreign Office Agent to dispose of it, and admit the Resident's representative at

the






the trial. He says that he is quite ready to do so.


Meanwhile the Arab will, with concurrence of local authorities, remain in my custody.

Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge.

-------oooOOooo-------



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